CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, 4th CAG ltr 1/JCW/rjl 5700 Ser: 01D037 dated 6Feb69

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 January 1969 to 31 January 1969 (U)

1. The subject chronology has been reviewed for completeness and is forwarded herewith.

[Handwritten signature]

W. F. DEEDS
By direction

Copy to:
CO, 4th CAG
CONFIDENTIAL (Declassified upon removal of the basic correspondence)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 4th CAG ltr 1/JCW/rgj 5700 Ser: 01D037 of 6 Feb 1969

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 January 1969 to 31 January 1969 (U)

1. Forwarded.

[Signature]

MARION C. DALBY
BY DIRECTION

Copy to:
CO, 4th CAG

UNCLASSIFIED

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CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS
4th Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 January 1969 - 31 January 1969

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ENCLOSURE (1)
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 Jan 1969 to 31 Jan 1969

Ref: (a) AMC 5750.2
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8

Encl: (1) 4th Combined Action Group Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Downgraded at 3-year intervals
   Declassified after 12 years
   DOD Dir 5200.10

J. E. Greenwood

UNCLASSIFIED
PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. Designation

Commander

Headquarters
LtCol J. S. GREENWOOD 1 - 31 Jan69

4th Combined Action Group

III Marine Amphibious Force

FPO San Francisco 96602

Subordinate Units

Caco 4-1
Capt F. BRADLEY 1-31 Jan69

Caco 4-2
Capt W. C. BLAHA 1-31 Jan69

Caco 4-3
1stLt J. P. MURCHISON 1-31 Jan69

2. Location

Headquarters
1-31 Jan69 Quang Tri Combat Base

Caco 4-1
1-31 Jan69 Dong Ha District

Caco 4-2
1-31 Jan69 Mai Linh District

Caco 4-3
1-31 Jan69 Trieu Phong District

3. Staff Officers

Group Executive Officer
Maj R. W. COOPER 1-31 Jan69

S-1/admino
1stLt S. MURLEST 1-11 Jan69

CWO-2 R. S. FAUST JR. 12-31 Jan69

S-3
Maj W. R. LUCKEY 1-22 Jan69

Maj J. C. WILSON 23-31 Jan69

S-4
CWO-2 R. A. GREEN 1-31 Jan69

ENCLOSURE (1)
PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY
COMMAND, OPERATIONS, AND TRAINING

During January, major developments occurred in the expansion of 4th CAG. As a result of continued negotiations with CG ICTZ, CG III MAF obtained concurrence to a plan calling for deactivation of three CAFs in 2d CAG, reduction of Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to a total of five, and activation of three new CAFs in Quang Tri. Inter-CAG adjustments of personnel followed immediately. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Combined Action Program, was able to raise the programmed strength for 4th CAG to 292 enlisted, a figure sufficient to support 1 CAG Headquarters, 3 CACO Headquarters, 16 CAFs, and 1 MTT. Thus, at mid-month, it appeared that 4th CAG would get sufficient personnel for 4 of the 12 new CAFs authorized in December but that further expansion would be delayed until after TET.

It was possible to organize the Marine element of one new CAF (4-2-7) from personnel returning from CAF school at the end of December. Although formed and designated 4-2-7, this unit was retained for work on the 4-1-4 compound, as explained below, and not activated until 21 Jan 1969. Individual replacements and the deactivation of one MTT in mid-month permitted forming the Marine elements of two more CAFs. One of these, CAF 4-3-5, was retained for construction work at CAF 4-1-7 site until 31 Jan 1969. The other was linked with its FF platoon and designated as CAF 4-1-7 but, as explained below, will not be officially activated until its new compound is operational. Assignment of 31 new men on 11 Jan 1969 provided the Marine elements for two more CAFs upon their return from Danang on 23 Jan 1969. At the end of the month unexpected orders were received transferring 30 additional men from 2d CAG to 4th CAG as the III MAF adjutant moved to align units with their long range programmed strengths sooner than originally anticipated. The 30 additional men reported on 29 Jan 1969 and formed the Marine elements of still two more CAFs.

In summary, personnel inputs enabled 4th CAG to form the Marine elements of seven new CAFs during January. Although one of these was drawn from personnel who should have been assigned as individual replacements, the other six reflected a true increase in strength. 4th CAG ended the month in the following posture:

- Thirteen CAFs and 1 MTT operational
- Marine element slated for CAF 4-3-5 assigned to construction of the 4-1-7 compound scheduled for activation on 1 Feb 1969.
- CAF 4-1-7 formed, but engaged in compound construction and not operational. Expected activation date is 8 Feb 1969.

ENCLOSURE (1)
The Marine elements of four new CAPs undergoing indoctrination and training at 4th CAG CP. These elements were slated for activation as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAP</th>
<th>HAMLET</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>PF PLT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
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<td>4-1-8</td>
<td>An Binh</td>
<td>Dong Ha</td>
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<td>4-2-8</td>
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<td>Hai Lang</td>
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<td>Trieu Phong</td>
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<td>Tuong Van Ap</td>
<td>Trieu Phong</td>
<td>52</td>
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CAP 4-2-2 operational but slated for deactivation on or about 8 Feb 69.

4th CAG now has on hand the resources necessary to support 18 CAPs and one MTT. Further expansion to the authorized level of 24 CAPs is not contemplated at least until completion of FSI.

During the month, considerable progress was made in the construction of the two compounds within 4th CAG. CAP 4-1-4 began work on its position in late October, but progress was slow due to the operational commitments and the efforts devoted to PSOPS and civic action matters. From 3 - 10 January, however, the personnel slated for the new CAP 4-2-7 were assigned temporarily to CAG 4-1 to work on the 4-1-4 compound. A crash program was instituted and all pending projects completed in the seven day period. The work accomplished included:

1. Removal of PF/USMC living "hooches"
2. Erection of a strong-back tent
3. Installation of three fighting bunkers
4. Reconstruction of all individual fighting holes
5. Restoration and repair of the dirt berm
6. Improvement of the searchlight position
7. Reorganization of the SEA hut to permit better use of space
8. Hauling of fill gravel

On 20 Jan 1969, work began on a compound for CAP 4-1-7. When activated, this CAP will replace CAP 4-2-2 and will occupy an area of coordination that contains much of the present 4-2-2 AOC. Need for change in the 4-2-2 area had long been recognized by 4th CAG and the Trieu Phong District. CAP 4-2-2 was formed in February 1967. It is the oldest CAP in 4th CAG and has become relatively stagnant. Its compound is old and in need of extensive rebuilding. PF platoon #32 is capable of functioning without Marine assistance and is benefiting little from current training
efforts. Consideration was given to making CAP 4-1-7 mobile and operating without a compound. It was decided, however, that a new compound was necessary to provide a secure base from which fire support (60mm/81mm mortars) could be provided to the five RF/RF elements located in the general vicinity. Relocation of the compound would also be a benefit as it would put the new CAP more directly astride the principal infiltration routes and in a more central position within its AOC. (See sketch map, part IV.)

In order to accomplish the construction work without suspending tactical activities in the 4-2-2 area, the following decisions were made:

- To delay activation of CAP 4-3-5 until compound construction was well in hand and utilize the marines intensively for that CAP as a work force.

- To postpone assigning some 13 other marines as individual replacements, and to organize them, along with RF platoon #31, into CAP 4-1-7. This CAP, however, would not be officially activated but would begin work on its future compound, leaving tactical responsibilities to the adjacent CAP 4-2-2.

- Deactivate CAP 4-2-2 when CAP 4-1-7's compound is ready and reassign the marines from it as individual replacements.

The net effect of these decisions was to provide a work force to construct the 4-1-7 compound at the expense of delaying the activation of 4-3-5 by 10 days and delaying the assignment of several individual replacements for a somewhat longer period.

Plans for the CAP 4-1-7 site differ considerably from those used at 4-1-4. The latter position adhered closely to the "French Fort" concept — a small triangular shaped compound surrounded by wire, a moat, and a berm, with little attempt at concealment or depth of defense. At the CAP 4-1-7 site a larger area was chosen. The moat and berm were omitted; trees and hedges were thinned but not removed. They will provide some screen for activities within the compound. Defensive positions were chosen along inner and outer lines permitting development of flexible defensive plans. (See part IV for diagrams and photographs of these compounds.) By the end of the month, work on the wire was completed, fighting holes had been dug, a sea hut erected and bunker materials were being prepared by 3d Engineer Battalion. CAP 4-3-5 was withdrawn from the project on 31 Jan 1969 and is scheduled for activation in its own AOC on 1 Feb 1969. It is expected that the 4-1-7 compound will be far enough along for that CAP to be activated and 4-2-2 closed by 8 Feb 1969.

Efforts devoted to the construction of these compounds raised a question concerning their relative worth. Generally speaking, 4th CAG does not favor CAP compounds. The principal disadvantages of them appear to be these:
(1) High construction cost in terms of manpower and material; (2) high maintenance cost in terms of manpower; (3) manpower to defend them is diverted from its primary mission of hamlet security; (4) they present the enemy with an obvious, set-piece target; (5) they tend to create a false sense of security; and (6) they impose a considerable housekeeping burden on occupants.

On the other hand, there are advantages that on occasion can compel their use. They provide a fire support base at which 81mm/60mm mortars can be located. They are a symbol of SVN authority and presence. They give a degree of confidence to the people and to the PFs associated with them. 4th CAG felt that such considerations were overriding in the cases of 4-1-4 and 4-1-7 and, therefore, agreed to accept a compound concept in both of these areas. No other compounds remain in 4th CAG, however, and none are contemplated at the present time. Unless conditions in Quang Tri Province should undergo a major change, it is expected that such compounds will remain the exception rather than the rule in this area.

Training continued to be an important facet of this command's activities during the month. A complete re-evaluation of general military subjects training for both the Marine and PF was conducted in an attempt to devise more effective instruction at the grass roots level. As an outgrowth of this study, several new techniques have been applied within 4th CAG which appear to be meeting with some success.

One of these techniques is designed to provide the CAP leader with capsules of instruction which can be taught in most any environment, are easily communicated to the PF, require few training aids, and can be presented without seriously disrupting the operational activities of the CAP. 4th CAG devoting fifteen to twenty minutes on several days of a week, tactical fundamentals are brought into focus for both the Marines and the PFs. Whenever possible, these fundamentals relate to a specific incident or contact occurring in one of the CAPs of 4th CAG. This type of short "after-action report" motivates the CAPs to avoid the pitfalls experienced by others. The name "On-the-Job Training Tip" has been coined for these capsule instruction periods, increased emphasis on on-the-job training, however, has not eliminated the need for formal instruction. In so far as possible, however, 4th CAG hopes to utilize teams of special instructors for these classes. Personnel from the 4th CAG 3-3 section and HTs will be utilized as will experts from outside commands. 4th CAG continues to draw upon the resources of the 3d Marine Division in the form of Division Contact Teams. These contact teams, escorted by an individual from 4th CAG, conduct training at the District headquarters or at CAP locations. The quality of this instruction is excellent and reception of the material by the PF has been good. The interpreters which accompany the teams are knowledgeable in the subjects being taught, which promotes more effective instruction. Currently, these teams are available to provide instruction in the M-60 machine gun, claymore mines, intelligence, fire support and observation procedures, field fortifications, demolitions, mines and booby traps, compass and map reading, FOG handling, Starlight scope operation and employment of scout dogs.

ENCLOSURE (1)
The 4th CAG Marksmanship Program which began in October continues to receive major emphasis. During January, the PF elements of ten regular CARs received M-16 rifles, which created an increased requirement for mechanical instruction, care and cleaning classes, and firing practice. The Group Program provides marksmanship training in five phases, each involving a class held on the range followed by a livefire exercise emphasizing the appropriate teaching points. Below are listed the five phases of the marksmanship course.

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<th>PHASE</th>
<th>COURSE</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Individual Marksmanship</td>
<td>Target detection, firing positions, sight adjustment, trigger squeeze, zero of weapon, battle sights. (10 weapons are used.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Quick Fire</td>
<td>Five positions and techniques of field firing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Application of Fire</td>
<td>Competitive firing at ranges of 100, 200, and 300 meters by individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fire and Maneuver</td>
<td>Base of fire, individual and unit maneuver, fire distribution and control, fire commands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Night and Ambush Firing</td>
<td>Night firing techniques, fire control and distribution of fire at night, sectors of fire in the ambush.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although it is not intended that these exercises be tactical problems, each phase involves enough tactical instruction and application to make the firing phase realistic and challenging. This review of tactical principles and techniques is a valuable adjunct to the marksmanship effort. In all phases targets are scored where possible to lend a competitive atmosphere to the training.

Part IV contains a copy of the new 4th CAG directive on training and copies of thirteen of the On-the-Job Training Tips recently distributed.

CaCO 4-2 has centralized its formal training with classes being conducted at the District Headquarters on the basis of one day of instruction for each CAP every week. The advantages to this system are that the District Chief becomes involved in supervising PF attendance, i.e., it's a Vietnamese order to attend as opposed to advice from the CAP leader. The Vietnamese District staff is able to observe some of the training and becomes more interested and involved in upgrading the PF, and the quality
of instruction is normally higher. The one drawback is that the individual involved with daytime activity from a CAP is absent from training with his platoon, although a makeup class is attended on another day with another CAP.

