Contents

1) Letter from CG XXIV Corps to CO, CAF concerning CAP/CORDS Relations.
2) I Corps Coordinating Instructions establishing joint policy on CAP's
3) CAF Order 3300.1 Rules of Engagement
4) Fact Sheet as of 31 Mar 70
5) III MAF Order 31.41B SOP for CAP
FACT SHEET ON THE COMBINED ACTION FORCE
III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
31 MARCH 1970

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

a. The Combined Action Force was known as the Combined Action Program until 11 January 1970 at which time the Program was given separate command status. The Combined Action Force (CAF) was conceived and developed by the Marine Corps in Vietnam, where it has been functioning since August 1965. The CAF and its associated concepts could be considered a natural outgrowth of Marine Corps experience in the so-called banana wars fought in the Caribbean area from 1915 to 1934, when Marines advised, trained, and fought side by side with native constabulary forces in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua.

b. The Combined Action Program and later the CAF has functioned under the operational control and direction of Headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force in close coordination with Headquarters, I Corps. On 26 March 1970, the CAF passed to the Commanding General XXIV Corps. Administrative and logistics functions remained under the control of Headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force. A diagram of the present Combined Action Force command and coordination structure and a chart of the present Combined Action Force command relationships is provided at enclosures (1) and (2).

2. Organization and Function

a. The primary purpose of the CAF is to provide security to the people in hamlets and villages by protecting them from VC/NVA incursions, influence, and terror. Collaterally, the program serves to aid in local law enforcement, to engender respect for the local and National governments, and to promote general community welfare.

b. There are currently some 2000 Marines and Navy Corpsmen, along with about 3000 Popular Force (PF) soldiers participating in the Combined Action Force.

c. A unique feature of the CAF is the fact that a squad of Marines is integrated with a PF platoon to form a Combined Action Platoon (CAP) which functions under the operational control of the local District Chief. In this combination, the Marines provide advice, training, encouragement, and improved fire support. On the other hand, the PF, being local residents, provide knowledge of the area, rapport with the people, improved access to information about the enemy, and the motivation that is inherent in the defense of one's own home. Although the PF comprise the lowest paid and least trained element of the Vietnamese military, their value is not to be underestimated. Indices of effectiveness show that the PF are playing a key role in this conflict. In addition, by working with the PF and earning their respect and confidence, the Marines in the CAF are able to relate to the local people in a way that no conventional US military organization could do. The PF therefore act as a link between the Marines and the local people. In a "peoples war," it goes without saying that this link is a vital asset. A diagram of a CAP is provided at enclosure (3).
d. Enclosure (4) sets forth the formally assigned missions of the CAPs. It is emphasized that the primary mission is a combat mission, namely to help establish and extend Government authority in the CAP's assigned area by conducting aggressive patrols and ambushes in and around the CAP-protected hamlets.

e. In addition to the seven missions assigned to the CAP as a whole, the Marine element of the CAP has an important additional mission -- namely, to train the PF soldiers to an adequate level of military proficiency. When Government authority is well established and the CAP PF platoon has achieved the desired proficiency, the Marine element of the CAP relocates to a new village where Government authority is sharply contested and where the local PF are too poorly trained to deal effectively with the enemy in the area. Thus, CAP Marines are engaged in a process of perpetually working themselves out of a job, a procedure which exemplifies the concept of Vietnamization.

f. On the other hand, great care is taken to insure that the Marine element does not relocate prematurely, for to do so would be to leave the village vulnerable to VC reprisals or reversion to VC control, and would leave the PF inadequately prepared to sustain village security needs. Therefore, certain criteria must be met before the Commanding Generals of XXIV Corps and I Corps, respectively, will grant approval for the relocation of the Marine element of a CAP. That the relocation process has been executed successfully is attested to by the fact that to date, 93 relocations have been effected, of which 27 have occurred since August 1969; and in no case has a CAP-protected hamlet ever reverted to VC control after relocation of the Marine element. Enclosure (5) provides statistics on the number of PF platoons and the amount of population that have benefitted from past or present CAP association.

g. It is important to note that the method of training used by CAP Marines is almost all of the "on-the-job" variety, with very little formal instruction. The CAP Marine conceives of himself as a combat Marine, and therefore his classroom is the "bush" where the VC provide the necessary training aids. In addition to the on-the-job training offered by the CAPs, some formal instruction is conducted at the CACO and GAO levels in subjects such as night firing, artillery forward observing, and map reading.

h. There are 114 of these CAPs dispersed throughout the populated coastal lowlands of all five provinces in I Corps. Although the basic element of the CAP is the CAP, controlling and coordinating headquarters exist at the District, Province and Corps levels. The 114 CAPs are organized into 19 Combined Action Companies (CACOs) which in turn are organized into four Combined Action Groups (CAGs). Generally speaking, CACO headquarters correspond with and are co-located with District headquarters, and GAO headquarters correspond with and are located close to Province headquarters. The CACO Commander and GAO Commander are counterparts to the District and Province Chiefs, respectively. Corps level coordination is effected through close liaison between the Commanding Officer, Combined Action Force, and the Deputy Commander for Territory, I Corps, as well as between the Commanding Generals of XXIV Corps and I Corps, respectively. A map of the distribution...
of C&Ps, CACOs, and CAGs is shown at enclosure (6).

1. Most CAP Marines are assigned directly from the United States, although a few volunteers are obtained from other III MAF Marine Units. Regardless of the source, all men are personally screened to insure adaptability to the program. Following selection, they attend the two-week Combined Action Force School at Danang before going to their CAGs for subsequent assignment to the CAPs. Some of these Marines will come back to Danang three or four months later to receive intensive Vietnamese language training at the CAP Language School. Perhaps the effectiveness of the system for obtaining, screening, and motivating CAP Marines is best exemplified in the fact that one out of every eight CAP Marines extends his tour of duty in Vietnam for a period of three or more months.

3. Tactics and Techniques

a. Tactics employed by the CAPs follow three basic principles. The first of these is the principle of tactical mobility. A CAP does not defend its hamlets from behind bunkers and barricades. The idea is not to put up a wall around the hamlet, but rather to put out a screen of ambushes on the approaches to the hamlet. When coupled with stealth, mobility provides not only offensive striking power, but also the protection afforded by elusiveness. By virtue of this quality of elusive mobility, the CAP seems to be everywhere, but never predictably anywhere. The unpredictability of CAP ambushes is the basis of CAP security against surprise attack by overwhelming enemy forces. But what is more important, this same unpredictability insures that the VC will never feel safe anywhere in a CAP area of operations. A more detailed discussion of the CAP concept of mobility is attached as enclosure (7).

b. The second principle of CAP tactics is that of combining a minimum of personnel with a maximum of firepower. By being small, yet backed up by fire support and reaction force assistance, a CAP in the presence of an enemy force exposure only a small target to the enemy, yet can bring down the fire power of a Marine battalion in terms of air and artillery support.

c. The third principle of CAP tactics is that of credible permanence. It has already been indicated that the FF are recruited from the local area. Likewise, the CAP Marines are villagers, too. They are of the village, they come to be known by the villagers, and their stay partakes of permanence in that they will remain as long as they are needed. The CAP is clearly wedded to the people, the political structure, and the land of a particular geographical locality. This quality of permanence is one of the characteristics that clearly sets the CAP apart from the regular infantry unit.

4. Effectiveness

a. Experience shows that the presence of a CAP serves to deny the VC his source of manpower, because he is denied a free hand in recruiting among the people. Second, the VC is normally blocked from his source of food,
since he often finds it too dangerous to run rice parties through the gauntlet of CAP ambushes. Third, the VC is limited in his opportunity to gather intelligence from the villagers, while at the same time the villagers are more apt to give intelligence to their PF and Marine protectors. And finally, the stability and credibility of the GVN is greatly enhanced when, under the CAP umbrella of protection, village and hamlet officials can safely stay at night in their homes; elections can be held, schools can be reestablished, and the people can help the GVN cause with a minimum of concern for reprisal from the VC.

b. The 2000 Marines and Navy Corpsmen in the CAP represent a US force of roughly reinforced infantry battalion size. However, while an infantry battalion has only 12 rifle Platoons, the CAP fields 144 platoons, which is even greater than the number of rifle platoons in a Marine Division comprised of some 20,000 officers and men. This fact illustrates that the CAP makes more economical use of a given number of US personnel when compared to other types of US combat forces. The influence of the CAP is therefore inherently much greater than the influence of any single infantry battalion. With very small headquarters elements, and with almost 90% of its total personnel tactically deployed in the villages of I Corps 24 hours a day throughout the year, the CAP epitomizes the principle of economy of force.

c. Enclosures (8) and (9) contain statistics reflecting the combat effectiveness of the Combined Action Force. Enclosures (10) through (12) show the degree to which CAPs are more effective than the independent non-CAP PF platoons alone.

