(Unclassified upon removal from the basic letter)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 2d CAG ltr 3/LMN/gbs over 3000 of 18 Aug 1969

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO7D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 June to 30 June 1969 (U)

1. Forwarded.

R. E. Reed
BY DIRECTION

Copy to:
CO, 2d CAG
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 June to 30 June 1969

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.1A
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8A

Encl: (1) 2d Combined Action Group Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Enclosure (1) is downgraded at 3 year intervals. Declassified after 12 years. DOD Directive 5200.10

E. L. Lewis
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1 June 1969 to 30 June 1969

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DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12-YEARS

ENCLOSURE (1)
# Part I

## Organizational Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2d Combined Action Group</td>
<td>LtCol. E. L. Lewis</td>
<td>1 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Subordinate Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combined Action Company</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. J. E. Seitz</td>
<td>1 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Combined Action Company</td>
<td>1stLt. P. E. Traft</td>
<td>1 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. W. J. Campbell</td>
<td>1 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. D. A. Wogllosang</td>
<td>1 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Maj. A. J. Moore</td>
<td>1 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. G. E. Brown</td>
<td>1 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. D. D. Dean</td>
<td>1 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30 Jun 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ATTACHED UNITS

Detachment, Scout Dog Platoon, 3rd M. P. Battalion
Detachment, Kit Carson Scouts, 1st MarDiv G-2 (C-1)
Detachment, ARVN Interpreters/Translators, III MAF
Detachment, Medical Section, HQ, III MAF

2. Locations

1 June 1969 to 30 June 1969

HQ 2d CAG
CAG 2-1
CAG 2-2
CAG 2-3
CAG 2-4
CAG 2-5
CAG 2-6
CAG 2-7
CAG 2-8
CAG 2-9

District III, Danang Special Sector, RVN
Hieu Duc District, Quang Nam Province, RVN
Dai Loc District, Quang Nam Province, RVN
Dien Ban District, Quang Nam Province, RVN
Hieu Minh District, Quang Nam Province, RVN
Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province, RVN
Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province, RVN
Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province, RVN
Duc Duc District, Quang Nam Province, RVN

3. Staff Officers

Executive Officer/Civic Action Officer: Major R. O. BROAD Jr. 1 - 30 Jun 69
S-1 Officer: 1stLt. H. NAGAI 1 - 30 Jun 69
S-2/S-3 Officer: Major M. J. DUBE 1 - 30 Jun 69
Asst S-2/S-3 Officer: 1stLt. P. E. CASWELL 1 - 30 Jun 69
S-4 Officer - Supply Officer: Capt. C. A. BURR Jr. 1 - 30 Jun 69

4. Average Strength. The average strength of the 2d Combined Action Group during the month of June 1969 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>On Rolls</th>
<th>Chargeable/Effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 2d Combined Action Group continued to be handicapped by the lack of junior noncommissioned officers, operating at approximately 50% of authorized manning level. The total effective strength of Corpsman attached to this unit also started on a downward trend.
Unit average effective strength is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th># of CAPs</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| CAG HQ  | 0         | 6 67 | 0   
| 2-1     | 6         | 1 84 | 0  3|
| 2-2     | 4         | 1 56 | 0  3|
| 2-3     | 6         | 1 84 | 0  5|
| 2-4     | 5         | 1 70 | 0  4|
| 2-5     | 2         | 1 28 | 0  2|
| 2-7     | 6         | 1 84 | 0  5|
| 2-8     | 5         | 1 70 | 0  4|
| 2-9     | 2         | 1 28 | 0  2|
| MTT     | 0         | 0  9 | 0   |
| TOTAL   | 36        | 14 580 | 0 32 |

1-3
PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. Personnel Administration.

   a. Joined and Transferred. During the month of June, the 2d Combined Action Group joined and transferred the following number of personnel listed in the four categories below.

   (1) Joined

      Officers  |  Enlisted
      -------  |  -------
      0        |  91

   (2) Rotated CONUS

      Officers  |  Enlisted
      -------  |  -------
      0        |  33

   (3) Transferred within WestPac Command

      Officers  |  Enlisted
      -------  |  -------
      0        |  5

   (4) Transferred by SR/w sick (out of country hospitals)

      Officers  |  Enlisted
      -------  |  -------
      0        |  23

   b. Awards.

      (1) There were two recommendations for heroism and 19 end of tour awards submitted to FMFPac for approval during the month of June 1969.

      | USMC | USN |
      |------|-----|
      | NC   | BSM | NOM | NAM |
      | 0    | 4   | 5   | 11  |
      | BSM  | 1   | NOM | 0   |

      (2) Personnel of the 2d Combined Action Group received the following awards as a result of combat wounds and heroism in the Republic of Vietnam.

      | BSM | PHM |
      |-----|-----|
      | 1   | 29  |
Casualties. The 2d Combined Action Group suffered the following casualties during the month of June 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>DOW</th>
<th>DDC</th>
<th>WIA/NE</th>
<th>NBC</th>
<th>KIA/WIA/NBC-PET TO DUTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>12 / 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Congrants/Splints/Helrep. This organization received and processed two Congressional interest letters during the reporting month. One inquiry was of a Marine who had failed to provide support for dependents. The other was on a Marine who had made application for a humanitarian transfer because of his mother's health. There was one other Congressional interest letter received at Headquarters III MAF, which concerned a Marine in this organization. He had applied for a hardship discharge. No special interest letters were received during the month.

e. Administrative Assistance.

(1) Administrative assistance to every individual Marine and companies seeking assistance continues to be provided as expeditiously and as completely as possible.

(2) Two administrative discharges by reason of unsuitability were processed during the month. Both were approved and Marines transferred to ONS for discharge.

f. Legal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article 32 Investigations</th>
<th>Informal Investigations</th>
<th>WIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

  SCM 2  SPM 3

g. Morale and Welfare. The morale of the unit continues to be high and recreational activity is available to all hands. The beach adjacent to the Group Compound is open at regularly scheduled times for swimming and is a tremendous boost on morale during these hot, humid days.
The following Rest and Recuperation (R&Rs) leave quotas, out of country and in country were received and utilized:

(1) Out of Country R&Rs - Quotas Utilized
   39  36

(2) In Country R&Rs - Quotas Utilized
   24  17

i. Mail. Daily average bags of mail were processed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incoming</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 bag</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Packages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incoming</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 bag</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: One bag of letters represents approximately 2,000 letters.

j. Promotions. Promotions were effected during the month of June as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meritorious Combat</th>
<th>Regular</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sgt.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/Cpl.</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to above enlisted promotions this organization effected one appointment to Major and one appointment to Captain during the reporting period.

k. Hospital Visits. Weekly hospital visits were made by designated officers of the command in addition to those made daily by the Hospital Corps representative and the Commanding Officer. No significant problems were encountered.

l. Informational Services. One hundred sixty one Fleet Hometown news releases were forwarded to the III MAF Combat Information Bureau during the reporting month. These included information on promotions, joinings and decorations.
Career Planning.

1. During the month of June, Career Planning interviews were conducted, with the following rank breakdown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Eligible</th>
<th>Recommended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Sergeants</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Corporals</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Lance Corporals</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) PFC's</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. No career reenlistments or extensions resulted from these interviews. Four Marines extended their overseas tours for 6 months.
a. During the month of June, Civic Action personnel of 2d Combined Action Group continued to initiate and further develop Self-help Civic Action projects. Increased contact between CAP Marines and the Vietnamese people has brought about a better understanding and relationship between the Vietnamese people and CAP Marines, enabling utilization of new ideas in Civic Action, which have become a big success and are beneficial to both.

b. With increased knowledge and a fuller understanding among CAP Marines of the self-help idea, projects such as no cost/no material have become an everyday procedure.

c. The Civic Action NGOs have been instructing and assisting the Vietnamese in acquiring the materials they need for improving or rebuilding their village or hamlet through GVN sources. Civic Action NGOs of the CAPs have been instructing their hamlet and village officials on how to use the official forms and processing them through GVN channels to acquire required support.

