(Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1))

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, 2d CAG ltr 3/MJD/jmm 5750 of 26May69

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 March to 31 March 1969

1. The subject chronology has been reviewed for completeness and is forwarded herewith.

R. D. WHITE
By direction

Copy to:
CO, 2d CAG
CG, III MAF

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY
FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 2d CAG ltr 3/JJD/Jmm 5750 of 26 May 1969

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code 403D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 March to 31 March 1969 (U)

1. Forwarded.

R. H. Barrow
R. H. BARROW
By direction

Copy to:
CO, 2d CAG
UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FO 0 S.n Francisco, California 96602

CONFIDENTIAL (Unclassified when enclosure 1 is removed)

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AD3D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
      (2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 March to 31 March 1969

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.1A
     (b) FMFPacO 5750.6A

Enc: (1) 2d Combined Group Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure
   (1) is submitted.

2. Enclosure (1) is downgraded at 3 year intervals. Declassified after
   12 years. DOD Directive 5200.10

E. L. Lewis

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 March 1969 to 31 March 1969

INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part I</td>
<td>ORGANIZATIONAL DATA</td>
<td>1-1 - 1-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part II</td>
<td>NARRATIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>2-1 - 2-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part III</td>
<td>SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS</td>
<td>3-1 - 3-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part IV</td>
<td>SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS</td>
<td>4-1 - 4-56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12-YEARS

ENCLOSURE (1)
## ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2d Combined Action Group</td>
<td>1st Lt. E. L. LEWIS</td>
<td>1 Mar 69; 30 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SUBORDINATE UNITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. J. E. SETZ</td>
<td>1 Mar 69; 30 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. J. W. BOHAN</td>
<td>1 Mar 69; 30 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. A. H. MOURIE</td>
<td>1 Mar 69; 30 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. J. H. VOGELGESANG</td>
<td>1 Mar 69; 30 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. J. D. HORNIS</td>
<td>1 Mar 69; 30 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. D. D. DEAN</td>
<td>1 Mar 69; 30 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SSgt. J. W. BROWNING</td>
<td>1 Mar 69; 30 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capt. A. P. TOKARZ</td>
<td>1 Mar 69; 30 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Combined Action Company</td>
<td>1st Lt. R. A. CHENIN</td>
<td>1 Mar 69; 30 Mar 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ATTACHED UNITS

- Detachment, Scout Ing Platoon, 3rd M.P. Battalion
- Detachment, Kit Carson Scouts, 1st MarDiv G-2 (C.I)
- Detachment, ARVN Interpreters/Translators, III MAF
- Detachment, Medical Section, Hq III MAF

### LOCATION

1 March 1969 to 31 March 1969
3. Staff Officers

Executive Officer/Civic Action

Officer S-5

Major R. O. BROAD JR. 1 Mar 69 - 31 Mar 69

S-1 Officer

1st Lt H. NAGAI 1 Mar 69 - 31 Mar 69

S-2/S-3 Officer

Major R. J. WISE 1 Mar 69 - 31 Mar 69

S-4 Officer/Supply Officer

1st Lt R. L. BUCHANAN 1 Mar 69 - 31 Mar 69

4. Average Strength. The average strength of the 2d Combined Action Group during the month of March 1969 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>On Rlge</th>
<th>Chargeable/Effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 2d Combined Action Group continued to be handicapped by the lack of junior noncommissioned officers, operating at approximately 50% of authorized manning levels. The total effective strength oforrh support attached to this unit also started on a downward trend.

a. Unit Average Effective Strength is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th># of CAPs</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART II
NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. Personnel Administration.

a. Joined and Transferred. During the month of March, the 2d Combined Action Group joined and transferred the following number of personnel listed in the four categories below.

(1) Joined

Officers
Enlisted
2
66

(2) Rotated OUS

Officers
Enlisted
0
88

(3) Transferred within WestPac Command

Officers
Enlisted
0
0

(4) Transferred by SR/w sick (out of country hospitals)

Officers
Enlisted
0
25

b. Awards.

(1) There were seventeen recommendations for heroism and four end of tour awards submitted to MACPac for approval during the month of March 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USC</th>
<th>VN</th>
<th>Popular Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>BSM</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BSM</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Personnel of the 2d Combined Action Group received the following awards as a result of combat wounds, heroism/meritorious service in the Republic of Vietnam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USN</th>
<th>USM</th>
<th>PUN</th>
<th>REWC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Casualties. The 2d Combined Action Group suffered the following casualties during the month of March 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USC</th>
<th>USN</th>
<th>USM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 9 Returned to duty from previous months casualties.
d. CONRINTS/SPLINTS/WELEIP. There was one Congressional inquiry processed during the month concerning medical treatment provided to a Marine. Investigation revealed no foundation for the complaint to the Congressman. There were no Special Interest Letters received. The welfare reports were primarily concerned with the lack of correspondence between individual Marines and next of kin. Continued guidance will be provided to all Marines to write to their next of kin and keep them advised of their welfare and health.

e. Administrative Assistance.

(1) The 2d Combined Action Group administration continues to give all possible assistance to the companies. Newly joined administrative clerks are being trained in the mechanics of the administrative field and are expected to be proficient in their duties within a month. The new manpower management system went into effect during the month of March with no problems encountered.

(2) One administrative discharge recommendation was processed and forwarded to higher headquarters during the reporting period. Results were still pending at the end of the month of March.

(3) The following Group Directives were published during the reporting month.

(a) Group Order 3460.1 of 18 March 1969; Control of Privately Owned Weapons and War Trophies.

(b) Group Order 5560.2 of 8 March 1969; Assignment of Vehicle Operators.

(c) Group Bulletin 1500 of 20 March 1969; Inspection of Personnel and Individual Arms.

f. Legal. A breakdown of legal activities for March 1969 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informal Investigations</th>
<th>SCM</th>
<th>NJP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the above, one Article 32 Investigation pending from the month of February was completed during the reporting period.

g. Morale and Welfare. The morale of the unit continued at a high average with recreational activity available to all hands. Quotas for both out of country and in country Rest and Recuperation (R&R) are effectively being utilized. The following is a breakdown.

(1) Out of Country R&R - Quota Utilized
   - 42  39
   - 12  12

(2) Variety shows from the FLC club system continued to be available for entertainment of the troops almost every Sunday at the Headquarters.
Compound with Marines from each CAP, commensurate with operational commitments being brought in from the field to relax and enjoy the Program and the Sunday cook-outs. Also, a 2d Combined Action Group talent show was staged during the month by member of 2d CAP. The show was very well received by all hands. More are planned for the future.

h. Mail. Mail for the troops is processed and expeditiously delivered, operational requirements permitting. The Group Mail room again passed their Postal Inspector's Inspection with no discrepancies reported. Daily average bags of mail processed were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letters</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incoming</strong></td>
<td><strong>Outgoing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2 bag</td>
<td>1/2 bag</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Packages</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incoming</strong></td>
<td><strong>Outgoing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: One bag of letters represent approximately 2,000 letters.

i. Promotions. There were 45 promotions effected during the Month of March as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Regular</th>
<th>Meritorious</th>
<th>Meritorious Combat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSgt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ssgt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cpl</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCpl</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pfc</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

j. Career Planning.

1. During the Month of March, a total of thirty-two career planning interviews were conducted, both at the Career Planning Office of the Group Headquarters, and on site at CAP's operating in the field. Interviews in the field are scheduled in advance by the Career Planner after a review of records, and notifications of visits are made to Company Commanders weekly; this provides for availability of personnel to be interviewed. Interviews in the Career Planning Office, on the other hand, are normally the result of referral by a third party or initiated by the individual Marine.

2. No career reinstatements or extensions of enlistment resulted from interviews conducted during the month. A rank breakdown of interviews is as follows:

(a) Sergeants . . . . . . 4
(b) Corporals . . . . . . 8
(c) Lance Corporals . . . . 10
(d) PFCs . . . . . . . . 10

2-5

DECLASSIFIED
(3) An attempt having been made to categorize the reasons for failure to reenlist or extend reenlistment, the following reasons appear to be consistent within the Group, however they might compare with reports from other organizations:

(a) Rank. This is the overriding subject brought up by interviewees. A discussion of the difficulty in promoting PFCs to Lance Corporal, particularly, has been provided previously; an average of less than twenty quotas to lance corporal monthly, in a Group which averages approximately 290 eligible PFCs, is quickly and consistently noted by those in the eligible category.

(b) Pay. Pay is a common motivator, and accounts in large part for the high extension of overseas tour rate, but at the same time discourages many when applied to career planning.

(c) Educational plans.

(d) Employment plans.

(e) Marriage plans. Frequently, marital difficulties are the lot of married Marines in Vietnam, and the knowledge of these difficulties act as a deterrent to the young Marine who plans marriage and is hesitant to compromise future plans with what he takes to be a too-common tendency toward incompatibility with a military career.

(4) The Navy Education Testing Center of the Naval Support Activities, Danang, once again cooperated during the month in the administration of high school level General Educational Development Tests. Thirty tests were administered to Marines of 2d CAG. The interest in this program remains high.

k. Hospital and Brig Visits. Weekly hospital visits were made by designated officers of the Command in addition to those made daily by the Hospital Corps Representatives and frequent visits made by the Commanding Officer. No welfare or other problems were uncovered.

1. Informational Services. Two hundred and two Fleet hometown news releases were forwarded to the III MAR information Bureau during the reporting month.
2. **Civic Action/Psychological Operations.**

a. During the Month of March, Civic Action NGO's from the eight companies of the 2d CACB continued their efforts to act as a liaison between hamlet, village, and district officials in initiating civic action and community development projects. As a result of the recent offensive, many CACB's have concentrated on the tactical situation and helped in many ways to rebuild destroyed homes, schools, and pagodas. Civic action has continued at an acceptable level despite the increase of enemy activity during the period.

b. Continuing emphasis has been put on no cost/non-material civic action projects, which has resulted in a most advantageous form of civic action for mobile CACB's in particular, where the Marines can profit from living among the people, realizing their needs, and profiting from the gaining of their respect and friendship.

1. An example of the no cost/non-material approach is the emphasis which has been put on health and sanitation. It has become routine with the mobile CACB's to have police calls in their hamlet and village main and bath calls, and physical education programs in the form of organized sports. CAP 2-2-1, for example, has started a gymnastics class.

2. CAP 2-7-3, as a result of the success of their English language classes, has started a Pen Pal Club, wherein the villagers correspond with service men and their relatives in the U.S.

3. A popular event has been the visits of the III MARP Drum and Bugle Corps to CAP villages and hamlets. The group played a concert in the hamlet of An-By (Cap 2-5-4) on 31 March, drawing most of the hamlet population.

c. Since beginning agricultural civic action projects on a larger scale in March, they have rapidly become promising. Because of the adaptability of such projects to the Vietnamese economy, they have been readily accepted.

1. The raising of rabbits has met with enthusiasm. Although few of the people have had the experience of eating rabbit, they are fully aware of the high price of rabbit on the market. The money which can be made from selling rabbits is a prime motivator. For fast distribution of rabbits among others in a village, a method is planned wherein the first two litters of each doe must be given to two families previously selected by the hamlet chiefs. In this way, eventually, the rabbit population will be generalized throughout the village, and every family which desires rabbits will have them.

2. The Civic Action NGO of CACB 2-5, assisted by an agricultural advisor from NAGW, held several meetings in hamlets surrounding CACB's 2-5-4 and 2-5-5 with tobacco farmers, concerning problems they had faced with their crops. The introduction of proper insecticide and improved methods of curing the tobacco seemed to interest the farmers most. The meeting was rewarding to both the farmers and the CAP Marines.
a. Commodities distributed during the month of March were as follows: food (2347 pounds); soap (436 pounds); clothing (187 pounds); personal hygiene kits (200); school kits (76); sewing kits (14); blacksmith kits (7); masonry kits (1).

c. During March, CAP personnel of the Group assisted Vietnamese civilians in completing the following projects: culverts (6); fences (14); dwellings (15); public heads (1); wells (13); pagodas (17); bridges (1); school classrooms (3); family bankers (5); public showers (2).

d. Medical assistance in support of civic action saw MedCaps resulting in the treatment of 13,573 Vietnamese Civilians. 171 dental cases were treated. 97 Vietnamese children and 63 adults were medically evacuated during the month.

e. CAP corpsmen continued to train Vietnamese civilians in the basics of first aid. During the month, 54 such civilians were undergoing training. These widows assist in MedCaps and serve as interpreters for the corpsmen.

h. Psychological operations activities employed by the Group during the month of March included the use of air-dropped leaflets and hand dissemination of leaflets and Vietnamese newspapers.

(1) Approximately 26,000 CAPs ARE HERE TO HELP YOU leaflets were air-dropped.

(2) Approximately 42,000 SAFE CONDUCT PASS leaflets were air-dropped.

(3) 42,000 REWARD leaflets were air-dropped during the month.

(4) Approximately 30,000 Vietnamese newspaper articles distributed by CAP Marines.
3. Intelligence.

b. Intelligence Information Chain. The widely deployed elements of 2d CAP continue to provide timely intelligence information up the intelligence chain that has proven accurate as well as life saving in numerous cases. This information originates in CAP controlled hamlets where the civilian population is responding to the increased measure of security the CAP units are providing. The local civilians are pointing out booby traps, reporting enemy acts, enemy locations, strengths and other information in steady streams as they gain confidence in the Marine and BF soldiers. All of the information provided through these numerous sources was expeditiously processed through appropriate GVN and other FMAR channels. Intelligence summaries from all sources were distributed throughout all of 2d CAP units. Combined Action Company Commanders (CACOs) also have access to the U.S. Marine TAOR Commanders for prompt receipt of intelligence as well as processing of intelligence gathered by their CAP units. The CACOs access to all Vietnamese agency data provided through District Intelligence/Operations Command Centers (DIOCCs), completes the intelligence chain. Any information gathered from this source is quickly disseminated up the CAP chain to all higher levels of command.

c. Counter Intelligence. Again during March, the CAP headquarters benefited from a close working relationship with the 5th Counter-intelligence Team located adjacent to the 2d CAP compound. CAP units worked closely with the CIT to pursue intelligence or data provided by the CIT as a result of their interrogations. On two separate occasions, information led to the capture of confirmed VC. One such action resulted in identification of several members of a hamlet enemy infrastructure which CAP members subsequently picked up for interrogation. The data provided by these methods assisted greatly in uprooting the entire infrastructure in this hamlet.

d. General Enemy Situation. The general enemy situation during March 1969 changed considerably from a previous peak during the increased enemy activity in February throughout the Province of Quang Nam. A sharp decrease in activity was evident as the month began. The first week of March was characterized by the sharp decrease in contacts but an increase from normal in attacks by fire. Several CAPs came under mortar attack as were some of the outlying District Headquarters. Throughout CAP/TACOs, roughly four times the weekly average of mining incidents and attacks by fire were reported by CAP units. In addition, ground attacks while by no means approximating the last week of February’s numerous contacts, were well above the weekly average throughout our TACOs. The termination
of the Post-TP offensive required an increased effort by local NV to in-
dict CAP activities with a varied assortment of booby trap incidents and
mines. There were no major enemy contacts reported, nevertheless, the enemy
continued to move throughout the TAOC's area and were spotted on numerous occasions
at long range and taken under fire. It was apparent that enemy forces still
remained in areas of late February contact in substantial numbers. Prisoner
interrogations indicated that the last week of February's offensive was
but the 1st round of a multi-phased series of attacks which were scheduled to be
re-directed against CAP units throughout Quang Nam Province.
The only evident signs on the battlefield that there would be a continuation
of efforts on a major scale were the increased booby traps, attacks by
fire and numerous sightings. At the end of the first week in March it
was evident that the enemy would continue with their "stop and start"
tactics against the CAP's to keep us off balance and on edge. At the
termination of the first week, all CAP's and CACO's were awaiting the
"start again" cycle of enemy operations and all indications pointed
towards a high threat period in the near future. All CAP's were on
increased alert for the beginning of the 2nd week.