5. Conclusion

a. The Combined Action Force functions as part of the overall pacification effort in fulfillment of the "one war" concept.

b. By combining some psychological operations and civic action projects along with an umbrella of security and protection for the villagers, the Combined Action Force helps to win support for the GVN.

c. The primary strength of the Combined Action Force lies in the fact that, by living and operating in the villages, the CAPs are keeping the VC away from the people and the supplies. Mao Tse Tung's "fish" are thus kept out of the sustaining "sea".
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS CHART

XXIV CORPS

CAF

III MAF

1ST CAG

2ND CAG

3RD CAG

4TH CAG

COMMAND XXX
OPCON -------
ADCON -----(COMMAND LESS OPCON)

ENCLOSURE(2)
COMPOSITION AND ORGANIZATION OF A COMBINED ACTION PLATOON

USMC SQUAD

SQUAD LEADER

1M-79 GRENADIER
1 CORPSMAN

FIRE TEAM
4 MARINES

POPULAR FORCES PLATOON

PLATOON LEADER

PLATOON HQTRS
5PF

PF RIFLE SQUAD
10 PF

COMBINED ACTION PLATOON

VNPF PLT LDR
USMC ADVISOR

PLT HQTR

4 VNPF
1 USN
1 USMC GRENADIER

42 USMC AND VNPF

TOTAL:

50 USMC & VNPF

ENCLOSURE(3)
MISSION OF THE COMBINED ACTION FORCE

1. DESTROY VC HAMLET-VILLAGE INFRASTRUCTURE.

2. PROVIDE PUBLIC SECURITY, HELP MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER.

3. PROTECT FRIENDLY POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.

4. PROTECT BASES AND LOC WITHIN VILLAGES AND HAMLETS.

5. CONTRIBUTE TO COMBINED OPERATIONS WITH OTHER FORCES.

6. PARTICIPATE IN CIVIC ACTION AND PSYOPS AGAINST VC.

7. ASSIST IN RD ACTIVITIES.
PF Platoons Trained by CAPS

Now being trained: 114
Trained by former CAPS: Over 95
Total: Over 209

Hamlets Protected by CAPS

Now being protected by CAPS: About 460
Formerly protected by CAPS: About 350
Total: About 810

Population Protected by CAPS

Now being protected by CAPS: About 240,000
Formerly protected by CAPS: About 185,000
Total: About 425,000
4TH CAG
3 CACOS
18 CAPS

3RD CAG
5 CACOS
31 CAPS

2ND CAG
7 CACOS
36 CAPS

1ST CAG
4 CACOS
29 CAPS

CAF
STRENGTH SUMMARY
2000 USMC AND USN
3000 PF
4 CAGs
19 CACOs
114 CAPs

QUANG TRI
THUA THIEN
QUANG NAM
QUANG TIN
QUANG NGAI

COMBINED ACTION FORCE
A DISCUSSION OF THE MOBILE CAP CONCEPT

In opening the discussion of the mobile CAP concept, it might be well to note that there are two kinds of mobility -- "noisy" mobility and "stealthy" mobility. Helicopters and vehicles provide noisy mobility -- they are fast but the virtue of speed is partly cancelled out by the loss of surprise through obviousness. Stealthy mobility is provided by the infantryman's feet traversing any kind of terrain at any time of day or night in any kind of weather. This is the kind of mobility the VC use -- and the CAP uses. It is a slow kind of mobility, but makes up for lack of speed by achieving surprise through stealth. To the extent that the VC have enjoyed any success in this war, it can be largely attributed to his stealthy mobility employed in a surprise attack (or ambush) against a relatively less mobile adversary.

Operating on the mobile concept, the CAP should not attempt to defend a hamlet by establishing a fortified position next to or overlooking the hamlet. Nor should the CAP attempt to put up a defensive wall or perimeter around the hamlet. Instead, the mobile CAP protects the hamlet by setting up a screen of ambushes on the approaches to the hamlet. A screen is porous, but conversely, a wall is brittle and can be broken down. The psychology of mobility is offensive; the psychology of walls, citadels, and perimeters is defensive. Operating on the mobile concept, the CAP secretly sets up several ambushes in different places on the approaches to the hamlet each night, never in the same place twice, and never according to a predictable pattern. By so doing, the CAP makes it impossible for the VC to feel safe anywhere in or near the protected hamlet. Given the advantage of surprise inherent in the ambush, the CAP has a tactical advantage over a "visiting" VC force several times larger. After a while, the VC find the price for visiting the hamlet to be too high, and contacts cease to occur.

When coupled with stealth, mobility provides not only a sword, but a shield as well. The sword symbolizes offensive striking power, and the shield symbolizes the protection afforded by elusiveness. In the defense of our fixed installations in Vietnam, we tend to rely on sheer bulk of forces and firepower alone. The habit of doing so may cause us to lose sight of the fact that if the enemy could not find and fix his target with such certainty, he could not strike a telling blow, even if he had superior forces. The CAP must never lose sight of the value of elusiveness, because the CAP, being small, cannot enjoy the luxury of relying on sheer bulk of force alone, particularly since the enemy in many CAP areas has the capability of massing superior forces against the CAP. It is the elusiveness and unpredictability of CAP ambushes that is the basis of CAP security against surprise attack by overwhelming enemy forces.

While the CAP is tactically mobile, it should not be thought of as being strategically mobile. The CAP, unlike an infantry organization, is wedded to the people and the governmental structure of a particular geographical locality. The infantry organization may pursue the enemy wherever he goes, but the CAP is concerned with only the enemy who enter or live in the CAP TAOC. The CAP's geographical locality is thus fixed, but

ENCLOSURE(7)
the CAP's position within that locality must be unpredictably mobile.

If the CAP is operating according to the mobile concept in its TAOC, it will seem to be everywhere, yet will never be predictably anywhere. The so-called "compound" or "fixed" CAP is a negation of this mobile concept. When the CAP occupies a fixed defensive position, it must tie up much of its efforts in defending that position. Soon, the preoccupation becomes that of defending the position rather than protecting the hamlets. Soon, the CAP can only afford to send out one small ambush at a time, for fear of leaving the citadel inadequately defended. Soon, we find that the VC may stay clear of the citadel, but are enjoying a free hand in the hamlets and in the countryside. But at its worst, we find that the enemy studies the citadel for weaknesses that are inherent when a defensive psychology takes over, and when he has found his opening, he launches his surprise attack. In this manner, the enemy has succeeded in destroying some of our compound CAPs. He has never destroyed a mobile CAP.

In pondering the relative merit of the compound CAP versus the mobile CAP, it might be well to reflect on how short this war would have been if the VC and NVA operated out of fixed compounds.

A few words should be addressed to the notion that a mobile CAP is unsafe in proximity to the Vietnamese population. This notion is based on the assumption that the population is infested with VC informers, and that notion may lead some individuals to believe that the protecting wall of a CAP compound is a necessary safeguard against the treachery of the villagers. It is well known that many non-CAP military organizations in Vietnam shun the population altogether, preferring to establish bases, defensive positions, patrol routes, and ambushes in uninhabited areas. By ignoring and avoiding the population, such an organization gives the VC a free hand in the hamlets. For example, a rifle company may establish an impregnable bastion on a rise of ground and set up ambushes on the approaches to its position, while the VC are left free to visit the nearby hamlets, and are even able to sleep in them with complete impunity. The men in a CAP must realize that while there may well be informers in every hamlet, the informers cannot readily obtain and transmit detailed information to the VC about an ambush position established after dark somewhere outside the hamlet. Even if worse came to worst and an informer was able to tip off the VC as to the location of an ambush, he would hardly be able to relate all of the particulars, such as the exact position of the leaders, the principal weapons, the claymores, the radio, and the fields of fire. It is well known that the VC do not like to attack without knowing all of these particulars, even when he has superior forces. In view of that, the most aggressive course of action he would be likely to pursue would be a standoff attack against the ambush site, using RPGs, small arms fire, and possibly mortars. This type of attack may inflict friendly casualties, but it also presents an opportunity for the CAP to inflict casualties, especially through the use of supporting fires. Moreover, this type of attack will never result in the destruction of a CAP or the loss of weapons, and seldom results in casualties.
If a CAP operates in its TAOC according to a mobile concept, the enemy will be denied a free hand in recruiting or proselyting among the people. He will be blocked from his source of food, since it will be too dangerous to run rice parties through the gauntlet of CAP ambushes. He will be limited in his opportunity to gather intelligence from the villagers, while at the same time, the villagers will be more apt to give intelligence to their CAP protectors. Eventually, the CAP will achieve complete tactical dominance in the TAOC. In time, the stability and credibility of the GVN will be greatly enhanced when, under the CAP umbrella of protection, village and hamlet officials can safely stay in their homes, elections can be held, schools can be established, and the people can help the GVN cause with little fear of VC reprisal.
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# Combined Action Force Operations Statistics

1 January - 31 December 1969

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<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>1,952</td>
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TOTAL KIA 302
TOTAL WIA 1,543
# COMBINED ACTION FORCE OPERATIONS STATISTICS

1 JAN - 31 MAR 1970

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TOTAL KIA 64
TOTAL WIA 287
NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT PF PLATOONS COMPARED TO NUMBER OF CAP PF PLATOONS IN ICTZ
1 JAN - 31 DEC 69

NUMBER OF ENEMY KIA BY INDEPENDENT PF PLATOONS COMPARED TO NUMBER OF ENEMY KIA BY CAPS (ICTZ)
1 JAN - 31 DEC 69
NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT PF PLATOONS COMPARED TO NUMBER OF CAP PF PLATOONS IN ICTZ
1 JAN - 31 MAR 70

NUMBER OF ENEMY KIA BY INDEPENDENT PF PLATOONS COMPARED TO NUMBER OF ENEMY KIA BY CAPS (ICTZ)
1 JAN - 31 MAR 70
INDEPENDENT PF PLATOON KILL RATIO COMPARED TO CAP KILL RATIO (ICTZ)
1 JAN - 31 DEC 69
INDEPENDENT PF PLATOON KILL RATIO COMPARED TO CAP KILL RATIO (ICTZ)
1 JAN - 31 MAR 70
NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT PF PLATOONS COMPARED TO NUMBER OF CAP PF PLATOONS IN ICTZ

1 JAN - 31 Dec 69

NUMBER OF WEAPONS CAPTURED BY INDEPENDENT PF PLATOONS COMPARED TO NUMBER OF WEAPONS CAPTURED BY CAPS (ICTZ)

1 JAN - 31 Dec 69
<table>
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<th>Number of Independent PF Platoons</th>
<th>Number of Weapons Captured by Independent PF Platoons</th>
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<td><strong>INDEPENDENT</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>CAP PF PLT</strong></td>
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<td>114 PLTS (12%)</td>
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<td><strong>WPNS CAPTURED</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>WPNS CAPTURED</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>BY CAPS</td>
<td>134 EN WPNS (40%)</td>
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**Number of Independent PF Platoons Compared to Number of CAP PF Platoons in ICTZ**

1 JAN - 31 MAR 70

**Number of Weapons Captured by Independent PF Platoons Compared to Number of Weapons Captured by CAPS (ICTZ)**

1 JAN - 31 MAR 70
Da Nang, Viet-Nam

March 14, 1970

LTG Melvin Zais
Commanding General
XXIV Corps

Dear General Zais:

At General Nickerson’s request the Consulate and COMUS I CTZ have for the past several months been engaged in a survey of the 102 villages of I CTZ in which the 113 Combined Action Program Platoons are currently assigned. American-directed 3-man Vietnamese survey teams have already surveyed public opinion in about 30 of these villages toward the military performance and conduct vis-a-vis the people of the CAP Marines; at the same time we have reviewed CAP policies and directives in the light of national pacification and development objectives and our Vietnamization policy. While the surveys are not yet completed, I believe it is now possible to report some of our findings for your consideration.