The CAP school under the supervision of the III MAF, Assistant Chief of Staff, Combined Action Program, continues to provide excellent preparation for future CAP members. To supplement this training, a local indoctrination program is used to familiarize individuals with the operations of the 4th CAG, ensure individual weapons are zerosed, and to acquaint incoming personnel with pertinent administrative matters. The syllabus provides for two and one-half days of instruction for all joinees following completion of CAP school. This instruction consists of formalized classes given by the 4th CAG staff, range firing, and the planning and execution of a daytime patrol. Arrangements were made with the Quang Tri Base Coordinator whereby the patrol routes are within the Combat Base Area of Operations, but outside the base facility. These patrols are accompanied by Staff NCOs from the Base Defense and 4th CAG who provide objective observations for the critique. Upon completion of the daytime patrol, individuals designated as individual replacements are sent to their CACOs for assignment. Those individuals designated to form the Marine element of a new CAP remain at the Group Headquarters for an additional twenty-four hours. During this period an inspection of the new CAP is held by the CACO commander and a night activity is planned and executed in an existing CAP AOC. This activity is also monitored by a 4th CAG Staff NCO to provide a performance evaluation critique. A copy of the most recent orientation training schedule is contained in Part IV.

CACU 4-1 continued improvements of its Headquarters area by erecting two Sea huts and one strong-backed tent with a concrete deck. This construction improved the operational environment as well as the living facilities for the headquarters. A galley operated by the CACO Headquarters and the District Advisory Staff provides one hot meal every other day to all CAPs. CAP 4-4-2-2, although in Trieu Phong District, continued under the supervisory control of CACU 4-1 due to the proximity of the 4-1 Headquarters to the 4-2-2 area of coordination. This arrangement is expected to continue with CAP 4-1-7 once it is activated.

Major operations or contacts for CACU 4-1 during the month included:

1. 122330H Jan69. While in night CP location at YD 274613, CAP 4-1-6 fired small arms at eight VC approaching their position from a range of under 15 meters. Two VC bodies, two PPS-43 assault rifles, 40 pounds of rice, and assorted documents were recovered. Negative friendly casualties.

2. 252230H Jan69. At YD 256512 PT platoon #111 was attacked by an
unknown number of VC. CACO 4-1 Headquarters, CAP 4-1-6, and three PF platoons from District Headquarters formed a reactionary force arriving at about 250430H Jan69. The reactionary force made negative contact and evacuated 11 PF KIA and 7 PF WIA (E) from Platoon #111.

Following the 25 Jan 1969 action CG 3d Marine Division placed one rifle squad from Company "G", 2d Battalion, 3d Marines and one rifle squad from Company "H", 2d Battalion, 3d Marines under the operational control of 4th CAG to assist in restoring PF confidence and to augment the military forces in the area.

The "G" Company squad was integrated with PF platoon #80, designated as CAP 4-1-1, and assigned an area north of the Cua Viet River immediately east of Highway #1. The "H" Company squad linked up with the remnants of PF platoon #111 in its original area east of Dong Ha. See Part IV for map of AOCS and copy of message passing OPCON to 4th CAG.

CACO 4-2 continued activities in Hai Linh District. A significant increase in enemy activity in CAP 4-2-6 was noted. An enemy mortar squad moves in and out of the southern end of the CAP 4-2-3 AOCC with some regularity to fire on Province Headquarters and Hai Linh District Headquarters. During the month, some difficulty was experienced in CAP 4-2-6 with the integration of PF and Marines. On 19 January, an unplanned PF patrol from the CAP was successfully ambushed by the VC in Nhu Le hamlet. This action has significantly demoralized the PFs of Platoon #62. An After Action Investigation was conducted and the report is appended in Part IV. On the day following this contact, the CG, 3d Marine Division placed one rifle squad from Company "F", 2d Battalion, 3d Marines under the operational control of 4th CAG to reinforce the friendly forces astride this critical avenue of approach to Quang Tri City from the Ba Long Valley. This squad initially was integrated with PF platoon #59 operating in CAP 4-2-6 AOCC. At the end of the month, however, the CAP Marines, the remainder of the augmentation squad (6 men), and PF platoons #59 and #62 were operating as one CAP unit.

Major operations and contacts for CACO 4-2 during the month included:

1. 111915H Jan69. CAP 4-2-6 at YD 309478, while on patrol, made contact with five VC carrying automatic weapons. After laying a base of fire, the CAP swept the area and apprehended two VC's who were turned over to District Headquarters. One PF was WIA (E).

2. 192135H Jan69. At YD 314485 a PF element of CAP 4-2-6 was ambushed while returning from a night activity. A reactionary force from the remainder of the CAP swept the scene killing one VC. Artillery was fired on probable escape routes. Ten PFs KIA, and 6 PFs WIA (E). (See Part IV)

3. 281030H Jan69. CAP 4-2-7 at YD 400517 located ten large bunkers constructed of concrete, sand and logs, which showed signs of recent occupation. Army engineers destroyed the bunkers with demolitions on 28 and 29 January.
CACO 4-3 continued activities in Trieu Phong District. Major planning and liaison were completed to prepare for the activation of the three new CAPs in early February. Pacification efforts and improved rapport with the villagers resulted in an increase in intelligence received directly from the people concerning VC activities. Operations with the National Police accounted for the successful contact of 21 Jan 1969 described below. The recovery of enemy and friendly ordnance items, capturing of VC documents and the destruction of several VC bunkers were all the result of information provided by villagers.

Major operations and contacts for CACO 4-3 during the month included:

1. 122000H Jan 69. While in a night OP at YD 360595, CAP 4-3-2 was approached by one Vietnamese who stated he was an NVA lieutenant from K-8 NVA Battalion and desired to Chieu Hoi. He was armed with a 9mm Chinese pistol. The Chieu Hoi was turned over to District Headquarters.

2. 122230H Jan 69. CAP 4-3-2 responded to a request to assist PF platoon #40 located at 361590 following contact by the PF with an unknown number of VC. CAP 4-3-2 had negative contact but assisted in the MEDEVAC of two PF KIA and nine WIA (E).

3. 211230H Jan 69. At YD 367577, using intelligence from the National Police, CAP 4-3-3 located a bunker. After receiving three rounds of incoming small arms fire, one VC male was flushed from the bunker. The bunker was grenaded and assaulted. One wounded VC female, National Liberation Front recruiting documents, and one AK-47 were found in the bunker. The VC female died of wounds prior to evacuation. The male VC led the CAP to another bunker which was empty, where he attempted to escape and was shot and killed. The bunkers were destroyed by hand.

Although contact with the enemy was light in early January, by the middle of the month there had been a significant increase. Total operational effort for the month was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day Patrols</th>
<th>Night Patrols</th>
<th>Ambushes</th>
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<tr>
<td>377</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>160</td>
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Complacency constitutes a continuing problem within 4th CAG. When units go for some time without contact or evidence of VC incursions into their areas, it is extremely difficult for them to maintain the level of professionalism required. Personnel, both PF and Marines, unconsciously stumble into the pitfall of believing the enemy will not come. Planning procedures, briefings, alertness, the entire spectrum of activities, can deteriorate quickly and seriously under these conditions. Other factors aggravate the problem. PSYOPS, civic action, intelligence collection, training, and people-to-people efforts compete for time and energy. Bad weather also detracts from the desired tactical performance. The net
result is that the entire command must wage a constant campaign against the danger of complacency. During the month CO, 4th CAG 1TR of 14 Jan 1969 to CACO commanders addressed this problem as did a letter from the Assistant Chief of Staff, Combined Action Program, on 21 Jan 1969. Copies of these documents are contained in Part IV.

Psychological operations were conducted during the month in accordance with 4th CAG PSYOPS operation order 3-69, which is contained in Part IV. Effective leaflet distribution techniques were employed during the month to get the Vietnamese, military and government officials, more involved. PSYOPS patrols consisting of Marines, PF village officials or hamlet chiefs were conducted. By approaching the villagers in their homes, the Vietnamese with the combined patrol were able to explain the leaflet themes and answers questions. The employment of armed propaganda teams continued to be successful in our campaign to get the Vietnamese more involved and to increase the face-to-face contact between representatives of the government and the people in contested hamlets. The Chieu Hoi theme dominated the PSYOPS effort during the month. Preparation for the TET, PSYOPS Campaign was well under way by the end of January. Arrangements were made with the Quang Tri Chieu Hoi center to host the families of known VC or VCI prior to TET. The District Chief, village officials and hamlet chiefs have become involved in assisting the CACO commanders and CAP leaders in identifying and organizing the target audience. At the Chieu Hoi Center, the families will be entertained, fed the noon meal, and conducted through the center. An opportunity to speak with Chieu Hois will be presented and a tour will be conducted through the Vocational Training Center in downtown Quang Tri. The TET PSYOPS Order is also contained in Part IV.

To assist the Marines in understanding the social and religious significance of TET, a descriptive brochure was distributed. This brochure listed the basic do's and don'ts on each day during the holiday season and described the background of each custom. The results of the January program are as follows:

- Posters Displayed: 3,125
- Leaflets Distributed: 5,690
- Armed Propaganda Team Broadcast Hours: 8
- Ordnance Items Turned In: 89
- Voluntary Information Funds Expended: 2500 VNS

The operational methods of the Mobile Training Teams remained the same. Training commitments were all in Hai Lang District. Although a CACO Headquarters is not located in Hai Lang District, no difficulties were experienced. The CACO commander of 4-2 located at Hai Linh District Headquarters coordinated logistics and fire support requirements. Mobile Training Team 4-2 was deactivated on 15 January in response to directives from III MAF as discussed above. Training activities during the month were:

11Jan69: MTT 4-1 completed a two week training cycle with PF Platoon #18 at YD 385470 in Hai Lang District.
14Jan69: MTT 4-2 completed a two week training cycle with PF Platoon #3 at YD 461448 in the Hai Lang District.

20Jan69: MTT 4-1 completed training of PF Platoon #8 at YD 425490 in the Hai Lang District.

One significant find was made by MTT during the month. At YD 437495 MTT-1 located twenty-five bunkers with supporting fighting holes on 25 Jan 1969. Fifteen of the bunkers were reinforced with green bamboo and showed signs of recent use. These were destroyed with demolitions. Ten were villager's incoming bunkers and were not destroyed. Villagers filled in the fighting holes. Total training and operational accomplishments of MTIs for January were:

- Day Patrols: 35
- Night Patrols: 46
- Ambushes: 52
- Live range Firing: 6 days
- Formal Instruction Hours: 59
- TACTCAPS: 26
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

PERSONNEL. There continues to be a shortage of 3041/3051 sergeants/below. In addition, there is a critical billet vacancy for a SSgt 3516 essential to the operation of this organization's Motor Pool.

ADMINISTRATION. The service records of each individual have been changed to identify him to his respective Combined Action Company, by organizational entry on page 3. The purpose is to provide a means of accounting for personnel and records by unit.

PROMOTIONS. The following promotions were effected:

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OFFICERS JOINED

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ENLISTED DROPPED ROTATION

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<th>E-7</th>
<th>E-6</th>
<th>E-5</th>
<th>E-4</th>
<th>E-3</th>
<th>E-2/1</th>
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<td>0331</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>5</td>
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TRANSFERRED TO CAMP BUTLER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>E-8</th>
<th>E-7</th>
<th>E-6</th>
<th>E-5</th>
<th>E-4</th>
<th>E-3</th>
<th>E-2/1</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>0331</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE (1)
USN JOINED

1 HM1
1 HM2
3 HM3
1 HN

USN DROPPED

1 HMC
1 HM2
1 HM3

AVERAGE STRENGTH FOR JANUARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USMC OFF</th>
<th>USMC ENL</th>
<th>USN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AVERAGE NON-EFFECTIVES FOR JANUARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USMC OFF</th>
<th>USMC ENL</th>
<th>USN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CASUALTIES. The following casualties were received:

KIA 1
WIAE 0
WIANE 0
NBCE 3
NBNE 0

LEGAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>Pending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCM</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Hours</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE (1)
MEDICAL

The 21 Naval corpsmen conducted an active MEDCAP Program throughout the month treating a total of 7,161 patients. PF corpsmen were trained on a daily basis in conjunction with the MEDCAP Program and daily sick call.

All of 4th CAG was placed on the daily malaria prophylaxis during the month. The daily consumption of Dapsone to counter vivax malaria and the continued weekly chloroquine trimquine should reduce the probability of a significant malaria problem in further months. All corpsmen have been directed to supervise this daily and weekly routine.

Medical support beyond the CAG level was provided by the 3d Medical Battalion, 3d Marine Division. Dental services were provided by Headquarters Battalion Dental Clinic, 3d Marine Division, Quang Tri Combat Base.

During late January, 4th CAG inaugurated a DANTCAP Program in the hamlets located within their areas of coordination. Four pilot DANTCAPs were held in Cam Xuan (YD 231631), Thaong Ha (YD 374494), Tram Ly (YD 360337) and Phouc Ly (YD 273577) hamlets. The reception of this program appeared excellent. By working through hamlet and village officials, it is planned to sponsor two DANTCAPs per week during February. In conjunction with the DANTCAPs, the planning was completed for a project to teach school children contemporary oral hygiene habits. The plan calls for regular presentations to be conducted in the classroom of the public grade schools. These presentations involve the use of a lecture, charts, mock-ups and application techniques. At the conclusion of each session, the children are given toothbrushes and toothpaste.

A general classification breakdown of the disorders of military patients treated this month is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disorder</th>
<th>Patients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper respiratory infection</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skin diseases</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diarrhea and dysentery</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fever of undetermined origin</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries (non-combat)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries (Combat)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venereal diseases</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LOGISTICS/SUPPLY

This command continues to experience a critical shortage of 25 AN/PRC-25 radios. There are presently 15 AN/PRC-25 radios on loan from FMFPac Allowance Pool. Four M107 water trailers are on order and are urgently needed by this command. Also there is a shortage of typewriters, cleaning rods for the M-16, chamber brushes for the M60 and bore brushes for the M-79.

The Supply Section has continued to maintain strict control and accountability over the personal effects and baggage section. All personal effects of MEDVAC personnel are processed within 72 hours after receipt of transfer orders.