The second week saw the tempo of enemy operations once again decrease.
Most CAP contacts were very brief and resulted in the enemy's choice to
break contact and move out of the TAOC's area. The appearance from the previous
week's "stop-start techniques" was thought to be a prelude to an overall
effort against CAP's throughout the province of Quang Nam. The anticipated
increase in tempo never did materialize as only small scale ground contacts
and sporadic firing occurred. One significant event took place on 14 March
1969 when CAP 2-7-6 at Hai Kim San (limestone) located (16) 122mm
rockets buried in shallow pits in a vegetable garden. This find, located
within range of the TAOC's fire control certainly prevented numerous injuries
that could have materialized had they been launched. Pictures of the ammunition
were located in section IV of this chronology. (Original copy of chronology to
CAC only)

The third week of March was punctuated by a defined increase in
activity. With the exception of the heavy NV/VC Post-TP offensive, which
saw most of 2d CAC's CAP's in contact, it was the highest level of activity
experienced in the past few months. The number of contacts increased
considerably as the enemy forces seemed to regroup for larger actions
and company size assaults instead of small squad sized harassing elements.
The CAP's located in Dien Ben and Binh Nhon districts, bore the brunt
of these renewed efforts. Viet Cong terrorism increased significantly
within the CAP TAOC's as assassination squads attempted to
demonstrate to the CAP hamlet civilians that their cooperation with the CAP's was not
going unnoticed. Urban efforts were limited to one night time
throwing event which was aimed at a CAP hamlet chief in Hoa Vang District
and setting houses on fire in two other CAP hamlets. In Dien Ben and
Binh Nhon, CAP's made sizeable contacts as they inducted NV/VC units
moving through their TAOC's area to attack other larger ARVN or Korean
units in the area. Most of the attacks were preceded by either 3-40
rockets or mortar fire. The most significant ground contact of this period
occurred on 10 March when CAP 2-4-2, on an island south of Hoa An,
engaged a large enemy force 2.5 kilometers southwest of Hoa An at 0557Z. An
aerial observer reported sighting 43 enemy bodies in the action that continued
throughout the afternoon and into the night. Civilians in the area reported
there were over 100 enemy KIA's and WIA's and revealed that the local

2-3 UNC反腐化ated
The populace had been forced to carry wounded enemy troops west during the night. The CAP was credited with 19 enemy killed for the action.

The Month of March ended in about the same pattern of activities. It is evident that the enemy forces intend to launch phase II of their offensive in the near future. Their tactics of "stop and start" of activities have certainly kept CAP units on edge wondering when the offensive will once again materialize. The activity in all CAP TACOs stabilized at the end of the reporting period, and fewer enemy sightings were reported during the last week.

(1) Enemy Plans and Policies. As the reporting period came to a close, it was apparent that CAP units would once again become prime targets in the event the 2d Phase of the offensive was commenced. CAP heads personnel informed their Marines and PPs that enemy agents had advised them not to in any way participate with or assist the Marines in their activities. These enemy forces also informed the people that they were seeking revenge for previous setbacks meted out by CAP units. Recent tactical defeats on the battlefield have countered the enemy's impression of bravery and strength. The CAPs remain prepared to cope with the enemy's increased efforts. The type of attacks which may be expected in the coming weeks will be similar to those experienced by CAP units during the past month -- attacks by fire directed at CAP fixed compounds or mobile day or night sites and subsequent or simultaneous ground attacks against our units.

c. Interrogator/Translator. During the Month of March 1969 all detainees or prisoners were either processed through the various district headquarters or were forwarded to USMC interrogation/translator teams for processing. A feedback of information produced as a result of these interrogations is provided to 2d CAG for dissemination to capturing CACOs or CAPs.

f. Interpreters. 2d CAG had seven interpreters on the rolls during the Month of March 1969. One officer and one enlisted man are assigned to CAG headquarters in Da Nang, working in the S-3 office while the other six enlisted are assigned to specific District headquarters as required as well as the 2d CAG Mobile (MTT) Training Team. These interpreters assist the CACOs and the MTT in communicating with PF leaders on all CAP matters and daily coordination. They translate official correspondence for the CACO and CAG headquarters sections.

B. Injury Statistics. Injury statistics for the Month of March 1969 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>POW</th>
<th>Detainees</th>
<th>Host G.</th>
<th>Detainees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.9
(1) Weapons and Ordnance Captured.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK-50</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK-Machine Gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9mm Pistol</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.45 Cal. Pistol</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm Pistol</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-40 Launcher</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordnance</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangalore Torpedoes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG rounds</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-26 grenades</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giocos</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm Mortar round</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar round</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box Mines</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Mines</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-40 Rocket rounds</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122mm Rockets</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Booby Traps</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Operations

a. General. As described in the intelligence section of this chronology, the level of activity during the Month of March decreased considerably from February but was still considerably more than the average amount of contacts. We continued to stress daily complete coordination at all levels in preparation for phase II of the enemy’s post-TET offensive which never did materialize. All CAP and CACO units prepared for expected operations by becoming familiar with all TAOCs, coordinating their plans with adjacent U.S. and Vietnamese or other RVNAF units. An increased measure of security was evident as a result of additional patrols and ambushes throughout TAOCs. Reaction plans, both intra-unit as well as inter-unit, were used during the month as CAPs reacted to each others needs and continued to call on TAOR commanders for assistance whenever sizeable contacts were developed. There was also marked improvement, in internal CAP unit security as units were acutely aware of impending attacks. CAP TAOCs are constantly being reevaluated to ensure adequate room is provided for CAPs to thoroughly control these areas while still accomplishing the pacification part of their mission. As in previous months CAPs relied on their flexibility in operations and their varied reaction plans to pull themselves out of potential hot spots. Previously coordinated plans and support enabled 2d CAP units to enjoy success in every enemy encounter.

b. Mobility. As described in previous chronologies, Mobile CAPs have a definite advantage over the static compound CAPs. The basic concept of operations generally remains the same but the wide flexibility provided by mobile CAPs overshadow the comfort of permanent structure benefits provided in the compounds. Our friendly security continues to stay at an optimum because the kill ratio goes up. The mobile CAPs provided increased security in their areas realized because of their extensive patrolling, aggressive ambushes and positive direct contact with the civilian population. Local civilians continue to assist the CAPs by providing timely information on enemy activities and pointing out danger spots or booby traps to CAP members.

(1) At the termination of the reporting period 2d CAC had twenty-five mobile CAPs operating in Quang Nam Province. Two of these were redesignated as Mobile CAPs from static CAPs during the Month of March. The CAPs changing status during the reporting period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAP</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>DATE MOBILE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-5-2</td>
<td>Hoa Vang</td>
<td>21 March 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5-3</td>
<td>Hieu Rhon</td>
<td>25 March 1969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Individual letters reporting the changes in status are located in Section IV of this chronology. (Supporting Documents).

(2) CAP 2-7-2, previously located at grid AT97472 in Hoa Vang District was relocated and redesignated as Mobile CAP 2-7-2 in the vicinity of grids AT9372, AT9472 and the Northern half of AT9472. This CAP was shifted from a

ENCLOSURE (1)

2-12
relatively secure hamlets complex to targeted hamlets in support of the 1969 Pacification Program for Quang Nam Province.

c. Activity. The overall level of activity and number of enemy contacts decreased in level from the last week of February. The month started with relatively higher incidents and more enemy contacts than usual, but tapered off at the termination of the reporting period. The intelligence section of this chronology describes these activities and compares activity on a weekly basis. All indications continue to point towards an increase in activity in the near future. CAPs reorganized after the last week of February's action and continued normal surveillance of their entire AOCS. The numerous contacts of the post-TET offensive had re-emphasized the need for close coordination and liaison with all adjacent units. CAPs continued extensive coordination in all cognizant areas and generally sharpened up all phases of their CAP activities. The increased faith in CAP units is evident in the civilian population as they cooperate freely and openly with CAP members. Generally, preparedness was the order of the day as all units ensured that all would be in order in the event the enemy struck again in the force during the month.

d. Coordination. The coordination and liaison performed on the CAP level is intricate, and time consuming, but it pays off in big bonus results in terms of lives saved. During March 1969 new coordination measures were originated. For a long time, P.F. soldiers attached to CAPs (P.F. element of the CAPs) were never provided with what 2d CAP considered adequate instructions, guidance or orders from their control agencies, the District Chiefs, and their staffs. A trial project was started in Hon Yen District, that has since been adopted throughout all of 2d CAP units. Coordination with the District Chiefs was effected and the need for combined orders was explained to them. The original format was an order from the Combined Action Company Commander explaining the mission of CAP units, the specific mission of that particular CAP the letter referred to, a thorough explanation of the concept of operations, specific specified tasks as assigned to the CAP within their AOCS and an overlay outlining the specific boundaries of that AOCS. The pilot letter proved so effective in eliminating problems that were generally improved on subsequent ones until we had a plan that greatly assisted CAP commanders in the accomplishment of their daily tasks. The P.F. platoon leader had written orders to execute, and to disseminate to his troops.

Another system was attempted with great success. The information in the basic letter was converted into an operation order format and translated for a combined order for CAP. This order was jointly signed by the District Chiefs as well as the CACO Commanders. A ceremony for presentation of the CAP orders completed the cycle. With due pomp and ceremony, the orders were presented at District Headquarters with the Company Commanders as well as the District Chief's presiding.

One part of the combined order directs both the CAP Commander and the P.F. platoon leader to present themselves at headquarters, in the event any matters cannot be resolved between them satisfactorily. The overall efforts have proven extremely beneficial in solving everyday CAP Marine and P.F. coordination difficulties.

District Chief/CACO meetings weekly with CAP Commanders/P.F. Leaders attending have been another broad step in effecting maximum participation from
the key personnel in the CAPs. This graphically shows them the amount of interest higher echelons have in their every day problems. Copies of the combined letters as well as some photos of the ceremonies are provided in section IV of this chronology. Copies of the combined orders will be included in the April chronology.

e. Training.

(1) Training Plans. The training plans submitted on 25 February for the month of March were executed during this reporting period. Emphasis remains in training all Marines and CAP P.F.'s in general military subjects, weapons employment, fire support, patrols and ambushes, and offensive as well as defensive combat. Emphasis will continue to be made in all areas commensurate with the enemy activity during the period.

(2) Outside Assistance Training. The 1st Marine Division School's Mobile Training Team continued their instruction and finished training 2d CAG units. The team provided expert training and instruction on mortars and gunnery, quick fire - quick kill techniques, aiming of weapons, night firing techniques, patrols and ambushes, demolitions of bunkers and fortifications as well as safety. All instructors included practical application and familiarization firing of weapons instructed on. The team did an excellent job and CAPs will benefit from this excellent instruction.

(3) 2d CAG Mobile Training Team. The 2d CAG MTT is still assigned to the 3rd Combined Action Company in Dien Bien District. During March, the MTT trained one P.F. platoon and started training a second platoon. The MTT has trained a total of six P.F. platoons in Dien Bien since their arrival. All training has been well received and is enthusiastically supported by the District Chief. The MTT expects to train four more platoons in this same district.

f. Inspections. A regular schedule of inspections by staff members remained the units best methods of ensuring efficiently coordinated operation. All 2d CAG Staff members make field visits and inspect all areas under their cognizance. Reports are made on site and subsequently reduced to writing for permanent records purposes. Improvements are apparent in all areas as the additional supervision and the command interest motivates all units to improve their operations. Technical assistance in the form of medical inspection teams, administration and logistics contact teams and armory personnel weapons checks for serviceability are all provided each unit in the field.

g. Conferences/Meetings.

(1) Staff Conferences. 2d CAG continued to hold weekly staff conferences during March. These conferences are scheduled the day prior to the CACO meetings to provide the staff with adequate time to prepare agenda items to be presented during the CACO meetings. All matters requiring multiple staff action are coordinated thoroughly and courses of action are presented for commanders approval and final implementation by the CACOs.

(2) Combined Action Company Commanders meeting. All Combined Action Company Commanders met every Sunday during March to discuss problems areas, forthcoming operations, orders and other events planned for the next week.

DECLASSIFIED
These meetings continued to be extremely beneficial to all concerned. Inspection results were discussed, coordination was effected in areas of mutual interest, CACOs exchanged ideas and each presented a concise evaluation of his own district activities for all to hear.

(3) CAP Commanders Conference. The monthly CAP Commanders conference was held during the last week in March. Agenda items were submitted by CACOs several days preceding the conference, were correlated by the S-3 and organized for discussion during the conference. This single monthly meeting of the 2d CAG "working leaders" is probably the best means we have available of disseminating information, exchanging ideas, promulgating orders and generally assisting the CAPs. The response to these monthly meetings has been outstanding. All participants have praised this one means of mind as a key point in increasing operational efficiency and standardizing efforts towards the accomplishment of the CAG's mission. The exchanges of ideas resided in promulgation of documents such as the Co 2d CAG memo on enemy booby traps found in Section IV of this chronology.

h. Operational Aide. The S-3 office provided training aids support to all CACOs and CAPs during the reporting period. The section presently has 4 trained draftsmen who are capable of producing excellent aids for the field units. An inventory of stocks on hand was made and requests for additional equipment have been forwarded.


(1) Kit Carson Scouts. Scouts assigned to 2d CAG continued to produce excellent results during the month of March. One additional Kit Carson Scout was assigned during this period bringing our total to seven scouts. These Kit Carson Scouts have provided valuable information on enemy tactics, weapons, enemy hiding places, booby trap techniques and search techniques. We still have an outstanding request for nine additional scouts to provide a total of two per Combined Action Company. A report submitted as a briefing for one of our CACOs is appended to section IV of this chronology.

(2) Scout Dogs and Handlers. An average of four scout dogs and handlers were assigned from the Scout Dog Platoon, 3d M.P. Battalion, to 2d CAG units. Handlers who work with CAPs always invariable request an additional 15 day tour. We currently have handlers who have joined CAPs for their sixth or seventh 15 day period with their dogs. These scout dog teams area providing a valuable service and have won the admiration of all those troops who have had the opportunity of working next to them.

(a) A shortage of scout dog handlers during the month of March prompted 2d CAG to offer the services of CAG Marines to be trained as handlers. The plan was approved and seven CAG Marines attended a course of instruction at 3d M.P. Battalion in scout dog handler training. The Marines were still in training at the end of the reporting period. The primary reason for offering the services of these men was to provide 3d M.P. Battalion with men to work the dogs before they went "state". Training is progressing well.

j. Voluntary Information Program. The Voluntary Information Program continued on its upward trend during the month of March. This program is a system by which Vietnamese Nationals are rewarded for turning in information
Artillery Support. During the month of March 2d CAG units adjusted over 1300 rounds of artillery fire on suspected or known enemy targets. The majority of these missions were in direct support of 2d CAG CAPs. In addition to the supporting artillery approximately 750 rounds of mixed 60mm and 81mm mortar were adjusted on the enemy by CAPs and CACOS.