(1) In order to better relations, many CAPs have been holding swimming classes for the Vietnamese people. During June, 45 such classes were held in Quang Nam Province, with 300 Vietnamese nationals attending regularly.

(2) To assist in furthering understanding over 70 English language classes were held. Total attendance was over 700.

(a) A major attempt was made to establish a "little brother program" whereby each CAP Marine would more or less adopt a child and take care of him. This program has been readily accepted and has thus far been a great success.

(b) CAP 2-5-1, as a result of the little brother program, has a baseball team made up of their little brothers. They have baseball games against CAP 2-5-2's little brothers. CAP 2-7-3 has developed a marching-squad with their little brothers. They now have a marching-squad that can do many marching maneuvers.

(3) A popular event was at 2-5-2 where the CAP held an "Elders Day" for all the Elders of the hamlets in their area. They awarded each elder a certificate of recognition. Showing the elders, who are normally forgotten, that their importance is recognized by the CAP. This had a beneficial effect on the Vietnamese attitude toward the CAP Marines.
(4) The CAPs are holding different types of events where the Vietnamese people are becoming more closely related to the CAP Marines. The CAPs have practically done away with any "give-away" programs. They now have achievement events where they have awarded the contestants, as prizes, the items they would have normally given away. The Vietnamese enjoy these contests and feel more proud in accepting their prizes by having done something to earn the award, taking away the feeling of a give-away program.

(a) Several CAPs have built bulletin boards in the Hamlets Center of popularity where the Vietnamese can post important events so that all the people of the hamlet can receive the information. The bulletin boards have become very useful for the Vietnamese people and are therefore appreciated.

(5) Commodities distributed during the month of June were as follows: Food, 3,000 lbs; 1500 bars of soap; Clothing, 100 pounds; Personal Hygiene Kits, 300; School Kits, 600; Care Kits, 2; Masonary Kits, 3; Midwife Kits, 4; and Blacksmith Kits, 2.

(6) During June, CAP personnel of the Group assisted Vietnamese in completing the following projects: Fences, 3; Dwellings, 4; Wells, 5; School Roof Repairs, 2; Foot Bridges, 4; Playgrounds, 1; School Classrooms, 2; Heads, 2; Culverts, 1.

(7) Medical assistance in support of Civic Action saw Med Caps resulting in the treatment of 14,818 Vietnamese Civilians. Dental care was given to 53.

(a) 54 Vietnamese Children and 71 adults were medically evacuated during the month.

(b) CAP Medical Corpsman administered 2,000 immunizations during June.

(c) CAP Corpsmen continue to train Vietnamese Civilians in the basics of first aid. During June 12 such Civilians were undergoing training. Vietnamese Civilians assisting the Med Caps totaled 45.

d. Psychological operations activity employed by the CAPs in June included airdropped leaflets and hand dissemination of leaflets and handbills and Vietnamese Newspapers.

(1) During June approximately 50,000 reward leaflets were airdropped.
(2) Approximately 60,000 Anti-VC infrastructure leaflets were airdropped.

(3) Approximately 50,000 Chieu Hoi leaflets were airdropped.

(4) Approximately 26,000 "CAPs are here to help you" leaflets were airdropped.

(5) All CAPs during the month distributed 30,000 safe conduct passes.

(6) Approximately 40,000 reward cards were distributed.

(7) Approximately 40,000 Anti-VC Posters were handed out.

(8) Approximately 40,000 Newspapers were distributed to the Vietnamese people in Quang Nam Province.
3. INTELLIGENCE

a. General. Action on a T/O change to include a S/WCO as intelligence chief is still pending. The tasks of this billet continued to be accomplished by the Operations Chief.

b. Intelligence Information Chain. The intelligence chain originating with the information passed from the CAPs to the District Headquarters for dissemination through both the GVN and MAF channels continued to function smoothly and productively during the reporting period.

c. Counter Intelligence. The 2d OAG Headquarters continues to benefit from a close working relationship with the 8th and 9th Counter Intelligence Teams. Intelligence was disseminated by CTTs to CAOCs in the form of Black Lists of VC collaborators, routes of enemy food supply, enemy collection and disbursing agents and points of agent meetings.

d. General Enemy Situation. The general enemy situation at the beginning of June indicated renewed offensive efforts were in the offing although the bare statistics continued to show a decline in enemy initiated activity for the third consecutive week. The first week in June was punctuated by scattered and uncharacteristically disorganized sapper attacks in urban areas. The tempo of enemy initiated ground attacks increased in the second week of June and continued at an increased rate thru the end of June. The scope of the enemy's strategy continued to be harassment and gradual attrition rather than decisive meetings of larger forces.

During the first week of June enemy sightings became more and more frequent in the CAP TACO's situated across enemy lines of communications. The week began with the majority of sightings being of small groups of VC, 3-6 in number, in the northernmost CAPs in Hien Nhon District. On the evening of 1 June and early morning of 2 June groups of 3 VC were spotted on three different occasions by CAPs 2-4-2 and 2-4-3. Again on the 3rd of June the same CAPs apprehended a total of 8 VC suspects moving through their TACOs. On the evening of 6 June and the morning of 7 June DaNang City was rocketed from south of the airstrip. In the same time frame elements of five Combined Action Companies came under attack. At approximately 07-0100H an estimated 35 VC attacked CAP 2-7-3's defensive perimeter using satchel charges, grenades and S.A.F. The initial attack caused one Marine and 2 PF casualties. After the initial attack was repulsed illumination and Spooky were requested, along with reaction forces and a medevac. One Marine was killed during the continued fire but a CAP ambush sent out from the main body re-
turned and placed heavy organic weapons fire on the attacking VC's flank causing the VC to withdraw. Spooky arrived on station and poured fire into the retreating VC. The CAP swept the area at first light. Two VC KIA were found and villagers had seen five bodies being dragged off by the VC leaving the area. Friendly casualties were 1 Marine KIA, one Marine WIA, 2 PFGs WIAE and one PFG MIA. In the next hour and a half between 0105 and 0235, 2 CACOs (CACO 2-4 and 2-2) and four CAPs (2-2-4, 2-3-2, 2-9-1 and 2-9-2) were attacked by fire which included mortars, recoilless rifles, S.A.F. and satchel charges all resulting in negative friendly casualties. At first light the battlefields were swept and no enemy dead were found. Later in the morning, 071035, CACO 2-9 was bombarded with seven 122 rockets which caused negative damage.

In addition, the enemy attempted to use CS gas to aid them in getting through to their objective south of the airstrip. CAP 2-1-3 reported receiving a small quantity of CS gas 9km SW of the airstrip. The concentration was reported as weak and moving through their position in an easterly direction. Its origin could not be determined. CAP 2-1-2 found evidence of 4 rockets having been launched from approximately 9km SW of the DaNang Airfield. On 7 and 8 June the CAPs received many reports that the enemy had passed through villages and hamlets seeking food and supplies. Several CAPs apprehended civilians acting as porters for the fleeing enemy. One such group of 70 civilians was detained by CAP 2-2-4 when they were spotted immediately after 5 VC were driven from the area by organic weapons fire. The 70 civilians were carrying 700 lbs. of rice, 100 lbs. of salt and 15 sandbags full of clothing.

Incidents of harassment by small groups of VC continued at the previous week's accelerated pace thru the 2d week of June. CAP 2-3-4 participating in a joint sweep was engaged by at least three VC, 3km SE of Dien Ban. An 81mm mortar mission was called on suspected withdrawal routes. Shortly thereafter the CAP received four incoming 60mm mortar rounds causing negative damage. Sporadic sniper fire continued until contact was broken. On the following day CAP 2-3-4 retrieved the bodies of 9 VC KIA which had resulted from their mortar missions the previous afternoon. On 13 June, a CAP 2-2-2 ambush received approximately 10 rounds of S.A.F. from AT925573, 1km E of Dai Loc District Headquarters. The CAP returned fire and swept the area under illumination. One VC KIA and one AK-47 were found. Again on 13 June CAP 2-7-4 enroute to an ambush site fired on 6 VC near a village at AT996698 approximately 4km s of the DaNang Airfield. The VC re-
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returned fire and broke contact. The CAP swept the area and detained three female suspects. Numerous brief contacts were made yielding negative results as the enemy tended to break contact almost immediately unless they had initiated it.