First, we found that the people are generally quite happy with the CAP Marines. They sleep better at night knowing that the Marines are helping to provide security, and they appreciate the MEDCAPs and other civic action projects the CAPs engage in. They praise the CAP Marines’ general standard of conduct, and the fact that the Marines remain in the village makes it easier to resolve any unfortunate incidents between them and the villagers, who can report the Marine involved by name through the PF platoon leader to the Marine squad leader, who usually resolves the problem on the spot.

Second, we find a general consensus that the performance of PF Platoons is significantly improved by their relationship with the CAP Marines. They operate more aggressively and proficiently, and their morale is improved by the Marine presence and the fact that the Marines can call in US fire support and MEDVACs. There are, however, indications that the performance of the PF Platoons tends to slide back to previous levels after the Marine elements are reassigned, which raises the question of whether the Combined Action Program is contributing as much to Vietnamization as one might hope.
There are some shortcomings in the quality and number of Marines currently assigned to the CAP units. Several Vietnamese and American military officers told us that many of the leaders of the CAP Marine squads are in their early 20s, with a rank of E-4 or E-5 and little or no previous combat experience. While the program used to be voluntary, now all Marines are assigned and individual motivation seems lower than in the early days of the program. The Vietnamese-language training is inadequate and has seriously hampered the ability of some teams to gather intelligence and to protect themselves. Finally, although the authorized strength of each CAP team is 14 Marines and one Navy corpsman, assigned strength tends to average about 10 and present-for-duty strength perhaps a little lower. We found a consensus that present-for-duty strength should not be less than 10.

Fourth, there are some inconsistencies between the chain of command prescribed in the CAP directive (Joint I CTZ/III MAF Instruction of CAP Joint Policy) and that required by GVN and US national directives:

a. Although the Vietnamese Constitution guarantees a certain autonomy to the village government, and the 1969 and 1970 Pacification Plans and other GVN decrees provide that the village chief exercises command authority over all GVN personnel and resources assigned to his village including PF platoons, the leader of the PF element within a CAP unit is in practice responsible directly to the subsector and bypasses the village chief, his deputy for security, and his military assistant who normally is a senior PF platoon leader. In a few cases CAP TACOs, following natural geographical features, cross the boundaries of more than one village. This tends to weaken the unity of command at the village level.

b. Despite the emphasis on the single-manager concept throughout the CORPS structure, and despite the fact that the CAP program is now virtually exclusively a pacification program, there is a separate CAP command chain which coordinates with but is not subordinate to the CORPS chain of command. The 113 CAP leaders report to 20 Combined Action Company (CAGO) Commanders, who are often equal in rank to CORPS District Senior Advisors and the CAGO commanders may have CAPs in several districts. There are only four Combined Action Groups (CAG), with CAG-1 covering both Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces, and CAG commanders are usually lieutenant colonels, as are most military CORPS Province Senior Advisors. At the III MAF (now XXIV Corps) level, a Marine full colonel is Assistant Chief of Staff for CAP (ACOGAP), while an Army full colonel is Chief of the Territorial Forces Division of CORPS I CTZ. While we know of no
irreconcilable disputes that have arisen between the two command structures during coordination of plans and operations for territorial security, it would seem that the arguments which justify the single-manager concept in our pacification program apply with equal force to the Combined Action Program.

c. We heard some complaints that the current requirement that shifts of CAP teams must be approved in advance by the US and Vietnamese Corps CGs is unnecessarily rigid.

I conclude that the Combined Action Program is basically sound in concept and that it makes a significant contribution to pacification and security and specifically to the improvement of the Popular Forces. It is rumored that the program will be phased out as current teams complete their present assignments, and it may be that the security situation will make this possible or that the requirements for withdrawal of US troops will make it necessary. But given a continuation of roughly the present situation in the countryside, I believe the CAP program should be continued with some changes and improvements. My specific recommendations are:

1. That the Marine CAP program be continued at basically the present level in I CTZ or that it decline only gradually, and that the US Army give serious consideration to developing a similar program.

2. That as US combat troops withdraw, a greater effort be made to assign somewhat older, higher-ranking NCOs with combat experience as CAP leaders, that the program be composed of volunteers to the extent possible, and that training of CAPs be upgraded. In particular, each CAP should have at least one member who is relatively fluent in Vietnamese; an intensive course of at least three or four months would be required to attain the desired level of fluency.

3. That the present-for-duty strength of the CAP be maintained at not less than 10. If this number were maintained, it might be possible to cut three authorized spaces from each team, reducing the over-all number of authorized spaces.

4. That the Vietnamese CAP chain of command be changed to harmonize with national policy in regards the autonomy of the village and the powers of the village chief.

5. That the American CAP chain of command be integrated into CORDS.
6. That the authority to move CAP teams be decentralized in a way consistent with the authority to deploy other territorial forces.

7. That as the withdrawal of US forces continues and ARVN improves its combat and combat-support capabilities, MACV and the GVN consider a Vietnized CAP program in which squads of regular ARVN troops would be combined with PT platoons to provide training and other types of support now provided by the American CAP.

Sincerely,

Francis T. Nunnane
American Consul and
Political Adviser to the
Commanding General XXIV Corps

cc: Deputy for COMDS
AGSCAP
III MAF
POL/Embassy
MEMORANDUM FOR:  Col T. E. Metzger
Commanding Officer
Combined Action Force
Da Nang, RVN

SUBJECT: CAP Employment

21 March 1970
S-28 March 1970

1. The attached letter was received by the Corps Commander and makes some interesting points.

2. General Zais requests that you furnish him comments on the recommendation contained in the letter from the American Consul. I would appreciate it if these comments could be furnished by 28 March 1970.

W. E. SHEDD
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff
HEADQUARTERS
Combined Action Force
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/rdj

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, XXIV Corps
Via: Chief of Staff, XXIV Corps

Subj: Consulate - CORDS Survey of CAP Villages; comments concerning

Ref: (a) Consul's ltr of 14 Mar 70 to CG, XXIV Corps
(b) C/S Memo of 21 Mar 70

1. Reference (a) has been reviewed. As requested by reference (b), the following comments are offered:

   a. Comments in 3rd paragraph, page one, regarding CAP efforts in Vietmanization:

      It is true that some PF Platoons revert to old habits and patterns when the Marine elements are relocated. This is frequently due to village pressure to keep the PFs close in to afford maximum personal security for the village and hamlet officials. This use of PF runs counter to stated JCS and MACV policy which directs PF to be mobile and to patrol and ambush outside hamlets. When this non-aggressive pattern of activity occurs, U.S. advisory personnel as well as district officials should be alert to take corrective measures. As a general response to this comment, however, I would like to point out that in no case has a former CAP TADC reverted to VC control.

   b. Comments in 1st paragraph, page two, regarding CAP personnel selection, experience, motivation and unit strengths:

      (1) It is true that CAP Marines in the ranks of PFC through LCPL are largely combat inexperienced when received. However, the majority of the CPL - SGT CAP leaders have served previous tours in RVN, many in line infantry units. It is also true the majority are in their late teens or early 20s.

      (2) It is not true that the CAP Marines were all volunteers in the early stages of the program. Some were, as some are today, being received from in-country units. However, before the CAF received a formal T/O, many CAP personnel selected by the unit commanders for this duty were not generally those held in highest esteem. A 1968 RAND study of CAP points out that the quality of CAP personnel, while this system was in use, was one of the CAP's most serious problems. A second, and equally significant problem, was generated by this practice. Marines coming to CAP from line infantry units had little or no motivation for working with, or safe-guarding, Vietnamese villagers. The present system of direct CONUS personnel input has definitely
HEADQUARTERS
Combined Action Force
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco 96602

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, XXIV Corps
Via: Chief of Staff, XXIV Corps

24 MAR 1970

Subj: Consulate - CORDS Survey of CAP Villages; comments concerning

Ref: (a) Consul's ltr of 14 Mar 70 to CG, XXIV Corps
(b) C/S Memo of 21 Mar 70

1. Reference (a) has been reviewed. As requested by reference (b), the following comments are offered:

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It is true that some PF platoons revert to old habits and patterns when the Marine elements are relocated. This is frequently due to village pressure to keep the PFs close in to afford maximum personal security for the village and hamlet officials. This use of PF runs counter to stated JCS and MACV policy which directs PF to be mobile and to patrol and ambush outside hamlets. When this non-aggressive pattern of activity occurs, U.S. advisory personnel as well as district officials should be alert to take corrective measures. As a general response to this comment, however, I would like to point out that in no case has a former CAP TACC reverted to VC control.

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(2) It is not true that the CAP Marines were all volunteers in the early stages of the program. Some were, as some are today, being received from in-country units. However, before the CAF received a formal T/O, many CAP personnel selected by the unit commanders for this duty were not generally those held in highest esteem. A 1968 RAND study of CAP points out that the quality of CAP personnel, while this system was in use, was one of the CAP's most serious problems. A second, and equally significant problem, was generated by this practice. Marines coming to CAP from line infantry units had little or no motivation for working with, or safe-guarding, Vietnamese villagers. The present system of direct CONUS personnel input has definitely...
upgraded personnel quality and reduced the problems of CAP-PF/Villager relationships.

(3) The statement that CAP motivation "seems lower" is therefore based on a false premise. Actually, CAP Marines generally, is completing their post-tour critiques, comment that in their opinion CAP morale is higher than that of other units. These critiques are uniformly prepared in an honest and objective manner. It is certainly my impression that CAP morale is excellent and this is an impression shared by many senior visitors to the CAPs as well as by the CAP Officers and NCOs.