The regular monthly meeting of all CAP and CACO Supply NCO's was held 13 January 1969. Topics of discussion included supply procedures, accountability and supply economy and the importance of maintaining proper supply support to using units.

All new personnel joining the 4th Combined Action Group are given a complete lecture on the use of organizational clothing and equipment and supply economy.

All weekly PMs were accomplished on schedule in addition a quarterly PM was pulled on each vehicle monthly. A total of 8,863 miles were driven during the month of January. It is also to be noted that only two vehicles were deadlined. Three drivers from the Motor Transport Section attended the three-day Multi-fuel Instruction Course held at FLCG-NAVU at Dong Ha.

Shortage of supply personnel continues to exist within the S-4/Supply Section. A breakdown of personnel shortages is as follows: 2-sergeant MOS 3041; 1-corporal MOS 3051; and 2-lance corporal MOS 3041.
CIVIC ACTION

During the month of January all CARS and the Mobile Training Team participated in civic action projects including over 7,003 medical treatments, over 100 dental treatments and the distribution of 272 pounds of foodstuffs, 199 pounds of clothing, 142 pounds of soap, 7 physical education kits, and 31 school kits. Clothing and a few of the school supplies continue to be received from individual donors in CONUS. In addition, 20 health workers were trained.

The following construction projects were completed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>YD</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An Dung</td>
<td>364571</td>
<td>Clean-up of village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dich Le Thong</td>
<td>329578</td>
<td>Clean-up of village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuong Ha</td>
<td>379496</td>
<td>Bridge repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nhu Le</td>
<td>314432</td>
<td>Fence construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nhu Le</td>
<td>314478</td>
<td>House repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Van</td>
<td>314482</td>
<td>Garden restoration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lap Inach</td>
<td>332620</td>
<td>Clean-up of village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuong Ha</td>
<td>279507</td>
<td>Stairway into river</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Hung</td>
<td>279497</td>
<td>Bridge construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Binh</td>
<td>366578</td>
<td>Clean-up of village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Van</td>
<td>333600</td>
<td>Clean-up of village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuong Ha</td>
<td>377592</td>
<td>Bridge repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuong Ha</td>
<td>397447</td>
<td>Bridge repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>362535</td>
<td>Trail cleared</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Progress continued to be made throughout the month in the general clean-up of the villages and in clearing hedgerows and filling in spider holes that are possible VC havens. On the other hand the popular Force soldiers and Marines of CAP 4-2-6 restored garden plots in Nhu Le (YD 314482) that were damaged by tracked vehicles operating in the area.

Plans were completed for a dental program to be conducted in all CAP areas of coordination and the program initiated with DMCAPS conducted in the hamlets of Cam Xuan (YD 231631), Thuong Ha (YD 374494), Tran Ly (YD 360537) and Phuoc My (YD 278577). In addition a dental hygiene pilot project was initiated for a selected class of 40 school children in the hamlet of Vin Lai (YD 327657) in Trieu Phong District.

All funds in the amount of $75,000 were received from the 3d Marine Division for purchase of civic action materials. These funds were used to purchase tin roofing and school supplies to support existing projects and the six month project plan. School supplies and tin roofing continued to be two of the items in greatest demand.

The 3d Marine Division Band conducted a concert in Cam Xuan (YD 231631), Lang Tay (YD 233615), the city of Dong Ha, and Thuong Ha (YD 374494) during this period. During the performance in the hamlet of Lang Tay PCTOPS material was distributed by popular Force soldiers and Marines and surplus
foodstuffs was presented to the hamlet chief.

Rapport with the Vietnamese people in all areas continued to be excellent. The following were considered prime examples: Construction of a new compound CAP site was commenced in the vicinity of Phouc My (UL 285573) and the village chief and village cadre were on hand with approximately 150 local civilians to assist in the clearing of hedge rows for fields of fire and to assist in carrying materials for constructing the tactical wire on the perimeter. Mobile Training Team 4-1 was welcomed by 75 village elders and officials at a meal and ceremony in Cu Hoan, Hai Lang District, on the first day of operation with Popular Force Platoon #8. Excellent relations continued throughout the entire training cycle.
PART III
SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

081800H Jan69 - A PF element of CAP 4-2-6 fired upon an unknown number of VC who were sighted from a night CP location at YD 308478 at a range of 100 meters. The area was swept with negative results.

10Jan69 - The Commandant of the Marine Corps visited CAP 4-1-4. He was received by the CU 4th CAG and briefed on the 4th CAG program. After the briefing, he met with all 4th CAG CAP leaders, local village officials and hamlet elders, and toured the CAP 4-1-4 compound.

11Jan69 - MTT 4-1 completed a two week training cycle with PF platoon #18 at YD 385470 in Hai Lang District.

11Jan69 - 31 men were assigned to 4th CAG to form two new CAPs upon completion of CAP school on 28 Jan 1969.

100230H Jan69 - CAP 4-2-3 received five mortar rounds impacting 400 meters from their night CP location at YD 318523. A counter-battery mission was fired on the suspected enemy location. At 0305 several more rounds impacted 200 meters from the CP and counter-battery was again fired with unknown results.

122000H Jan69 - While in a night CP at YD 360595, 4-3-2 was approached by one Vietnamese who stated he was an NVA Lieutenant from K-8 NVA Battalion and desired to Chieu Hoi. He was armed with a 9mm Chinese pistol.

122330H Jan69 - While in night CP location at YD 274613 CAP 4-1-6 fired small arms at eight VC approaching the position apparently without knowledge of its presence. Two VC bodies, two PK-43 assault rifles, 40 pounds of rice, and assorted documents were recovered. Negative friendly casualties.

122230H Jan69 - CAP 4-3-2 responded to a request to assist PF platoon #40 located at YD 361390 following contact by Platoon #40 with an unknown number of VC. The CAP had negative contact but assisted in the MEDEVAC of 2 PF KIA and 9 WIA (a).

131915H Jan69 - CAP 4-2-6 at YD 309478, while on patrol, made contact with five VC carrying automatic weapons. After laying a base of fire the CAP swept the area and apprehended two VC. One PF was KIA (b).

132240H Jan69 - CAP 4-1-4, at YD 232631, fired upon one VC seen in a searchlight beam outside the compound wire. The CAP swept the area of sighting with negative results.

14Jan69 - MTT 4-2 completed a two week training cycle with PF platoon #3 at YD 461443 in the Hai Lang District.

ENCLOSURE (1)
16130h Jan69 - Elements of CaP 4-2-6 at YD 307478 were fired upon by approximately six VC. The CaP returned fire and swept the area with negative results.

171845h Jan69 - At YD 45617, a resupply motor boat from CaCo 4-3 Headquarters received approximately thirty rounds of incoming automatic small arms. One USMC passenger was killed. The boat driver was not hit. No fire was returned.

192155h Jan69 - At YD 314485 a PF element of CaP 4-2-6 was ambushed while returning from a night activity. A reaction force from the remainder of the CaP swept the scene killing one VC. Artillery was fired on escape routes. Ten PPs KIA and six WIA(E). The after action report is contained in the supporting documents.

20Jan69 - Final selection was made of a site for the CaP 4-1-7 compound and construction began.

200300h Jan69 - At YD 275574 CaP 4-2-2 apprehended twenty-six Vietnamese women carrying moderate amounts of foodstuffs. This area is known to harbor VC and had been placed off-limits by the District Chief. All personnel were turned over to District Headquarters.

201645h Jan69 - Local villagers reported an enemy platoon moving in grid YD 3264. CaP 4-3-6 moved to intercept the enemy and spotted two Vietnamese at YD 323642 who fled when challenged. The CaP fired small arms and swept the area with negative results.

200930h Jan69 - CaP 4-3-3, upon receipt of intelligence from the National Police, located and searched a bunker at YD 307581. The patrol found a spool of demolition cord, ten Chi Comm grenades, and documents.

20Jan69 - MTI 4-1 commenced training of PF Platoon #6 at YD 425490 in Hai Lang District.

211230h Jan69 - CaP 4-3-3, upon receipt of intelligence from the National Police, located a bunker at YD 367577. After receiving three rounds of incoming small arms, one VC male was flushed from the bunker. The bunker was gendraged and assaulted. One wounded female VC, recruiting documents, and one AK-47 were found in the bunker. The female VC died of wounds prior to evacuation. The male VC led the CaP to another bunker which was empty, where he attempted to escape, was shot and killed. The bunkers were destroyed by hand.

21Jan69 - CaP 4-2-7 activated. CaP is working with PF Platoon #10 and #21 in the hamlet of Tra Loc located at YD 390535 in Mai Linh District.

22Jan69 - One USMC squad from G/2/3 was placed under operational control of 4th CaP for employment with PF Platoon #59 in the southern portion of Nhu Le village, YD 310478 Mai Linh District.
242230H Jan69 - At Yd 324522 the CP of CAP 4-2-3 fired upon three VC who returned fire and broke contact. Artillery illumination was fired and the area swept immediately and again at first light with negative results.

251130H Jan69 - At Yd 477475, KIA-1 located twenty-five bunkers with supporting fighting holes. Fifteen of the bunkers were reinforced with green bamboo and showed signs of recent use. These were destroyed with demolitions. Ten were villagers incoming bunkers and were not destroyed. Villagers filled in the fighting holes.

252230H Jan69 - At Yd 266612 PF Platoon 411 was attacked by an unknown number of VC. CAP 4-1-6 and three PF platoons from District headquarters under the direction of C.O. A-1 company commander formed a reaction force arriving at about 260000H Jan. The reaction force made negative contact and evacuated 11 PF KIA and 7 PF WIA (c) from Platoon 411.

263345H Jan69 - At Yd 215629 CAP 4-1-4 located nine tons of rice in 100 pound bags and an unusual amount of medical supplies in two village houses. The rice, nine injection syringes, and eight bottles of medicinal tablets were evacuated to District headquarters. 7 VC were apprehended for questioning.

262330H Jan69 - CAP 4-2-6 while in a night CP location at Yd 307478 received ten to twelve incoming mortar rounds which appeared to come from a northeastern direction. Seven Marines WIA (a) and five PF WIA (b). Subsequent investigation revealed that the mortar rounds were fired from LE SHARON (Yd 339490) by the U.S. Army.

273300H Jan69 - A local villager informed CAP 4-2-1 that two surprise firing devices were located at Yd 334594 and Yd 384498. A patrol located one 82mm grenade and one 60mm Comm grenade, both rigged with trip wires. The devices were destroyed and 1200 $VA VIP funds were paid.

27Jan69 - One WO4 squad from F/2/3 was placed OPCON to 4th CAG for employment with PF Platoon 410 working near Long Lai (Yd 246627) and was designated as CAP 4-1-4. A second squad from H/2/3 was placed OPCON to 4th CAG for employment with PF Platoon 411 working at Phu Le Hamlet (Yd 264612) and was designated as CAP 4-1-3.

271400H Jan69 - CAP 4-2-3 at Yd 322515 found 10 National Liberation Front propaganda leaflets of seven types spread along a trail. The patrol policed up the leaflets and forwarded samples.

28Jan69 - CAP 4-2-2 commenced dismantling the 4-2-2 compound. The materials from this compound were used to help in the building of the new 4-1-7 compound.

280800H Jan69 - CAP 4-1-4, at Yd 228617, found 200 National Liberation Front propaganda leaflets of two types spread along a road. The patrol policed up the leaflets and forwarded samples.

ENCLOSURE (1)
29Jan69 - 30 men were received from 2d CA to be used to form the four
new Co's scheduled to be activated in early February.

291300H Jan69 - A Vietnamese civilian, at YD 283379, turned in thirty
105mm artillery fuses of U. S. make. Vir fuses of 600 SVN were paid.

291600H Jan69 - A village chief reported to CAP 4-2-4 that one unarmed
VC was soliciting information on marine and RF activities. A patrol was
dispatached to the hamlet of Iram Ly (YD 365532) with negative results.

291700H Jan69 - CAP 4-1-7 apprehended one female VC at YD 283366. The
VC was moving in the direction of known harbor sites. She was turned in
to district headquarters for interrogation.

302300H Jan69 - A patrol from CAP 4-2-2 sighted two persons running in
Phuoc Ly hamlet at YD 283374. One unarmed Vietnamese was apprehended.
Further search of the area and several houses produced negative results.

302330H Jan69 - CAP 4-2-2 reported sighting five individuals armed with
three rifles about 75 meters south of their compound at YD 276576. An
element was dispatched to pursue but could make no contact.

311830H Jan69 - A PF security patrol from RF Platoons 359 at YD 306477
working CAP 4-2-6 APC, sighted 10 VC carrying PK-16 rifles and carbines,
and wearing American style uniforms. The PF patrol fired approximately
50 rounds of small arms at the enemy patrol and received no return fire.
The enemy patrol fled to the south. CAP 4-2-6 responded as a reaction
force but made negative contact with the enemy.
HEADQUARTERS
4th Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/DRD/rjl
1500
9 Jan 1969

GROUP BULLETIN 1500

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Training Policy, greater emphasis to be directed toward On-the-Job Training

Encl: (1) List of Formalized Subjects

1. Purpose. To publish information concerning the training policy to be initiated in this command.

2. Background. A basic mission of the Combined Action Program is to train the Popular Forces to assume the responsibility for the security of their village/hamlet areas. A detailed review of our training program has been completed recently in an attempt to evaluate how successfully we are accomplishing this important mission. Two tentative conclusions stand out. First, we have placed inadequate emphasis on our on-the-job training; and, second, the quality of much of our formal training has dropped off; we have assigned topics to personnel who lack qualification, time and resources to prepare and present good instruction. The purpose of this directive is to redirect our training efforts and overcome these basic weaknesses.