Enemy initiated B-40 and small arms attacks on the CAPs continued at a slightly abated pace through the third week in June. At the Province and Corps levels numerous intelligence reports indicated that the VC were making extensive preparations to intensify their political, proselytizing, propaganda and terrorist activities in support of the summer offensive and to influence the Paris talks. It was expected that the VC announcement of their defeat of the U.S. forces, based on proposed U.S. troop withdrawals, was forthcoming. Proselytizing people by the announcement of a "Provisional Revolutionary Government" was also expected at the cadre level of indoctrination. Small harassing activities were still pretty much the order of the day. Contacts by CAP 2-3-2 and CAP 2-5-2 tended to set the pattern for the week. On 15 June at approximately 2230H CAP 2-3-2 received S.A.F. and B-40 rockets from an estimated VC squad about 2km south of Bien Ban. The CAP returned a heavy volume of fire and Spooky was employed in the area causing the VC to break contact and flee to the west. A sweep at first light yielded negative results. On 18 June, CA CO 2-5-2 spotted a squad size enemy unit moving SW in a rice paddy, 7km W of the DaNang Airfield. The CAP opened up with organic weapons fire and received S.A.F. and one B-40 rocket in return. The CAP called for illumination and swept the area after the enemy broke contact, finding one KIA. Two PPs received minor wounds.

During the last week of June enemy initiated harassment continued at a somewhat reduced level. Several enemy supply points were uncovered all indicating by signs of recent activity that the enemy was still quite busy organizing for further small unit attacks and political propagandizing. Many of the attacks consisted of mortar fire on fixed locations rather than against maneuvering units.

On 22 June CA CO 2-2 and 1/7 received approximately five rounds of eighty-two mortar fire. Again on the 23rd and 24th six and eight 82 mortar rounds respectively were fired on CA CO 2-2. While on patrol 28 June, CAP 2-4-3 heard what sounded like a radio transmitting in the vicinity of BT168586, 2km NE of Hoi An. While sweeping the area the CAP found 4 bunkers built up to a height of 3-4 feet above ground. There were no perceivable airholes in the bunkers. Empty food cans and footprints indicated considerable enemy activity in the area. A claymore was detected while a search was held to find air holes or an en-

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE (1)

2-10

DECLASSIFIED
The mine was blown in place and the bunkers were destroyed by artillery. The month of June proved to be very active as the enemy tried, by continuous harrassment, to cause as many casualties as possible without decisive contacts in order to gain maximum psychological and propaganda benefits to influence negotiations taking place or expected to take place.

1. **Enemy Plans and Policies.** The enemy's modus operandi during June was to make maximum use of attacks on fixed installations and small units, particularly CAP size ambushes and patrols. This would reinforce their claims about the inability of the GVN to protect its people while making it appear that the FWAF units were more and more confused and defeated. The tactics of brief repeated mortar attacks from rapidly dispersed small groups were moderately successful. The use of CS gas in small quantities to provoke confusion and provide cover for their movement, and attempts to lob 250 pound bombs into fixed installations were somewhat novel techniques in the greater DaNang area of Quang Nam Province. The usual attempts to replenish food supplies immediately following attacks in populated areas were also evident. In general enemy plans and policies reflected their close attention to the political and psychological effects desired as the result of military activity.

c. **Interrogator/Translator.** During the month of June all detainees or prisoners were either processed through the various district headquarters or were forwarded to USMC interrogator/translator teams for processing. A feedback of information produced as a result of these interrogations is provided to 2d CAG for dissemination to capturing CAGs.

g. **Interpreters.** Eight interpreters were employed by 2d CAG during the month of June. Seven were assigned out to the various companies and the MIT where they assisted the communication process at briefings and conferences between CAP Commanders and PF platoon leaders. Two interpreters working with the MIT had the additional duty of participating in formalized instruction for several PF platoons being trained to work in CAP units.

g. **Enemy Statistics.** Enemy statistics for the month of June 1969 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>POW</th>
<th>Detainees</th>
<th>Ho Chi Minh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE (1)
(1) Weapons and Ordnance Captured

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-72 LAAW</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, 9mm</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordnance</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chicom Grenades</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-33 grenades</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-26 grenades</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. OPERATIONS

a. General. During the month of June 2d CAG CAP units contended successfully with a steady increase in enemy initiated activity which seemed to have been triggered on 6 and 7 June by a rocket attack on DaNang City and attacks on elements of five 2d CAG Combined Action Companies. Aggressive patrolling and alert use of supporting mortar, artillery and air allowed the CAPs to maintain an effective counter force to suppress the enemy's tactics. CAP areas of operation in Hieu Duc and Hoa Vang Districts lie across enemy access routes to the DaNang area and are a serious impediment to the enemy's ability to move through the area. In addition, CAP operations continued to provide timely intelligence about enemy movement and the identity of enemy units in the area. The close relationship of the CAP Marines with the villagers again proved invaluable because through intelligence provided by local villagers many civilians acting as porters for enemy supplies were apprehended before the supplies could be delivered to enemy hiding in the hills and mountains. Aggressive night patrolling activities by the CAPs identified locations where rockets were launched requiring the enemy to constantly move supply distribution points and meeting places as well as allowing immediate pinpoint response by air and artillery. The number of small unit attacks during June were apparently intended to have maximum effect in convincing the people of the power and omnipresence of the VC thus giving them a basis on which to claim broad sweeping support. The continued cooperation of the villagers with the CAPs by supplying information on enemy movement and the amount or ordnance received through the V.I.P. program indicated that the VC probably had little success in impressing the people.

b. Mobility. At the end of the reporting period, 2d CAG had thirty mobile CAPs operating in Quang Nam Province. Although plans were being developed for the relocation and mobility of several CAPs during the month of June no additional CAPs were moved or converted from static to mobile operation. Rather, a great deal of time and attention was given to study of the revised system of the Vietnamese Government for indicating pacified areas in the new plan for expanding the number of population centers loyal to the GVN.

c. Coordination. The formulation of new plans, operations and directives in terms of the bilingual format discussed and recorded in previous chronologies are becoming more widely accepted by the Vietnamese. Studies of the pacification plan mentioned in the section on mobility were accomplished by a continuous exchange of information between 2d CAG and Vietnamese officials at District and Province level.
d. Training. In accordance with Group Bulletin 1500 the training plans for the month of June 1969 were submitted for approval to the CO, 2d CAG by the CAO's. Emphasis remained on training all Marines and PFs in general military subjects, patrolling, ambushes, listening posts and calls for fire support. Emphasis will continue to be made on all areas commensurate with the enemy activity during the period.

(1) 2d CAG Mobile Training Team. The 2d CAG MTT continued to train PF platoons at Dien Ban District Headquarters during the month of June. With the completion of training of PF platoons QNM 25 and QNM 24 a total of 59 PF soldiers were provided the basic training in weapons and tactics necessary in the CAP. In addition to the normal training schedule both PF platoons participated in various actions against the enemy in the Dien Ban area resulting in (1) VC KIAs, (2) AK-47's captured and one B-40 rocket launcher captured. At the end of June there were two PF platoons remaining to be trained in Dien Ban District.

(2) Outside Assistance Training.

(a) The First Marine Division Schools Mobile Training Team provided instruction to two Combined Action Companies during the month of June. This team provided excellent instruction on the 50 caliber machine gun, quick-fire, quick-kill techniques, mines and booby traps, 60mm mortars and 8mm mortars. All instruction involved practical live firing exercises.