(4) It is true that too few CAP Marines, both officer and enlisted, are Vietnamese Language trained. This problem was partially relieved by activation of the CAF Vietnamese Language School some four years ago. However, this school can only provide a 28-day syllabus to limited numbers of CAP Marines due to the adverse impact that a longer course and larger classes would have on personnel availability. The school does provide a 500-700 word vocabulary base of largely military orientation on which the CAP Marine can build a more fluent language capability. To the casual observer, the language problem may appear more severe than it is in actuality. This is not to discount the problem, but it is true that many PF speak some English and that many Marines do develop a limited conversational ability in Vietnamese. However, language problems are not unique to CAPs. They exist in every agency required to work closely with the Vietnamese.

(5) Presently, CAP strengths average ten Marines, a minimally acceptable level. In September, this figure was about nine with some CAPs having only seven or eight Marines available for duty. Personnel strengths then improved to a 12.5 average about 1 January. Present personnel strengths are largely the product of KeyStone Bluejay early rotation and the requirement levied on the CAF to transfer 134 O311s to the 3rd MarDiv. As in any line infantry unit, CAP personnel strengths will never equal T/O authorizations without a disproportionately high personnel overhead. The transfer of the 134 O311s did provide an opportunity to realign Marines who had difficulty adjusting to living and working with the Vietnamese and thus had a bonus effect.

(6) As of 21 Mar 70, 70 CAPs were led by SGTs, the remainder by CPLs, in some cases LCPLs. Again, unless HM3C and FMFPac take direct action to provide selected, highly qualified SGTs for duty with CAF in a quantity which would overcome all anticipated losses, the problem of maintaining SGTs only in CAP leader billets will continue. At this point in time, I question the desirability of such an effort because of the effect on other infantry units and on Marine Corps requirements generally for top quality O311 SGTs.
c. Comments in paragraph a, page two regarding village authority over PF Platoons:

The CAPFs were caught in the middle in this delegation of authority from district level to the village chief. Although initially viewed with concern, problems have seldom arisen because the village chiefs largely are reluctant to exercise the authority. It has been my policy to stimulate village level direction of the PFs, but until major changes occur in Vietnamese military-civilian relationships and in senior-junior (or class) relationships, little progress will be made in this regard. It is true that some CAP TACOs cross village boundaries. When necessary, these TACOs can be easily adjusted.

d. Comments in paragraph b, page two and continued on page three regarding CORDS control of the CAFs:

This recommendation postulates that CORDS has a monopoly interest in pacification and therefore should control the CAF in the interest of single-manager effectiveness. First, every agency and major unit in I Corps is contributing to the pacification effort. Secondly, a single-manager for pacification has long been established under the authority granted the Senior U.S. Commander in I Corps. Further, the CAF is a tactical military unit assigned a security mission which at this stage of the war can only be met by the use of standard, small-unit tactics. In this respect, CAP operations are today comparable to those of major infantry units located in the populated lowlands. Hence, the point is simply that CORDS possesses no capability to direct or support military operations. As a corollary, consideration is now being given to transferring U.S. Advisory responsibility to the I Corps territorial forces from CORDS to the Deputy Senior Advisor, I Corps. This action would produce several advantages, but primarily in stimulating ARVN interest in, and, support for, the RPs and PFs under a single-manager military advisory effort.

e. Comments in paragraph c, page three regarding present procedures required to obtain authorization for CAP relocations:

This comment is correct. The rigidity and inflexibility of response to changing conditions created by this situation have only been overcome by the unofficial method of authorizing temporary relocations pending final approval for permanent relocations. Temporary relocations have been effected between myself and Colonel VINH, Deputy for Territorial Forces, ICTZ. Final approval by the respective senior U.S. and Vietnamese commanders occasionally requires up to thirty days. In addition, the documentation required is overly complicated and difficult for inexperienced personnel to process. I firmly believe that routine relocations should be proposed by the Province Chiefs and CAG Commanders to Colonel VINH and myself, respectively, for approval. Information copies would then be submitted to our respective commanders. The present system derives from General LAM's desire to retain close, positive control of the CAPFs. I certainly sympathize with his concern, but the system has produced a certain stagnation. For example, a large number of 3rd CAG CAPs
and all of 4th CAG should have been relocated several months ago to the southern three provinces at considerable profit to the pacification effort. I had discussed this problem on several occasions with General NICKERSON and he was well aware of its implications. However, he felt at the time the threat of TET militated against major relocations and concurred with General LAM that these be held in abeyance until the threat dwindled. In view of pending developments affecting the CAF, this problem will probably soon be overtaken by other events.

2. With the exception of the recommendation regarding CORDS control of the CAF, the subject analysis has uncovered no new problems nor has it provided new solutions. It is certainly healthy for the CAF to receive the close and continuous scrutiny which it does from such a wide range of units and agencies. It is therefore particularly significant that these surveys of CAF efforts often conclude as does Mr. McNAMARA: "I conclude that the Combined Action Program is basically sound in concept and that it makes a significant contribution to pacification and security and specifically to the improvement of the Popular Forces."

T. E. METZGER

Copy to:
Deputy Cmrd, XXIV Corps
HEADQUARTERS
Combined Action Force
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco 96602

COMBINED ACTION FORCE ORDER 3300.1

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: The Rules of Engagement and Standards of Conduct for Members of the
Combined Action Force

Ref: (a) IGCI 5370.1A
(b) IGCI 5830.2A
(c) CAFO 5830.1
(d) FMFPacO 1610.2A
(e) FMFPacO 1500.3

1. Purpose

   a. To state the Combined Action Force policy concerning compliance
      with the Rules of Engagement and maintenance of standards of conduct tradi-
      tionally associated with Marines.

   b. To prescribe Rules of Engagement and certain standards of troop con-
      duct for the Combined Action Force and to set forth associated training,
      reporting, and supervisory instructions.

2. General

   a. CAP Marines have been noted for their adherence to the high stan-
      dards of personal conduct traditionally associated with Marines and for
      their restraint in initiating fire when the identity of the target is in
      doubt or when noncombatant personnel would be placed in jeopardy. However,
      recent incidents involving CAP Marines point up the necessity for greater
      stress in assuring knowledge of and compliance with the Rules of Engagement,
      standards of personal conduct, and leadership responsibilities.

   b. The nature of Combined Action Force operations places a high pre-
      mium on small unit leadership and responsibility. Consequently, any fail-
      ure in command supervision of these small unit activities can result in
      highly unfavorable and tragic consequences. Premature engagement by fire
      on one or two Vietnamese who are believed to be hostile may well be an
      overreaction to a presumed threat.

   c. Members of the Combined Action Force continually conduct operations
      with other organizations whose standards of conduct and/or Rules of Engage-
      ment may be less restrictive; however, this is no license for relaxation of
      CAP standards. The senior CAP Marine present will continue to be responsible

DECLASSIFIED
for the actions and conduct of the CAF element.

d. Because CAF Marines operate within Vietnamese hamlets and villages, disregard for life and property of civilians through abusive, inconsiderate, thoughtless, or careless acts may jeopardize the Marines' mission and their lives while furthering the cause of the enemy.

e. All incidents which are unfavorable, harmful, or detrimental to members of the Combined Action Force or their mission, or which may possibly become discreditable to CAF or III MAF in any way, must be promptly, accurately, and completely reported.

3. Policy. It is the policy of the Combined Action Force that:

a. Strict compliance with the Rules of Engagement will be observed by all members of the Combined Action Force.

b. High standards of personal conduct will be met by all members of the Combined Action Force in order to avoid acts that may endanger the lives and property of innocent civilians or may tend to alienate them.

c. An active, aggressive indoctrination program will be pursued in order to insure that all CAF Marines are thoroughly trained in the Rules of Engagement and the standards of personal conduct.

d. Command supervision of the execution of this policy will be accomplished at the CAF, CAG and CACO level.

4. Instructions

a. The following Rules of Engagement will apply to all members of the Combined Action Force:

(1) Fire may be directed against VC/NVA forces in contact without obtaining political clearance.

(2) Fire may be directed against VC/NVA forces engaged in clearly hostile acts without obtaining political clearance.

(3) Observed fire from supporting units may be directed at targets of opportunity which are clearly identified as hostile without obtaining political clearance.

(4) Targets of opportunity that cannot be clearly observed as hostile, intelligence type targets to include B&A missions based on information received from CAP PF or local villagers, require political clearance.

(5) Vietnamese in violation of curfew may be apprehended, preferably by a PF member of the CAF. However, these curfew violators do not warrant further
response unless the violator is clearly engaged in a hostile act or is otherwise identified as the enemy.

b. Regardless of orders or instructions emanating from other local US Forces or from Vietnamese sources to include District Chiefs, there are no "Free Fire" zones in CAP TACOs.

c. Livestock and family living areas, even abandoned houses, are specifically exempt from destruction. In no case will Vietnamese homes, either occupied or abandoned, be destroyed by burning.

d. Indiscriminate reconnaissance by fire is prohibited.

e. "Fan-firing" of weapons will be accomplished only under proper supervision and at such times as designated by competent authority.

f. All CAP Marines shall respect the law, property, institutions, traditions, and customs of Vietnam and shall conform to the standards of conduct prescribed by reference (a).

5. Action

a. CAP Commanders shall:

1. Ensure that the contents of this order are made known to, and understood by, each Marine and Navy Corporal of the command.

2. Promptly report all adverse incidents in accordance with references (b) and (c).

3. Take prompt disciplinary action according to the facts and applicable law in each case in which an offense has been committed.

4. Review references (d) and (e) and ensure that CAP training directives and policies are in strict compliance with their provisions.

b. The CAP S-3 shall prepare and present to each session of CAP School instruction on the Rules of Engagement and standards of conduct.

T. E. NETZER

DISTRIBUTION: "B"
HEADQUARTERS
Combined Action Force
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco 96602

CAFO 3300.1
6/tai
17 May 1970

COMBINED ACTION FORCE ORDER 3300.1

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: The Rules of Engagement and Standards of Conduct for Members of the Combined Action Force

Ref: (a) ICCI 5370.1A
(b) ICCI 5830.2A
(c) CAFO 5830.1
(d) FMFPac0 1610.2A
(e) FMFPac0 1500.3

1. Purpose

   a. To state the Combined Action Force policy concerning compliance with the Rules of Engagement and maintenance of standards of conduct traditionally associated with Marines.

   b. To prescribe Rules of Engagement and certain standards of troop conduct for the Combined Action Force and to set forth associated training, reporting, and supervisory instructions.