3. On-the-Job Training. This type of training lends itself to the majority of activities that are conducted in the Combined Action Program. This training method can be used to provide initial training of individuals or small groups or to maintain proficiency in specialized fields. Essentially on-the-job training is referred to here consists of teaching by example and continually reinforcing the example with a series of short discussions to explain how things should be done and why. To accomplish on-the-job training with PFs, CAP Marines must first do their day-to-day job in a proficient, efficient manner. They must clearly understand the full spectrum of hamlet security and work at all parts of it — terrain study, enemy tactics, intelligence collection, reconnaissance, small unit tactics, civic action, PSYOPs, and winning support of the people. Each aspect of the job must be done thoroughly, by the book, correctly. But it is not enough simply to do it correctly; each step must be explained and discussed so that the PF fully understands how things are being done and why the techniques are important. The effectiveness of on-the-job training depends primarily on proper planning and close supervision of the training effort. It requires all
The following formal training will be presented in the 4th Combined Action Group:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course/Subject</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Instructor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marksmanship</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase (1) * Zeroing—Fam Firing</td>
<td>4 hours</td>
<td>S-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marksmanship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase (2) * Quick Fire</td>
<td>4 hours</td>
<td>S-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase (3) * Competition Firing</td>
<td>4 hours</td>
<td>S-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase (4) * Firing and Maneuver</td>
<td>4 hours</td>
<td>S-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase (5) * Fire Distribution and Control on Patrol/Ambushes</td>
<td>4 hours</td>
<td>S-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hand Grenades</strong></td>
<td>1 hour</td>
<td>S-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>M-60 Machine Gun</strong></td>
<td>3 hours</td>
<td>Contact Team 3d MarDiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(*Include Live Firing)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Claymore Mine</strong></td>
<td>1 hour</td>
<td>Contact Team 3d MarDiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(*Includes Firing Demonstration)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communication (Care, Cleaning, Maintenance and Operation PRC-25)</strong></td>
<td>1 hour</td>
<td>Comm Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>M-79 Grenade Launcher</strong></td>
<td>1/2 hour</td>
<td>S-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medical</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation and Field Hygiene</td>
<td>1/2 hour</td>
<td>Medical Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddy Aid and Three Life Saving Steps</td>
<td>1/2 hour</td>
<td>Medical Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence, Collection and Security</td>
<td>1 hour</td>
<td>Contact Team 3d MarDiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fire Support and F.O. Procedures</strong></td>
<td>1 hour</td>
<td>Contact Team 3d MarDiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Field Fortification/Demolitions</strong></td>
<td>1 hour</td>
<td>Contact Team 3d MarDiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mines and Booby Traps</strong></td>
<td>1 hour</td>
<td>Contact Team 3d MarDiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Compass, Use and Care</strong></td>
<td>1/2 hour</td>
<td>Contact Team 3d MarDiv</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE (1)
ON-THE-JOB TRAINING T.F.

1. **Teaching Point**: Detailed planning and briefing on tactical activities.

2. **Discussion**: Small units should always plan their activities in detail and everyone should know exactly what he is supposed to do before the activity begins. On an ambush, for example, everyone should know such things as:
   
a. His assigned position

b. Position of other members

c. Location of killing zone

d. Positioning of claymores

e. How far enemy should be allowed to advance before ambush is sprung

f. Who should spring it

g. Who will fire illumination and when

h. Composition of search element

i. When search element should move through killing zone and where it should set up.

j. Plans for reaction force

3. **On-the-Job Training Technique**: If CAP Marines make a large sketch of the area of their activities most of these points can be explained easily. Personnel will then soon develop the habit of planning activities in greater detail.
ON-THE-JOB TRAINING TIP #2

1. **Teaching Point:** Sectors of observation for patrol members

2. **Discussion:** Everybody on a patrol should have a assigned sector of observation. Unless specific assignments are made, some areas may be unprotected and the patrol will have poor security. Sectors apply on the move and also when patrol is held up to listen, or while point crosses open area or checks out suspected locations.

3. **On-the-Job Training Technique:** (1) Assign sectors to all individuals on every patrol. (2) Stop during patrol and ensure personnel are observing assigned sectors and prepared to engage threat from that direction.
ON-THE-JOB TRAINING TIP #3

1. **Teaching Point:** Proper use of the point to provide security to the front of a patrol.

2. **Discussion:** In CAP 4-3-6's area there is a long causeway which crosses a wide stream and swampy area. Night patrols from the CAP have frequently crossed this area without sending point men across first to secure the far bank. A single, well positioned enemy could easily have wiped out most of the patrol on each of these occasions.

   ![Diagram of Patrol](image)

   - Patrol should remain off causeway in position to support by fire while point checks far bank.
   - The same rule applies everywhere, not just on causeways. The point must move far to the front, checking right and left screening the area for the main body. In many CAP areas it would not be uncommon for the point to move 200 - 400 meters ahead to check out a tree line before the entire patrol exposes itself.

3. **On-the-Job Training Technique:** Work the point men. Put people in position to cover them with fire. Never expose the entire patrol to a likely ambush position without first checking it out.
ON-THE-JOB TRAINING TIP #4

1. **Teaching Point**: Controlling the Battlefield

2. **Discussion**: Once the enemy has been engaged in a meeting situation or at an ambush site, the best tactic is usually to remain in the area and dominate the battlefield. Such action permits recovery and treatment of casualties. It enables men to find cover and build up fire superiority, which is a safer course of action than surrendering fire superiority and then trying to flee the area. It allows the activity to capitalize on enemy casualties and inflict more should the enemy try to recover bodies or weapons. CAP units should prepare to hold the ground. They should carry several illumination pop-ups and use them every two or three minutes as necessary until illumination is obtained from an outside source. They should maneuver forward into better firing positions within the killing zone until they control it and can search it thoroughly. If the enemy is strong and remains in the area, it may be necessary to call a reaction force. The presence of the original activity on the ground with information and fire support will greatly assist the reaction element and simplify its job.

3. **On-the-Job Training Technique**: For every activity, plan and discuss what will be done AFTER contact has occurred. Don’t leave this a question in anyone’s mind! Take adequate illumination and ammunition. Work out plans for reaction force and brief everyone on them.
ON-THE-JOB TRAINING TIP #5

1. **Teaching Point.** Selection of routes for reaction forces

2. **Discussion.** A favorite enemy tactic is the "entrapment ambush. VC often plan to open an action with a secondary attack against a minor objective. Their real purpose may be to ambush a reactionary element coming out of a compound or fire base along an obvious route. This enemy tactic can be countered by careful planning. Reconnoiter less obvious routes and use them even though they may be somewhat longer. Be particularly careful at check points, entrance to compounds, stream crossing sites. Make good use of point and flank security. Do not plan to move reinforcement initial to the exact position of the element you are reinforcing, but move to an adjacent area on the flank or in the rear of the enemy from which support can be given.

3. **On-the-Job Training Technique.** Plan for use of reactionary forces carefully. Select less obvious routes. Make initial move to a position 200 - 500 meters away from the position being reinforced rather than to exact site. Brief all personnel on plans. Explain why moving in the easiest, quickest, or most obvious manner is Number Ten, for it may be playing right into the plans of the VC.
ON-THE-JOB TRAINING TIP #6

1. Teaching Point: Listening posts and local security to counter standard VC tactics.

2. Discussion: VC elements favor use of well planned, sudden, surprise attacks to overrun isolated US/GVN units. Through careful reconnaissance and intelligence collection, they learn the location of our forces. At fixed compounds, this is a simple task. Mobile CAPs use many positions and rotate among them, but these also can be located and scouted out without too much difficulty. The enemy then plans to approach the position as closely as possible undetected. Dozens of examples demonstrate that the VC are willing to spend several hours working their way into within a few yards of their target. Guided by noise from radios, talking, rattling equipment, and by occasional lights from flashlights, cigarettes or cooking fires they will creep or crawl for several hundred yards, often right across an open field or other unlikely avenue of approach. On signal, such as the firing of an RPG rocket or a few mortar rounds, they rush forward with satchel charges. Sometimes they have used rifle fire from one direction as a diversion while the assault comes from another. If the approach goes as planned, they are in the position within seconds of the first signal. In 4th CAG night CPs are continually set up and defended without any regard for these common VC tactics. We select a small courtyard, house or pagoda. The defense consists of perimeter positions only a few steps from where off-duty personnel sleep. As few as three or four men are assigned guard. Often the radio is placed on one of the perimeter positions where it detracts from the alertness of the sentry, serves as a beacon for the VC, and will be lost in the first onslaught. The positions are so small that only a few grenades, satchel charges, or RPG fragments will saturate most of the area. The plain truth is we play directly into the enemy hands. We set ourselves up for certain defeat. One of the best answers to this type attack is early warning. Listening posts and sentries must be out 100 or more yards. Trip flares or other early warning devices should be installed. Noise and light discipline are extremely important. Personnel must be at or in their fighting positions with weapon ready not asleep in buildings some distance away.

3. On-the-Job Training Technique: Insist on adequate CP positions and an adequate security system for every position. Discuss VC tactics for the attack. Set an example on light and noise discipline. Put additional Marines on duty. Be particularly alert on dark nights.
ON-THE-JOB TRAINING TIP #7

1. **Teaching Joint:** Enemy prisoners are valuable and worth much more to our cause than enemy KIAs.

2. **Discussion:** Not long ago CAF 4-3-4 responded to an intelligence tip concerning enemy elements in Lao Lao. While searching through an area around a damaged pagoda, they discovered a small camouflaged hole occupied by VC. A woman was pulled out of it and apprehended. At the same time two VC males ran from the hole to a nearby position and were shot and killed. The woman was questioned and within a few minutes admitted knowing of another hole where other VC were hidden. She led the CAF to the site immediately adjacent to a trail the patrol had traveled over about 45 minutes earlier. The hole was located, and ultimately four more VC were killed and several weapons captured. These actions occurred early in the afternoon. Upon analysis, several conclusions stand out: First, by capturing the woman, we gained immediate information that led to four additional enemy. Later interrogation produced a great deal of additional information on VC contacts and operations. Second, greater effort should have been exerted to capture the four VC in the second hole. Several hours of daylight remained in which to work. As the hole was initially pointed out, Marines stood over it and dominated it in position to kill any enemy emerging if necessary. It is believed that with greater patience, use of CS grenades or other special equipment, and continued coaxing, the enemy could have been persuaded or forced to surrender. Instead of this, however, the CAF very quickly resorted to using all its available force. During the action that followed, three CAF members were wounded and the four enemy killed. Third, we failed to gain intelligence benefits we should have received from the incident. Other VC were known to have been in the area and possibly could have been located through intelligence obtained from the prisoners had they been taken alive.

3. **On-The-Job Training Technique:** CS grenades and a gas mask should be taken on activities when it is suspected that the enemy may try to go to the ground. Fire control should have been stressed. Patrol leaders should be alert for opportunities of taking prisoners. Prisoner taking should be specific objectives of activities, and action should be planned accordingly. CAF Marines should learn and practice Vietnamese phrases like:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Vietnamese</th>
<th>Phonetic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Come here!</td>
<td>Lai day!</td>
<td>Lie day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't move!</td>
<td>Lung cung day!</td>
<td>Lung doong day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrender!</td>
<td>Bau hang ui!</td>
<td>Dow hang de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Throw down your arms!</td>
<td>Vut sung xuong!</td>
<td>Vutt sung xoong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raise your hands!</td>
<td>Gio tay len!</td>
<td>Joe tie lan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lie face down!</td>
<td>Nam mat xuong dat!</td>
<td>Name met xoong dies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halt!</td>
<td>Lung lai!</td>
<td>Lung lie</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. **Teaching Point:** VC underground positions are effective hiding places.

2. **Discussion:** Hiding places used by the VC are almost limitless, although underground locations appear to be the favorite. The means of hiding personnel and equipment underground range from simple "spider traps" holes to elaborate reinforced complexes which may cover large areas. From the surface these underground installations are most difficult to detect. Critical points are entrances, ventilation ports, and emergency exits, which are usually concealed in gardens, animal pens, under piles of straw or dung, in or under structures, and in river banks. Some complexes are constructed in such a manner that they permit long term underground habitation; others serve simply as well camouflaged places in which the enemy can find temporary safety when under pressure. Such hiding places must be discovered and destroyed if we are to rid the area of enemy influence.

3. **On-the-Job Training Technique:** When the enemy appears to have suddenly vanished into thin air, chances are good that he may have gone to the ground. A detailed search is probably in order. Insist that all such areas be searched thoroughly by probing and moving objects which could cover tunnel entrances. Remember that walking slowly through a yard is not searching. Men must be taught to probe and test every square meter in a systematic thorough manner. It is hard and tiring work, but anything less will not do the job. Once a unit finds a few hiding places, the teaching point will be automatically driven home. Use each place discovered as a training aid and have personnel study its construction, location, etc.
ON-THE-JOB TRAINING TIP #9

1. **Teaching Point:** Repeated use of trails sets a CAP up for easy ambush by the enemy.

2. **Discussion:** Nearly every CAP in 4th CAG makes repeated use of one or two key trails running through their hamlets. The action that occurred on 19 Jan 1969 in CAP 4-2-6 shows what this practice can cost if the enemy decides to take advantage of such habits. Eighteen PF departed on a hastily planned patrol at approximately 1930. They moved south through Nhi Le following the principal trail that parallels the river. At 2130 they returned again planning to follow the main riverside trail for the last several hundred meters into the CP. At a place they had long regarded as "home territory" - right in the relatively secure middle portion of Nhi Le - the VC had set their ambush. PF security was almost nonexistent as their patrol was nearly over and the area had always been "safe". When the ambush was sprung 10 PF were killed; 6 were wounded. Seven M-16 rifles were lost.