1. AIR

(1) Fixed Wing. A total of 9 missions totaling 20 sorties were flown in support of CAP operations during March. Most of these missions were flown in the My Tho and Long Binh District areas of operations. Air support was a big factor in the successful routing of an NVA force by CAP 2-4-2 on 18 March 1969.

(2) Flareship and Gunship. A total of 12 missions were flown during the reporting period. (Nine flareship and three gunship missions). Reaction time is excellent and the support remains outstanding in all respects.

(3) Medical Evacuation Missions. A total of 41 medical evacuation missions were controlled by 2d CAG CAP units during the period. These included missions called in to evacuate Vietnamese civilians, P.F.s and Marines. Timely MedEvacs continue to be a large morale factor in all units.
a. With the addition of larger office and storage facilities, the Special Services has been able, during the month, to expand the level of its service to the men of the Group. Previous procedures for issue of items having been found to be too restrictive, the issue point is now open all day, for issues to every member of the Group. Marines of the CAGs are thus assured the opportunity of being able to check out gear whenever they are in the Headquarters Compound. In addition, Company Commanders and Gunnery Sergents are authorized and encouraged to check out items in large numbers for distribution throughout their respective companies.

b. The previous purchase of musical instruments was found to be popular to the extent that additional purchases of guitars were made during the month. Thirteen guitars are now carried on the Special Services account and see heavy use.

c. Paperback books continue to be sought after, and the location continues to be difficult. The majority of paperback books made available to the group come from donations of private citizens in the U. S. Sources are continually sought to increase the number available.

d. The most popular single item handled through Special Services is the weekly issue of beer and soda. The nature of the Combined Action Platoon is such that water supply is restrictive, and the beer and soda alleviate the problem. Soda is consistently more popular than beer in this regard. During the month, 296 cases of soda and 204 cases of beer were issued to the eight companies of the group.

e. Entertainment is provided at the CAG Headquarters weekly, on Sunday, by Force Logistic Command Club System. During the month of March, a program of making this entertainment available to the men in the field was inaugurated by having the members of each CAG accompany the CAG Commanders to the Headquarters. A steak cookout is held, the entertainment can be enjoyed, and the clubs are open for business. The result is a welcome respite from continuous field duty in isolated CAGs.

f. The heavy buying schedule of recent months has resulted in an inventory of property which is nearing adequacy and of satisfactory variety. It is planned that more long-range projects can now be considered for the continued future success of the special service program.
6. Logistics General. The overall logistics status of 2d CAG has not changed appreciably during this reporting period. As reported on the previous report, under the FORSTAT reporting system, 2d CAG was rated as being in a C-2 category in Equipment/Supplies on Hand, and C-1 in Equipment Readiness. The C-2 rating is a result of the lack of receipt of T/E equipment.

   a. Significant Events.

   (1) During the reporting period, a Logistic Chief (O43l) reported for duty. Some of the duties of Logistic Chief include, but not limited to, overall supervision of the logistical responsibilities of the Group, liaison between supporting units and companies in local TACOMs, liaison for all work performed for the headquarters compound by the U. S. Army Public Works Maintenance Center and is the coordinator for the independent workers hired to work on the 2d CAG Headquarters compound by Industrial Relations Section of Public Works in Danang EWN. Additionally, he is responsible for compiling all reports generated from the S-4 section.

   b. Damage to Weapons Due to Enemy Action. No weapons were reported damaged as a result of enemy action during the reporting period. Operations losses due to direct contact with the enemy during the period resulted in the loss of five (5) M-16 rifles. Total monetary value of these losses were $680.00.

   c. Motor Transport.

   (1) During the reporting period the vehicles of the 2d CAG motor transport section compiled a total of 31,596 miles.

   (2) A total of eight (8) vehicles were deadlined for second echelon repairs during the reporting period. A breakdown by vehicle type is as follows:

      (a) Two (2) M153A1 1/4 ton Truck (Cargo)
      (b) Three (3) M37B1 3/4 ton Truck (Cargo)
      (c) One (1) M274A2 1/4 ton Vehicle (Cargo)
      (d) Two (2) M35A2C 2 1/2 ton Truck (Cargo)

      Average deadline time was ten (10) days. The excessive amount of deadline time is attributed to lack of supply response for necessary repair parts.

   (3) A total of four (4) vehicles were deadlined for third echelon repairs during the reporting period. A breakdown by vehicle type is as follows:

      (a) Three (3) M151A1 1/4 ton Truck (Cargo)
      (b) One (1) M37B1 3/4 ton Truck (Cargo)

      Average deadline time was eleven (11) days.
(4) A total of 100 tons of cargo were transported by HQ's vehicles to all companies consisting of Rations, Ammunition and Field Fortifications Material. Most of this tonnage was transported to the 3rd and 4th companies located within the Korean TAR.

d. Air Lift. Two (2) separate Heli-Lifts consisting of emergency ammunition resupplies were sent to the 3rd Company operating in the Dien Bien area. Loadage was approximately two (2) tons of mixed ammunition. Additionally, one (1) aerial resupply of C-Rations was made by chopper to the same company. Tonnage was approximately three (3) tons.

e. Food Service.

(1) The Headquarters messhall served a total of 15,150 meals during the reporting period.

(2) 1,050 meals have been served during the reporting period as a result of the Sunday Barbecues mentioned in the February Chronology.

(3) 2,360 meals of "B" Rations have been distributed to the CACO's during the reporting period.

(4) "A" Rations have been provided to CACO's and are picked up on a daily basis when available. This enables CAP Marines to have occasional fresh produce.

f. Amory.

(1) A contact team from 1st PSR made a technical inspection at the 2d CAG Headquarters Amory. Forty-two weapons were taken to 1st PSR for repair. The turnaround time at 1st PSR averages five days.

g. Miscellaneous Services.

(1) Adequate plumbing and facilities repairs were provided by the Maintenance Section, China Beach Public Works, Naval Support Activity, Danang East, NVN.

(2) The Force Logistics Laundry Platoon has continued to provide good support for both 2d CAG Headquarters and it's Companies.

h. Supplies. The only noteworthy items of supplies received during this period were Lightweight Jungle Utilities. Force Logistic Command was able to release all our back orders for this much needed item to support all of our field units.

i. Problem Areas.

(1) Supply. The same problem areas exist as were reported in several previous reports. The lack of receipt of T/2 items is responsible for this unit continuously reporting "C" rating in the area of Equipment/Supplies on hand as reported under the FORSTAFF System. Examples of shortages are as follows.
(a) Telephone Set, TA/312 83
(b) Telephone Set, TA/1/FT 190
(c) Radio Control Group, AN/GRA-39 26
(d) Generator Set, MU-482 2
(e) Address Plate Machine 2
(f) Embossing Machine Address Plate 1
(g) Wrist Watch 103
(h) Binoculars, 6x30 61
(i) Mount, Tripod, M122 39
(j) M3 Mount f/50 cal. MG 9
(k) Truck, cargo, 3/4 ton, M3/M4 3
(l) Night Vision Scopes 3
(m) TMR, 5 ton, M41/61 11

(2) Communications. The same problems still exist as previous. The turn-around time for direct exchange items still is approximately Ten (10) to Fifteen (15) days.

(3) Motor Transport. During the reporting period the Motor Transport section had an excessive deadline time for second echelon repairs due to lack of repair parts in the supply system. This was alleviated somewhat by borrowing needed parts from other Marine Corps units in the Da Nang area.
7. **Medical Department.**

   a. **General.** Continued emphasis on training of selected Marines and Naval Force Soldiers was made during the reporting month to ensure that immediate medical aid will be available to casualties in the event of the nonavailability of a corpsman. As the hot, humid weather approaches, the use of salt tablets and drinking of plenty of water purified with iodine tablets has to be greatly stressed to avert manpower losses from nonbattle causes, i.e., heat casualties and dysentery. Log books are maintained by each of the platoon corpsman to record daily sick calls, ensure immunizations are up to date and to ensure that each Marine takes his malaria pills.

   b. **Personnel.**

   (1) Medical Department Representatives: HMC H. L. MITCHELL, USN
   (2) Administrative/Sick Call Petty Officers: HM2 G. L. PATER, USN
   (3) Supply/Sick Call Petty Officers: HM2 C. G. LANIER, USN
   (4) Hospital Corpsman Personnel Statistics for the month of March 1969:

   - Detached: 7
   - Joined: 2
   - TAD Personnel Attached: 1
   - TAD Personnel Terminated: 0
   - Casualties:
     - KIA: 0
     - WIA: 2
     - Twice WIA & Evacuated out of RVN: 0
     - Died of Wounds: 0
   - During the Month of March 1969 the 2d Combined Action Group (CAG) Aid Station treated 560 USMC/USN personnel at routine sick call, including 246 personnel from the tenant Combined Action Program and Vietnamese language schools.

   c. **Medical Civic Action Program (Med CAPs).**

   (1) During the Month of March CAP Corpsman conducted a total of 48 classes resulting in a total attendance of 439 Vietnamese civilians and Naval Force Soldiers. This is a decrease of 497 over the month of February 1969. This decrease is probably due to the increase in hostile action.

   (2) Efforts are being emphasized in training of Naval Force Corpsman in the routine Med CAP treatment of the Vietnamese civilians. More efforts are being directed toward having the Vietnamese Corpsman actually conduct the Med CAPs.

   d. **Sanitation.**

   (1) Routine sanitation inspections were conducted within 2d CAG Headquarters Compound during the Month of March. No discrepancies found.
have been corrected. Vietnamese civilians have been hired and are now undertaking the duties of policing heads under the direction of the Police Sgt. It was discovered that the water in 22 CAG has been coming from an unsuitable source. Water samples in the past months indicate that there was no coliform in the water. Procedures are now underway to chlorinate the water as it arrives in the 22 CAG compound. This is being accomplished through the help of HM 3rd and China Beach water works. Until the time that the water is chlorinated all water from water tanks is used only for laundry and bathing. Portable water is obtained from a water trailer on the compound.

f. Noteworthy Items:

(1) During the Month of March there were 17 2d CAG personnel admitted to hospitals with intestinal disorders compared to 7 in the Month of February. Continued emphasis on field sanitation and hygiene is being stressed to combat this situation.

g. Inspections:

(1) HM/2 CAG conducted routine monthly inspections of all CAP units of 2d CAG during the Month of March. A special effort was put forth to see that every CAP corpsman had a proper log book and that all entries were up to date. Emphasis was made to ensure that each Marine used iodine tablets to purify the water. In some areas, it was also recommended that water be boiled for 30 minutes. Corpsman are also advised to remind Marines of the hazards of eating Vietnamese food and the possibility of becoming infected with liver flukes or other side effects as a result of eating local foods.
a. Security. The Group Admin Frequency and the primary frequencies of 2-3 and 2-9 were changed because of interference from other adjacent authorized users. III MAF has notified this command that all frequencies and call signs would be changed monthly throughout 2d CAG beginning 1 June 1969. On 23 March new call signs for the 1st Marine Division were made available to all CAG's.

b. CAG Comm Chief Conference. 2d CAG was host unit for a communications chief conference held 10-11 March 1969. The communications T/O, T/E, and the communications portion of the CAP School was discussed at length. The following recommendations were forwarded to the Commanding General, III MAF (G-6) for evaluation:

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO T/O

Discussion

1. A Comm Chief MSgt 2591 Billet be established at the Directorate level.

Justification. A communication chief is needed at the Directorate level to assist in the supervision of training, routine administration, and the tactical employment of all the communication within the CAG. He would effect liaison and coordination with the CAG Comm Chiefs. He would further ensure periodic inspection of all communications within the CAG to insure proper maintenance of equipment and communication records. He would arrange through Electronic Maintenance Support Units, for periodic technical inspection. He would also maintain strength levels and assign all incoming communication personnel to the various CAGs.

Discussion

2. The GySgt 2591 CommChief be replaced with a GySgt/MSgt 2539 Radio Chief.

Justification. The communication system within a CAG is primarily radio and under the mobile concept is entirely radio. The MOS requirement for a GySgt/MSgt 2539 consists of supervising the activities of personnel engaged in operating fixed and field radio equipment, visual signalling, the preparation of messages for delivery to the message center or readdressing and routing of messages to appropriate circuits for relay. He supervises maintenance of radio station logs, coordinates fixed and field radio station operation and requisitions supplies and equipment. This more than meets the requirement for a CAG communication chief.

The MOS requirements of a Communication Chief 2591 are not fully utilized in the CAG. The majority of the equipment is basic radio. In addition there is no operating message center or wire section, the assignment of a radio chief 2539 is considered a more practical utilization of man power.
3. Add Sgt 2531 Radio Technician.

**Justification.** A radio technician would give the CACO's a second echelon maintenance capability which would solve the majority of the maintenance repair problems. The time element involved evacuating equipment to the Electronic Maintenance Company, FSR or approximate battalions is from 10 to 15 days. 2d CAG alone has maintained a minimum of 15 pieces of equipment in the 2d echelon since December 1968. This has proven to be inconvenient and generally unsatisfactory. The addition of a Sgt 2531 would relieve the Electronic Maintenance Company of the responsibility of 2d echelon maintenance and would eliminate the excessive turn around time for using CACO's.

**Discussion.**

4. Delete the Sgt 2531 and Sgt 2511 at the CAG Headquarters.

**Justification.** The Comm Chief can relieve both the Sgt 2531 radio chief and 2511 wire chief of their duties at Group Headquarters. His knowledge of wire is more than is required to provide comm for the CAG.

**Discussion.**

5. Add 1 Op 2531 radio supervisor/operator and 3 LoOp/Pfc 2531 radio operators to Group Headquarters.

**Justification.** The primary means of communications with the CACO's is radio. This necessitates manning both tactical and administrative nets 24 hours a day. The additional 2531's would provide adequate personnel to maintain these circuits. Additionally these personnel could be cross trained by the Comm Chief to maintain the SB comm for internal wire communication within the CAG Headquarters and land line communication with adjacent and supporting units.

**Discussion.**

6. Add 2 LoOp/Pfc 2531 to CACO Headquarters.

**Justification.** The only means of communications with the CAPs is by radio which necessitates manning tactical and administrative nets 24 hours a day. In order to maintain these nets and to relieve the Sgt 2531 already assigned to perform his duties of training CAP personnel in proper radio operation technique, security, equipment maintenance, operations and to supervise the overall communication within the CACO, it is necessary to have trained operators on duty at the CACO. During periods of contact and when using supporting areas additional radio nets have to be utilized. These two radio operators could man all circuits on a 24 hour basis.
1. That the below listed test equipment be provided to perform 1st and 2d Echelon Maintenance on all Comm-Elect equipment organic to CAG.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Test Kit</td>
<td>MK-992/URC-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test Kit</td>
<td>MK-993/PRC-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multimeter</td>
<td>ME 25A/N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test set, Radio Freq Power</td>
<td>AN/URM-43C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery Tester</td>
<td>TS-183 B/N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Generator</td>
<td>TS-505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tool Kit</td>
<td>AN/USM-15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Justification.** (Same as para (3) of Recommended T/O change).