2. General

   a. CAF Marines have been noted for their adherence to the high standards of personal conduct traditionally associated with Marines and for their restraint in initiating fire when the identity of the target is in doubt or when noncombatant personnel would be placed in jeopardy. However, recent incidents involving CAF Marines point up the necessity for greater stress in assuring knowledge of and compliance with the Rules of Engagement, standards of personal conduct, and leadership responsibilities.

   b. The nature of Combined Action Force operations places a high premium on small unit leadership and responsibility. Consequently, any failure in command supervision of these small unit activities can result in highly unfavorable and tragic consequences. Premature engagement by fire on one or two Vietnamese who are believed to be hostiles may well be an overreaction to a presumed threat.

   c. Members of the Combined Action Force continually conduct operations with other organizations whose standards of conduct and/or Rules of Engagement may be less restrictive; however, this is no license for relaxation of CAF standards. The senior CAF Marine present will continue to be responsible
for the actions and conduct of the CAF element.

d. Because CAF Marines operate within Vietnamese hamlets and villages, disregard for life and property of civilians through abusive, inconsiderate, thoughtless, or careless acts may jeopardize the Marines' mission and their lives while furthering the cause of the enemy.

e. All incidents which are unfavorable, harmful, or detrimental to members of the Combined Action Force or their mission, or which may possibly become discreditable to CAF or III MAF in any way, must be promptly, accurately, and completely reported.

3. Policy. It is the policy of the Combined Action Force that:

a. Strict compliance with the Rules of Engagement will be observed by all members of the Combined Action Force.

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e. "Smart-firing" of weapons will be accomplished only under proper supervision and at such times as designated by competent authority.

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5. Action

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(2) Promptly report all adverse incidents in accordance with references (b) and (c).

(3) Take prompt disciplinary action according to the facts and applicable law in each case in which an offense has been committed.

(4) Review references (d) and (e) and ensure that CAG training directives and policies are in strict compliance with their provisions.

b. The CAF S-3 shall prepare and present to each session of CAF School instruction on the Rules of Engagement and standards of conduct.

T. E. METZGER

DISTRIBUTION: "B"
FORCE ORDER 3121.4B

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Standing Operating Procedure for the Combined Action Program

Ref: (a) T/O P-4912
(b) T/O P-4911
(c) T/O P-4910
(d) FoR 02000.1B
(e) T/O P-4910.45
(f) FoR 04000.5A
(g) Hq 0 3121.1
(h) Hq 0 5000.5

Reports Required: I. Liaison with PFs in Former CAP Locations (par 13.b.)
   II. Report of Activation and Relocation of CAP (par 14)
   III. Report of Transfer of PF Platoon from CAP (par 14)
   IV. Monthly Report Strength and Activities (par 20.a.)
   V. Weekly Summary of CAP Activities (par 20.c.)
   VI. After Action Report (par 18.d.)
   VII. Civic Action and Revolutionary Development (par 17.d. and 20.c.(5))

1. Purpose. To provide instructions for the operation of the Combined Action Program within III Marine Amphibious Force.

2. Cancellation. Force Order 3121.4A.

3. Background. By mutual agreement between the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force and the Commanding General, I Corps Tactical Zone, Marine units have been integrated with Popular Force units within certain villages and hamlets to assist in providing security and pacification measures.

4. General. The Combined Action Program has been organized to provide military security to selected villages and hamlets in the ICTZ. In addition, the forces of the Combined Action Program will support, where
feasible, the Revolutionary Development Campaign Plan in I DZ. It has been found that Popular Force units native to the area, assisted by U. S. Marines, form a unit ideally suited to the task of providing security to hamlets and villages in cleared or semi cleared areas. Combined Action units are operationally supported by U.S., FMNMF and ARVN units in the accomplishment of their mission.

5. **Organization of the Combined Action Program.** The Combined Action Program includes: Combined Action Group (CAG) Headquarters, reference (a); Combined Action Company (CACO) Headquarters, reference (b); and Combined Action Platoons (CAPs), reference (c). The III MAF Combined Action Program is under the staff cognizance of the Director, Combined Action Program who is located at III MAF Headquarters. CAG Headquarters will be located to facilitate coordination with the local Province Chief and major U.S. commands as determined by CG III MAF. The CACO Headquarters will command the U.S. element, and administer and supervise the operations of CACOs and CAPs within assigned sectors of responsibility. The CACO Headquarters will be located at the headquarters of the district in which its subordinate CAPs are deployed. The CACO will command the U.S. element, and administer and supervise the operations of its subordinate CAPs. See paragraph 7 below for description of CACO/Sub-Sector Commander coordination and functional relationships. The basic unit of the Combined Action Program is the CAP, consisting of PF and USMC elements, integrated into a single operational entity. Organization follows the PF organization in which the platoon is the largest tactical unit. The Marine element of a CAP consists of 14 Marines and 1 U.S. Navy Corpsman, for a total of 15 men. The PF Platoon has an authorized strength of 35 soldiers. CG I Corps has pledged to keep platoons at a minimum of 30.

6. **Command.** Command of the Combined Action Program’s U.S. Marine elements is retained by the Commanding General, III MAF. This responsibility will be discharged through the Combined Action Program Director (who will function under the general staff cognizance of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5); Commanding Officers, Combined Action Group Headquarters; Commanding Officers, Combined Action Companies and Marine squad leaders of CAPs. Command relationships within the CAPs are on a coordination and cooperation basis. The USMC squad leader does not command the PF element of the platoon, nor does the PF platoon leader command the Marines. Neither has authority to discipline members of the other component. Offenses by Marines will be handled through the command channels stated above and incidents involving PF soldiers will be reported to the district chief.

7. **Combined Action Company Coordination Responsibilities.** One or more CACO headquarters will be located at headquarters of the districts in which CAPs are located. If two or more CACOs are located in one district headquarters the senior officer will be designated as OIC of the
appropriate liaison personnel to insure effective fire support to CAPs, PF platoons and KD teams in the district's area of responsibility. The CACO will serve in the operations center/fire support direction center of the sub-sector to assist the district chief in his execution of the KD Campaign Plan and providing meaningful military security to the Vietnamese population in the district. The CACO will effect, with the nearest U.S., F-MAF or ARVN battalion commander, the necessary coordination of fire support, reaction forces, medevac procedures, patrol activities, ambushes, etc., and combined operations involving the CAPs in the district.

6. **Missions and Tasks**

   a. The stated missions of the Popular Forces is as follows:

   (1) Destroy the VC infrastructure within the village or hamlet area of responsibility.

   (2) Provide public security and help maintain law and order.

   (3) Protect the friendly political structure.

   (4) Protect bases and communication axis within the villages and hamlets.

   (5) Organize local intelligence nets.

   (6) Participate in civic action and conduct propaganda against the VC.

   b. The mission of the Marine element of the Combined Action Program is to support Popular Force Platoons, through integrated operations, in carrying out the Popular Force missions and to train the Popular Force soldiers so that they can carry out their missions unaided.

   c. **Tasks.** Appropriate tasks in support of these missions include but are not limited to the following:

   (1) Motivate, instill pride, patriotism and aggressiveness in the PF soldier.

   (2) Conduct combined/coordinated day and night patrols and ambushes in assigned areas.

   (3) Conduct training in general military subjects, leadership and language for all personnel of the CAP to increase the proficiency of PF elements so that Marine elements may ultimately be withdrawn and PF elements will continue to perform in an effective manner.
(4) Conduct combined/coordinated operations with U.S., ARVN and FMAF units in coordination with district chief within the CAP area of responsibility.

(5) Marine squad leaders in individual CAPs will function as U.S. Revolutionary Development representatives for the hamlet in which they serve.

(6) Insure that information gathered is made available promptly and on a regular basis to the intelligence center at district level as well as to nearby U.S. and FMAF units.

(7) Participate in the rewards program for collection of enemy information and material.

9. Concept of Operations of Combined Action Platoons

a. CAPs are to be located to provide village and hamlet security, to support the RD Campaign Plan and to provide training for Popular Forces. The CAPs will be provided the capability to call for and adjust supporting arms, to request reaction forces and request medevac assistance. The peculiar nature of the war against the VC guerrilla requires the CAP to operate in a flexible but specific manner. The CAP must of necessity conduct active and aggressive operations in the hamlet area to prevent VC incursions and attacks directed against hamlet residents and officials. The basic mission of village and hamlet security cannot be accomplished solely through the successful defense of the CAP compound. CAP operations function as a part of the overall pacification effort and as such will be conducted to contribute to this larger goal.

b. For coordination purposes, CAPs will be assigned operating areas (AO's) in coordination with the sub-sector commander and the commander of the U.S., FMAF or ARVN force in whose area the platoon is located. CAPs should be left free to conduct operations within this assigned AO, however, the proximate battalion commander will be kept informed of all patrols, ambushes and other planned combat operations. The proximate battalion will be prepared to provide responsive reaction forces and fire support for each CAP in his area. Proximate unit operations within the CAP AO are permissible when required but must be closely coordinated with the CAP, sub-sector and CACO commanders.

c. Employment of CAPs outside their village or hamlet and in conjunction with other U.S., FMAF or ARVN forces may be planned and conducted. When this occurs, full coordination among sub-sector, CACO, and proximate battalion commanders must be effected and full agreement on employment reached. In no case will the location or length of such
an operation be detrimental to the primary mission of the CAP.

d. CAPs operate under the operational direction of the district chief (sub-sector commander). Normally prisoners and detainees will be expeditiously released to the district chief, his authorized representative or District Operations and Intelligence Coordination Center (DOICOC), and the proximate battalion commander notified. However when participating in joint operations all prisoners and detainees will be released to the senior commander in the operation.

e. The role of the Marines in the CAP is that of an advisor and assistant to the Popular Force soldier. The district chief controls the PFs and their activities, therefore all activities of the CAP should be mutually planned and executed. On all operations the Marines should maintain their advisory role whenever possible, and maximum PF participation should be encouraged.

f. The CAP must be aware of everything that takes place in its area of operation and be able to control this area within the capabilities of its own resources or with assistance from adjacent and/or supporting units. CAP patrols must be seen throughout their areas of operation so as to impress the people that they represent a visible Vietnamese government. The CAP can only accomplish its mission by aggressive, continuous patrolling.