3. **On-the-Job Training Technique:** Send out daylight activities to reconnoiter routes off the trails. Carry machetes or Vietnamese knives to cut openings in hedge rows so alternate paths can be prepared for later use. Study backyards and gardens so that movement through them can be rapid. Preach to PFs that "Trails are Number 10".
ON-THE-JOB TRAINING TIP #10

1. Teaching Point: VC have fallen into habit of moving in late afternoon and evening. We should take advantage of this.

2. Discussion: A recent analysis of VC activity in Quang Tri Province and a study of CAP contacts both show that VC strongly favor early evening activities. They move out in the late afternoon and plan to reach their objective hamlets at dark or shortly after. They have fallen into this habit for several reasons:
   a) Movement is easiest if some daylight remains to choose good footing.
   b) Dusk provides concealment from long range observation.
   c) US activities usually slack off during this period as troops are eating evening meals, getting set in night position, etc.
   d) By starting early, VC can accomplish objective and have ample darkness to cover their withdrawal and avoid pursuit.

GVN/US are not taking advantage of this habit. Night activities are starting at 1900 - 2000, after VC are in position. Contacts frequently occurring with VC in ambush positions and GVN/US forces on the move. Large portions of hamlets are left unattended during most critical periods.

3. On-the-Job training Techniques:
   a. Point out repeatedly to FF that the most critical period runs from 1700 - 2000.
   b. Stress advantages of being on ground first before VC arrive.
   c. Insist on making maximum effort with 100% participation during critical periods.
   d. Ensure that activities during critical periods cover most likely avenue of approach into hamlet.
ON-THE-JOB TRAINING TIP #11

1. **Teaching Point:** Hamlet security is the most important mission being performed by the CAFs.

2. **Discussion:** In every contested hamlet the majority of the population is "on the fence". In other words, they are compelled to obey whoever happens to occupy the hamlet at a given moment. When the enemy enters the hamlet, the people must help them by providing rice and money to the tax collectors. They must attend political discussions by the cadre and allow an infrastructure to be maintained in the hamlet. They accept all of this because they want to stay alive. Furthermore, they will not often report these activities because of their fear of possible reprisals. Our main task then is to stop these VC from entering the villages. We must protect the people by denying the VC access to them. Pacification is possible only where adequate security is provided. Progress can be made only when the VC are kept out.

3. **On-the-Job Training Technique:** Plan your activities with the intent of protecting the villagers. Evaluate the logical avenues of approach and work these areas with determination. Locate night and day CI positions where they will be effective in providing security for the whole hamlet. It is not enough that the IF platoons and CAFs protect themselves. They must protect the people. Ensure that this is the goal, that every activity contributes to the security of the people.
1. **Teaching Point**: Proper employment of claymores.

2. **Discussion**: The Viet Cong and NVA make effective use of claymore mines in ambushes and defensive positions. This type of mine offers several tactical advantages.
   (a) It does not reveal the location of the person detonating the weapon.
   (b) Several can be rigged so as to detonate simultaneously, effectively saturating a large killing zone with shrapnel.
   (c) Followup claymores can be emplaced to fire as the enemy moves in to police the battlefield.

3. **On-the-Job Training Technique**: Use claymores in all ambush locations to cover the planned killing zone and any likely avenues of approach to your position. Assign specific USMC and FF to carry and emplace claymores. Plan for their employment and set them in position during a short rehearsal of the ambush. Discuss who will fire the claymores and when. Plan on using hand-held illumination and small arms as a followup after the mines have done their job.
ON-THE-JOB TRAINING TIP #13

1. Teaching Point: Defense of a night position requires detailed planning.

2. Discussion: On 25 Jan 1969, FF Platoon #111 in Fhu Le Hamlet, east of Dong Ha, was attacked by a VC force. The platoon was located in a small defensive position around a blockhouse. Individual fighting holes were not particularly well chosen or carefully prepared. People did not clearly understand how they were going to conduct the defense. Fields of fire, principal directions of fire, final protective fires, illumination plans, and support plans were neglected. Individuals did not have specific, clear instructions as to where they would go and what they must do in the event of an attack. When the sudden attack came, the defense fell apart. Word was not passed to higher headquarters although the radio remained operative for several minutes. When it was felt that ammunition was running short panic set in and personnel began withdrawing toward Dong Ha. Many were slaughtered a short distance from the defensive positions by an ambush the enemy had set up with such a possibility in mind.

3. Teaching Technique: Make an issue out of local defense plans each night as the CP is being established. All hands should occupy assigned positions and observe where other persons are located. Inspections should then be made by both FF and Marine leaders. Adjustments should be made to insure good dispersion and that there is depth in the defense. Every man must understand he has but one place to go in event of attack. Do not let anything cause you to neglect these preparations and precautions. Even though you move after dark, some villagers will know where you are and the enemy can find out. It is imperative that you be ready to defend your position against a determined attack.
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: Assistant Chief of Staff, Combined Action Program)

Subj: After Action Report, CAP 4-2-6 Contact of 19 Jan 1969

Ref: (a) ForO 31214B

Encl: (1) Activity Overlay
(2) Schematic diagram of contact site

1. At about 1915Z 19 January 1969, the CAP leader of 4-2-6 coordinated with the FF platoon commander regarding the specific location for the night CP location and confirmed the planned night activities. The platoon leader then departed stating that he had the night off. The assistant platoon leader notified the CAP leader at about 1815 that he had fresh intelligence that three VC would be active in the hamlet at YD 320489. (See enclosure (1)). The CAP leader concurred in an activity modification and notified the CAGG of the new ambush and night CP site. At about 1830 the Combined Platoon assembled at the new CP and shortly thereafter, the scheduled ambush departed along with the assistant FF platoon commander. This activity consisted of three Marines and three FF’s. Twenty-one FF’s, and six Marines remained at the night CP. At 1900 the FF radio operator informed the CAP leader that eighteen FF’s were going on a short patrol to the south. The CAP leader asked why, but the radio operator responded that the patrol would be back at 2100. The CAP leader asked again but was not given any reason. The FF’s have done this on previous occasions, the most notable being 24 Dec 1967 when they successfully ambushed two VC. The patrol departed at 1900 with one radio, leaving three FF’s and six Marines at the CP. At 2135, the CAP leader heard a heavy small arms fire, estimated to be AK-47, and explosions to his south. The FF radio operator in the CP tried to get communications with the patrol but could not raise the patrol. The FF’s did not use communications while on patrol unless contact was made. The CAP leader moved the CP group to the ambush site rapidly after requesting artillery illumination. The move took eight to ten minutes and the first round of illumination hit the area just as the reaction force arrived on the scene. Several figures were seen moving to the east, and a high explosive artillery mission was called to block escape routes. An initial estimate of the situation showed most of the FF patrol was wounded or dead. As the CAP leader
Subj: After Action Report, CAI 4-2-6 Contact of 19 Jan 1969

Swept through the ambush site posting security, one VC was encountered and killed; another was believed to have been killed but the body was not recovered. In the meantime, the CAP leader had called for the scheduled ambush activity to reinforce his reaction force. The corpsman rendered first aid to the wounded; a landing zone was secured and marked. MEDEVAC aircraft requested, ten wounded moved to the site for evacuation. Six PFs were dead and one was a minor, non MEDEVAC, wounded. One PF received no wounds. Four died of wounds after MEDEVAC, bringing the total to ten dead.

2. A sweep of the ambush site at dawn revealed no additional information. A debrief of those involved and a detailed search of the area revealed the following:

a. Estimated enemy strength: Six to ten VC armed with AK-47s and employing five claymore mines plus other explosive devices, possibly I/N.

b. VC moved into the area from, and withdrew to, the east.

c. Ambush duration: 4 minutes

d. PF KIA: 10 (including four who actually died of wounds)

e. PF WIA: 6 MEDEVAC
   1 Non MEDEVAC

f. VC KIA: 1

g. Weapons lost: 7 - M-16 rifles

3. A schematic of the ambush site has been appended as enclosure (2).

4. Several concluding observations can be made regarding this contact.
   a. Although the Marine CAP leader objected to the patrol, its com-
   position, and the proposed route, the FF platoon sergeant insisted on
   executing this activity without Americans. Enforced Marine participation
   may have precluded some of the salient tactical errors, but this is by no
   means certain.

   b. Movement of the obvious, habitually used route, in this case, the
   main hamlet throughfare, significantly enhances a unit's vulnerability to
   ambush
Subj: After Action Report, CAT 4-2-6 Contact of 19 Jan 1969

d. This was a well laid ambush, utilizing a minimum of enemy personnel and capitalizing on fire power.

e. Local security by the PPs was lacking. Complacency was aggravated by the lack of previous contact in that portion of the hamlet.

f. The FP platoon involved in this action has a history of non-cooperation and failure to follow sound planning procedures. A formal recommendation/request was submitted on 6 Jan 1969 asking for the relief of the platoon leader. Action has been taken, but it did not occur until after this incident added additional emphasis to the recommendation.

g. The Marine squad leader's immediate response with a small reaction force and his subsequent coordination of artillery illumination, the HE mission, MEDDAC'S, and his effective maneuvering of the remainder of the CAT was commendable.

J. E. GREENWOOD
The troop distribution shown are those at the time of contact.

Original CP, ambush plan unplanned at ambush point of contact.

CAP 4-2-6, Quang Tri Province, Vietnam Activity overlay 1900:44 July 19:50 Binh Xuan Lai Du 1:25,000

ENCL (1)
Schematic Diagram of Contact Site

River

110 meters

200 meters

300 meters

Village & Fields

3 foot crater

Claymore Fire Fan

VC Positions

PF

ENCL (2)

DECLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS
4th Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco 96602

From: Commanding Officer
To: CACO Commanders

Subj: Tactical Operations; Policies and Guidance concerning

1. Within 4th CAG the problems of CAP tactics and day-to-day operations are considered to be the primary domain of the CACO commander. Our basic organizational concepts resulted primarily from a desire to assist the CAP leaders and CACO commanders and to relieve them of as much of the burden of nontactical matters as possible. It was hoped that they could thus focus their efforts more on the critical areas of operation. Thus CAG level personnel are expected to carry much of the load in PSTOPS, Civic Action, intelligence collection, supply, ammunition, and training while the main thrust of the CACO and CAP leader goes to operations.

2. After nearly six months of experience, I see no reason to change this basic approach. The CAG has not as yet developed the dynamic programs needed in the areas allotted it. In the fields of intelligence and training particularly, little has been accomplished, but I feel certain the desired progress can and will be made. Likewise in the field of tactics and operations, I feel our performance is far below the standard desired and am most anxious for prompt and dramatic improvement.

3. Here are several areas that need attention:

   a. Our goal in every hamlet is SUSTAINED SECURITY. We are trying to change the environment; trying to make the people feel safe enough to commit themselves to the SVN effort. Killing VC helps, but sometimes that action serves to only demonstrate that the VC still have access to the hamlets we are trying to defend. The critical idea is to protect the people and keep them separated and safe from the VC. All activities, operations, and night and day positions must be planned and selected with this foremost in mind. It is simply not being done today.

   b. The vast majority of our contacts occur at night. It is clear that the VC move, seek entry into our hamlets, and operate almost exclusively at night. CG III MAF has directed that two-thirds of each CAP remain outside its compound and conduct operations during the hours of darkness. The same principle obviously applies to CAPs without compounds. We are simply not adhering to this unequivocal, and eminently sound, order.

   c. People cannot function indefinitely without sleep. If we reverse
our days in order to have maximum activities at night, we must sleep during the day. This may not be desirable, but the multitude of people who work night shifts throughout the world clearly demonstrate that it is possible. Meals, resupply runs, administrative requests, routine chores must be programed around the requirement for sleep. The CACO must ensure that a sound schedule exists for the daily routine within his CAPs. He must ensure that people sleep in order to be fit for duty at night. He must control his own Headquarters and administrative processes so that CAPs can adhere to a program that truly inverts night and day. This is not being done. CAP personnel are harassed and usually couldn't sleep if they tried.

d. There are a number of chores that must be performed in daylight. Many of them contribute directly to tactical success. PSYOPS, Civic Action, intelligence collection, training, reconnaissance, area observation and control activities must be conducted during daylight. Thus the problem of managing the time of each CAP member is complicated. These things must be programed around the demands for sleep and maximum night time activity. The answers are careful scheduling, attention to detail, and stricter control of personnel. These ingredients are often missing.

e. The greatest single danger to our program is probably complacency. It is evidenced in countless different ways. Inadequate security measures, neglect of basic rules of patrolling and ambushing, sleeping on watch, reluctance to leave trails and paths, failure to dig in (or even select a covered position to fight from), and a gross indifference toward finding out what goes on in our hamlets are just a few of the signs of spreading complacency that anybody can observe. The enemy need only leave an area alone for two or three weeks and it softens itself through complacency.

f. Sound tactics are not god-given; they are not inherited or acquired automatically. Not one young corporal or sergeant in a hundred has adequate competence in this field. Their understanding of the proper use of terrain, the control of a point element, all around security, fire and maneuver, fire superiority, fire control and discipline, etc. (to say nothing of the psychological and morale forces involved) leave much to be desired. In six months I have yet to see any CAP leader working to improve his own knowledge or understanding of tactics, nor have I seen any CACO commanders giving them any real assistance in the form of reading material or discussion groups or other teaching aids.

g. Since 4th CAC was activated we have never encountered an enemy who sought action. He has consistently avoided it and fought only when forced. Despite this, I cannot recall a single action that we pushed aggressively to its logical conclusion. We are consistently timid, and we consistently embolden our enemy because of it. Our operations are
largely a story of lost opportunities. In an environment like ours, every contact must be exploited to the fullest. The correct response is to pile on, commit adjacent elements, converge forces, pursue relentlessly, maintain pressure until every enemy is killed or captured. For some reason, thinking in these terms has become alien to us, and we suffer for it.