**Discussion.**

2. Add 1 AN/UT-524 Radio Set and 1 PP-2953 power supply to each CAG and CACO Headquarters.

**Justification.** This equipment has a much greater operating range, better receiving capabilities and in general is much more reliable than the AN/PRC-25 now in use. Second CAG is presently using this equipment at Group Headquarters, and the 5th and 7th Company Headquarters with outstanding success.

**Discussion.**

3. Add (1) AN/URC-125 to each CAG Headquarters and CACO Headquarters.

**Justification.** The equipment would be mounted on the vehicle used by the CAG S-3 and each CACO. The CAG S-3 and the CACO's are continually on the radio and it is felt a requirement exists for a reliable means to maintain tactical control while mobile.

**RECOMMENDED COMM SYLLABUS FOR CAP SCHOOL.**

(1) After carefully considering the mission of the CAP Program the communication requirement, the number of school trained radio operators assigned and the time allowed for comm instructions within the CAP School the below listed comm syllabus is recommended.

- 1 Hrs. Transmission security. (Lecture)
- 2 Hrs. Basic voice procedure. (Lecture)
  1. Medevac procedure.
  2. Spot reports.
- 1 Hrs. AN/PRC-25, RC-292 (Lecture)
- 1 Hrs. Preventive maintenance and preventive maintenance forms. (Lecture)
c. **Equipment Status.** An RT-525 was issued to 2d CA G to be used at CAG Headquarters. This equipment increased our communication reliability considerably.

d. **Combat Operations Center.** Total communication traffic declined slightly from February. Again spot reports and casualty reports increased due to increased enemy activity. The following communication traffic was passed through the Combat Operations Center on various nets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Traffic</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incoming Messages</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgoing Messages</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence reports</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty reports</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIR reports</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spot reports</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Traffic</td>
<td>949</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. **Communication Supply.** Components of end items are continuing to be readily available and are in adequate stock at Group Headquarters. Requisitions of new end items are still outstanding. Requisitions status for components and end items for the Month of March are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requisitions Submitted</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requisitions Completed</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requisitions Outstanding from previous months</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Requisitions Outstanding</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. **Maintenance Support.** 1st PSR provided excellent support on components of end items, however the turn around time for RT-505 radio sets is still unsatisfactory. Total support by 1st PSR during March is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Work Request</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work Requests Submitted</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Requests Completed</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Request Code &quot;a&quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Request Incompleted</td>
<td>*21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Three (3) incomplete from February
PART III
SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1 March 69
CAP 2-1-1 discovered (15) fighting holes at AT915710. Results: (3) pounds of rice, (1) SK-96 machine-guns, (1) AK-47, and (15) ChiCom grenades captured.

CAP 2-3-5 while in ambush site received 60mm mortars and small arms fire. 2-3-5 returned fire with negative results.

CAP 2-5-7 Vietnamese children turned in (2) bangalore torpedoes, (4) ChiCom grenades, (6) 60mm mortar rounds. A VIP fund reward was paid.

CAP 2-7-5(9) Vietnamese children led 2-7-5 to assorted ordnance at AT918650. Results: (3) M-26 grenades, (3) ChiCom grenades, (2) 60mm illumination rounds and (1) 105mm LAAM. A VIP fund reward was paid.

CACO 2-9 received incoming 60mm mortar rounds. Results: negative.

CAP 2-3-2 received small arms fire from (5) VC at grid B051595. 2-3-2 returned fire. Results: negative.

CAP 2-4-2 while checking ID cards found (2) females without ID cards and (3) males whose ID cards were incorrect. Results: (5) VC's.

CAP 2-5-6 Vietnamese civilians turned in (1) AK-47, (3) M-26 grenades, (1) 60mm rocket round and (1) 105mm round. A VIP fund reward was paid.

CAP 2-7-6 heard explosions at BT073705. While checking area 2-7-6 received small arms fire. CAP 2-7-6 returned fire. Results: negative.

2 March 69
CAP 2-4-2 while on patrol opened fire on (2) VC at BT13554. Results: (1) VC KIA, (1) ChiCom grenade, and (1) M-26 grenade captured.

CAP 2-7-7 was taken under fire by an unknown number of VC's. 2-7-7 returned fire. Results: (2) VC KIA, (1) VC POW, (4) ChiCom grenades and (2) M-26 grenades captured. Also captured were: (3) AK-47's, (1) 9mm ChiCom pistol, (1) RPG launcher and (7) rounds.

3 March 69
CAP 2-4-1 discovered an 82mm booby trap at BT184591. Results: (1) booby trap destroyed in place.

4 March 69
CAP 2-1-6 was informed of the whereabouts of a 140mm rocket round at AT907258. 2-1-6 conducted sweep of area and found (1) NVA WIA. Results: (1) NVA POW, (1) AK-47, (3) ChiCom grenades and (1) 140mm rocket round captured.

CAP 2-3-6 Vietnamese civilians turned in (6) .50 cal. W.P. rounds and (1) 60mm mortar round. VIP fund reward was paid.
6 March 69
CAP 2-3-5 while on night ambush opened fire on(1) VC at K571569. Results: (1) VC KIA, (1) AK-47 and 4) 81mm grenades captured.

CAP 2-4-3 while in ambush opened fire on (10) to (12) VC at grid DN 65587. Results: (1) VC KIA.

CAP 2-1-6 Village Chief of Phu Thuong turned in (6) 3.5" W.P. rounds and (1) 81mm mortar round. A VIP fund reward was not paid.

CAP 2-7-5(8) Vietnamese children reported location of (4) M-26 grenades, (4) 60mm illumination rounds, (2) M-79 rounds, (1) 81mm illumination round and (20) M-16 rounds. A VIP fund reward was paid.

CAP 2-4-3 while in night ambush site received 8 to 10 grenades at DN 65587. 2-4-3 also received automatic weapon fire. 2-4-3 returned fire. Spooky case on station. Results: negative.

7 March 69
CAP 2-7-3 was in ambush site at AT936570 on enemy force. Results: (2) VC KIA and (1) AK-47 captured.

9 March 69
CAP 2-4-3 while in ambush site opened fire on VC force at DN 655879. Results: (1) VC KIA.

CAP 2-2-2 while on ambush took VC squad under fire at AT931582. Results: (1) VC KIA.

CAP 2-3-2 while in night site saw (2) VC moving west at grid DN 55692. 2-3-2 opened fire. Results: (3) VC KIA.

23 March 69
CAP 2-3-2 while in night site spotted (12) VC at grid DN 499598. Called fire mission. Results: negative.

10 March 69
CAP 2-7-5(5) Vietnamese boys showed 2-7-5 location of (1) 81mm grenade, (1) M-26 grenade, (6) M-16 magazines, (1) 60mm mortar round, (1) 105 mm round, (1) LAW. Ammo blown in place. A VIP fund reward was paid.

11 March 69
CAP 2-7-5 Vietnamese boys reported location of (1) M-79 round, (1) 60mm illumination round, (3) 105 mm rounds, (1) M-16 rounds, (3) M-16 magazines, (1) trip flare, (1) hand pop-up. A VIP fund reward was paid.

14 March 69
CAP 2-8-3 while on sweep found enemy spider trap. 2-8-3 received fire and returned fire. Results: (2) VC KIA, (2) AK-47, (6) AK-47 magazines and (3) 81mm grenades captured.

CAP 2-7-6 while on patrol found tunnel complex containing (16) 122mm rocket rounds. Results: (16) 122mm rocket rounds captured.

CAP 2-7-5 Vietnamese boys turned in (1) LAW round, (1) M-67 grenades, (6) M-79 rounds, (1) 60mm mortar round, (1) 81mm illumination round. A VIP fund reward was paid.
CAP 2-9-2 snipers spotted (6) NVA at AT866495. 2-9-2 opened fire. Result: (1) NVA KIA.

16 March 69

CAP 2-3-5 spotted (2) VC at BT075558. 2-3-5 opened fire. Results: (1) VC KIA.

17 March 69

CAP 2-1-1 on sweep of area captured (1) NVA at AT902073. Results: (1) NVA POW and (1) AK-47 captured.

CAP 2-9-2 and snipers at AT862491 spotted (3) VC getting water at AT862492. 2-9-2 opened fire. Results: (1) VC KIA.

CAP 2-8-3 and advisor from District Headquarters with VC informer located tunnel complex. There were (3) VC in tunnel. 2-8-3 received (2) Chicom grenades, 2-8-3 returned with M-26 grenades. Results: (3) VC KIA, (1) AK-47, (1) .45 cal. pistol and (4) Chicom grenades captured.

CAP 2-7-5 (8) Vietnamese children turned in (2) 105 rounds, (1) 90mm round, (1) 81mm mortar round, (6) 60mm illum rounds, (10) M-79 rounds and (1) hand pop-up. A VIP fund reward was paid.

Caco 2-9 Vietnamese children reported location of (15) 105 rounds. A VIP fund reward was paid.

CAP 2-4-1 while on patrol was fired upon by VC. 2-4-1 returned fire. 2-4-1 swept area. Results: (1) VC KIA and (1) VGS.

18 March 69

CAP 2-3-2 while on night site made contact with a platoon of NVA. Gunship was requested. Results: (6) NVA KIA, (1) NVA POW, (1) AK-50, (5) AK-47's, (1) SKS, (1) B-40 Rocket Launcher w/ (6) rounds, (1) Chinese radio and (8) Chicom grenades captured.

CAP 2-4-2 while on patrol observed (3) VC crossing river. 2-4-2 opened fire on VC while sweeping area of contact. 2-4-2 made contact with (30) to (50) NVA. Called in artillery and fixed wing air strikes. Results: (19) NVA KIA and (6) AK-47's captured.

III District Liaison while on sweep with 5 CIT apprehended (20) VCS. Results: (20) VCS.

19 March 69

CAP 2-3-3 while in day site was informed that two squads of NVA were at BT063575. 2-3-3 swept area and made contact with NVA. Results: (4) NVA KIA, (2) AK-47's, and (1) B-40 rocket launcher captured.

CAP 2-2-2 the hamlet of Gomuhn was attacked. 2-2-2 came under heavy fire. Called in fire mission. Swept area. Results: negative.

3-F3

ENCLOSURE (1)
CAP 2-3-5 opened fire on approximately 1 platoon of VC at BQ75558. Called fire mission. Results: (1) VC KIA, (1) AK-47 and 4) ChiCom grenades captured.

CAP 2-1-5 trapped unknown number of VC in spider hole at AT-954666. 2-1-5 threw M-26 grenades in spider hole. Results: (4) NVA KIA, (1) NVA POW, (4) VC, (1) AK-47, (2) ChiCom grenades captured.

MIT was sent as a reactionary force for the U.S.A. Advisors at BT062583 who were pinned down. Results: (2) NVA KIA.

CAP 2-3-6 while in blocking force received small arms fire from grid BT065993. Results: (1) NVA KIA.

GACO 2-3 while attempting to resupply CAP's 2-3-1 and 2-3-5 were pinned down by small arms fire. 2-3 spotted (4) NVA in a house and opened fire. House caught on fire. Results: (4) NVA KIA and (1) AK-47 captured.

CAP 2-4-1 while on patrol observed (4) VC at grid BT181591. 2-4-1 received (1) incoming grenade. 2-4-1 returned fire and swept the area. Results: (1) VC POW and (1) VC.

III District Liaison went on sweep with District personnel, National Police and RDI's at BT051768. Results: (10) VC.

CAP 2-1-5 while in ambush spotted (2) NVA at ATY42667. 2-1-5 opened fire and VC returned fire with small arms and RPG. Estimated size of VC was a platoon. 2-1-5 called in fire mission. Result: negative.

GACO 2-3 received approximately 15) rounds of 60mm mortar fire. 2-3 called fire mission on grid BT06583.

CAP 2-4-3 while on patrol located two 105 booby traps at BT168588. Results: (2) 105 booby traps destroyed in place.

20 March 69

CAP 2-7-5 Vietnamese civilians turned in (17) M-26 grenades, (150) 7.62 rounds, (21) 5.56 rounds, (6) 4-79 rounds, (3) 3.5 rounds, (1) M-19 machine gun barrel, (7) 30mm illumin rounds, (0) 105 rounds, (0) 106 rounds. A VIP fund reward was paid.

CAP 2-7-7 spotted rocket site at BT05705. 2-7-7 fired (9) rounds 60mm mortar fire. Results: negative.

21 March 69

CAP 2-7-2 was redesignated as mobile CAP 2-5-2 at 1000H. 2-5-2 will operate in the vicinity of grids AT957, AT957-2, and the northern half of AT947.

CAP 2-5-6, 3) Vietnamese civilians turned in (6) M-26 grenades, (7) ChiCom grenades, (1) 105 round, (9) 106 rounds. A VIP fund reward was paid.
CAP 2-3-3 while in night site spotted (5) VC at AO 66576. 2-3-3 opened fire and called fire mission. Results: (1) VC KIA.

CAP 2-4-1 A Vietnamese boy reported the location of a booby trap. 2-4-1 went to inspect the booby trap consisted of (2) M-72 LAWs. Booby trap was blown in place. A VIP fund reward was paid.

22 March 69
2-1-2 was in night site when the alarm was passed that (5) to (10) VC were approaching. The alert was given. 2-1-2 came under heavy M-40 and M-79 attack. Gunships were called and upon arrival they spotted 40-50 VC moving Northeast. Results: negative.

23 March 69
CAP 2-4-4 while sitting in ambush site observed (3) VC moving north. 2-4-4 opened fire. Results: (1) VC KIA.

CAP 2-5-2 while in daytime site was informed that RDs and PFs had a Chieu Hoi. On the way to pick up Chieu Hoi 2-5-2 came under fire from treeline. Results: (1) Chieu Hoi.

CAP 2-1-2 spotted 10 VC at AT927707 called fire mission. Results: negative.

24 March 69
District III liaison while on sweep of grid AO 43761 picked up 26 VC for improper identification. Results: (26) VC.

CAP 2-1-2 spotted 30 VC at AT932709. 2-1-3 and 2-1-2 joined forces and opened up on VC. VC returned fire. Called in fire mission. Results: (1) NVA KIA and (4) Chicom grenades captured.

CAP 2-7-5 Vietnamese boys turned in (16) M-26 grenades, (2) M-79 rounds, (50) 5.56 rounds, (15) 7.62 rounds, (1) 60mm illum round and (2) hand pop-ups. A VIP fund reward was paid.

25 March 69
CAP 2-4-3 Vietnamese security and USA found information leading to the pickup of (4) VC POWs in CAPs 2-4-1 and 2-4-3. Results: (4) VC POWs.

CAP 2-1-2 spotted (25) VC at grid AT927707. Called fire mission. Results: (6) VC.

CAP 2-7-5(8) Vietnamese boys turned in (5) M-26 grenades, (1) 81mm illum rounds, (3) 60mm mortar rounds, (4) 5.56 rounds, (10) 7.62mm rounds. A VIP fund reward was paid.

26 March 69
2-7-5 while on patrol spotted (2) VC at grid AT92863. 2-7-5 opened fire. 2-7-5 swept area. Results: (1) VC KIA.

CAP 2-1-1 were informed that 1 company of NVA were located at AT925718. 2-1-1 called in fire mission. Results: negative.
CAP 2-2-4 while in night ambush was fired upon from their flank by approximately (4) VC. 2-2-4 returned fire. VC broke contact. Results: negative.