(b) The First Marine Division NCO Leadership School also provided assistance training on a space available basis. 2d CAG was able to send eight NCOs to this school during June. The competition was very keen with the top ten of a student class numbering 40 all averaging in the 94-98 range. Three 2d CAG Marines were in the top ten graduates.

(3) 2d CAG NCO Leadership School. The student and instructor response to the first class of the 2d CAG NCO School held from 27-30 May was very enthusiastic and completely favorable. After a thorough evaluation of student critique sheets and instructor evaluations made by various 2d CAG staff members a number of modifications to the curriculum were made. These changes included an extension of the course length from four to five days, the addition of another hour in the areas of personal response, leadership principles, RF/FP relationships with CAP Marines and medevac procedures. In addition, several other classes
were modified in terms of subject material and method of presentation. Two classes of approximately 15 students each divided about equally between Sergeants and Corporals were held during June. Both classes responded enthusiastically to the school and contributed to its growing excellence. No further major modifications were made during June. Bi-monthly classes were planned for July pending the tactical situation.

e. Inspections. Staff inspections of the CACOs and CAPs continued on a regularly scheduled basis during June. Detailed inspections were made of the records being kept and coordination accomplished by both the CACO and CAP levels of command. Supply and Communications inspections were also accomplished to inform the CACOs on their state of readiness based upon usage data compiled at 2d CAG Headquarters. Permanent records were kept to assist in continued high efficiency.

The initial groundwork established in the last part of May for Combined inspections by the Province and CAG levels of command with the aim of heightening the troop's morale and improving the coordination between the PF and US Marines in the CAPs was accomplished on 9 and 10 June. The resulting impact upon both the PF platoon leaders and the CAP Marines surpassed expectations by the number of problems, particularly difficulties experienced by the PF soldier that were brought out for study and resulted in informed protective measures. One very definite lesson learned was the advantage to the harmony between the PF and the Marine in the CAPs for a catharsis before people in authority. This opportunity has been continued by weekly meetings between PF Platoon Leaders/Marine Cap Commanders and CACO COs and District Chiefs. Another Combined inspection of the CAPs by CAG and Province representatives was tentatively scheduled for 10 and 11 July.

f. Conferences/Meetings.

(1) Staff Conferences: 2d CAG continued to hold weekly staff meetings where matters of multiple staff cognizance could be discussed. The primary item on the agenda continued to be a discussion of the detailed plans necessary for a smooth transition when the Group Headquarters moves to its new location in Hoi An. The projected completion date for the move was set for the 23rd of July.

(2) Combined Action Company CO's Meeting. A meeting was held weekly for all Combined Action Company Commanders and Headquarters staff for the purpose of working out problems of support and coordination and passing command guidance. In addition each CACO CO or his representative gave a picture of the DIOCO (District Intelligence/
Operations Control Center) intelligence for the coming week. This
meeting continued to be most beneficial to all concerned because of
the opportunity for face-to-face dialogue to discuss operations and
problem areas.

(3) CAP Commanders Conference. The monthly CAP Commanders
Conference was held on the first Sunday in June. Agenda items were
submitted by the CACU Commanders several days prior to the conference.
The suggested agenda items were evaluated, arranged for logical sequence
and given to the CAP Commanders as a guide for discussion. Items of
continued concern were training techniques for best retention and
practice by the PFs, Marine-PF relationships and group support of civic
action projects. This conference was another needed opportunity for
catharsis and group attack on common problem areas. It continued to
be unanimously supported by all concerned as time well spent.

g. Operational Aids. The 2d CAG Combined Action Companies continued
to receive replenishment maps, mapboards and drafting assistance on
special projects from the S-3 draftsman during the month of June. One
such special project was the Vietnamese Armed Forces Exhibition which
is described in the Special Operations Section of this Chronology.

h. Special Operations.

(1) Kit Carson Scouts. Ten Scouts were employed by 2d CAG
during June. In general, their performance was outstanding as they
participated in more than 190 day and night patrols, discovered 7
enemy underground hiding/storage places and detected 11 mines/booby
traps. Three Kit Carson Scouts were also reported very favorably for
their enthusiastic attitude. Several companies have requested additional
Scouts as they seem to work best in pairs.

(2) Scout Dogs and Handlers. During the month of June 2d CAG
received three new scout dogs. After training was completed these dogs
contributed to the increasing number of tunnels, caves and enemy move-
ment being detected by this valuable supporting arm. The CAP's readily
adapted their techniques of patrolling and ambushing necessary to add
this valuable component to their other security and detection measures.
Although the PFs initially were afraid of the dogs they generally felt
much more confident and secure when one was working with their CAP.

(3) Troop Test of XM-31 Wire Gun. A complete report on the
troop test of the XM-31 wire gun is provided in the Supporting Documents.
section of this chronology. The wire guns were in the CAPs for two
weeks under normal combat conditions. They were found to be 70% capable
of performing as described in the specifications. The general con-
clusions about its tactical value were that it is relatively light for
the protection afforded, has no explosives to cause accidental discharge,
and has definite possibilities in defensive as well as offensive employ-
ment. It was recommended the 100 cases/CAP/month be provided.

(4) Vietnamese Armed Forces Exhibition, 2d CAG Participation.
A complete report of 2d CAGs participation in this event is provided
in the Supporting Documents section of this chronology (includes pho-
tographs). A Major from 2d CAG was appointed to work with a Vietnamese
Major in completing the details for participation by 2d CAG as the only
American unit to be represented in the celebration. The design of the
2d CAG booth was made simple while at the same time it photographically
reconstructed the mission of the Combined Action Program by means of
enlarged pictures of the various activities carried on by the CAPs.
The photographs ran the entire spectrum of involvement from Scout Dogs
on patrol to the HTT training FPs to the use of the 60mm mortar and
from Medcaps to hamlet baseball games and construction of school rooms.
The Vietnamese also contributed a scale model of a CAP static compound.
The exhibition lasted from 19 June to 23 June at the DaNang City Stadium.

i. Voluntary Information Program. The total funds expended as
rewards to Vietnamese Nationals for information pertaining to enemy
activity and/or enemy equipment was 404,705 piasters. The amount paid
out during June dropped somewhat from May's all-time high of 570,700
yet remained well above the largest amounts spent in months prior to
May 1969. 2d CAG continued to stress the importance of this program
because of the many casualties prevented from enemy booby traps.

j. Artillery Support. During the month of June 2d CAG units ad-
justed over 20 artillery fire missions on suspected or known enemy
targets. The majority of these missions were in direct support of 2d
CAG CAPs. In addition to the supporting artillery approximately 44,
81mm mortar and 2, 60 mortar missions were adjusted on the enemy by the
CAPs and CACOs.

k. Air.

(1) Fixed Wing. A total of 3 missions were flown in support
of CAP operations in June.

(2) Flareships and Gunships. A total of 12 missions were
flown during June. Reaction time was excellent and support remained outstanding in all respects (Spooky (7)), Basketball (5).

(3) Medical Evacuation Missions. A total of 73 medical evacuation missions were requested/controlled by 2d CAC CAP units during the month of June. These included missions called in to evacuate Vietnamese civilians, PPs and Marines. Timely medevacs continue to be a large morale factor in all units.
5. SPECIAL SERVICES

a. Almost eight hundred paperback books were received during the month from donors in the United States. These paperbacks were distributed to all of the CAPs.

b. One organizational party was held jointly by the S-4 section and the Motor Transport section of CAG. Beer and soda were furnished by the Special Services section.

c. Battery-powered Tape Recorders were purchased in sufficient number to place one in every CAP and CACO in the Group. These will permit every man in the field to both make and receive tape recordings from home.

d. Two talent shows were held during the month and both contained some of the best entertainment held in the headquarters in quite a while. Special Services acquired electric guitars and speakers from III MAF, H&G Co. Special Services for both of the shows.

e. Beer and soda rations were distributed this month with the new increase. One hundred and thirty-five cases a week were distributed which is an increase of thirty cases a week.
6. LOGISTICS-GENERAL

The over-all Logistic Status of 2d Combined Action Group did not change appreciably during the reporting period. As previously reported, this organization is still in a C-2 Category under the FORSTAT Reporting System for Equipment/Supplies on hand which has resulted from a lack of receipt of Table of Equipment material from the supply system. Examples of the shortages of equipment are shown under paragraph (1) Problem Areas.

a. Significant Events

(1) The pending relocation of this Headquarters in the Hoi An area was given final approval during the reporting period and construction began on the 3rd of June with a completion target date of 19 July 1969. At the close of the reporting period, the construction was approximately 75% finished.