4. Get with it.

J.E. GREENWOOD
Lieutenant Colonel, J. E. GREENWOOD,
Commanding Officer,
4th Combined Action Group,
III Marine Amphibious Force,
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

Dear John:

Recent activities and events in the I Corps Tactical Zone have served to underscore the absolute requirement for continuous, aggressive, saturation patrolling by coordinated small units in order that they might maintain an offensive posture. In three separate contacts within the past three days the Combined Action Program has suffered 2 USMC KIA, 1½ USMC WIA, 1 USN WIA, 11 PFs KIA, and 12 PFs WIA, while inflicting but one casualty on the enemy.

During my recent visits to CAPs I observed no less than 5 CAPs move into a night position, set up in a building or in a concentrated perimeter, post minimum security and then turn in for the night. One Marine told me personally that he had 7 hours sleep while on his activity. This constituted the sole performance for these CAPs and was called an "AMBUSH". In two of the contacts mentioned above, Marine and PF units were not integrated as required by Force Order 3121.4B, nor was there supervision of the PFs present. With practices such as these I am not surprised by our mounting casualties.

I desire that you take immediate action to ensure that proper professional offensive action is undertaken and continued by each of your CAPs. In the recent past some CAPs have fallen into bad habits due to lack of contact. It is now obvious that the enemy will no longer avoid the CAPs so long as the CAPs do not interfere with their operations but will feed upon them. The enemy is aggressively seeking contact with our CAPs and we must meet this threat with renewed vigor through aggressive saturation operations within each CAP's area of coordination.
Each of our CAP leaders must brief and debrief each activity originating from his CAP. Only through proper briefing and debriefing can he accomplish his mission. As an example, ambushes must be thoroughly planned, briefed and rehearsed. Each member of the ambush must know the location of every other member. Likewise patrol orders must be issued in detail. Each activity must be debriefed not only for its intelligence value but also for lessons learned and, perhaps more importantly, as a training vehicle for future activities.

I am sure you know what has to be done - I shall expect you to use that knowledge. Continuous supervision at CACO and CAG level as well as immediate improvement in operations is mandatory.

E. F. DANOWITZ
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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<tr>
<td>0600-0900</td>
<td>Leadership Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900-1100</td>
<td>Citizen of Patrons/Instructors Learned</td>
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<tr>
<td>1100-1330</td>
<td>Instructor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1330-1600</td>
<td>Prepare for Inspection</td>
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<td>1600-1700</td>
<td>Barrack Chow</td>
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<tr>
<td>1700-1730</td>
<td>Retreat Order</td>
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<td>1730-0100</td>
<td>Report to Asst. CPO</td>
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<td>0100-0800</td>
<td>Right Activities</td>
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<td>0800-0930</td>
<td>Return to 4th CPO</td>
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<td>0930-1300</td>
<td>Free Time</td>
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<tr>
<td>0630-1300</td>
<td>Morning or ACC</td>
</tr>
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REMARKS:
- 2-3 and Asst.
- GFAP Web Mission

INSTRUCTION:
- Leadership
- Citizen of Patrons/Instructors Learned
- Instructor
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) CACO 4-2

BRAVO - (Where) IN Quang Tri PROVINCE YD 308478 COORD,

7 KM Southwest OF Quang Tri City

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURRED) 081800H Jan 69

DELTA - (Who, What, How) At above coordinates, a PF element of CAP 4-2-6 engaged an unknown number of VC. Contact was broken prior to the Marines arrival.

ECHO - (Results) A sweep of the area produced two (2) VC KIA.

FOXTROT - Pr/KIA 0 GOLF - Pr/KIA 0 HOTEL- Pr/KIA 0

INDIA - En/KIA 2(c) JULIET - En/Caprtd 0 KILO - En/Sus 0

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) Negative

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) Negative

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken) Establishing a night activity at this location.

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) Final
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) CACO 4-2

BRAVO - (Where) IN Quang Tri
PROVINCE 318523
COORD,
2.5 KM Southwest OF Quang Tri City

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURED) 100230H Jan 69

DELTA - (Who, What, How) CAP 4-2-3 received 5 enemy mortar rounds
that landed 400 meters from their night CP. Contacted Quang Tri Base
FACs and requested counter fire mission. The fire mission was checked
because the rounds were hitting too close to the CAT CP. At 0305 CAP
4-2-3 received more enemy mortar fire which landed 200 meters short of
CAP CP. Quang Tri Base Defense was again called for counter fire mission

ECHO - (Results) 


FOXTROT - Fr/KIA 0 GOLF - Fr/WIA 0 HOTEL - Fr/KIA 0

INDIA - En/KIA 0 (C) JULIET - En/Captured 0 KILO - KIA/SAS 0

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) Negative

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) Negative

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken) 


OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) Final
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) CACO 4-3

BRAVO - (Where) IN Quang Tri PROVINCE 360595 COORD, 8.5 KM Northeast OF Quang Tri City.

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURED) 122000H Jan 69

DELTA - (Who, What, How) While in night CP, (1) NVA Lieutenant approached CAP 4-3-2 and stated he wanted to Chieu Hoi. He was from K8 NVA Bn.

He had (1) Chinese 9mm pistol with 5 rounds.

ECHO - (Results)

POX Trot - Fr/KIA 0 GOLF - Fr/MIA 0 HOTEL - Fr/MIA 0

INDIA - En/KIA 0 (C) JULIET - En/ Captrd 1 KILO - En/Sus 0

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) (1) Chinese 9mm pistol

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) Negative

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken) Turned NVA into District

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) Final

DECLASSIFIED
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) _ CACO 4-3_

BRAVO - (Where) IN _Quang Tri_ PROVINCE _361590_ COORD,
6.5 KM Northeast OF _Quang Tri City_.

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURED) _122230H Jan 69_.

DELTA - (Who, What, How) FF Platoon #40 was in position when contact
was made with unknown number of VC. Enemy fired claymore or threw
 grenade,(PFs did not know which).

ECHO - (Results) CAP 4-3-2 sent reactionary force to area, but contact
was broken before they arrived. CAP called for MEDEVAC. Helocopter
unable to land because of weather. CAP 4-3-2 assisted FF unit in com-
pleteing MEDEVAC by boat.

PHOTOT - Fr/KIA _2 (FF) _ GOLF - Fr/KIA _6 (FF) _ HOTEL - Fr/KIA _0_

INDIA - En/KIA _0_ (C) JULIET - En/Caprd _0_ KILO - En/Sus _0_

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) Negative

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) Negative

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken)

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) _Final_
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) CACO 4-1

BRAVO - (Where) IN Quang Tri PROVINCE 274613 COORD,

2 KM East of Dong Ha City

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURRED) 12230H Jan 69

DELTA - (Who, What, How) (8) VC were sighted walking on the trail leading
to CAP 4-1-6 night position. When VC were 6 to 8 meters away the CAP
opened fire with M-16 and M-79 illumination. CAP called for artillery
illumination and recalled CAP patrol to standby as reactionary force.

ECHO - (Results) Search of area revealed 2 dead VC, 2 assault rifles
and 40 pounds of rice.

FOX - Fr/KIA 0 GOLF - Fr/WIA 0 HOTEL - Fr/WIA 0

INDIA - En/KIA 2(C) JULIET - En/Captred 0 KILO - En/Sus 0

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) 2 PPS-43 assault rifles

MINK - (Equipment/Documents) Rice and money collection records

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken) Weapons and collection records
forwarded to District.

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) Final
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) CACO 4-2

BRAVO - (Where) IN Guang Tri PROVINCE 309478 COORD, 8 KM Southwest OF Quang Tri City.

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURRED) 131915H Jan 69

DELTA - (Who, What, How) A 4-2-6 CAP patrol heard movement and immediately made contact with (5) VC carrying automatic weapons. Patrol laid down a base of fire, and VC immediately broke contact. CAP 4-2-6 swept area and picked up (2) VCS.

ECHO - (Results)

FOXTROT - Pr/KIA 0 GOLF - Pr/WIA 1 (FF) HOTEL- Pr/WIA 0

INDIA - En/KIA 0 (C) JULIET - En/Captd 0 KILO - En/Sus 2

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) Negative

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) Negative

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken)

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) Final

DECLASSIFIED
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) CACO 4-1

BRAVO - (Where) IN Guang Tri PROVINCE 232631 COORD,

2 KM North OF Long Ha City

CHARLIE - (When, DTO INCIDENT OCCURRED) 1322L09 Jan 69

DELTA - (Who, What, How) Searchlight team working with CAF 4-1-4

spotted (1) VC outside wire. The VC ducked when the light was turned

on. The VC panicked and ran toward the Northwest. The guard opened

up with an M-16. The VC escaped behind a hill.

ECHO - (Results) (2) USMC and (3) FFs swept the area of wire and last

area where the VC was spotted. Negative results on the sweep.

FOXTROT - Fr/KIA 0 GOLF - Fr/WIA 0 HOTEL- Fr/WIA 0

INDIA - En/KIA 0 JULIET - En/Captred 0 KILO - En/Sus 0

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) Negative

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) Negative

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken)

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) Final
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) 4-3

BRAVO - (Where) IN Guang Tri PROVINCE YD 345617 COORD,

7.0 KM NW OF Guang Tri City.

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURRED) 171845H Jan 69

DELTA - (Who, What, How) Supply boat was returning from CAF 4-3-6

from a resupply mission. At 0048 YD 345617, the occupants were fired

on by unknown size enemy force with small arms fire. Operator of the

boat moved from the ambush site as fast as possible.

ECHO - (Results) Negative enemy casualties. One USMC KIA and one

damaged boat.

FOXTROT - Fr/KIA 1 GOLF - Fr/WIA 0 HOTEL - Fr/KIA 0

INDIA - En/KIA 0 (C) JULIET - En/Captured 0 KILO - En/Sus 0

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) None

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) None

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken) MEDEVACED

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) Final
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) 4-2-6

BRAVO - (Where) IN Guan Tri PROVINCE YD31485 COORD,
_________________________ KM ___________________ OF _______________________.

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURED) 192135H

DELTA - (Who, What, How) PF element from CAF-4-2-6 returning from ambush site was ambushed by approx. 15 to 20 VC. Ambush was sprung with (5) claymores, TNT, and heavy volume AWF. PF/USMC CP element reacted to engagement, as did 4-2-6 ambush activity to provide security for medevac.

ECHO - (Results)

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FOXROT - Fr/KIA 9 GOLF - Fr/WIA 7 HOTEL - Fr/WIA 0

INDIA - En/KIA 1 (C) JULIET - En/Captd 0 KILO - En/Sus 0

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) (7) M-16 lost by PF element

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) None

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken) After action report being prepared

(NOTE: District officials did not know about this special activity which was run by PF element only.)

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) FINAL

DECLASSIFIED
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) CACO-4-1 (CAP-4-2-2)

BRAVO - (Where) IN Guang Tri PROVINCE YD275574 COORD.

6 KM NW OF Guang Tri City.

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURRED) 200800H Jan 69.

DELTA - (Who, What, How) (26) Vietnamese women carrying moderate amounts

foodstuffs were apprehended in an area placed off-limits by the District

Chief.

ECHO - (Results) VCS transported to District for interrogation, were

questioned, cautioned and released.

FOXTROT - Fr/KIA 0 GOLF - Fr/MIA 0 HOTEL- Fr/MIA 0

INDIA - En/KIA 0 (C) JULIET - En/Cptrd 0 KILO - En/Sus 26

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) N/A

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) N/A

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken) NONE

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) FINAL

DECLASSIFIED
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report)  4-3

BRAVO - (Where) IN  Guang Tri  PROVINCE  YD 367581  COORD,  4.0  KM  NE  OF  Guang Tri City.

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURED)  20093CH Jan 69

DELTA - (Who, What, How)  CAP 4-3-3 had intelligence of bunker position in use by VC. At coord YD 367581. CAP searched thoroughly and found a spool of demolition cord, and 10 Chi Co mun grenades. Also found papers referring to the FF Plt. Ldr. of FF Plt. #24, requestin the people living there to obtain photograph of him and pass it on to a suicide squad for his assination. Two (2) squads of FFs assisted in sweep and search.

ECCHO - (Results)  The demolition cord is in 4-3-3's possession. The 10 Chi Co mun grenades were blown up by a claymore mine. The papers were given to the National Police who assisted in intelligence report.

 FOXTROT - Fr/KIA  0  GOLF - Fr/WIA  0  HOTEL - Fr/WIA  0

INDIA - En/KIA  0  (C)  JULIET - En/Captd  0  KILO - En/Sus  0

LIMA - (Weapons Captured)  None

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents)  Found wanted poster and instructions.

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken)  Informed 4th CAG (S-3) and 7th CIT

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report)  Final
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) CACO-4-3

BRAVO - (Where) IN Trieu Phong PROVINCE YD323642 COORD, 

____________________ KM ____________________ OF ____________________.

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURED) 201645H Jan 69

DELT - (Who, What, How) Villagers reported to CAI 436 that approx. a platoon of VC/NVA were headed for their position. CAP sent out patrol to above grid and observed (2) people. Called to them to halt but the (2) ran in opposite direction. CAP fired over their heads with negative results and the people disappeared in forest at YD323642. CAP swept area with negative results and returned to their CP.

ECHO - (Results) n/a

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FOXTROT - Fr/KIA 0 GOLF - Fr/KIA 0 HOTEL- Fr/KIA 0

INDIA - En/KIA 0 (C) JULIET - En/Captrd 0 KILO - En/Sus 0

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) NONE

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) NONE

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken) NONE

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OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) FINAL

________________________
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) 4-3

BRAVO - (Where) IN Guan Tri PROVINCE YD 367577 COORD,

4.0 KM NE OF Guan Tri City.

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURED) 211230H Jan 69

DELTA - (Who, What, How) At about 211200H, CAP 4-3-3 unit received

intelligence from National Police that VC were in bunker at coord YD 367577.