26 March 69

CAP 2-1-5 received fire from approximately (1) squad of NVA. 2-1-5 returned fire. Results: negative.

CAP 2-9-1 while on patrol received small arms fire. 2-9-1 returned fire with negative results. 2-9-1 swept area. Results: (2) VC POW.

29 March 69

CAP 2-7-5 Vietnamese boys turned in (11) M-26 grenades, (1) claymore mine, (5) M-79 rounds, (2) 60mm illum rounds and (x0) 5,56 rounds. A VIP fund reward was paid.

31 March 69

CAP 2-3-2 while on patrol spotted (50) VC at grid EN58593. 2-3-2 opened fire and VC returned fire. 2-3-2 called fire mission. Results: negative.

CAP 2-7-5(14) Vietnamese boys turned in (4) M-26 grenades, (10) M-79 rounds, (3) M-70 shot gun rounds, (1) 60mm mortar round, 2 240mm boosters, (1) 81 illum round, (1) 105 round and (x0) 5,56 rounds.
## PART IV

### SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>GpU. 3460.1 of 18 March 1969 (Control of Privately Owned Weapons and War Trophies.)</td>
<td>4-1 - 4-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>GpU. 5560.2 of 8 March 1969 (Assignment of Vehicle Operator.)</td>
<td>4-3 - 4-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>GpBal.1500 of 20 March 1969 (Inspection of personnel and Individual Arms.)</td>
<td>4-7 - 4-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Pictures of Civic Action Projects</td>
<td>4-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mobilization ITR for Mobile CAP 2-4-1 (Vietnamese/English)</td>
<td>4-11 - 4-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Mobilization ITR for Mobile CAP 2-1-6</td>
<td>4-21 - 4-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>WELL DONE Msg from C.O., III MAF (W/Vietnamese Translation.)</td>
<td>4-30 - 4-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Group Memorandum 3300 dated 5 March 1969 (VC/NVA Supply Activity.)</td>
<td>4-32 - 4-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Change of CAP status ITR for CAP 2-7-2</td>
<td>4-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Relocation of personnel from CAP 2-7-2 Subsector Commander</td>
<td>4-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Pictures of Arms Cache found by CAP 2-7-6 14 March 1969.</td>
<td>4-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Impact of effectiveness of P.F.s armed with M-16 Rifles (ITR from C.O. 2d CAG to Senior R.F.s/P.F. Advisor I Corps.)</td>
<td>4-50 - 4-51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Enemy Tactics Brief prepared by a 2d CAG Kit Carson Scout.</td>
<td>4-52 - 4-54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>March 1969 Voluntary Information Program (List of ammo and materials turned in.)</td>
<td>4-56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GROUP ORDER 3460.1

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Control of Privately Owned Weapons and War Trophies

Ref: (a) MACV Directive 210-5
(b) ForO 3460.4C
(c) SecNav Note 5500.8 of 18 Dec 1968

1. Purpose. To publish information pertaining to War Trophies and privately owned weapons outlined in references (a), (b), and (c).

2. Definition. Weapons are defined as follows.

   a. All fire arms such as handguns, shotguns, rifles, carbines, light automatic weapons, and similar weapons which use an explosive force to propel a projectile.

   b. Knives with blades longer than three (3) inches, swords, sabres, stillettes, and spring release (switch blades) knives.

   c. Metal knuckles, blackjacks, saps, clubs and similar items.

   d. Instruments in which compressed air or a chemical propellant is used to fire a projectile.

   e. Explosives or explosive devices; ie, hand grenades, mines, demolition charges or explosive material such as TNT, C-3, primacord or arming device.

3. Information

   a. Privately owned weapons. The possession of privately owned weapons as defined above by U. S. Forces in Vietnam is prohibited and will be placed in the custody of the Commanding Officer or returned to the United States as out-
b. War Trophies

(1) Captured enemy weapons meeting the criteria outlined in reference (a) will be processed as a war trophy and will be registered through the III MAF G-2 (Collection Officer) and the Provost Marshal's office (CID) Danang, Republic of Vietnam.

(2) Upon completion of registration/authorization procedures outlined above, the war trophy will be placed in custody of the Commanding Officer until the individual's tour of duty in Vietnam is completed.

4. Action

a. Company Commanders will ensure by periodic inspections of personnel that privately owned weapons and war trophies are not in the possession of individuals.

b. The Group S-4 Officer is designated the Collection Officer for privately owned weapons and war trophies and will be responsible for its safekeeping.

c. The Group S-4 will make a monthly report to the Group S-3 of the number of war trophies turned in not later than the 8th day of the following month.

d. Personnel requiring registration of weapons by III MAF G-2 will first, check in their war trophies with the Group S-4 and will process their requests at III MAF upon authorization by the Group S-4.

E. L. LEWIS

DISTRIBUTION "A"
GROUP ORDER 5560.2

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Assignment of Vehicle Operators

Encl: (1) Request/Authorization for Motor Vehicle Operator

1. Purpose. The purpose of this order is to establish a policy for the assignment of operators to all vehicles within the 2d Combined Action Group.

2. Information.
   a. Maintenance and proper operation of motor vehicles is essential to the conservation of existing motor transport resources. Vehicles can be maintained and operated properly only if the responsibility for their care is vested in specific individuals whose abilities to drive and maintain their vehicles are assured.
   
        b. Possession of a valid Motor Vehicle Operator's Permit does not, in itself, authorize an individual to operate a specific motor vehicle. That prerogative rests with the Command. The abuse of the privilege to drive has, in some cases, resulted in negligence in the care of vehicles and unnecessary vehicle accidents.

3. Policy. It is the policy of the Group that only such personnel as are specifically authorized by the Commanding Officer will be permitted to operate motor vehicles.

   a. Group Headquarters Section Heads, and Combined Action Company Commanders will assign a primary and an alternate driver to each vehicle under their cognizance.
b. Primary and alternate drivers will report to the Group Motor Transport Chief for testing and instruction. When the ability of the individual to operate and care for the vehicle has been determined, the first endorsement to enclosure (1) will be completed and signed by the Group S-4.

d. The above will be accomplished no later than 16 March 1969. Effective 16 March 1969, no member of 2d CAG will be permitted to operate a motor vehicle without a properly completed Request/Authorization.

E. L. LEWIS

DISTRIBUTION "A"
GROUP ORDER 5560.2 CH 1

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Assignment of Vehicle Operators

1. Purpose: To promulgate pen and ink changes to the basic order.

2. Action

   a. Change paragraph 4c to read 4d.
   
   b. Insert new paragraph 4c to read as follows:

   "c. Once the Request/Authorization is approved for the driver, he will be issued a laminated card which will identify him as an authorized driver of a 2d CAG vehicle of specified type and serial number. This card must be carried by the driver at all times while operating his vehicle."

   E. L. LEWIS

DISTRIBUTION "A"
2d COMBINED ACTION GROUP
REQUEST/AUTHORIZATION FOR MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR

From: Commanding Officer, 2d Combined Action Group
To: Commanding Officer, 2d Combined Action Group

Subj: Request for assignment of motor vehicle operator

1. It is requested that authorization to operate a 2d CAG motor vehicle be granted as indicated below:
   
   Name of Driver ________________________________
   
   Rank _______ SerNo _______ Company/Section ________
   
   Type of vehicle _______ SerNo _______

   (Signature CACO/Section Head)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT

From: Commanding Officer
To:

1. Returned, approved.

2. The individual named above is authorized to operate the vehicle indicated.

3. This authorization will be carried by the individual assigned at all times while operating the vehicle.

CAG S-4 by direction

ENCLOSURE (1)
GROUP BULLETIN 1500

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Inspection of Personnel and Individual Arms

Encl: (1) Inspection Schedule

1. Purpose. To publish a schedule for periodic inspection of Headquarters personnel and individual arms.

2. Information. Regular inspections are mandatory to ensure that Headquarters personnel maintain an appropriate personal appearance commensurate with working conditions, and that individual arms are properly cleaned and maintained. The responsibility of all officers and non-commissioned officers in this regard must be positive and continuing. Existing policy requires that Sections Heads of Headquarters Sections cause daily inspections of weapons and personnel to be conducted. This policy is reaffirmed. Recent spot inspections show that individual efforts toward maintenance of weapons are particularly deficient. Formal Headquarters inspections are therefore established to correct such discrepancies.

3. Action

a. A weekly inspection of personnel and individual arms for all personnel, sergeant and below, permanently assigned to Headquarters, 2d Combined Action Group will be conducted in accordance with the schedule contained in enclosure (1).

b. The Group First Sergeant will muster and form troops at 0715 in appropriate formation for presentation to the Inspecting Officer at the time indicated on the helicopter pad.

c. Uniform for all personnel will be uniform of the day with individual arms.
GrpBul 1500
20 Mar 1969

d. The Group First Sergeant will utilize Staff Non-commissioned Officers to assist as required.

e. Weapons serial numbers will be verified during the course of the inspection.

4. Inspecting Officer. The inspecting officer for the listed dates will be informed by separate correspondence.

5. Self-Cancellation. This Bulletin is cancelled on 1 October 1969.

E. L. LEWIS

DISTRIBUTION "A"
**INSPECTION SCHEDULE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 Mar 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Apr 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Apr 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Apr 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Apr 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Apr 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 May 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 May 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 May 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Jun 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Jun 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Jun 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Jun 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Jul 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Jul 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Jul 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Jul 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jul 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Aug 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Aug 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Aug 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Aug 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Sep 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Sep 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Sep 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Sep 1969</td>
<td>0730</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ENCLOSURE (1)**

1

UNCLASSIFIED
4th Combined Action Company  
2d Combined Action Group  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/AMD/imm  
3000  
1 April 1969

From: Hieu Nhon Subsector Commander/Commanding Officer, 4th Combined  
Action Company, 2d Combined Action Group  

To: Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1

Subj: Mobilization of Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1

Encl: (1) Tactical Area of Coordination overlay

1. Organization.
   a. A Combined Action Platoon composed of Popular Forces Platoon 001  
   and U. S. Marines from the 4th Combined Action Company, 2d Combined Action  
   Group is hereby activated as mobile Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1 to protect  
   the people of Tan Thanh Hamlet and Can An Village from the terroristic tactics  
   of enemy infrastructure, from enemy forces attempting to infiltrate into the  
   hamlets, and other missions mutually agreeable to the Hieu Nhon Subsector  
   Commander and the Commanding Officer of the 4th Combined Action Company.

   b. This order and all future orders concerning the mission, concept  
      of operations, Tactical Area of Coordination (TAOC) and coordination with  
      adjacent Vietnamese and U. S. Units will refer to Popular Forces Platoon  
      001 and the U. S. Marines assigned to work with them as Combined Action  
      Platoon 2-4-1. This order and all future orders will be signed by the  
      Hieu Nhon Subsector Commander and the Commanding Officer, 4th Combined Action  
      Company.

2. Mission. Provide security from VC/NVA throughout entire Tactical Area  
   of Coordination as assigned by enclosure (1) to include but not limited to  
   the following tasks:
   a. Destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure.
   b. Protect the friendly political/social structure.
   c. Conduct patrol and ambushes within the assigned Tactical Area of  
      Coordination.
   d. Conduct vigorous civic action and psyops programs to obtain the  
      trust and confidence of local populc.
   e. Organize local intelligence units,
   f. Report military intelligence immediately to the District D'CC and  
      adjacent Vietnamese Districts.
   g. Train and assist the hamlet People's Self Defense Force.
DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

h. Participate in combined operations with the ARVN and/or other FWMAF Units.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1 will operate in all of the hamlets within its assigned tactical area of operation on a staggered basis, never setting patterns in location, on a day to day basis and will change its night and day command post/base of operations daily. The command post/base of operations will be composed of several different houses in the hamlets to enable the Combined Action Platoon to disperse. One third of Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1 will remain at the day command post/base of operation to conduct local MedCaps, work on civic action, conduct training, plan night activities, effect necessary coordination with adjacent units, and conduct patrols. After dark Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1 will move to a preselected command post/base of operations and conduct patrols and ambushes throughout its entire TAOC. All patrols, ambushes, and other operations will be integrated down to the squad level.

b. Patrol/Ambush/Command Post Operations.

(1) Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1 will conduct their patrols, ambushes, and command post operations as follows:

   (a) Conduct a minimum of two integrated squad size patrols and/or ambushes daily between the hours of 1900 and 0700.

   (b) Conduct a minimum of one integrated squad size patrol daily between the hours of 0700 and 1900.

   (c) Change the command post location/base of operation every 12 hours, command posts will not be public buildings nor concrete structures.

   (d) Once every 24 hours patrol or ambush every hamlet in the assigned TAOC without using the same routes, trails, and setting a pattern to operations.

c. Additional Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1 will conduct additional operations as directed by the Hieu Nhon Subsector Commander and the Commanding Officer, 4th Combined Action Company.

d. Planning.

(1) Patrol routes, ambushes, and other CAP operations will be based on paragraph 3a and b, above, current enemy intelligence or anticipated plans, and that all infiltration routes or other previous enemy locations be checked or interdicted daily throughout the entire TAOC.

(2) All planning will be accomplished by the respective Popular Forces Platoon Commander and the CAP Leader of the U.S. Marines. Disagreement as to location, frequency and size of patrols and ambushes or other activities will be referred to the Hieu Nhon Subsector Commander and the Commanding Officer, 4th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives for decision. In all cases of disagreement the Popular Forces Platoon Leader and the Marine CAP Leader will promptly report to the Hieu Nhon District Headquarters. In no case will a disagreement be allowed to go unresolved.

4-12

UNCLASSIFIED
before 1000h the day the patrol or activity is to be conducted.

(1) All patrols/ambushes and QP locations will be planned in advance and submitted to the Hieu Nhon Subsector Commander and the Commanding Officer, 4th Combined Action Company on Saturday for Monday through Sunday of the next week. Changes to the planned operations may be authorized by the Hieu Nhon Subsector Commander and the Commanding Officer, 4th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives.

e. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) The assigned operating area, Tactical Area of Coordination enclosure (1), is assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1 to properly identify its respective area and to assist in overall coordination. All patrols, ambushes, or other operations within the assigned TAC will be coordinated with the Commanding Officer of the 10th Company, 3rd RMC Battalion, 2d RMC Brigade and the other ARVN and FWMF units as necessary.

(2) Fire support and reaction forces will be coordinated through the Commanding Officer, 2d Korean Brigade.

4. Administration/Logistics.

a. Administration and logistics for Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1 will be through the respective ARVN or Marine Commander at Hieu Nhon District Headquarters except as modified in existing orders.

b. Members of the CAP 2-4-1 will ensure to maintain good conduct and to keep the houses and area they use in a clean and neat condition.

5. Command/Communications.

a. Command of the Popular Forces and U. S. Marines assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1 is exercised separately by their respective Commanders. Unity of command is dependent upon mutual cooperation and coordination.

b. The Popular Forces and U. S. Marines will be responsible for their own communications with Hieu Nhon District Headquarters.
Đại đội hòn h regexp 4
Đề nghị đoàn Lực-Lưỡng Hòn-Hregexp
Đề Tam Lực-Lưỡng thủy-Bộ

31/1.62/gbs
3000
01-04-1969

Đối diện : Chi Khu Trưởng, Chi Khu Hiếu-Hơn/đại-trưởng, đại đội Hòn-Hregexp 4, đề nghị
Đoàn Lực-Lưỡng Hòn-Hregexp

Nơi nhận : Trung đội Hòn-Hregexp 2-4-I

Tích xem : V/v Lưu động của Trung đội Hòn-Hregexp 2-4-I

Đính kèm : (1) Phòng đội phó h regexp của khu vực chiến thuật.