(2) Liaison was established between the 2d CAG S-4 Officer and the Industrial Relations Section of Public Works in Danang and the Industrial Relations Section of MACV in Hoi An to complete security investigations for fifteen (15) indigenous workers which will be hired as General Laborers and twelve (12) indigenous workers which will be messhall workers in the new Hoi An compound.

b. Damage to Weapons Due to Enemy Action

No weapons were damaged due to enemy action during the reporting period; however, combat losses of two (2) M-16 rifles which resulted from contact with the enemy were experienced during the month. The monetary value of these losses was $272.00.

c. Motor Transport

(1) The Group Motor Transport Section drove a total of 33,611 accident free miles over a 1200 square mile TAOR during the reporting period.

(2) During the period only a total of two (2) vehicles were deadlined for Second Echelon repairs. The average deadline time was three (3) days.

(3) Two (2) vehicles were deadlined for Third Echelon repairs at Force Service Regiment during the month. Average deadline time for these vehicles was fifteen (15) days.
(4) A total of 120 short tons of cargo was transported to all the operational companies during the period. The cargo consisted of ammunition, rations, field fortification material, and medical supplies.

d. Air Lift

No air lifts were scheduled during the month.

e. Food Service

(1) A total of 22,900 meals were prepared and served by the Group messhall during the month. This figure includes 1,800 meals which were served during the Sunday Barbeques. During the month, the Combined Action Platoons started a "Big Brother" program where a Marine invites a Vietnamese child or his counterpart, a Popular Force Soldier, to the Sunday Barbeque. This program has been highly successful and will be continued in the months to come.

(2) "B" Rations totaling 2,300 meals were distributed to all operational companies during the month; additionally, "A" rations have been furnished to the companies on a daily basis.

f. Armory

(1) During the month, the Armorer and his assistant made visits to every company to inspect and repair weapons "on-the-spot" as required. In addition to the weapons repaired as a result of these field trips fifty seven (57) weapons were repaired at the Armory.

Forty-Two (42) weapons requiring Third Echelon Maintenance were sent to Ordnance Maintenance Company at 1st FSR. The average turn around time at FSR was five (5) days.

g. Miscellaneous Services

(1) Adequate plumbing and trash pick-up support was received from the China Beach Public Works Maintenance Section during the month. Additionally, a crew of painters and plasterers completely refurnished all the structures on the compound this month. This has improved the looks of the buildings considerably.

(2) The Force Logistic Command’s Laundry Platoon provided adequate support for the Group Headquarters Supply Section and the operational companies during the period. Average turn-around time for laundry is two (2) days.
h. Supplies

(1) Noteworthy items of supplies received during the month were messhall equipment which consisted of two (2) sinks, two (2) ice cream cabinets, one (1) 250 cu. ft. commercial refrigerator, one (1) electric range, two (2) drink dispensers, seven (7) dining tables; one (1) prefabricated 100 cu. ft. refrigerator, one (1) steam jacket cooker and nine (9) polaroid cameras. The messhall equipment was ordered for and is being installed in the new messhall at Hoi An. The polaroid cameras were ordered for and have been distributed to the operational companies for use.

i. Problem Areas

Supply - The problem area of lack of receipt of T/E material as previously reported still exists. Without the material this unit is in a C-2 rating under the FORSTAT reporting system. Examples of these shortages are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telephone Set, TA-312</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone Set, TA/1-PT</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Control Group AN/GRA-39</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generator Set, PU-482</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address Plate Machine</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embossing Machine Address Plate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binoculars 6X30</td>
<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mount Tripod, M122</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mount Tripod, M3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck Cargo 3/4T M37B1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Vision Scope</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRLR, 1/4T, M416B1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRLR, Water 400 gal, M149</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(n) Duplicating Set, Spirit Process  1
(o) Duplicating Set, Stencil Process  1

Motor Transport - The turn-around time for vehicles being repaired at FSR is still excessive which is due to a shortage of repair parts within the Supply System.

Communications - The only problem with communications was the turn-around time on direct-exchange items was still taking from 2-3 weeks as mentioned in previous reports.
7. MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

a. General. Emphasis on the training of selected Marines and Popular Forces Soldiers to act as Corpsman in the event a Corpsman is not available in the CAS was again stressed during the Month of June. The use of Iodine tablets and Malaria pills were also emphasized as the number of casualties from disease continued to rise. Also the use of Salt tablets as the temperature rose.

b. Personnel:

(1) Medical Department Representative: HM2 M. A. RINELL, USN
(2) Administrative/Sick Call Petty Officer: HM3 D. B. MICHAEL, USN
(3) Supply/Sick Call Petty Officer: HM3 A. M. GARDNER, USN
(4) Hospital Corpsman Personnel Statistics for the Month of June 1969:

   (a) Detached 4
   (b) Joined 3
   (c) TAD Personnel Attached 1
   (d) TAD Personnel Terminated 1
   (e) Casualties:
      (1) KIA 0
      (2) WIA 1
      (3) Twice WIA and Evacuated out of RVN 0
      (4) Died of Wounds 0

   (f) During the Month of June the 2d Combined Action Group (CAC) Aid Station treated 657 USMC/USN personnel at routine sick call, including 183 personnel from the tenant Combined Action Program School and the Vietnamese Language School.

CONFIDENTIAL
Medical Civic Action Program (Med CAPs)

(1) During the Month of June 1969, CAP Corpsman treated 14,818 Vietnamese civilians at daily routine Med CAPs. This is a decrease of 168 from the Month of May 1969. There were also 70 Vietnamese civilians treated as a result of hostile action.

(2) The 2d CAG Headquarters Medical Section treated 435 Vietnamese civilians at daily routine Med CAPs during the Month of June 1969.

d. Training:

(1) During the Month of June CAP Corpsman conducted a total of 58 classes resulting in a total attendance of 760 Vietnamese civilians and Popular Forces Soldiers. This is a decrease of 19 from the Month of May.

e. Sanitation:

(1) Routine Sanitation inspections were conducted within the 2d CAG Headquarters Compound during the Month of June 1969. Some problem areas were encountered and steps were being taken to rectify them.

f. Noteworthy Items:

(1) On 13 June 1969 HN B. E. O'NEIL was WIA while on patrol with Combined Action Platoon 2-3-6.

(2) On 21 June 1969 HMC H. L. MITCHELL was Med-evaced for Toxic Vasculitis.

(3) During the Month of June there were 18 2d CAG personnel admitted to hospitals with intestinal disorders as compared to 22 in May.

g. Inspections:

(1) HMC Mitchell and HM1 Rinell conducted monthly inspections in the CAP units of 2d CAG during the Month of June. Most of the discrepancies noted were of a minor nature and were rectified immediately. The CAPs are continuing to use iodine tablets and the number of intestinal disorders continues to drop.
8. COMMUNICATIONS

a. Problem Areas

The same problem areas exist as were reported in previous reports. Lack of T/E items:

(1) Telephone Set, TA-312  *83
(2) Telephone Set, TA-1/PT  190
(3) Radio Control Group, CRA-39  26

*MCSA Phila message 231410Z June 69 stated 66 TA-312 being shipped.