CAP responded, received 3 rounds incoming AK-47 fire, and flushed one

male from bunker with CS.


ECHO - (Results) The bunker was grenaded and entered and one young

(about 23) female and 1 AK-47 were in bunker. Female died of grenade

wounds shortly thereafter. Male VC gave location of another bunker

at YD 360570. Upon arrival at second bunker, VC ran into brush and

was killed by patrol. The 2d bunker contained nothing, the 1st contained

recruiting documents, photos, leaflets and records which were given to National

Police.

PORTROTR - FR/KIA 0 GOLF - FR/WIA 0 HOTEL - FR/WIA 0

INDIA - En/KIA 2 (C) JULIET - En/Captd 0 KILO - En/Sus 0

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) one AK-47

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) Documents as described.

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken) Bodies taken to Trieu Pheng District Hqs.

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) Final
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report)  4-3

BRAVO - (Where) IN  Quang Tri  PROVINCE  YD 377546  COORD,  5.0 KM SE OF  Quang Tri City

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURED)  241615H  Jan 69

DELTA - (Who, What, How)  One Vietnamese boy, age 14, reported to CAP 4-3-4 that VC had hidden ammunition in a bunker at coord YD 377546.

ECHO - (Results)  CAP 4-3-4 checked the bunker and found 57 M-79 HE rounds of ammunition.

FOXTROT - Fr/MIA  0  GOLF - Fr/MIA  0  HOTEL - Fr/MIA  0

INDIA - En/KIA  0  (C)  JULIET - En/Captrd  0  KILO - En/Sus  0

LIMA - (Weapons Captured)  None

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents)  57 rounds of M-79 HE

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken)  Destroyed the amm and paid VIP funds of GVN $700 for the information.

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report)  Final
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) 4-2

BRAVO - (Where) IN Quang Tri PROVINCE YD 324522 COORD.

1.0 KM E OF Quang Tri City.

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURRED) 242230H Jan 69

DELTAS - (Who, What, How) CAP 4-2-3 spotted three VC at coor YD 324522

Moving southwest. CAP 4-2-3 brought the enemy under small arms fire

and received return fire. Illumination was called for and when received

contact was broken.


ECHO - (Results) Search team swept the area of contact with negative

results


FOXTROT - Fr/KIA 0 GOLF - Fr/WIA 0 HOTEL- Fr/KIA 0

INDIA - En/KIA 0 (C) JULIET - En/Captd 0 XILO - En/Heav 0

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) None

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) None

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken) None


OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) Final
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) 4-2

BRAVO - (Where) IN Guang Tri PROVINCE YD 437495 COORD.
          2.0 KM NE OF Guang Tri City.

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURED) 251100H Jan 69

DELTA - (Who, What, How) An MTT 4-1 patrol located 25 bunkers at coord
         YD 437496 with fighting holes supporting them. 15 of the bunkers were
         believed to be VC positions. 10 of the bunkers were in homes of villagers
         for protection.

ECHO - (Results) Bunkers were searched with negative results. Inspection
          of the bunkers indicated they were large enough to hold 15 people each.

FOXTROT - Fr/KIA 0 GOLF - Fr/WIA 0 HOTEL - Fr/WIA 0

INDIA - En/KIA 0 (C) JULIET - En/Captrd 0 KILO - En/Sus 0

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) None

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) None

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken) Contacted engineer team and destroyed
          the 15 bunkers not being used by villagers. The villagers filled in the
          fighting positions.

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) Final
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) 4-1

BRAVO - (Where) IN Quang Tri PROVINCE YD 218629 COORD,

0.5 KM E OF Dong Ha City

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURED) 260945H Jan 69

DELTA - (Who, What, How) While on patrol, CAP 4-1-4 located nine tons

of rice and an unusual amount of medical supplies in two houses at

coord WD 218629.

ECHO - (Results) Seven detainees from the two houses were taken into

custody and turned over to District Hos. for questioning.

POXPORT - Fr/KIA 0 GOLF - Fr/MIA 0 HOTEL - Fr/MIA 0

INDIA - En/KIA 0 (C) JULIET - En/Captred 0 KILO - En/Sus 7

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) None

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) Nine tons rice and medical supplies,

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken) Collected the 9 tons of rice, 4 benz-

thene penicillin syrettes, 8 bottles of Isonized tablets, 5 calcium

glucosacetate syrettes and turned over to District Hos.

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) Final
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) 4-2

BRAVO - (Where) IN Guang Tri PROVINCE YD 307472 COORD.

6.0 KM SW OF Guang Tri City

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURRED) 262330H Jan. 69

DELTA - (Who, What, How) An element from CAP 4-2-6 while in night CP

location received ten to twelve rounds of incoming mortar fire in a

one minute period. Rounds appeared to come from Northeast.

ECHO - (Results) Injured Marines and FFs Medevaced to III Med by air.

Evacuation completed at 2330 hours.

7 USMC (E)

FOXTROT - Fr/KIA 0 GOLF - Fr/WIA 5 FF (E) HOTEL - Fr/KIA 0

INDIA - En/KIA 0 (C) JULIET - En/Captd 0 KILO - En/Sus 0

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) None

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) None

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken) 1st Bn, 5th Mech Div (USA) notified.

Follow up indicates they were friendly rounds from U.S. Army at LZ Sharon.

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) Final
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) 4-2  YD 384498
BRAVO - (Where) IN Guang Tri PROVINCE YD 384504 COORD,

5.0 KM SE OF Guang Tri City

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURED) 270930H Jan 69

DELTA - (Who, What, How) A local villager informed CAF 4-2-1 of the
location of two booby trapped grenades at coord YD 394498 and YD 384504.

ECHO - (Results) CAF 4-2-1 checked the area and found two booby trapped
grenades and destroyed them in place.

FOXHOT - Fr/KIA 0  GOLF - Fr/WIA 0  HOTEL- Fr/WIA 0

INDIA - En/KIA 0 (C)  JULIET - En/Captd 0  KILO - En/Sus 0

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) None

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) None

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken) Paid civilian V$1200 for reporting
the information.

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) Final
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) 4-2

BRAVO - (Where) DMZ Guan Tri Province TD 222515 COORD.

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURED) 271600H Jan 69

DELTA - (Who, what, how) While on patrol CAF 4-2-3 found about

30 propaganda leaflets of 7 types spread along trail. Pelleted

up leaflets.

ECHO - (Results) N/A

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FOXTROT - Fr/KIA 0 GOLF - Fr/WIA 0 HOTEL - Fr/WIA 0

INDIA - En/KIA 0 (c) JULIET - En/Cptd 0 KILO - En/Sus 0

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) None

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) 30 leaflets

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken) Samples delivered to District and

summarized to III MAF under separate cover.

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) Final
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report)  A-1

BRAVO - (Where) IN Guang Tri PROVINCE YD 228617 COORD,

       2.5 KM N OF Dong Ha City.

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURRED) 280800H Jan 69

DELTA - (Who, What, How) CAP 4-1-4 patrol found approximately 200 VC

leaflets scattered along trail at cord YD 228617.

ECHO - (Results) Filled up leaflets and turned in to CAPO 4-1 Hqs.

FOXTROT - Fr/KIA  0 GOLF - Fr/KIA  0 HOTEL- Fr/KIA  0

INDIA - En/KIA  0 (C) JULIET - En/Captred  0 KILO - En/Sus  0

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) None

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) 200 VC leaflets

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken) Samples forwarded to District Hqs.

          and III MAF under separate cover.

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) Final
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) 4-2-7

BRAVO - (Where) IN  Guan Tri PROVINCE YD 400517 COORD,

6.0 KM East OF Guan Tri City

CHARLIE - (When, Dtg INCIDENT OCCURED) 281030H Jan 69

DELTA - (Who, What, How) Patrol located ten bunkers made of concrete,

sand and legs which showed signs of recent occuration. Hai Lang

District Headquarters notified.

ECHO - (Results) Negative

FOXROT - Fr/KIA 0 GOLF - Fr/WIA 0 HOTEL - Fr/KIA 0

INDIA - En/KIA 0 (C) JULIET - En/Cptd 0 KILO - En/Sba 0

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) None

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) None

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken) Army engineers destroyed 7 bunkers.

Returned next day to destroy remaining 3.

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) Final
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) 4-1

BRAVO - (Where) IN Guang Tri PROVINCE YD 280575 COORD.
       0.5 KM Sd OF Dong Ha City

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURRED) 291000H Jan 69

DELTA - (Who, What, How) Vietnamese civilians turned in 30.105mm
        fuse to USP 4-1-7.

ECHO - (Results) Negative

FOX − (KIA) 0 GOLF − (WIA) 0 HOTEL − (WIA) 0

INDIA - (KIA) 0 (C) JULIET - (Captured) 0 KILO - (Sus) 0

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) None

MKE - (Equipment/Documents) None

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken) Paid civilians from VIP funds for
          turning in the ordinance. Ordinance was turned over to EOD for
          disposal.

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) Final
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) 4-1

BRAVO - (Where) IN Da Nang PROVINCE YD 285566 COORD,

0.5 KM NW OF Dong Ha City

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURRED) 1200H Jan 60

DELTA - (Who, What, How) OP from GAT 4-1-7 picked up one suspect

female moving in the direction of a known VC harbor site at coord

YD 285566.

ECHO - (Results) Negative


FOXTROT - Fr/KIA 0 GOLF - Fr/WIA 0 HOTEL - Fr/WIA 0

INDIA - En/KIA 0 (C) JULIET - En/Captd 0 KILO - En/Sus 1

LIMA - (Weapons Captured) None

MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) None

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken) Suspect turned over to District Hqs.

OSCAR - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report)
SPOT REPORT

ALPHA - (Unit sending report) □-I

BRAVO - (Where) IN Guang Tri PROVINCE YD 283574 COORD, 
6.0 KM NN OF Guang Tri City.

CHARLIE - (When, DTG INCIDENT OCCURED) 30230H Jan 69

DELTA - (Who, What, How) A patrol from CAF 4-2-2 spotted two men running 
at coord YD 223574. The patrol searched the area and apprehended one 
suspect. At the same time the CAP OF at coord YD 276576 spotted 5 men 
75 meters south of the compound.

ECHO - (Results) A searching element was sent out to search with 
negative results.

FOXTROT - Fr/KIA O GOLF - Fr/WIA O HOTEL- Fr/WIA O
INDIA - En/KIA 0 (C) JULIET - En/Captrd 0 KILO - En/Vis 1
LIMA - (Weapons Captured) None
MIKE - (Equipment/Documents) None

NOVEMBER - (Command Action Taken) Turned suspect over to 15th ITT.

OSCART - (Initial, Interim, or Final Report) Final
PRIORITY 090531 Z JAN 69

FM: FOURTH CAG
TO: CG III MAF
(ATTN: DIRCAP)

UNCLASS E F T O (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

CHANGE OF PF PLT WITH CAP

1. EFFECTIVE 8JAN69 PF PLT #66 WAS ASSIGNED BY MAI LIMH
   DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS TO WORK WITH CAP 4-2-3. REASON FOR
   CHANGE, PF PLT #57 WAS ASSIGNED A NEW MISSION BY ITS
   HEADQUARTERS.

BT

CCn 14/9JAN TIME ________ RKL BY ________________________
PRIORITY 150151  2 JAN 69

FROM:  FOURTH CAG
TO:  CG III MAF
(ATTN:  DIR CAP)

UNCLASSIFIED  (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

COMPLETION OF MTT 4-1 TRAINING

1. On 11 JAN 1969 MTT 4-1 completed a two-week training cycle with PF PLT #18 at Coord YD 382470 in Hai Lang District.

CON_________ TIME_________ REL BY_________
PRIORITY 210127  Z JAN 69

FM: FOURTH CAG
TO: CG III MAH
(ATTN: DMCAP)

UNCLAS EFPTO (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

MTT TRAINING OF PF UNIT AND ACTIVATION OF NEW CAP.

1. ON 20 JANUARY 1969 MTT 4-1 COMMENCED TRAINING PF PLT #8 AT COORD YD 428390 IN HAI LANG DISTRICT.

2. ON 21 JANUARY 1969 CAP 4-2-7 WAS ACTIVATED. CAP WILL WORK WITH PF PLT #10 AND #21 IN THE VILLAGE OF THON TRA LOC COORD YD 390535 IN MAI LINH DISTRICT.

CCN __________ TIME __________ REL BY __________
ROUTINE Z JAN 69

FM: FOURTH CAG
TO: CG III MAF
BT
CONFIDENTIAL FOR A C/S, CAP, III MAF

1. 3D MARDIV CHOPPED TWO USMC SQUADS OPCON DONG HA DISTRICT FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH PF PLATOONS #80 AND 1114. PLATOON 80 TO WORK GRIDS YD 2362, 2462 AND 2361, 2461 NORTH OF RIVER. PLATOON 1114 TO WORK GRIDS 2561 AND 2661. BOTH WILL BE UNDER CONTROL OF CACO 4-1. CAP 4-1-6 NOW WORKING WITH PF PLATOON 34 VICK 33 IN CAP 4-1-6 AOG. ONE USMC SQUAD CHOPPED FROM 3D MARDIV TO 4TH CAG TO AUGMENT 4-2-6 FOR THIRTY DAYS AT 220900H JAN 69

BT

CCM ________________ TIME ______________ REL BY ______________
PRIORITY Z JAN 69

FM: FOURTH CAG
TO: CG THIRD MARDIV
INFO: CG III MAF

1. IT IS REQ THAT TWO SQUADS FROM SECOND BN THIRD MAR CHOPPED OPCON TO FOURTH CAG ON 27 JAN 69 EACH BE AUGMENTED WITH TWO AN/PRC-25 RADIOS AND ACCESSORIES.