I. Thành lập


b. Lệnh này và những lệnh khác trong tương lài liên quan đến nhiệm vụ trên, những ý niệm h hiện quan,

Giữ: Kinh

4-14
khu vực phối hợp chiến thuật và những phối hợp của Việt-Nam hay Hoa-Kỳ lần cuối sẽ chỉ định cho trung đội 2-4-I lãnh đạo và những lãnh đạo khác trong tương lai sẽ do Chi-Khu Trưởng Chi Khu Hiếu-Nhơn và Đại đội trưởng đại đội lãnh hổp và ban hành.

II. Nhiệm vụ

Mang lại an ninh trật tự cho dân chúng trong khu vực chiến thuật chỉ định mà Việt-công cũng như quân chính quê của chúng thường quấy phá, khu vực chiến thuật chỉ định (xem bản định kèm I). Nhiệm vụ này gồm có những phần việc sau đây:

a. Phá vỡ hổ tòng cọ sỡ Việt-công.

b. Báo về các can bộ chính trị và cọ sỡ xã hội.

c. Sắp xếp tuân tiêu và phục kích trong khu vực chiến thuật chỉ định.

d. Dạy mạnh công tác dân sự vụ và chương trình âm lý chiến để tạo niềm tin trong dân chúng cũng như đối lại lòng tin nhiệm của họ.

e. Tổ chức đơn vị tình báo địa phương.

f. Báo cáo những tin tức quân sự ngay tức khắc cho trung tâm tỉnh báo tại quân và các đơn vị Việt-Nam cũng như Hoa-Kỳ ở gần đó.

g. Huấn luyện và giúp đỡ nhân dân tự vệ trong thốn áp.

h. Tham dự những cuộc hành quân hổp với đơn vị Việt-Nam hay các đơn vị đồng minh khác.

III. Thi hành

a. Y niêm hành quân: Trung đội hổp 2-4-I
sẽ hoạt động trong tất cả thần ap trong khu vực chiến thuật chỉ định và trải khắp vùng an ninh nội trên, dồn bao giờ đảm chân vào thời quan trọng việc phải thay đổi luôn, ghi ghi không nhất định, nhưng điểm đồng quân ban ngày và điểm phải khác nhau thay đổi luôn Bộ chỉ huy trưởng đồ gồm có năm bảy nhà khác nhau ở trong áp đề cho trung đội hồn hợp có thể phần tan dúc. Một phần ba (1/3) của trung đội hồn hợp sẽ deline tại nội trú đồng ban ngày của Bộ chỉ huy trưởng đội để chuẩn bị và phân phát thuốc men cho dân chúng, làm công tác dân sự, hướng dẫn huấn luyện, hoà bình khi hoang hoa hoạt động ban đêm, thực hiện những phó hợp cần thiết với các đơn vị lãnh cận, thay đổi sắp xếp các cuộc tiến tiêu. Sau khi trôi tói, trung đội hồn hợp 2-4-1 sẽ di chuyển đến địa điểm đồng quân ban đêm để được lựa chọn tử tốc và hướng dẫn tiến tiêu, thực hiện và các hoạt động khác phải dựa, cắt chốn không một tiêu đồ gồm có cả Nghĩa-quan và T.L.C./ Hoa-Ky.

b. Tuần tiêu/Phuc kich/ Dio diem Bo chi huy trung doi

(1) Trung doi hồn-hop 2-4-1 sẽ xếp đặt tuần tiêu Phuc kich và dia diem Bo chi huy trung doi như sau:

a) Sắp xếp tối thiểu là hai cuộc tuần tiêu, hay phuc kich cấp tiêu đồ hồn hợp ( Đệ và N.Q.) hàng ngày trong khoảng từ 1900H và 0700H.

b) Sắp xếp tối thiểu là một cuộc tuần tiêu cấp tiêu đồ hồn hợp hàng ngày vào khoảng 0700H và 1900H.
c) Phải luôn luôn thay đổi B.C.H. trung đoi cuối 12 tiếng đồng hồ they đi một lần và không được ở trong những tòa nhà công cộng hay trong những công sự xây cất bằng bê-tông.

d) Trong vòng 24 tiếng đồng hồ mỗi cuộc tuần tiêu, phục kích trong khu vực chiến thuật chỉ định phải dùng con đường mòn khác, lối khác và không dùng theo một màu sắc như đã thực hiện.

C. Những hoạt động khác

Trung đoi hồn hợp 2-4-I phải theo dõi những hoạt động khác mà Chi Khu Trưởng, Chi Khu Hiếu-Nhon/ Đại đồi Trưởng, đại đồi hồn hợp sẽ ban hành.

D. Kế hoạch

(1) Con đường tuần tiêu, phục kích và những hoạt động khác của CAP phải theo dõi những hoạt động như đoạn 3a và 3b ở trên. Tính nhận diện quân hiện nay hay kế hoạch dự liệu của địch, tất cả con đường mà hiện nay khu vực dịch hoạt động mạnh, mọi nơi trong khu vực chiến thuật chỉ định phải kiểm soát nghiêm chỉnh.

(2) Toàn bộ kế hoạch, Trung đồi trưởng N.Q. và toàn trưởng 1.Q.L.C./Hoà-Ký phải hoàn tất. Những chỉ biêt (khác nhau) về khu vực hoạt động thường nhất cấp sở tiêu điểm phục kích hay những hoạt động nào khác phải để trình hay tham khảo với Chi Khu Trưởng Chi Khu Hiếu-Nhon và đại đồi trưởng đại đồi hồn hợp 4 hay qui vị Đại diện mà hai giới chức thẩm quyền trên đã chỉ định. Trong mọi trường hợp bất động, Trung đồi trưởng N.Q. và toàn trưởng 1.Q.L.C./Hoà-Ký phải lập tức

4-17
báo cáo ngày về Bộ chỉ huy Chỉ Khu Hiếu-Nhơn. Mọi trường hợp bất động phải được giải quyết trước IO.COH để củng cố tác được thị hành nghiêm chỉnh.

(3) Tất cả cuộc tuần tiếu, phục kích và tạo độ của B.C.H. trung đội phải được soạn thảo trước và đề trình Chỉ Khu Trưởng Chỉ Khu Hiếu-Nhơn và Đại đội Trưởng, đại đội Hồn-hợp 4 vào ngày thứ Ba vào kê hoạch hoạt động từ thứ hai cho đến thứ Ba của tuần kế tiếp. Những vị đại diện của hai giới chức thêm quyền trên có thể được phép sửa đổi kế hoạch hoạt động của CAP.

E. Huấn luyện phối hợp

(I) Khu vực chiến thuật chỉ định hoạt động xem định kỳ (I) được chỉ định cho trung đội Hồn-hợp CAP 2-4-I chính trung đội này phải biết chính xác khu vực mình để có thể yêu cầu sự trợ giúp phối hợp của các đơn vị bạn khác. Tất cả cuộc tuần tiếu phục kích và các hoạt động khác phải liên lạc phối hợp với Chỉ huy trưởng đại đội IO. tiêu diệu 3. Lữ đoàn 2 T.Q.L.C./Đài-Hàn và các đơn vị Việt-Nam cùng như đồng mình khi cần thiết.

(2) Hòa lực yểm trợ và lực lượng tiếp ứng sẽ liên lạc với Chỉ Huy trưởng Lữ đoàn 2 T.Q.L.C./Đài-Hàn.

IV. Quản trị và tiếp vận

a) Quản trị và tiếp vận cho trung đội Hồn-hợp 2-4-I sẽ thuộc về Quản đội Việt-Nam và sĩ quan Hoa-Kỳ tại bộ chỉ huy Chỉ Khu Hiếu-Nhơn ngoài trừ trường hợp có sự sửa đổi huấn luyện lĩnh hiện tại.

b) Các quản nhân thuộc trung đội Hồn-hợp 2-4-I phải
thi hành nghiêm chỉnh và giữ gìn pha o cùng như khu vực đã đến phải sạch sẽ và không được gây tổn thất.

V. Chỉ huy và liên lạc


Đại uỷ B. VÕ ĐĂNG Kассив
Đại uỷ Chi Khu Hiếu-Nhơn
Đại uỷ Trưởng

- Chỉ huy trưởng Đội chỉ đạo L.L.H.H. (2)
- Chỉ huy trưởng khu vực trách nhiệm (I)
- Đội chỉ đạo, Đội chỉ H.H.
- Toàn trường T.Q.L.C./HK

Phản hồi và sao lại:
- Đỗ Chỉ Huy Chi Khu Hiếu-Nhơn (2)
- Trung đội trưởng N.Q. (I)

Ciểu: Kìn

CONFIDENTIAL
From: Hieu Duc Subsector Commander/Commanding Officer, 1st Combined Action Company, 2d Combined Action Group
To: Combined Action Platoon 2-1-6

Subj: Mobilization of Combined Action Platoon 2-1-6

Encl: (1) Tactical Area of Coordination overlay

1. Organization.

   a. A Combined Action Platoon composed of Popular Forces Platoon #132 and U. S. Marines from the 1st Combined Action Company, 2d Combined Action Group is hereby mobilized on 1 April 1969 to protect the people of Phu Thuong Xa, Phu Thuong Thon, Thon Hoa Thanh, Ap Lco Hoa and Ap Khe Lam Hamlets from the terroristic tactics of enemy infrastructure, from enemy forces attempting to infiltrate into the hamlets, and other missions mutually agreeable to the Hieu Duc Subsector Commander and the Commanding Officer of the 1st Combined Action Company.

   b. This order and all future orders concerning the mission, concept of operations, Tactical Area of Coordination (TAOC) and coordination with adjacent Vietnamese and U. S. units will refer to Popular Forces Platoon #132 and the U. S. Marines assigned to work with them as Combined Action Platoon 2-1-6. This order and all future orders will be signed by the Hieu Duc Subsector Commander and the Commanding Officer, 1st Combined Action Company.

2. Mission. Provide security from VC/NVA throughout entire Tactical Area of Coordination as assigned by closure (1) to include but not limited to the following tasks:

   a. Destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure.

   b. Protect the friendly political/social structure.

   c. Conduct patrols and ambushes within the assigned Tactical Area of Coordination.

   d. Conduct vigorous civic action and psyops programs to obtain the trust and confidence of local populace.

   e. Organize local intelligence units.

   f. Report military intelligence immediately to the District DIOCC and adjacent Vietnamese and U. S. Units.
g. Train and assist the hamlet Peoples Self Defense Force.

h. Participate in combined operations with the ARVN and/or other FwMAF Units.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-1-6 will operate in all of the hamlets within its assigned tactical area of operation on a staggered basis, never setting patterns in location, on a day to day basis and will change its night and day command post/base of operations daily. The command post/base of operations will be composed of several different houses in the hamlets to enable Combined Action Platoon 2-1-6 to disperse. 1/3 of Combined Action Platoon 2-1-6 will remain at the day command post/base of operations to conduct local MedCaps, work on civic action, conduct training, plan night activities, effect necessary coordination with adjacent units, and conduct patrols. After dark Combined Action Platoon 2-1-6 will move to a preselected command post/base of operations and conduct patrols and ambushes throughout its entire TAOC. All patrols, ambushes, and other operations will be integrated down to the squad level.

b. Patrol/Ambush/Command Post Operations.

   (1) Combined Action Platoon 2-1-6 will conduct their patrols, ambushes, and command post operations as follows:

      (a) Conduct a minimum of two integrated squad size patrols and/or ambushes daily between the hours of 1900 and 0700.

      (b) Conduct a minimum of one integrated squad size patrol daily between the hours of 0700 and 1900.

      (c) Change the command post location/base of operations every 12 hours, command posts will not be public buildings nor concrete structures.

      (d) Once every 24 hours patrol or ambush every hamlet in the assigned TAOC without using the same routes, trails, and setting a pattern to operations.

c. Additional Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-1-6 will conduct additional operations as directed by the Hieu Duc Subsector Commander and the Commanding Officer, 1st Combined Action Company.

d. Planning.

   (1) Patrol routes, ambushes, and other CAP operations will be based on paragraph 3 a. and b. above, current enemy intelligence or anticipated plans, and that all infiltration routes or other previous enemy locations be checked or interdicted daily throughout the entire TAOC.

   (2) All planning will be accomplished by the respective Popular Forces Platoon Commander and the CAP Leader of the U. S. Marines. Disagreement as to location, frequency and size of patrols and ambushes or
other activities will be referred to the Hieu Duc Subsector Commander and the Commanding Officer, 1st Combined Action Company or their direct representatives for decision. In all cases of disagreement the Popular Forces Platoon Leader and the Marine CAP Leader will promptly report to the Hieu Duc District Headquarters. In no case will a disagreement be allowed to go unresolved before 1000H the day the patrol or activity is to be conducted.

(3) All Patrols/ambushes and CP locations will be planned in advance and submitted to the Hieu Duc Subsector Commander and the Commanding Officer, 1st Combined Action Company on Saturday for Monday through Sunday of the next week. Changes to the planned operations may be authorized by the Hieu Duc Subsector Commander and the Commanding Officer, 1st Combined Action Company or their direct representatives.

e. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) The assigned operating area, Tactical Area of Coordination enclosure (1) is assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-1-6 to properly identify its respective area and to assist in overall coordination. All patrols, ambushes, or other operations within the assigned TACO will be coordinated with the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines and the other ARVN and RVNAF units as necessary.

(2) Fire support and reaction forces will be coordinated through the Commanding Officer of 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines.

4. Administration/Logistics.

a. Administration and logistics for Combined Action Platoon 2-1-6 will be through the respective ARVN or Marine Commander at Hieu Duc District Headquarters except as modified in existing orders.

b. Members of the CAP 2-1-6 will ensure to maintain good conduct and to keep the houses and areas they use in a clean and neat condition.

5. Command/Communications.

a. Command of the Popular Forces and U. S. Marines assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-1-6 is exercised separately by their respective Commanders. Unity of Command is dependent upon mutual cooperation and coordination.

b. The Popular Forces and U. S. Marines will be responsible for their own communication with Hieu Duc District Headquarters.