(1) CAP patrols should be composed of Marines and PFs. PF participation should always be emphasized and the ratio of PFs to Marines should be at least 2 to 1.

(2) Patrol overlays must be submitted to the CACO and the proximate battalion a minimum of three days prior to the scheduled patrol to assure proper support and coordination. The patrol overlay will include patrol routes, check points, time of departure and return, and number of Marines and PFs on the patrol. Patrol returns will be submitted as required. The CACO must be informed by the most rapid secure method, of any quick reacting patrols to be made as a result of "hot" intelligence. Changes will be shackled or reference a thrust point and contain the reason for the change. Strict security will be maintained over the overlay in order to prevent compromise.

(3) Single CAPs will have a minimum of one daylight patrol and two night patrols and/or ambushes daily. Double CAPs will have a minimum of two daylight patrols and three night patrols and/or ambushes.

g. All CAP compounds will be located within or immediately adjacent to the village. The CAP compound is to be an administrative and logistical headquarters for the platoon and is not meant to be a citadel. Construction will be limited to trenches, covered fighting
holes, obstacles and SEK imts.

10. Location of Combined Action Platoons. The activation of a CAP in a selected hamlet area will be determined by mutual agreement between CG III MAF and CG ICTZ based on recommendations submitted through the parallel chain of command. The decision to locate a CAP in a particular area will be based on the following criteria:

   a. Have adequate real estate belonging to the GVN in or immediately adjacent to the village. The site should be readily accessible by road to facilitate resupply.

   b. Have supporting arms and reaction forces available.

   c. Be in an area free from imminent attack from main force VC units but has inadequate local security forces.

   d. Be located so as to contribute significantly to the security of the area and to the overall pacification program.

   e. Be capable of supporting the RD Campaign Plan or provide follow-up for the RD program.

   f. Have a PF platoon available from the subject village or immediate area.

11. Combined Action Platoon Plan. Prior to installation of a new CAP, the Commanding Officer, Combined Action Group will prepare, in coordination with the appropriate district chief and supporting unit commander, a plan for installation and operation of the new CAP. The plan should make provisions for, but not be limited to the following:

   a. Site Selection. In or proximate to a hamlet so as to involve hamlet residents. Tactical considerations relative to defense. Provision of land by GVN.

   b. Defensive Position Plan. Location of tactical wire, trenches, covered fighting holes and outposts positions, if any, relative to terrain and situation.

   c. Preparation of Hamlet Residents. Psychological campaign. Use of Vietnamese Armed Propaganda Team (APT) and Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU). Identification of Census Grievance Cadre (CGC) in a manner which will not compromise his role. Cultivate friendship of village and hamlet chiefs and village elders.

   d. Site Preparation. Procurement of materials, engineer support
and reinforcement security during construction.

e. **Defense Support Plan.** Reaction force plan to be prepared and rehearsed by proximate supporting unit in whose TACR the CAP is located. Reaction plan rehearsal may be conducted on similar terrain which is similar distance from reaction force base so as not to compromise actual routes of approach to the CAP. Fire support plan will be prepared and battery registered.

f. **PF Training.** Scheduling and records to assure all members of the platoon receive training.

g. **Hamlet Security.** Patrols, ambushes, check points, listening posts and rally points to react to attack on the CAP village or hamlet.

h. **Intelligence Network.** Use of Census Grievance information provided by district chief. Information from PRU and use of PF families. Recruitment of agents. Payment of rewards. Secret signals.

i. **Civic Action.** Short range construction, high impact, long range use with hamlet residents doing work. Motivation of PFs towards expending loyalties beyond family to community.

12. **Withdrawal of the U.S. Marine Element of the CAP.** Withdrawal of the U.S. Marine element of a CAP will be by mutual agreement between CG III MAF and CG IOTZ. Recommendations for relocation or deactivation will be submitted in the same manner as recommendations for activations are submitted. Factors to be considered when recommending relocation of the Marine element are:

   a. Military necessity of the position.

   b. Enemy threat during the past three months and the projected threat.

   c. Combat effectiveness of the PF element of the CAP to include their motivation, loyalty, and willingness to support the GVN.

   d. Level of pacification within the village/hamlet area.

   e. Status of the VC infrastructure within the CAP village or hamlet.

   f. The PF platoon has:

      (1) Been trained and demonstrated its military effectiveness.
22 JUN 1968

ForO 3121.4B

(2) Been recruited from the local populace or their families now live in the CAP village or hamlet.

(3) Adequate arms and equipment in good condition.

(4) A trained PF Corpman.

(5) An organized chain of command.

g. The PF Platoon Leader and Assistant Platoon Leader should:

(1) Be able to plan and execute patrols and ambushes.

(2) Be able to request and adjust artillery fires.

(3) Be able to use the AN/PRC-10 radio.

(4) Be able to assemble, disassemble, and employ all platoon weapons.

(5) Be able to read a map and use a compass.

(6) Have a working knowledge of the tasks, mission and activities of the RD, PHU, APT, sub-sector intelligence cadre, adjacent RF, ARVN, U.S., and FWMAF units in his area.

(7) Be able to plan and execute the defense of the village or hamlet.

(8) Have a working knowledge of intelligence to include collection, importance and use.

(9) Have established mutual trust and confidence with village/hamlet officials.

h. Platoon members must be trained in:

(1) Marksmanship.

(2) Defensive and offensive combat.

(3) buddy aid and hygiene.

(4) All platoon weapons.

(5) Mines and booby-traps.

(6) Construction of wire obstacles.
(7) Patrols and ambushes.
(8) RVN government, history, and patriotism.

13. Liaison with FFs in former CAP locations

a. CAG commanders will assure that frequent visits are made and close liaison is maintained with the FFs in former CAP locations. The CAG commander will establish and maintain a working relationship in order to monitor the effectiveness of the FF platoon, to reassure the FFs of our continued interest in their welfare and to provide encouragement and motivation.

b. CAGs will submit a monthly report, not later than the 15th of the month, to the Director, Combined Action Program on each former CAP site using the following format:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Previous CAP # and FF Platoon #</th>
<th>Original Location (Coordinates)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Status of compound</td>
<td>(To include state of compound maintenance, defense and security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Patrol and ambush activity</td>
<td>(Frequency of patrols and ambushes. Daylight/Night)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Enemy activity during period</td>
<td>(Description to include casualties, weapons captured, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Civic Action</td>
<td>(Progress on projects started but not finished when CAP relocated. New projects begun)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Problem areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Commendable areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. General evaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. Report of Activation and Relocation of CAP Elements. The Commanding Officer, CAG will report immediately to CG III MAF and the CG of the Divisional TACOR in which the CAP is located the activation and relocation of the U.S. Marine element of a CAP. Because the FFs are more effective when stationed near their home, movement of individual FFs and rotation of FF platoons or their subordinate squads from a CAP should be made by the sub-sector commander only on a basis of strict
military necessity. Sub-sector commanders should be discouraged from moving FF elements. Assistance from ARVN and FMAF should be sought to minimize the need to move the FFs from a CAP prior to completion of the below-described training objective. The Commanding Officer, CAG will report to CG III MAF any relocation of the FF element of the CAP.

15. Training. The training objective of the CAP is to enhance the combat effectiveness of the FF platoon as soon as feasible in order to relocate the USMC squad in another hamlet/village area. All members of FF platoons assigned for duty in a CAP will have completed basic military training. Additional training will be conducted by the Marine squad leader, operating in coordination with the VNPF platoon leader. Marine/Navy personnel assigned to the Combined Action Program as replacements or to form new CAPs will attend the Combined Action School in Danang or Phu Bai prior to such assignment.

16. Communications

a. See reference (d), III MAF Comm Plan III.

b. Notes

(1) CAP Common. This is the CACO’s tactical net and is monitored by all CAPs. All CAP patrols will operate on this net. The CAP will request all fire support and medevacs over this net.

(2) Supporting Unit’s Tactical Net. The CACO will monitor the supporting unit’s tactical net and will forward all requests for fire support, medevac and reaction forces over this net. Each CAP will be directed to come up on this net to adjust fire support and medevac and to coordinate with reaction forces.

(3) Where location and situation dictates, the procedures in paragraph 16.b(1) and (2) may be modified if approved by supporting unit and CAG.

c. The CACO and each CAP must know all call signs and frequencies of medevac, gunship, and fire support units in the event they are directed by the proximate battalion to coordinate directly.

17. Military Civic Action

a. CO CAG is responsible for military civic action performed by all CAPs. Those activities of mutual concern will be coordinated with the major commands.

b. Each CAP will engage in a vigorous military civic action program.
which will stress "self-help" by the villagers. Projects should be short term, high impact and low cost. All such projects will be coordinated with the village chief to insure maximum utility and benefit from the project and with the District Chief when approval is required in order to obtain materials from GVN.

c. Each CAP will prepare a semi annual Civic Action Plan to include all proposed projects. This plan will serve as a basis for requisitioning materials and as a measure of progress. The plan will cover the period January - June and July - December. The plan will be submitted by 1 December and 1 June respectively.

d. Civic Action Reports. See reference (e).

18. Administration and Logistics. See references (f) and (g). The Marine element of the CAP is administered and supported through the Combined Action chain of command and control. In a like manner the Popular Forces element of the CAP will be administered and supported through the sub-sector commander who is responsible for all classes of supply. The GVN supply system will not be circumvented as this will cause undue hardships on the PFs when the U.S. Marine element is relocated.

a. Requisitioning and supply of all Class II type 1, Class II type 2 and Class IV items for all Marine elements of the CAG will be the responsibility of the CAG. Routine resupply of class I, III and V for CAPs and CAGOs will be the responsibility of the U.S. battalion in whose TAOR the CAP is located. The commanding officer of the proximate U.S. battalion will assure that each CAP in his area receives maximum "A" rations per day commensurate with the tactical situation and availability. For those CAPs not located in a U.S. unit's area the CAG will make arrangements for routine resupply with the nearest U.S. unit or the CAG will accomplish resupply as appropriate to the situation.

b. Second echelon maintenance of motor transport will be performed by the CAG where possible. Where extreme distances or other factors exist, and this is not feasible, proximate U.S. units with the capability will perform the required maintenance. Second echelon maintenance of electronics will be performed by the nearest U.S. unit with the capability. Third echelon maintenance will be performed by the appropriate organization of the Force Logistics Command.