Service for the RT-505 was arranged through the 5/7th Communication Battalion's Electronic Repair Section with an acceptable down time of 3-4 days.

b. Inspections. The CAPs continued to receive regular inspections of their communications equipment during the reporting period. It was found that only minor discrepancies existed and these were brought to the attention of the CACO Commander for immediate remedial action.

c. Security. CACO personnel were continually briefed on security procedures and the correct use of language. There were no security breaches during June.

(1) Call signs and Frequency designators were changed on 15 June with no difficulty.

d. Combat Operation Center. Overall traffic increased slightly. The following communications traffic was passed through the combat operations center over various nets:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incoming Messages</td>
<td>654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgoing Messages</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Spot Reports 275  
Casualty Reports 49  
Intell. Reports 12  
SIR TOTAL 2  

\[ \text{TOTAL} = \frac{2}{1263} \]

e. Communications Supply. Components of Radio Sets were in adequate stock throughout the entire month with the exception of tape antennas for the radio set AN/PRC-25. The following list reflects requisition status of communication items:

1. Requisitions Submitted 10
2. Requisitions Completed 1
3. Requisitions Outstanding 9
4. Total Requisitions Outstanding 29

f. Maintenance. Excellent Maintenance support on repair of RT-505 radio sets was provided by 5/7th Communications Battalion Electronics Repair Shop. Good maintenance support on repair of components of end items was provided by Electronic Maintenance Company 1st Force Service Regiment.

1. (5/7th Comm) Work Request Submitted 54
2. (1st FSR) Work Requests Submitted 37
3. (5/7th Comm) Requests Completed 51
4. (1st FSR) Requests Completed 19
5. Total Requests Outstanding 21
1 June

The PF leaders of CAP 2-1-2 reported that (2) PFs from the CAP had detonated a box mine while riding a bike across a bridge, 9KM S.W. of the DaNang Air Strip. Results: 1 PF KIA and 1 PF WIAK.

On two occasions on 1 June, Vietnamese civilians turned in ordnance to CAP 2-4-5 at BT169566, 5KM E. of Hoi An. In return, VIP rewards were paid. Results: (1) 40mm HE rd, (1) 60mm HE rd, and (1) 60mm Illum rd. All destroyed.

2 June

A PF informed CAP 2-1-4 of a jug buried at approximately AT953680, 8KM S.W. of DaNang Airstrip. A CAP patrol sent to check the area found nearly 1500 lbs of rice buried in the ground and detained (1) female VCS. The VCS and the rice were taken to District Headquarters. Results: (1) VCS and 1500 lbs of rice.

A CAP 2-4-3 ambush initiated small arms fire on 3 VC crossing a road in the vicinity of BT178583, 3 KM N.E. of Hoi An. The VC returned small arms fire and fled N.W. An illumination mission was fired by ROAMC and the CAP swept the area finding (1) VC KIA. The KIA was carrying a pack full of medical gear and is believed to have been a VC Corpsman. While the CAP was moving to a new ambush position, they found (5) sand bags full of rice (approximately 100 lbs) on the road near where the VC had first been spotted. The rice was taken to District Headquarters. Results: (1) VC KIA and 100 lbs of rice.

3 June

A 16 year old boy found (1) 40mm and (1) 60mm rd at BT130558, 1.5 KM S.W. of Hoi An, and brought the rds to CAP 2-4-2. The CAP destroyed the rds and made VIP payment. Results: (1) 40mm and (1) 60mm rd destroyed.

A CAP 2-9-2 ambush opened fire on 4 enemy (NVA) at AT866489, 4 KM N.E. of An Hoa. The enemy threw (2) grenades and fled in a westerly direction. The CAP called an illumination mission and swept the area finding (1) NVA KIA, (1) AK-47, (1) chicom grenade, (1) M-26 grenade and 782 gear. Results: (1) NVA KIA, (1) M-26 grenade, (1) chicom grenade, (1) MCG, and (1) IWC.

4 June

A CAP 2-1-4 patrol found vacant enemy bunkers at AT966697, 6 KM S.W. of DaNang Air Strip. The bunker contained (1) NVA uniform, (3) maps, (1) NVA pack and (1) Chinese book. 2/7 was notified and the bunker was destroyed. Results: (1) NVA uniform and (3) maps.

DECLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (1)
5 June
CAP 2-1-1 spotted approximately 10 to 20 NVA at AT917122, 9 KM N. of DaNang Air Strip. The CAP initiated small arms fire and the NVA returned small arms fire, two grenades, and mortar fire causing (2) PFs to be WIAE. The CAP requested an emergency medevac and the helicopter took off the first time it tried to land. The evacuation was effected and gunships were employed in the area, causing two secondary explosions and silencing the enemy force. The CAP moved to a new ambush site and at 060150H, requested an artillery mission on AT917121. The target was again an estimated (10) to (20) NVA believed to be dug in at that position. A sweep of the nights contact area at first light found (1) NVA KIA, (1) chicom grenade, 782 gear and the site of the enemy mortar position at AT917128. Results: (1) NVA KIA and (1) chicom grenade.

7 June
CAP 2-3-6 detained (1) Vietcong male without ID card, at BT06592, 1 KM E. of Bien Han District Headquarters. The man looked like one of the VC spotted by the CAP in its 061750H contact. The man was taken to District Headquarters for questioning. Results: (1) VCS.

A Vietnamese boy found (1) 60mm dud rd at BT130562, 1 KM S.W. of Hoi An. The boy brought the rd to CAP 2-4-5 and the CAP blew the dud and made VIP payment. Results: (1) 60mm dud destroyed.

8 June
While in the process of setting in an ambush position, a booby trapped 105mm rd exploded in the midst of CAP 2-4-3 at BT171589, 2 KM N.E. of Hoi An. (1) PF was KIA and (1) MC and (4) PFs were WIAE. The ambush position had been checked out prior to the CAP's movement into the site. The exact cause of the detonation was unknown although the wounded Marine states he may have tripped a wire. A medevac was called and a search made of the area with negative results: (1) PF KIA, (1) MC WIAE and (4) PFs WIAE.

9 June
CAP 2-9-1 compound at AT590488, 5 KM N.E. of An Hoa, received approximately 100 rds of small arms fire and (2) 60 mortar rds. The CAP returned small arms fire and requested a fire mission. A search of the area had negative results.

10 June
A Vietnamese boy delivered (1) chicom grenade to CAP 2-4-3 at BT166582, 2 KM N.E. of Hoi An. A VIP payment was made. Results: (1) chicom grenade destroyed.

11 June
CAP 2-3-4 reports that 5 VC bodies were discovered at BT032568 and 4 more bodies were found floating in a river at BT088570, 2 KM S.E. of Bien Han. The VC KIA's resulted from a CAP's mortar mission during the afternoon of 10 June. Results: (9) VC KIA.
12 June
Two VC opened fire on CAP 2-8-9-1 ambush at AT934732, 5 KM N.W. of An Hoa. The CAP returned fire and (1) VC was seen to flee North. The CAP swept the area under illumination and found (1) VC KIA, (2) chicom grenades and a pair of binoculars. (1) MC WIAE but later DOH. Results: (1) VC KIA, (1) MC KIA and (2) chicom grenades.

13 June
CAP 2-7-4 elements enroute to an ambush site initiated organic weapons fire on (6) VC spotted near a village at AT96690, 4 KM S. of the DaNang Airstrip. The VC returned fire and broke contact, fleeing west. The CAP swept the area detaining three females as VCS. Results: (3) VCS.

14 June
A CAP 2-7-6 ambush opened fire with small arms, grenades and (1) claymore on U.S. at BT072678, immediately S. of Marble Mountain. The enemy fled and the CAP searched the area with negative results.

15 June
A LAAW found at BT162578, 1.5 KM N.E. of Hoi An, was brought to CAP 2-4-5 by a Vietnamese boy. CAP destroyed the weapon and made a VIP payment. Results: (1) LAAW destroyed.