Capt. Quang Cong Truc
Hieu Duc Subsector Commander

Capt. J. E. SEITZ
Commanding Officer
1st Combined Action Company

Copies to:
CO, 2d CAG 2
TADN Commander 1
CAGO 2
CAP Commander 1

Translated copies to:
Subsector Headquarters 2
PF Platoon Leader 1

DECLASSIFIED
Lâm Thanh Nhàn

1. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

2. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

3. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

4. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

5. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

6. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

7. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

8. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

9. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

10. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

11. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

12. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

13. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

14. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

15. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

16. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

17. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

18. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

19. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

20. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

21. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

22. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

23. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

24. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

25. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

26. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

27. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

28. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

29. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

30. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

31. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

32. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

33. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

34. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

35. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

36. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

37. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

38. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

39. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

40. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

41. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

42. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

43. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

44. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

45. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

46. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Truyện: Giáo Lý Học; còn có Truyện: Giáo Lý Học

47. Thời Truyện:

- Thời Trấn

---

Giải: Kính
thường quân Pháp, khu vực chiến thuật chỉ định
(kèm bản đồ kẽ I). Nhiệm vụ này gồm có những phần việc sau đây:

a. Phá vỡ hệ thống cơ sở việt cong .
b. Đạo vỡ các căn bǎo chính trị và cơ sở xã hội.
c. Sắp xếp tuần tiễu và phục kích, trong khu vực chiến thu
thút chỉ định.
d. Đấy mạnh công tác dân sự vụ và chương trình tập xí
chơi để tạo niềm tin trong dân chúng cũng như đối lai
lòng tin nhiệm của họ.
e. Tổ chức đơn vị tình báo địa phương.
f. Báo cáo những tin tức quân sự ngay tức khắc cho trung
tầm tỉnh báo tài quân và các đơn vị Việt-Nam cũng như Hòa
kỳ ở gần đó.
g. Huấn luyện và giúp đỡ nhân dân tự vệ trong thôn ấp .
h. Tham dự những cuộc hành quân hỗ trợ đơn vị Việt-
nam hay các đơn vị đồng minh khác .

III. Thì hành

a. Nhiệm hành quân: Trung đội hỗn hợp 2-I-6 sẽ hoat
động trong tất cả thôn ấp trong khu vực chiến thu
trực chỉ định và trải khắp vùng an ninh nội trợn, dùng bao gồm
câm chấn vào thời quan, công việc phải thay đổi luôn, giữ
giác không nhất định, những điểm đóng quân ban ngày và
điểm khác nhau thay đổi luôn. Bộ chỉ huy trung đội
gồm có num bày mà khác nhau ở trong áp để cho trung đội
hơn-hợp có thể phân tán được. Một phần ba(1/3) của trung
đội hỗn hợp sẽ ở lại nơi trú đông ban ngày của Bộ chỉ huy
trung đội để chuối bính và phát hành thuộc men cho dân -
chủng, làm công tác dân sự vụ, huấn luyện, huấn
đình kẽ-h你就 hoạt động ban đêm, thực hiện những phối hợp
đến thiec với các đơn vị ban lần tận, thay đổi sắp xếp các
cuộc tuần tiễu. Sau khi trì tôi, trung đội hỗn-hợp 2-I-6
sẽ đi chuyển đến địa điểm đồng quân ban đêm đã nêu.
b. Tuần-tiều/Phúc kích/địa điểm.Bộ chỉ huy trung đội
(I) Trung đội Hỏn-Hy 2-1-6 sẽ xếp đặt tuần tiêu phúc-kích và địa điểm Bộ chỉ huy trung đội như sau:
   a) Sắp xếp tới thiều là hai cuộc tuần tiêu, hay phúc kích cấp tiêu đội hòn hêp (Mỹ và N.Q) hàng ngày trong khoảng từ 1900 H và 0700 H.
   b) Sắp xếp tới thiều là một cuộc tuần tiêu cấp tiêu đội hòn hêp hàng ngày vào khoảng 0700 H và 1900 H
   c) Hậu liên lạc huyện đội Bộ chỉ huy trung đội cấp tổ. Đông họ they đội một lần và không được đơn trong những tụ điểm có thể... trong những công sự xây cất bằng Bê-tông.
   d) Trong vòng 24 tiếng đồng hồ mỗi cuộc tuần tiêu, phúc kích trong khu vực chiến thuật chỉ định phải dùng con đường, mòn khác, lối khác và không được theo một mâu màu như đã thực hiện.

c. Những hoạt động khác

Trung đội Hỏn-Hy 2-1-6 phải thi hành những hoạt động khác mà Chỉ khu Trưởng, Chỉ khu Hiệu Đội/Đội trưởng, Đội đội hòn hêp đã ban hành.

d. Kế hoạch
(I) Con đường tuần tiêu, phúc kích và những hoạt động khác của CAP phải thi hành như đoạn 3 a và 3b ở trên. Tình hình dịch quân hiện nay hay kế hoạch dự liệu của dịch, tất cả con đường xem phù hợp hay khu vực dịch hoạt động mạnh, nội nội trong khắp hoạt hu vực chiến thuật chỉ định phải kiểm soát ngăn chặn.

3) Tắt cả cuộc tuần tiễu, phục kích và tòa đố của B.C.H. trung đội phải được soạn thảo trước và để trình Chỉ khu Trưởng Chỉ khu HIỆU-DỤC và Đại đội trưởng, Đại đội Hơn-hop I vào ngày thứ Ba và kế hoạch đồng tử thứ Hai cho đến thứ Ba của tuần kế tiếp. Những việc đại diện cử hai giới chức thẩm quyền trên có thể được phép sửa đổi kế hoạch hoạt động của CAP.

e) Hưu thi phôi hợp.


(2) Hoá lực yếm trợ và lực lượng tiếp ứng sẽ liên-lac với Chỉ huy Trưởng Tiểu-đoàn 2/7 T.Q.L.C./Hk

4- QUAN TRI VÀ TIẾP VỆN

a) Quan tri và tiếp vện cho trung đội Hơn-hop
2-I-6 sẽ thuộc về Quân đội Việt Nam và Tiểu quan Hoa-Ky

Giữ: Kin

DECLASSIFIED
tế Bộ CHU HUY CHI Khu HIỂU-DỨC ngoài trùm trưởng hổp có sự sửa đổi huấn lernen hiện tại.

b) Các quản nhân thuộc Trung Đội Hồn-Hợp 2-I-6 phải thi hành nghiêm chỉnh và giữ gìn nhà cửa cũng như khu vực để đến phải sạch sẽ và không được gây tỏn thất.

5. CHỦ HUY VÀ LIÊN- LẠC

a) Văn đề chủ huy N.Q và T.Q.LC/HK được biết phải đến trung đội Hồn-Hợp 2-I-6 là do cấp chủ huy của N.Q và Trưởng T.Q.LC/HK chủ huy thuộc họa minh riêng biết, việc thông nhất chủ huy tùy thuộc vào sự hỗ trợ liên lạc và phó hổp.

b) Các N.Q và T.Q.LC/HK phải chịu trách nhiệm về phương tiện liên lạc cơ hũ của mình với Bộ chủ huy chủ khu HIỂU-DỨC

Đại 2 Hồn-Hợp T.Đ.T

Chỉ khu Trưởng CHI Khu HIỂU-DỨC

Phiên dịch và sao gởi:

B.C.H. CHI Khu HIỂU-DỨC (2)

Trung Đội trưởng N.Q. (1)
CAP 2:1:6 TAOC AREA OVERLAY

SCALE 1: 50,000
DATE 26 MAR 69

PHÒNG ĐỒ KHU VỰC CHIẾN THUẬT PHỜI HỘP CỦA TRUNG ĐỐI HỘN HỘP 2:1:6

TÌ LỆ XÍCH 1:50,000
NGÀY 26.03.69

THON HOA THANH
LOC HOA
KHE LAM
PHU THUONG THON
PHU THUONG

KHU VỰC CHIẾN THUẬT PHỜI HỘP CỦA TRUNG ĐỐI H.H. 2:1:6
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/MAR/jmm
3000
5 March 1969

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Well Done

Ref: (a) Q: III MAF msg 020340z Mar 1969

1. Reference (a), received from Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, is quoted below for your information.

"The reaction of units of the Combined Action Program to attacks initiated during the recent post Tet period deserves recognition of the outstanding leadership, readiness and dedication of all personnel in units with whom the enemy made contact. Further, your action validated the CAP concept in which GVN and U. S. elements can be wholly integrated and disposed to guarantee confidence and security in GVN hamlets and villages. During this period while engaged with CAP units the enemy left 140 of his dead on the field of battle and gave up 9 POW and valuable quantities of rockets, crew served and individual weapons. Equally important, the CAPs provided timely and vital information regarding the enemy which assisted other commands in locating and destroying him. To all Popular Force soldiers, Marines and U. S. Navy Corpsmen in the CAP I offer a well done. Lt. Col. Jordan sends."

K. O. BROAD JR.
by direction

DISTRIBUTION:
Each CACO
Each CAP

4-30
Những cuộc tấn công của địch quân bắt đầu trong thời kỳ trước và sau Tết vua quá đã bị các đơn vị CAP thuộc liên đoàn Luc Lương Hôn Hổ phân công và các cấp chỉ huy đã chứng tỏ tài ba lợi lạc, tội ác can và người khá cũng đã chi viện các đơn vị CAP mà địch quân đã tấn công. Họ mua hàng đúng của anh em trong đơn vị CAP đã chứng tỏ những yếu điểm hàng khá cứng tro trong nhưng đơn vị hồn hợp nhoho c khó có thể phối hợp chắc chắn và sẵn sàng bảo đảm nhiệm vụ của bộ đội Việt Nam và bảo vệ an ninh trong các tuyến, xa ở vùng I Chiến Thuật. Suốt trong thời gian nỗi liên kết, kể từ khi dùng do voi các đơn vị CAP, công quan đã bỏ xác thi tra-n i40 ,09 tử binh, met so lớn hoa -tien, quan dùng và vũ khí cá nhân bị ta bắt được và tông thức. Trên bình diện khác không kém phần quan trọng là các đơn vị CAP đã cùng cấp kip thời những tình túc tình báo và địch quan cho các đơn vị bán lớn hơn trong vùng để ngăn chặn và tiêu diệt. Toi ngao ơn nhiệt liệt ông khi tỉnh tất cả anh em Nghĩa -quân, Thủy quân lực chiến, hải quân y-ta o trong các đơn vị CAP.

TRUNG TƯỞNG TR钿 - THỊNH
CỬ SĨ MÃN
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

MEMORANDUM

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: VC/NVA Sapper activity

1. Enemy sapper elements are being employed with increasing frequency. These are specialized forces which pose a serious threat to PWNAP/RVNAF installations and against which a successful defense is extremely difficult.

2. Sappers are an elite force. They are volunteers who receive extraordinary training and political indoctrination, and when committed they demonstrate a willingness to accept any and all risks.

3. Sapper elements may or may not operate with other enemy units. Their stock-in-trade, however, involves extensive reconnaissance of their objective. They will spend months in preparation before conducting a specific operation. Ground probes are used to test friendly reactions. They infiltrate through defensive weakpoints and begin their assault by setting off charges in the objective area. At times their assault is preceded by preparatory mortar or rocket fire.

4. Quoted below are the five basic principles of sapper tactics:

   a. Detailed planning and reconnaissance. Every mission is planned in detail to insure success, and all roles are practiced until performance without error is assured.

   b. Secrecy and surprise. Every unit performs its mission in the utmost secrecy and attempts to preserve the element of surprise. The importance of secrecy and surprise is stressed by constant training of personnel in tactical discipline and camouflage.

   c. Speed. Units move rapidly to enable the assault elements to reach the objective in as short a time as possible and to exploit the defenders' disorganization.

   d. Initiative. Units take advantage of any favorable circumstances which arise during the mission. Initiative is encouraged by thorough training and indoctrination.
e. Flexibility. Each mission dictates the type and amount of weapons and equipment to be used. The sapper units tailor their needs to the individual characteristics of the mission. Reconnaissance of the objective normally covers:

(1) Routes of advance and withdrawal.
(2) Surrounding terrain.
(3) Perimeter fencing. Minefields, trip wires, flares, punji pits.
(4) Strong points in the defense.
(5) Guards (number, location, alertness)
(6) Construction of fortifications.
(7) Layout of barracks, Headquarters, strong points, floodlights, power sources, and communication centers within installations.

5. Targets of primary interest to sappers are major ammunition and storage facilities, aircraft and motor parks, major Headquarters and tactical operation centers. One recent example is the destruction of a number of aircraft in an area where the defense of the open-end airfield was good. However, the sapper elements were able to infiltrate through the main base and in behind the defense. Several aircraft were destroyed before anyone could react. In another incident the sapper elements used the confusion and noise provided by diversionary attacks around a perimeter defense to cut through a barrier and attempt to steal a tank.

6. According to captured documents the following weaknesses have been noted at U. S. facilities:

a. Defenses have become static. Weapons emplacements, barriers and guards are seldom shifted to different locations.

b. Patrolling is not aggressive. Listening and observation posts are seldom established outside the perimeter.

c. Guards fail to remain alert. Some units maintain watch periods in excess of the capability of the guards to remain alert.

d. Perimeter barriers are not often checked. Sapper reconnaissance agents have sabotaged or otherwise tampered with barrier construction.

e. Ammunition is often left exposed.

7. Considering the increasing number of sapper attacks, particularly in the current offensive, you are enjoined to be ever alert to the possibility that sappers may be targeted against your installations.

By direction

R. G. Brown
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/MJD/jam
3/21/1
21 March 1969

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: Assistant Chief or Staff Combined Action Program)

Subj: Change in 2d Combined Action Group status; Report of

1. The following changes are reported.

   a. CAP 2-7-2, Danang Special Sector located at grid AT974792 has been deactivated as of 1000H 21 March 1969.

      (1) The old 2-7-2 compound has been turned over to the Danang Absector Commander and the QM 11 PF platoon is being retained at that position for security.

   b. The Marine element of old CAP 2-7-2 has been transferred to Hoa Vang District and has been redesignated Mobile CAP 2-5-2 effective 1000H 21 March 1969.

      (1) This Marine element will combine with PF platoon QM 43 to form this mobile CAP.

      (2) They will operate mobile in the vicinity of grids AT9371, AT9372 and the Northern half of AT9472.

      (3) Data pages including Hamlet names, hamlet chiefs etc will be forwarded under separate cover to provide all available data on the new CAP TAP.

E. L. LEWIS

Copy to:
Province Chief
Province Senior Advisor
Hoa Vang District Chief
Hoa Vang Senior District Advisor

DECLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

17 March 1969

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commander Da Nang Subsector, Quang Da Special Zone
     Commander Hoa Vang Subsector, Quang Da Special Zone

Subj: Relocation of the U.S. Marine personnel assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-7-2

Ref: (a) Quang Nam Province Pacification and Development Plan 1969

1. In order to support Ref (a) the U.S. Marine element of Combined Action Platoon 2-7-2 will be reassigned from the Da Nang Subsector to the Hoa Vang Subsector on 21 March 1969.

2. The reassigned U.S. Marines and CMM Platoon 46 will form a mobile Combined Action Platoon 2-5-8 in Hoa Mung hamlet of Hoa Vinh village. Hoa Mung hamlet has been assigned as priority area by Ref (a).

3. Liaison and coordination with Da Nang Subsector Commander and Hoa Vang Subsector Commander was accomplished on 17 March 1969.

E. L. LEWIS

Copy to:
Director Combined Action Program
CMGR Quang Da Special Zone
CMGR Quang Nam Province
C.O. 26th Marines
C.O. N.S.D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: Assistant Chief of Staff, Combined Action Program)

Subj: Enemy Booby Traps

Ref: (a) CAG FRAG No. 32
     (b) 8-3 Notes for 2 March 1969 CACO meeting (copies to all CACOs and Staff)

1. In compliance with reference (a) the following excerpt from paragraph 3 of reference (b) is quoted in part:

   "During the past several days, units throughout Quang Nam Province have suffered needless casualties due to booby traps fixed on or around enemy flag poles or propaganda banners. It's a known fact that these items are always booby trapped as they invite the indignation of friendly troops because of the enemy's colors flying around the area and attract our troops because of our built-in need to acquire souvenirs. We cannot tolerate casualties for a mere piece of cloth. Whenever these flags or banners are approached, the area should be meticulously searched for mines and booby traps and a grappling hook or line with plenty of length should be used from a covered position to knock the pole(s) down. Here's how some of these things have been rigged:

   a. A gate adjacent to the pole was rigged with a pull type fuse on an 81mm shell.

   b. The strings holding a pole up were attached to a 105 shell.

   c. An M-26 grenade was placed under the pole set to detonate when the pole was lifted off the spoon of the grenade.

   d. A command detonated claymore was placed on a trail leading to a building where a flag was flying.

   e. The lowering of the flag, on one occasion, signaled the enemy to hit the pre-registered site with 8 rounds of 60mm mortars.