19. Personnel. Because of the isolated positions and the high degree of individual responsibility required of each member of a CAP, it is mandatory that personnel assigned to CAPs meet the following criteria:

a. Lance Corporals and below:
(1) Have been in country for at least two months if on first tour or have served a previous tour.

(2) Have a minimum of six months remaining on current tour or agree to extend to meet this requirement.

(3) Be a volunteer and motivated to live and work with the Vietnamese people.

(4) Be a mature, motivated Marine and recommended by his commanding officer.

(5) Had no non-judicial punishment within past three months, not more than one non-judicial punishment and no courts-martial within the past year.

(6) Have an average 4.0 mark in conduct and proficiency with last marks at least 4.0.

(7) Have not received more than one purple heart award on current tour.

(8) Preferably be a high school graduate.

(9) Be from 03 occupational field for assignment to a CAP. Other occupational fields may apply on AA Form with agreement to extend their tour for six months and receive approval or disapproval on an individual basis from CG FMFPac.

(10) Be from occupational fields listed in references (a) and (b) for assignment to CACOs and CAGs.

(11) Waivers may be requested for personnel who do not meet the above criteria provided they are highly motivated and are recommended with enthusiasm by their commanding officer. Personnel nominated who require a waiver will appear before the Combined Action Program screening board for interview.

b. Noncommissioned officers assigned to the program will, in addition to the above:

(1) Have combat experience in their MOS.

(2) Have demonstrated a high quality of leadership.

(3) Be considered highly qualified for promotion.

c. Unit commanders will establish and maintain current rosters of personnel who meet the above criteria. When quotas are assigned they
will be filled from this roster.

d. Upon rotation, the following entry will be made on page 11 of the SRB and page 5 of the OQR:

"Participated in the Combined Action Program in Vietnam from ______ to _______. This assignment entailed close and continuous contact with Vietnamese civilians and Popular Force soldiers."

e. Personnel Reports. See reference (h).

20. Reports

a. The Commanding Officers of CAGs will submit a monthly letter report to reach this headquarters not later than the third day of each month (Attention: Director, Combined Action Program), in the following format:

(1) Designation/effective strengths, USMC/USN/PF (as of the last day of the month) and location of the CAG, each CACO and CAP operational during the month. Include the designation of the PF platoon at each CAP. Include changes in location/strength of CACOs/CAPs during the month with an asterisk (*).

(2) Type and number of operations conducted: Night patrols, day patrols, ambushes, listening posts, check points, and sweeps.

(3) Number of VC/NVA KIA, WIA, PW, weapons captured, Boi Chanh, detainees (not confirmed as infrastructural), VC infrastructure cadre confirmed, ordnance turn in incidents and incidents of civilians providing information on enemy.

(4) Friendly casualties, including number requiring medevac.

(5) Noteworthy Contacts. Give brief description of each major contact with the enemy and actions where there are friendly KIA and WIA.

b. After Action Reports. The CO CAG will submit an after action report (Attention: Director, Combined Action Program) on all major contacts and on any incident which is noteworthy with respect to lessons learned.

c. A weekly letter summary of CAG activities will be submitted (Attention: Director, Combined Action Program) each Monday and will include information on the following:

(1) CAP Inspections.
(a) Results of inspections (significant problem areas and remedial action taken).

(b) List CAPs not inspected by an officer and reason.

(2) Critical supply shortages and action taken. The last report of the month will include equipment status report (enclosure (1) to reference (g)).

(3) Training
   (a) Subject and hours taught.
   (b) USMC student man hours.
   (c) PF student man hours.
   (d) Training goals met.

(4) Progress Report
   (a) Cantonment construction and repair.
   (b) CAP activation, deactivation, relocation or change in designation.


(6) General. Any other reportable items of interest.

DISTRIBUTION:
   Case 1
   Case 2
   Case 3

E.E. Anderson
Chief of Staff
HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
FPO San Francisco 96602
ICCI 5401.2A
14:abb
1 1/AUG 1969

I CORPS COORDINATOR INSTRUCTION 5401.2A

From: Commanding General, III MAF/Area Coordinator
ICCI
To: Distribution List

Subj: I Corps/III MAF Combined Action Program
Joint Policy

Encl: (1) Command and Coordination Diagram

1. Purpose. To provide information and policy concerning the subject program.

2. Cancellation. ICCI 5401.2

3. Background. The Combined Action Program, bringing together Marine and Vietnamese Popular Forces in wholly integrated units of platoon size, was initiated in August 1965. From a modest beginning of one Combined Action Platoon (CAP) at Phu Bai in August 1965, the program has grown to 114 platoons, 20 Combined Action Companies (CACOs), and four Combined Action Groups (CAGs). The program exhibited strength and promise from the start. Villages with a CAP have moved rapidly toward a condition of peace and stability. A clear evidence of a CAP's effectiveness is the fact that the Viet Cong have never been able to reestablish control over a village protected by a CAP. In order to provide for effective operations and the orderly expansion of the Combined Action Program and to assist in the execution of the Revolutionary Development Campaign Plan, the following items of joint policy have been agreed upon by F Corps and III MAF.


a. Both the Popular Force and U. S. Marine elements of the Combined Action Platoon have the following mission:

(1) Destroy the VC infrastructure within the village or hamlet area of responsibility.

(2) Provide military security and help maintain law and order.


BỘ TU-LỆNH
QUẢN-ĐOÀN I, VƯNG I CHIẾN-THUẬT
-KBC. 4109-

HUẤN-THỊ ĐIỀN-HÀNH QDI 54.01.2A

Nơiำ: Trung-Tướng Tu-Lệnh/QDI/TLPH Vương
Nơi nhận: ( danh sách phân phối )

Trích yếu: Chương trình hoạt động hỗn hợp của Quan Đoan I và lực lượng III Thủy-bộ.

Bình kèm: Lý thuyết phối hợp và chỉ huy.

1. Mục đích: Cung cấp tin tức và thể thuc hoạt động thuộc chương trình.

2. Huy động: ICCI 5401.2

3. Đại uong: Chương trình hoạt động hỗn hợp giữa Thủy Quân Lục Chiến Hoa Kỳ và các đơn vị Nhập cư từ cấp trung đội tới lõn đã bắt đầu hoạt động từ tháng 8 năm 1965. Một trung đội kiểu mẫu đã bắt đầu hoạt động tại Phú Bài vào tháng 8 năm 65, và từ đó đã tăng lên 114 trung đội, 20 cấp đội và 4 liên đoàn đã cung nhau hoạt động.

Ngày từ ban đầu, chương trình này đã biểu dương được sức mạnh của nó trong tương lai còn thêm nhiều hiệu huy.

Tai cấp thông xá, trung đội hỗn hợp đã hoạt động một cách nhanh chóng và đạt được kết quả và đóng cấp binh-jính cùng như ổn định tình hình và trị trị tại địa phương. Nó bằng chứng hiện nay là VC không thể tài kiểm soát được cả tháng xả mà trung đội đã và đang hoạt động.

Để giúp đỡ và hỗ trợ cho các cuộc hành quân, quân binh-jính có kết quả và cũng như phát triển chương trình này trong vòng trị ty nào đã thị hành dục kế hoạch xây dựng nông thôn, QDI và Lực lượng III Thủy Bổ đã đồng ý hỗ trợ với nhiều thông tin quan trọng sau đây:
I CORPS/ICCI 5401.2A
17 MARCH 59

(3) Protect the friendly political infrastructure.

(4) Protect bases and lines of communications within the village and hamlets in which they are located by conducting day and night patrols and ambushes in their assigned area.

(5) Contribute to combined operations with RF, ARVN, RWMAF, and other FF units in their area.

(6) Participate in civic action and conduct psychological operations against the Viet Cong.

(7) Participate and assist in RD activities to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the accomplishment of the foregoing missions/tasks.

b. The U. S. Marine element has the additional mission of providing further military training to the Popular Force soldiers in order to prepare them to more effectively perform the tasks cited above when the Marine element is relocated to another area.

5. Organization. The basic Combined Action unit is the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) composed of one FF platoon equipped according to the T/C and T/E with a combat strength of 35 FF soldiers, and a Marine rifle squad of 12 Marines plus one U.S. Navy Corpsman. The FF platoon retains its basic organization, while the Marines become advisors to the entire platoon, with the Marine squad leader serving as the advisor to the Vietnamese platoon leader. Within the CAP, command relationships are on a coordination and cooperation basis between the FF platoon leader and the Marine squad leader. The Marine squad leader does not command the FF element of the CAP, nor does the FF platoon leader command the Marine squad.

6. Command and Control of the Combined Action Platoons. Command and control will be exercised as depicted on enclosure (1) and as amplified in the following subparagraphs:

a. Command of the Combined Action Program's U. S. element is retained by the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force. This responsibility will be discharged through the Assistant Chief of Staff, Combined Action Program, Commanding Officers of Combined Action Groups, Commanding Officers of

4. Nơi mầu và công tác chung của các Trung-dội
hơn hợp:

a. Cả hai NQ và Thủy-quản Lục-chiến Hoa-ky, thuộc Trung-dội hồn hợp có những nhiệm vụ sau đây:

1) Hủy diệt kẻ tấn công số ít của VC tại các khu vực trách nhiệm của thôn xã.

2) Giúp đỡ chính quyền trên đồn để duy trì an-ninh trực tuyến đến chung.

3) Bảo vệ hạm tăng số chinh trị thuộc chính quyền QLVN.

4) Bảo vệ các căn cứ cùng như các trường của thom xã bằng cách cung cấp các cuộc tuần tiễu và phục kích ngày càng như đã làm.

5) Tham dự các cuộc hành quân do các lực lượng chính quy QPQ, QNQ và Lục-Dinh để chống trong khu vực trách nhiệm.