CAP 2-3-2 received small arms fire and B-40 rockets from an estimated VC squad at BT056602, 2 KM N.W. of Dien Ban. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and 60mm mortar fire, and spooky was employed in the area until requested by CAP 2-3-5. The VC fled in an unknown direction and at first light a search yielded negative results.

16 June
At BT162571, 1.5 KM E. of Hoi An. A Vietnamese boy found one 60mm dud. The boy brought the dud to CAP 2-4-5 and received a VIP payment. The CAP destroyed the dud. Results: (1) 60mm dud destroyed.

17 June
CAP 2-4-1 detained (1) female without an ID card at BT181589, 3 KM N.E. of Hoi An. The VCS was taken to District Headquarters for interrogation. Results: (1) VCS.

18 June
CAP 2-1-4 discovered 4 bunkers spaced about 30-35 meters apart along a river, 6 KM S.W. of DaNang Airstrip. Each bunker was approximately 10 meters square. Two of the bunkers were empty, one contained an NVA entrenching tool and the other contained two NVA uniforms. The bunkers were destroyed by the CAP. Results: (4) bunkers destroyed.
18 June  CAP 2-5-2 spotted a squad size enemy unit moving S.W. in a rice paddy 7 KM west of DaNang Airstrip. The CAP initiated organic weapons fire and received small arms fire and (1) B-40 rocket in return. The CAP called for illumination and swept the area after enemy broke contact, finding (1) VC KIA and (2) PFs received wounds during the contact. Results: (1) VC KIA and (2) PFs WIA.

19 June  CAP 2-4-5 received one dud M-26 grenade found from a Vietnamese boy at 1.5 KM E. of Hoi An. The CAP made a VIP payment and destroyed the dud. Results: (1) M-26 dud destroyed.

20 June  While enroute to an ambush position, CAP 2-4-3 spotted (5) VC moving E. to W. on a trail 2 KM N.E. of Hoi An. The CAP requested an artillery mission and received excellent coverage from ROKMC artillery. The CAP was unable to sweep the area at night, due to a plethora of booby traps. The CAP kept the area under observation throughout the night and swept at first light with negative results.

A CAP 1-3-10 element received small arms fire and (3) M-79 0.45 Calib. Shells S. of Binh Son. The CAP unit returned fire and approximately (10) enemy were seen moving north. The area was swept following the engagement and again at first light with negative results.

21 June  (Delayed Report) A CAP 2-8-3 element was returning from a combined sweep operation when one VC opened up on the rear of the column at AT905825, 9 KM N.W. of the DaNang Airstrip with an AK-47 wounding the PF platoon leader and killing one nearby Vietnamese female civilian. The element returned fire and swept the area with negative results. Results: (1) PF WIA and (1) civilian KIA.

23 June  A reinforced squad patrol from CAP 2-7-4 was ambushed by an USEF using grenades and small arms fire 3 KM S.W. of the DaNang Airstrip. The CAP patrol returned fire causing the VC to withdraw west. Elements of Company C, 1st Bn., 1st Marines established blocking positions vicinity of AT990696 while CAP 2-7-4 consolidated and swept from BT995702 to link up with the blocking element. The sweep had negative results.
24 June
CAP 2-3-2 spotted and initiated small arms fire on (5) VC moving west of the CAPs position, 1.5 KM N.W. of Dien Ban. The VC returned fire and fled west. A sweep of the area had negative results. One PF received a minor wound in the contact.

25 June
CAP 2-7-2's night time activity was ambushed by (3) VC at BT013708 2 KM south of the DaNang Airstrip. The VC fired small arms and threw one chicom grenade. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and the VC broke contact withdrawing in a southerly direction. One USMC received minor wounds during the contact. Results: (1) USMC WIAN.

28 June
A CAP 2-1-3 patrol spotted a platoon sized NVA force at AT9J1695, 8 KM S.W. of the DaNang Airstrip. CAP requested 81mm mortar mission but received negative clearance because of the number of houses in the area. As the NVA proceeded towards the CAPs position the CAP initiated a heavy volume of organic weapons fire. The NVA dispersed and returned 81-40 rocket and small arms fire. The CAP requested illumination and observed the area after the VC ceased firing. After detecting negative movement in the area, the CAP swept the area with negative results. A resweep of the area at first light found drag marks and blood trails.

29 June
A CAP 2-4-3 ambush observed (3) VC moving in a tree line 2 KM N.W. of Hoi An. The CAP called an artillery mission on the enemy position and swept the area with negative results.

29 June
CAP 2-4-3 while in an ambush site 2 KM N.W. of Hoi An, received three incoming exploding devices, believed to have been M-26 grenades, from a tree line 45 meters to the CAPs west. The CAP called an artillery mission on suspected VC positions, followed by a sweep of the area. Four PFs were WIAE and one PF was WIAN in the contact. The wounded were medevaced at first light. Results: (4) PFs WIAN and (1) PF WIAN.
## SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS SECTION

1. Group Bull 3410, Change I of 5 June 1969  
   (Revision of 2d CAG NCO School)  
   Page No. 4-1 - 4-7

2. CAG FRAG #62 of 5 June (Policy on  
   assignment of replacement personnel)  
   4-8

3. CAG FRAG #63 of 13 June (Updated info  
   and instructions concerning the CAP School)  
   4-9 - 4-11

4. CO 2d CAG's ltr of 7 June to all CACO  
   COs (Policy concerning Vietnamese  
   language proficient personnel)  
   4-12

5. CO, 2d CAG ltr of 16 June to CG  
   III MAF (Troop test of XM-31 wire gun)  
   4-15 - 4-16

6. CO, 2d CAG memorandum of 21 June 1969  
   (Complacent attitude in CAPs)  
   4-17 - 4-18

7. CO, 2d CAG ltr of 28 June to CO, Quang [a  
   Special Zone, RVN (Request for reaction  
   forces to support CAPs)  
   4-19

8. CO, 2d CAG Memorandum of 29 June (Indis- 
   criminate firing of weapons and use of  
   fireworks)  
   4-20

9. Ltr of Maj. A. H. Moore to CAP Director  
   (Narrative report on III MAF input to the  
   Vietnamese Armed Forces Exhibition)  
   4-21 - 4-24

10. Pictures of 2d CAG's participation in the  
    Vietnamese Armed Forces Day, 19-23 June 1969  
    (Copies 1 & 2 only)  
    4-25

11. List of VIP ordnance turned in during June  
    1969  
    4-26
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/MJD/gbs
3000
5 June 1969

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribute List

Subj: NCU School Course of Instruction, Group Bulletin 3410; Change I

Ref: Group Bulletin 3410

Enclosures: Notes to CO's and Students
   (2) Training Schedule by Training day

Para 1. Purpose: To promulgate change I to reference (a).

2. Background: After a thorough evaluation of the opinions and remarks of the
   first group of students to attend the 2d CAG NCU School together with the critiques
   of the various classes made by 2d CAG Staff members, a number of modifications to
   the curriculum have been made. These changes include an extension of the course
   length from four to five days, the addition of another hour in the areas of
   personal response, leadership principles, FC/PR relationships with CAP Marines
   and medicav procedures. In addition several other classes will be modified in
   terms of subject material and method of presentation.

3. Acting Company Commanders and Section Heads ensure that all assigned students
   are aware of the changes to reference (a). Copies of enclosures (1) and (2) will
   be provided to each student upon reporting for school.

4. Remove enclosures (1) and (2) from reference (a) and substitute enclosures
   (1) and (2) provided in this change.

   [Signature]
   E. V. LEWIS

UNCLASSIFIED
1. **Unit Commanders**

   a. Students report one day prior to class date by 1600H (classes will commence on Mondays on designated weeks). Students will report on Sundays by 1600H.

   b. Ensure that all students have necessary equipment and clothing to sustain them for one week.

   c. Take care of all administrative details prior to assignment. We do not want students running to III MAF or any other place on personal business during school hours.

   d. Ensure that all students report with a regulation haircut.