2. THIS ORGANIZATION OPERATING SHORT OF T/E AND UNABLE TO PROVIDE.

CON TIME REL BY
PSYOPS Operation Order 3-68

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION
   a. Enemy Forces
      (1) VC Cadre of South Vietnamese descent.
      (2) VC Cadre who went to North Vietnam to join the NVA and who have returned to South Vietnam.
      (3) NVA Cadre
   b. Friendly Forces
      (1) Vietnamese Information Service (VIS)
      (2) DICCC Personnel
      (3) Hamlet/Village Officials
      (4) Police Field Forces
      (5) U.S. and Free World Forces in AO's.

2. MISSION. The 4th Combined Action Group will conduct an aggressive psychological warfare campaign to induce the enemy forces and their supporters to rally to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of Operation. Commencing on 9 December 1968, CACO/CAP operations will incorporate a variety of PSYOPS measures to ensure maximum dissemination of the specified themes and accomplishment of the PSYOPS mission set forth above.

   b. The 4th CAG PSYOPS Officer will:
      (1) Coordinate all CACO's operations.
      (2) Distribute posters, leaflets, and other materials to CACOs as necessary to support program.
      (3) Assign Armed Propaganda Teams, as available, to meet the requirements of the plan.
      (4) Arrange for aerial broadcasts throughout the campaign and coordinate such operations with CACOs.
c. CACOs will:

(1) Coordinate all CAP PSYOPS efforts

(2) Continue to support awards campaign by using VIP funds.

(3) Employ assigned Armed Propaganda Teams as follows:
   (a) 9-14 December to announce the Chieu Hoi Program
   (b) 23-31 December to announce progress of Chieu Hoi Program
   (c) 6-11 January to encourage VC/NVA to rally and be home for TET.
   (d) 13-18 January to announce the progress of Chieu Hoi Program.

d. CAPs will execute the following PSYOPS campaign:

(1) 9-14 December, distribute and post poster #7-357 in key locations and distribute leaflet #2274 (Annex A)

(2) 16-21 December, distribute and post poster #7-503 and poster #7-548 in key locations (Annex A)

(3) 23-28 December, distribute leaflets #2779 and #7-571 (Annex A)

(4) 6-11 January, distribute leaflets #7-605 and #7-497 (Annex A)

(5) 13-18 January, establish daily checkpoints in and off the path area for ID Card checks.

(6) 20-25 January, distribute leaflet #244-339 (Annex A)

(7) Provide security for Armed Propaganda Teams during periods as outlined in paragraph 3.c.(3) above.

e. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Ensure thorough, systematic coverage of all hamlets in assigned area when making leaflet distribution.

(2) Hand leaflets to individuals. Urge FPs to mingle with the people and discuss leaflet contents during distribution.

4. ADMINISTRATION and LOGISTICS

a. Administration

(1) Special material may be requested through the S-3 Officer

(2) Turn Chieu Hoi ralliers over to respective CACOs immediately.

b. Logistics

(1) Supplies will be delivered to CACC CFs.
(2) Any request for special transportation should be submitted to this Headquarters, attention S-4 at least 24 hours in advance.

5. COMMAND and COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

a. No change from present procedures.

J. E. GREENWOOD
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEX:

A - PSYOPS Material
ANNEX A

The following list is the themes of materials that were attached as Annex A.

1. GVN appeals to NVA soldiers.
2. Chieu Hoi appeals and Rally instructions.
3. The Hand of Friendship is extended to you.
4. The GVN is waiting with open arms.
5. Why die of malaria? Rally now!
6. Your leaders deceive you. Rally now!
7. Now is the time to Rally.
8. The GVN will welcome you.
9. Rally and live with the GVN.
PSYOPS Operation Order 1-69

Ref: (a) Vietnam Maps; 1:50,000; sheet number 64421, 6442II, 6442III, 6442IV
(b) MACJ3-11, PSYOPS Policy Guidance No. 75 from USMACV dtd 26 Dec 1968
(c) CG III IAF Msg R 14090Z Jan 1969

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION
a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence)
b. Friendly Forces.
   (1) Vietnamese Information Service
   (2) DIOCC Personal
   (3) Hamlet/Village Officials
   (4) Police Field Force
   (5) Armed Propaganda Teams
   (6) U. S. and FFW in Quang Tri Province
c. Attachments and Detachments
   (1) AFT teams available for specific missions upon request to the Group S-3

2. MISSION. To conduct Psychological Operations in assigned areas of coordination to support the nationwide TET 1969 Campaign.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation. Conduct a three phase operation to underscore the acceptance of the Republic of Vietnam Government by the people, to focus attention on the Chieu Hoi and Lai Doan Kit Programs, and to exploit the traditional TET season as a means of influencing the people.
   b. Combined Action Companies. Make leaflet distributions; conduct visits to Chieu Hoi Center for known Viet Cong sympathizers; arrange face-to-face meetings between village officials, PF's and the people to emphasize the Awards Program, Chieu Hoi program and the support of the Government by the people.
   c. Group PSYOPS Officer. Coordinate and provide logistical support for the TET campaign.
   d. Coordinating Instructions.
      (1) Operational Phases.
         (a) Pre-TET 25Jan69 to 16Feb69
         (b) TET 17Feb69 to 19Feb69
         (c) Post-TET 20Feb69 to 24Mar69
      (2) Schedule for Leaflet Distribution and Poster Display:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LEAFLET #</th>
<th>BOOK</th>
<th>ADDRESS #</th>
<th>THEME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-3 Feb</td>
<td>7-516-68</td>
<td>7-500-68</td>
<td>7-630-68</td>
<td>Awards (Tai-Linh only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-7 Feb</td>
<td>7-548-68</td>
<td>Qua Con</td>
<td>2931, 2930</td>
<td>Chieu Hoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-19 Feb</td>
<td>2905</td>
<td>2941</td>
<td>2941</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-23 Feb</td>
<td>7-506-68</td>
<td>TBA</td>
<td>2941</td>
<td>Support your government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional leaflet distribution will be covered by frag order.

3. Leaflets will be delivered directly to the adults. Maximum use will be made of the PF in the PSYOPS Campaign. They will be encouraged to discuss leaflet contents with the people at the time of delivery.

4. APT teams will be dispatched by the PSYOPS officer to work a particular village. Their mission will be assigned and coordinated at the CAG level.

5. Visits to the Chieu Hoi center will be conducted on 100900 H Feb for VC families and sympathizers in accordance with the schedule below. CACOs and CAFs will work through village and hamlet officials and encourage them and a representative number of PFs to accompany the villagers to the center.

- 6Feb69 CAPs: 4-1-4, 4-2-1, 4-3-2
- 10Feb69 CAPs: 4-1-5, 4-2-3, 4-3-3
- 12Feb69 CAIs: 4-1-6, 4-2-6, 4-3-4, 4-1-5
- 14Feb69 CAIs: 4-1-7, 4-2-7, 4-3-5

6. Emphasize the Volunteer Information Program (VIP) employing the rates of payment listed in Annex B. CAP leaders will carry ample Awards funds to pay on the spot for information or ordnance. Awards may be made to any Vietnamese civilian within the guidelines of Annex B. During the period 1-3 Feb, leaflets and posters will be distributed. Advertise these awards.

7. Province officials will conduct a pre-TET celebration at Quang Tri City on 4 Feb 1969.

4. ADMINISTRATION and LOGISTICS

a. Administration.

1. Leaflets and posters will be distributed by this headquarters to the CACOs.

2. Weekly PSYOPS report due by 1600 each Friday using the revised
format listed in Annex C.

(3) Significant observations regarding Psychological Operations and results of various activities will be sent by spot report or memo to the S-3.

b) LOGISTICS.

(1) Transportation requests for Chieu Hoi center visits to be submitted 24 hours prior to the transportation need.

(2) Awards funds distributed to all CAPs by 29 Jan.

(3) Group S-4 provide food for the Chieu Hoi center visit on 10 Feb. 69.

(4) Group S-4 provide hand-held loud speakers for each CACO and coordinate food preparation with the center.

*Command and Communications-Electronics*

. Current COI and CommSOP.

J. E. GREENWOOD

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

ANNEXE II:

A. Intelligence
B. Awards
C. Report Form

DISTRIBUTION: Special
Annex A. (Intelligence) to PSYOPS Order 1-69

Ref. (a) Vietnam Maps; 1:50,000; sheet numbers 6442I, 6442II, 6442III, 6442IV

Zone: H

Summary of Enemy Situation. See current intelligence summaries.

Essential Elements of Information.

a. Which families have relations who are Viet Cong.

b. Which families are sympathetic to the V.C. cause.

c. Which individuals will accept payment to reveal the location of caches.

d. Which individuals will identify V.C. Cadre or infrastructure for payment.

3. Intelligence Acquisition Tasks

Combined Action Companies

a. Coordinate the collection effort of the platoons. Report information to the District Chief and this headquarters.

4. Measures for Handling Personnel Documents and Material

a. Prisoners of war and Chieu Hoi. Prisoners of war will be handled in accordance with current SOP. Prisoners will not be maltreated or manhandled. Chieu Hoi are instructed to surrender in the day time and that they need not raise their hands above their heads.

b. Documents. It is imperative that documents be labeled with the location and date-time-group of capture and that they be identified with the individual carrying the documents. Any documents which appear to relate to PSYOPS will be duplicated and a copy or sample forwarded to this headquarters by the most expeditious means possible.

J. E. GREENWOOD
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Special
Annex B (Awards) to PSYOPS order 1-69

Ref: (a) Force order 7200.3B

1. The following guide will be utilized within ICTZ for the expenditure of VIP funds: (all sums shown in RVN piasters)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AMMUNITION</th>
<th>MINIMUM</th>
<th>MAXIMUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small arms ammo - per rd up to 50 rd</td>
<td>5$VN</td>
<td>10$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small arms ammo - per lot more than 50 rd</td>
<td>50$VN</td>
<td>500$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar ammo, 60mm/81mm/82mm</td>
<td>500$VN</td>
<td>1,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery ammo</td>
<td>500$VN</td>
<td>3,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoilless rifle ammo</td>
<td>500$VN</td>
<td>3,000$VN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPONS</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hand grenade or rifle grenade</td>
<td>500$VN</td>
<td>750$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol</td>
<td>500$VN</td>
<td>1,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, semi auto, or bolt action</td>
<td>1,000$VN</td>
<td>1,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, auto</td>
<td>1,500$VN</td>
<td>2,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submachine gun</td>
<td>2,000$VN</td>
<td>2,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-79 grenade launcher</td>
<td>2,000$VN</td>
<td>4,500$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine gun, 30 cal or 50 cal</td>
<td>5,000$VN</td>
<td>8,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoilless rifle, 57mm/75mm/82mm</td>
<td>5,000$VN</td>
<td>10,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar, 60mm/81mm/82mm</td>
<td>5,000$VN</td>
<td>10,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery piece, less than 100mm</td>
<td>15,000$VN</td>
<td>25,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery piece, or mortar over 100mm</td>
<td>20,000$VN</td>
<td>50,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets, 122mm and 140mm or larger</td>
<td>20,000$VN</td>
<td>65,000$VN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINES OR BOobyTRAPS</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mines or boobytraps</td>
<td>500$VN</td>
<td>2,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a mine or boobytrap reported is set for explosion</td>
<td>2,500$VN</td>
<td>10,000$VN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMUNICATIONS OR ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communications or electronics equipment in working or repairable condition</td>
<td>500$VN</td>
<td>2,000$VN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFORMATION</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information which results in the killing or capture of VC/NVA troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than a squad</td>
<td>1,000$VN</td>
<td>2,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad size unit</td>
<td>1,000$VN</td>
<td>2,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoon size unit</td>
<td>2,000$VN</td>
<td>4,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company size unit</td>
<td>4,000$VN</td>
<td>6,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion size unit</td>
<td>6,000$VN</td>
<td>8,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8,000$VN</td>
<td>10,000$VN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DECLASSIFIED
INFORMATION (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>which leads to the capture of VC infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual members</td>
<td>1,000$VN</td>
<td>2,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet leaders</td>
<td>2,000$VN</td>
<td>5,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village leaders</td>
<td>5,000$VN</td>
<td>8,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District leaders</td>
<td>8,000$VN</td>
<td>10,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information on enemy infiltration activities</td>
<td>2,000$VN</td>
<td>4,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information on sapper activities</td>
<td>3,000$VN</td>
<td>5,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information on enemy troop movement</td>
<td>2,000$VN</td>
<td>4,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information on imminent attack on US</td>
<td>8,000$VN</td>
<td>10,000$VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RVNAF, or other FWNAF bases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information on location of Fw's and Fw camps</td>
<td>9,000$VN</td>
<td>10,000$VN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Information which leads to the successful recovery of IVA's—special amounts in excess of 10,000$VN will be paid. Amount will be determined by Commanding General, III MAF.

Information of imminent attack by mortar, rocket, or artillery in which the weapons are captured or destroyed in firing position. Amounts up to 100,000$VN may be authorized by III MAF.

2. The above list does not cover each and every type of information for which payment can be made. When the situation does not fall into one of the examples listed above, that example most nearly describing the situation will be used.

3. If the material provided by the informant is not in servicable condition, payments below the minimum amounts are authorized and encouraged. Further, if the custodian making a disbursement has insufficient funds to execute the minimum payment for an item listed above, and timely payment is desirable, payments below the minimum are authorized. All questions regarding the appropriateness of any disbursement will be referred to the Group S-3.

4. Under no circumstances will any expenditure of VIP funds in excess of 10,000$VN be made without prior approval of the Commanding General, III MAF.

5. Rapid payment is desirable.

J. E. GREENWOOD
Lieutenant Colonel U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Special