6) Tham gia công tác Đền-sy-ý và các hoạt động Tâm-lý-chiến nhằm mục đích chong lành ám-mưu truyền thông của Việt-Cong.

7) Góp phần và trực tiếp cho các hoạt động XĐNT hâu phát triển tối đa cùng lực để hoàn thành các nhiệm vụ công tác đã nêu trên.


Người Trung-dội-TQLC không có quyền chì-huy Trung-dội NQ và người lạy người Trung-
b. Command of the Combined Action Program’s Vietnamese Popular Force element is retained by the Commanding General, I Corps. This responsibility will be discharged through the Deputy Commander, Territorial, Regional and Popular Forces, Sector Commanders, Sub-Sector Commanders, and the Popular Force Platoon Leaders of the Combined Action Platoons.

c. Combined Action Platoons are under the operational control of the sub-sector commander in whose sub-sector the CAP is located. This duty is discharged through the sub-sector S-3 who will plan and coordinate all combatant activities of the CAPs in conjunction with the senior CACO Commander in the sub-sector.

7. Activation and Relocation of Combined Action Platoons

a. Definitions

(1) "Activation" describes the formation of a new CAP. Activations occur when resources become available to the program and additional CAPs are formed, or when a CAP is deactivated in one province and activated in another.

(2) "Relocation" describes the movement of a CAP, or the Marine element thereof, from one geographical location to another within the same province. Relocations are made when the PF platoon is trained to the degree that the presence of the Marine element is no longer required or when the Marine element is moved from a pacified area to a more contested area in support of the Pacification Plan or the Revolutionary Development Program. A significant change in the AOC of a CAP constitutes a geographical relocation and as such is considered to be a CAP relocation.

b. Authority to effect Activations and Relocations

(1) Activations. The activation of a CAP will be mutually determined by the Commanding General, I Corps and the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force based upon recommendations made by sub-sector and sector commanders forwarded through the Government of Vietnam channels, and similar recommendations of Combined Action Group.

đội-trung binh QĐ cùng không có quyền chỉ-huy binh sĩ trong Tiểu-dội TQLC.

6. Văn đề chỉ-huy và kiểm soát trong Trung-dội

hon hổp:

Việc chỉ-huy và kiểm soát sẽ được tổ chức như đề ra mục I và nội thêm trong các chương phụ sau đây:


7. Văn đề phát triển và di chuyển các Trung-dội hổp hổp

a. Định nghĩa:

(1) "Thành lập" Việc thành lập các đơn vị CAP mới chỉ được thị hành khi mối công tác trong chương trình quá nhiều hay khi một Trung-dội hổp hổp hoạt động không mong lâm kết quả tốt đẹp trong tỉnh này nhưng có thể phát triển khả năng của một vài tỉnh khác, như thể các Trung-dội -
Commanders within those provinces. CAP locations will be selected to contribute directly to the accomplishment of the RD Program or Pacification Plan, to provide defense of lines of communication, and to solve particular security problems unique to a given district such as those caused by the influx of refugees.

(2) Relocations. Relocations will be effected by and with the mutual concurrence of CG, III MAF and CG, ITCZ upon the recommendations of the Deputy Commander, Territory, Regional and Popular Forces, ITCZ and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Combined Action Program, III MAF.

8. Training. The training objective of the CAP is to enhance combat effectiveness of the FF platoons in order to relocate the Marine squad in another hamlet/village area. Sub-sector commanders will, insofar as practical, attempt to keep the FF platoons in the same hamlet for a sufficient period of time to accomplish this training objective. Movement of individual FFs and rotation of the FF platoons or their subordinate squads from a CAP will only be made on a basis of strict military necessity. Assistance from ARVN and FMMAF should be sought to minimize the need to move the FFs from a CAP prior to completion of the training objective. All members of FF platoons assigned for duty in a CAP will have completed basic military training. Additional on-the-job training will be conducted by the Marine squad leader operating in coordination with the FF platoon leader. Additional training guidance will be provided from time to time to the elements of the CAP through the I Corps and III MAF Combined Action Program channels. Marine and Navy enlisted personnel assigned to the Combined Action Platoon will attend the Combined Action Program School in Danang prior to such assignment.

9. Administration and Logistics. Administration and logistics will follow current procedures to support the respective Vietnamese and U.S. elements of the CAP.

10. Visits and Inspections. Frequent visits and inspections will be made by sub-sector commanders and CACO Commanders, and by sector and CAC Commanders, in order to correct deficiencies and to ensure the maximum effectiveness of the Combined Action

hon hop moi duoc thanh lap them.

(2) Di chuyen: Vi cung di chuyen 1 Trung-doi hon hop hay thanh phan cua Tieu-doi TQLC tu vung nay den vung khac trong 1 Tinh, cong vi vi chuyen nay chi duoc thi hanh khi 1 TD/NQ da duoc huynh luyn den mot trinh do co du khi nga thay the cho don vi TQLC trong khu vuoc trach nhiem cua hop, hay la khi don vi cua TQLC can chuyen tu mot vung da duoc binh dinh den mot vung xoi dug de yem tru cho cac cong tac binh dinh hay chuong trinh XDNT.

Sy thay doi vi tri CAP trong khu vo cong soat han quan cung co nghia la mot sy thay doi dia the dong quan.

b. Than quyen thanh lap va di chuyen cac Trung-doi hoat-dong hon hop:

(1) Thanh lap: Vi cung thanh lap 1 Trung-doi hon hop se duoc quyet dinh do Truong Tu-Lenh QD1 va Truong Tu-Lenh theo Lien luong III cua TQLC Hoc-ky, can cui vo su thien chau cua cac Tieu-khu Truong va Chi-khu Truong de trinh theo thong quan gian va thong su thien cua tuong ty cua cac Lien-Doan-Truong hon hop tai cac Tinh khu vuoc trach nhiem cua hop.

Vi tri dong quan cua cac TD hon hop se duoc lye chon de gap phan be hieu va vi cung hoan thanh chuong trinh XDNT hay ke hoach oinh dinh trong khu vo hoat dong de bao ve cac truc gia thong va gia quyet cac van de an-ninh tai Quan-ly de ch di Minh nhu van de tiep nhan dong bao ty nen CS v.v....

(2) Di chuyen: Vi cung phoi tri lai duoc quyet dinh boi Truong-Tuong Tu-Lenh QD1 va Truong Tu-Lenh Lien luong III Thuy-boc qua su de nghi cua TLP/LT kien CH/DP/NQ va Phu-ta TKT/LL/III/TS doc trach ve CAP.

8. Cong tac huynh luyn: Vi cung huynh luyn cho Trung-doi hon hop la de gia tang tiem nang chien dau cua Trung-doi NQ cot de thay the cho Tieu-doi
Hoa Kỳ cần di chuyển đến một khu vực khác. Các Tiểu khu, Chi-Khu Trưởng nên luôn luôn cố gắng để duy trì các trung đội NQ trong cùng một thời gian để có được thời gian hoàn thành việc huấn luyện. Việc thủy đồng chuyền và thay thế binh sĩ thuộc Tr-D/NQ hãy bình ảnh HK chỉ thực hiện theo nhu cầu quân sự cần thiết. Việc hỗ trợ của Quân Chinh và Đông Minh sẽ được yêu cầu tối thiểu để giúp đỡ đến khi Tr-D/NQ đã hoàn thành công tác huấn luyện. Tất cả các binh sĩ thuộc Tr-D/NQ phải hoàn thành việc huấn luyện quân sự trước khi được bổ nhiệm đến với việc hỗ trợ thực hiện hoạt động. Tham vao việc thực tập và huấn luyện họ còn được hưởng đến công tác bộ tiểu đội Trưởng TQLC/HK cũng với sự hợp tác của Tr-Đội Trưởng NQ.

Công tác huấn luyện bổ túc cho các thành phần thuộc Trung đội hội hợp theo thời gian do BTH/QDI và lực lượng III TQLCHK đồng điệu. Các binh sĩ TQLC/HK được phân công các công tác với Trung đội NQ thuộc chương trình hoạt động hỗ trợ phải trả qua một khóa huấn luyện bổ túc tại Đà Nẵng trước khi được bổ nhiệm.


10. Thêm viếng và thành trắc: Các cuộc thăm viếng và thành trắc thường xuyên sẽ được thực hiện do các chi khu trưởng, đại đội trưởng, Tiểu khu trưởng và Liên đội đội trưởng đảm nhiệm, soát đế sự đổi mới những khuyết điểm và bảo đảm cho sự thành công tốt da cho chương trình mà những mục đích đẩy mạnh chiến dịch xây dựng nông thôn - TULICH QUYỀN LÁI - GIẢI LỆNH VỆ TÍCH - TIẾN CHIẾN -

[Signature]

Nhượng thêm lưu
- BTH/VP/TNXF/TL/ĐQT/NQ
- BTH/P3
- BTL/BK/Quảng Đà
- Tiểu khu Quảng Trị
- Thừa Thiên
- Quang Nam

Để thi hành
- Tiệu Khu Quảng Bình
- Tiệu Khu Quảng Ngãi
Để thi hành
Command and Coordination Diagram

CG, III MAF

CG, ICTZ

Deputy Commander, Territory, Regional and Popular Forces

Commanding Officer, Combined Action Group

Sector Commander

Commanding Officer, Combined Action Company

Sub-Sector Commander

USMC Squad

Popular Force Platoon

Combined Action Platoon

Command

Coordination

Tu-Lệnh Bộ III

Lực lượng Thủy- nhóm HK

Tu-Lệnh QDI

Vùng I Chiến-Thuật

Phụ-Tá Th-Mau-Trưởng

Chương trình H-dòng

Tu-Lệnh-Phó Lệnh-

thổ kiểm CHT/DPQ/NC

Vùng I/CT

Chi-huy-trưởng

Lien-doàn hoạt-dộng

Hội hợp

Tiêu-Khu-Trưởng

Đại-Dồi-Trưởng

hoạt động hội hợp

Chi-Khu-Trưởng

Tiêu-Dồi T.VLC/HK

Trung-dồi NQ

Trung-dồi hoạt-dộng hội hợp

Chi-huy

Điều hành phối hợp

ENCLOSURE (1)