   CAUTION YOUR TROOPS THAT THESE FLAGS AND BANNERS ARE THERE TO ATTRACT THEM INTO A KILLING ZONE."

2. This command will continue to place emphasis on common sense approaches to cope with the enemy's tactics and efforts in causing casualties by means
CONFIDENTIAL

of booby traps. This is an area of constant concern at all levels of command.

E. L. LEWIS
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96620

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: Assistant Chief of Staff G-2)

Subj: New booby trap techniques encountered by 2d CAG units

Enclosure (1) Description of booby traps with sketches

1. Information contained in enclosure (1) herein was passed to this headquarters by Combined Action Company 2-4 operating in the Hoi An area.

2. There has been a marked increase in booby traps incidents throughout 2d CAG Tactical Areas of Coordination (TAOC's). All Combined Action units have been cautioned on being alert to possible booby traps and new techniques used by enemy forces are reported for immediate dissemination to all units in an attempt to keep casualties to bare minimum. The use of Kit Carson Scouts and Scout Dugs and handlers have been a definite asset in finding these booby traps and preventing casualties. It has been noticed that the more booby traps CAP units detect the more sophisticated the enemy traps become. Enemy forces are displaying more patience and ingenuity in rigging these traps in attempts to cause more casualties. Patience on the part of PF's and Marines in 2d CAG have disclosed numerous traps in the past two weeks and undoubtedly has saved numerous lives.

3. These techniques are passed in hopes that the information can be of value to other units in III MAF areas of operations.

E. L. Lewis

DECLASSIFIED
During an operation several 105 rounds booby trapped with a trip wire running some 15 yards off the trail, and successfully deactivating them, we found this method. The device was located in the center of the trail, covered with dirt so as to appear as the normal ground level. They were detected when the scout dog walked around them, and the Marines detected a soft spot in the ground. The mines were dug into the ground. A hole was dug about 8 inches by 12 inches. The two sides were lined with wood. The 105 round was placed under the hole. A wire ran from the top of the hole across and down to the firing device. Soft green bamboo was placed on the hole, covered with a small piece of tin. This was covered with a piece of parachute silk and the whole device was covered with dirt. This mine had a combination pressure/pull firing device as a fuze with a device similar to those on hand grenades as a detonator.

Stepping on green bamboo collapses the trap which pulls the trip wire up and releases the firing device.
This method was used approximately 10 meters from where a device like method number two was employed. Everything was identical except that the tin covering was also booby trapped with a trip wire, and the round was beside the hole. The other trip wire was rigged similar to method number two. It is interesting to note that these methods only require about 15 pounds of pull to set them off. It is believed that because of our successful Scout dog tactics in the past in this same area that they are rigging traps for the Scout Dogs and handlers.

Tin booby trapped to pull the trip wire when the tin was picked up.
Found on 20 March 1969. An expanded LAAM, (any souvenir or eye catching device could be used) was half buried in the center of the trail. Approximately 12 inches in front of it was a buried grenade fitted with a pressure firing device with the prongs barely evident at ground level. This same type rig has been found with a pressure activated electrical contact hooked up to the LAAM and the grenade with electrical blasting caps. Both rigs are set to go off by either pressure on the grenade fuse or tampering with the LAAM.
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/MJD/Jmm
1000
28 March 1969

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: Assistant
Chief of Staff G-2)

Subj: New booby trap techniques encountered by 2d CAG units

Ref: (a) CC 2d CAG ltr 3/MJD/Jmm over 3000 of 21 Mar 1969

Ends: (1) Schematic drawings and description of positions at time of
detonation

1. Information contained in enclosure (1) (Plates 1 thru 6), herein was
submitted to this headquarters as an after action report by Combined
Action Company 2-4 operating in the Hoi An area.

2. As indicated in reference (a), there has been a marked increase in
booby trap incidents in our Tactical Areas of Coordination (TACO's)
assigned to CAG units. These booby traps are becoming more sophisticated
and are expertly concealed as noted in enclosure (1).

3. This particular booby trap cost us six casualties. These schematic
drawings are submitted in hopes that the information can be of value to
other units in III MAF areas of operations.

S. L. Legis

DECLASSIFIED
COLUMN NO 1
REAR ELEMENT PF

COLUMN NO 2
PF KIA

MASONRY BLK COL
CEMENT FINISH

SHAPE CHARGE
DETONATION CORD
COMMAND DETONATED

NOTE:
DETONATION CORD
INSIDE COLUMN

PLATE # IV
AFTER ACTION REPORT
4th COMBINED ACTION COMPANY
2nd COMBINED ACTION GROUP
III MAP, PPO SF0599 R 96692

LINE OF BLAST
CENT FRAGMENTS

2'-0"
VALLEY LEVEL

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (1)
ARTIST CONCEPTION:

PERSPECTIVE
SHOWING POSITION AND MEMBERS OF PATROL
 AT THE EXACT MOMENT OF DETONATION OF COLUMN CHARGE

HOUSE CONTAINING EXPLOSIVE CHARGE

PLATE # VI
AFTER ACTION REPORT
4th COMBINED ACTION COMPANY
2nd COMBINED ACTION GROUP
III MAC, FPO SF 96402
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
NPU San Francisco, California 96602

3/31/69
3000
25 March 1969

From: Commanding Officer
To: Senior RF/PF Advisor 1 CORPS Tactical Zone
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: Assistant Chief of Staff Combined Action Program)

Subj: Impact of effectiveness of Loyalist Force soldiers armed with M-16's assigned to Combined Action Platoon units

Ref: (a) CORDS - 1RF PF from SR RF/PF Adv dated 11 Mar 1969

1. The following information on the impact of M-16's on RF/PF effectiveness is provided as requested in reference (a). This information has been consolidated from reports received by all 2d CAS Combined Action Company Commanders and reflects their personal opinions from direct observations of RF's assigned to their CAP's.

a. Impact on morale. It is the unanimous opinion of all Company Commanders that morale is at its highest peak ever among the RF platoons armed with M-16's. These platoons still armed with the old family of 30 caliber weapons are awaiting anxiously for the issue of M-16's. Pride seems to radiate from the RF soldiers armed with the M-16's.

b. Effect on kill ratios. A cross section check on statistics was made for this report. We find our enemy kill ratio is up approximately 60 percent since the issue of M-16's. It must be noted, however, that this increased kill ratio was during a period of increased enemy activity. A true ratio will not be available until data is consolidated over different periods of active activity and a comparison can be made over like periods of activity during preceding months.

c. Impact on RF enthusiasm for combat. The RF enthusiasm for combat is one of the most evident areas that can be effectively measured for this report. Their enthusiasm has been displayed many times as CAP's now search areas they never ventured into prior to the issue of the M-16's. The RF has eagerly searched out areas mentioned in only the lowest rated intelligence reports. The RF's have displayed mounting aggressiveness and appear more eager to close with enemy forces.

d. Operations effectiveness indicators. The measurable operations effectiveness can be categorized in two separate areas.

(1) We have realized more thorough physical coverage of all Combined Action Platoon Tactical Areas of Coordination (CAP-TACO's).
PF's are accompanying the Marines on detailed, thorough searches of their assigned areas whereas prior to having been issued the M-16's they were reluctant to stray into isolated areas.

(2) The additional coverage mentioned in (1) above provides increased interdiction of known enemy routes of ingress and egress into our CAP TAOC's. This greatly assists in the overall accomplishment of the CAP mission by providing increased protection to the pacification targeted hamlets and undermining the local VC infrastructure by prohibiting or denying them access to NVA units operating in their areas.

e. Influence on PF aggressiveness. There is a marked increase in aggressiveness as pointed out in paragraph (c) above. The PF's appear much more sure of themselves and welcome enemy contacts so they can prove their effectiveness.

E. L. LEWIS

4-51.
ENEMY TACTICS BRIEF BY KGS, MARCH 1969

THIS IS A SUMMARY OF A BRIEFING BY A KIT CARSON SCOUT ASSIGNED TO HOA VANG DISTRICT. THIS KIT CARSON SCOUT HAS HAD EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE AS AN ENEMY RECONNAISSANCE OFFICER AND HAS EXCELLENT INFORMATION ON ENEMY PLANNING AND TACTICS. THIS INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO ALL GACO COs FOR FURTHER DISSEMINATION THROUGHOUT THEIR CAPs.

The VC will infiltrate into a city, town, RVN or RVNAF bases in any strength from platoon size to regimental force. This requires extensive planning and accumulation of comprehensive, detailed information. This necessary intelligence is gathered by spy teams brought in to contact local VC who provide tunnel havens during the day and guidance to selected observation posts at night. The spy team has specific intelligence gathering objectives for each night. They will often disguise themselves as civilians or RVN. Binoculars may be used.

Specific information as gathered on each night by the spy team.

FIRST NIGHT: Of primary importance is a detailed study of terrain and topography and the living habits and living spaces of the locals. The patrolling and ambush sites are also noted primarily to determine which parts of the perimeter receive the most traffic and which the least traffic.

SECOND NIGHT: Static defenses is the priority for the second night. Static defenses include number of layers of barbed wire, number of concertina layers, number of tangle foot layers, location of mines. The topography inside the hamlet is noted to determine where VC can hide just before the attack.

THIRD NIGHT: After becoming familiarized with the possible ingress and egress routes of the defensive position these avenues are broached physically to determine the number of bunkers, number and placement of machine guns, location of the CP, the strength of mutually supporting weapons, patterns of defensive structure and likely reaction patterns.

FOURTH NIGHT: Reserved for thorough check by physical reconnaissance of accumulated data. The VC's willingness to assume the additional risk of discovery to obtain accurate and reliable descriptive detail is borne out as the most significant aspect of the preparation to attack.

At this time the spy team returns to their temporary CO to draw up a map that is taken to higher headquarters for summary and analysis of the spy team's recommendations for or against attack.

If the decision is to attack, the spy team will then guide VC cadres, infantry and artillery coordinators into the area so that key components of the attack sequence can be related to the particular area. Collecting points, aid stations and places to hide troops prior to the attack are recommended. Tunnels and shelters for from 6-12 men may be build for

UNCLASSIFIED

4-52
daytime shelter. Major emphasis on the possibilities for clandestine operations is the focus of interest. The spy chief then accompanies the infantry and artillery planners (cadres) to a briefing for the staff chief of the unit to attack. Here all plans are double checked with the emphasis on a thorough analysis of alternative courses of action and suggestions from all participants. A decision is also made about attacking the reaction force.
KCS SUGGESTIONS FOR SECURITY

1. This KCS suggests that no information of military significance, even names of commanders and particularly the number and kind of weapons in the compound should be divulged even to dependents of military personnel. Dependents should not be allowed into the compound. The VC will take every opportunity to use trusted people for intelligence gathering.

2. Structures. The following suggestions are important because they are seen to have high priority in the eyes of a former VC and not because they are not already emphasized as sound practice.
   a. Trenches should be dug in broken lines to prevent the dispersion of fragments.
   b. Sand bags are considered to be the best defense against B-40 or 4L VC rockets that will fragment solid cover.
   c. It is suggested that high OP's should be constructed whenever possible.
   d. Automatic and crew served weapons should be repositioned at night and particular care should be taken to disguise the position of the radio.
   e. Strict noise and fire discipline is essential. Claymores, mines or M-26 grenades should be used to destroy the enemy so as not to reveal positions.
   f. This KCS favors defense from underground positions and the use of artillery to destroy the enemy. This kind of fixed position defense has obvious limitations for mobile operations.

3. LAYERS OF BARBED WIRE.
   a. It is recommended that mines be placed around barbed wire and in likely places for VC observation points e.g. bushy, graves or ponds around the positions.
   b. Frequent inspections of the position should be conducted to detect signs or VC movements so that camouflaged mines can be placed for interception of his movement around the position.
   c. When patrolling, look for houses with blue or red lamps in doors or windows. Often this is a signal to the VC that no patrols are in the area. Well chosen ambush sites could be particularly effective in this situation.

4. BOOBY TRAPS AND MINE TRAPS. The following suggestions were made concerning security against booby traps and mines.
   a. Don't sit in a tight group in ambushes, around trees, or around houses with people, high knolls, or walls with VC counter signs.
   b. Don't use the same route patrols, go out and come back on different routes.
   c. Expect the VC to mine abandoned houses and or approaches to them.
Aircraft flare
M-60 barrel
Pop-up flare
.45 cal. rounds
Compass
.45 holster
90mm H.E.
M-26 booby trap
M-26 grenade
M-79 grenade rounds
M-79 illuminating rounds
M-16 magazine
60mm mortar
60mm illuminating mortar
5.56mm rounds
7.62mm rounds
M-72 L.E.A.W.
Chinese grenade
Chinese grenade fuses
warhead
1.5 warhead
81mm mortar illuminating
30mm rounds
AK-50 magazine
20mm rounds
M-60 rounds
3/4 T.N.T.
.30 caliber rounds
VC can booby trap
Tomato can booby trap
105 rounds
3.5 rocket rounds
105 rounds w/fuse
25 lb box mine
1.5 rocket jet
179 rounds
VC booby trap
106 rounds
B.A.R. rounds
B.A.R. magazine
Bangalore torpedo
Carbine ammunition
57mm H.R. rounds
Carbine magazine
8mm mortar
K-bar
Trip flare
Hand illumination

M-14 supers mines
B-40 rocket rounds
B-40 rocket rounds w/booster
Toe popper mine
VC grenade
M-33 grenade
15 lb. box mine
62mm mortar
Small arms rounds
M-16 bayonet
10.4mm
5 lb. VC mine
10 lb. VC mine
106 warhead
7162 rd
VC mine w/fuse
51 lb. box mine
3.5 booster
2.7 rocket
Blasting cap
PRC-25 antenna
.30 cal. rounds
Round box mine
115 rd
Drum magazine
5 lb. command detonation mine
51 lb. box mine
Chinese Sub-machinegun
Gas pellet
1 lb. blocks of C-4
Shotgun rounds
AK-47 rounds
AK-47 magazine rounds
AK-47 magazine
Yellow smoke grenade
Illumination grenade
Red smoke grenade
Smoke grenade
Incendiary grenade
Flare, signal
M-130 cal.
W.P. grenade
B-40 rocket launcher
VC 106 rd
Grease gun w/barrel
5 lb. tube charge
Claymore

CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 lb. tube charge</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS grenade</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1 rd</td>
<td>2257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartridge belt</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrying pouch</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57mm HR tripod</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 mortar rd</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-16 Al illumination</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W/P. rifle grenade</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine fuze</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartridge belt w/magazine &amp; compass pack</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartridge belt w/(2) M. 26 grenades, canteen, pack &amp; cup, (3) carbine magazine</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>