2. **Students**

   a. Report to the S-1 section for assignment of billeting space.

   b. Report promptly to the classroom, the Staff NCO/Officer’s Club, on Monday morning at 0715H for an opening address by the Commanding Officer of 2d CAU. On subsequent days you will report to the classroom by 0745H. You will be expected to return promptly after instruction breaks as ordered by the instructors.

   c. No student will be placed on the guard of the day during the school. This is to enable you to fully concentrate on the task at hand and to relax somewhat during your stay at 2d CAU Compound.

   d. There will be student critique sheets handed out at the end of the course. We earnestly solicit your opinions to better prepare instruction for subsequent classes.
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CONFIDENTIAL

COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
FPO San Francisco, 96602

CC#1 CRB:abb
2200
5 June 1969

CAD FROG #62

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, Combined Action Program
To: Distribution List

Subj: Policy on assignment of replacement personnel

Ref: (a) ForO 3121.48

1. An acute personnel situation recently forced us to assign replacement personnel to CAPs prior to their completion of CAP School. This was in violation of reference (a) and is not to be considered a precedent setting action. It is the policy of the Commanding General that all CAP personnel will attend CAP School and receive in-country indoctrination prior to assignment to a CAP. This policy will be adhered to in all cases, but it does not preclude having replacements visit a CAP for a period not in excess of 24 hours.

[Signature]

J.R. DURF CUGHS

DISTRIBUTION:
Each CAP
CAP School
Language School
File

UNCLASSIFIED
CAG FRAG #63

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, Combined Action Program
To: Distribution List

Subj: III MAF Combined Action Program School

1. PURPOSE. To promulgate updated information and instructions concerning the III MAF Combined Action Program (CAP) School.

2. CANCELLATION. CAG FRAG #25 of 29 Dec 68

3. CHANGE NOTATION. Significant changes contained in this revision are denoted by asterisks (*) in the left margin.

4. GENERAL. The III MAF Combined Action Program School conducts classes of two weeks duration designed to familiarize the students with the Combined Action Program, teach the requisite skills for independent operation with Popular Force platoons, and to conduct refresher training in basic military subjects.

5. ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

a. Input. Enlisted Marines and Navy Corpsmen assigned duties with the Combined Action Program will complete this course of instruction prior to being assigned permanent duties with a Combined Action Group (CAG). Classes are scheduled to begin every two weeks and each class can accommodate approximately 100 students.

b. Scheduling and Quotas. Classes will be scheduled and quotas assigned by separate correspondence.

c. Billeting and Messing. The Combined Action Program School will furnish billeting and messing for students assigned to the school.

d. Transportation. Transportation to the school will be arranged by the parent CAG. Return transportation will be arranged by the Officer in Charge of the school.

* e. Clothing and Equipment. Minimum clothing and equipment requirements are as follows:

(1) Minimum Clothing

- LEATHER BELT
- TROUSERS
- WEB
- KHAKI
- 4-9
Subject: III MAF Combined Action Program School

1 ea. Buckle, brass
1 pr. Boots, jungle
1 ea. Cap, utility
3 ea. Coat, utility
3 ea. Drawers, man's, cotton, white or green
3 pr. Socks, cushion sole
3 ea. Trousers, utility
3 ea. Undershirt, man's, cotton, white or green

(2) Minimum Equipment

1 ea. Blanket (or poncho liner)
1 ea. Poncho (or rain suit)
1 ea. Belt, cartridge
2 ea. Canteen
2 ea. Cover, canteen
1 ea. Kit, jungle, first aid
1 ea. Jacket, flak
1 ea. Mask, gas
1 ea. Helmet, w/liner and camouflage cover
7 ea. Magazine, .30 cal. with 18 rounds. Ball ammo. 6.6mm.
1 ea. Rifle, .30-06, M-16

As required: Stationery, notebook, paper, and toilet articles

(3) Optional Clothing and Equipment. Students are permitted to bring such other items of clothing and equipment as deemed necessary, however, they should be cautioned that facilities are not available for safeguarding valuables.

f. Pay. Students will not be paid while at the Combined Action Program School. Upon reporting to the school, each student should have sufficient funds in his possession to defray his expenses for a two week period.

g. Travel. Students assigned to the Combined Action Program School will be issued in-country travel orders directing them to report to the Officer in Charge, Combined Action Program School, III MAF, not later than 1600 on the day preceding the class convening date. Due to limited billeting facilities, students should not report to the school more than two days in advance of the scheduled class.

h. Graduation. Certificates of completion will be presented to each graduate of the school.
CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: III MAF Combined Action Program School

1. Service Record Book Entries. Commanding Officers will ensure that an appropriate entry is made on page 8a in the service record book of the individual concerned.

G. R. BURROUGHS

DISTRIBUTION:
Each CAG (3)
Force Surgeon (2)
CAP School (5)
Language School
File
From: Commanding Officer
To: All Combined Action Company Commanders

Subj: Assignment of Vietnamese Language Proficient Personnel

En:  
1. A list of 2d CAG personnel proficient in the Vietnamese Language provided in enclosure (1). The individual listings also contain the school attended as well as the individual's present assignment.

2. Current assignments indicate fair distribution of proficient personnel throughout 2d CAG CAP's. Some CAP's, however, list two or more personnel while others in the same CACO have none.

3. CACO's will review current assignments and ensure Vietnamese language proficient Marines are reassigned to provide at least one qualified man per CAP commensurate with the current operational and tactical situation.

4. CACO's are to continuously monitor these assignments and report changes, transfers etc. directly to the S-3 Officer monthly by the 3d of the month as of the last day of the previous month.

N. Y. Duke
By Direction
From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, Assistant Chief of Staff Combined Action Program  

Subj: Troop Test of XM-31 Wire Gun  

Ref: (a) CO, III MAF ltr 3d/AMW 3900 of 23 May 69 (NOTAL)  
(b) AC of S CAP ltr 14:CFM:abb 3000 of 31 May 1969  

Enccl: (i) CO, 2d CAG ltr 3d/MJD/gbs 3000 of 4 June 1969 (NOTAL)  

1. The results of the troop test directed by references (a) and (b) of XM-31 Wire guns is provided below. Questions provided in enclosure (2) of reference (b) have been answered. The nine Tests were conducted by separate Combined Action Platoons representing four Combined Action Companies of 2d CAG.

   a. Guidance for the conduct of the test was provided in the form of enclosure (i) which had reference (b)'s enclosures appended for standardization of test data.

2. Results of tests are provided in narrative form and answered in the same sequence as enclosure (2) of reference (b).

   a. All XM-31's received by units of 2d CAG were in excellent condition.

   b. There were no difficulties encountered in explaining the operations of this device to any of the troops who utilized it. Convincing the Vietnamese that this was in fact "canned barb wire" was difficult as they thought we were "pulling their leg". The Vietnamese PF's were told about the wire because we didn't want any of them inadvertently popping a top and hurting themselves. One unbelieving PF secretly "procured" one of the XM-31's and was found opening the bottom with a C Ration can opener. What could have happened if he had succeeded further can only be estimated but it brings to mind a definite requirement.

   (i) Have Vietnamese instruction to include safety precautions and do's and don'ts prepared to conducting further tests.

   e. The test troops had no trouble or problems understanding the functioning of the device. Instructions were clear and concise.
d. The guns were carried for two weeks under normal combat patrol and CAP activity conditions. The CAP Marines carried the XM-31's in rucksacks and standard packs when contact was improbable. Whenever the wire was taken on ambushes or patrols or whenever contact was probable they were carried in the hand. The weight prohibits carrying for long periods of time as it definitely strains the arms and fingers. Most CAPs suggested that some sort of carrying handle be welded to the bottom, or sides (similar to ammunition cans), for ease of carrying. Sweaty fingers while on patrol caused several Marines to drop the XM-31's thereby damaging the containers.

e. The device was found to be 70% reliable. Of 20 tested, 14 functioned reasonably well but they did not attain the predicted 40 meters. The fourteen good shots averaged 30 meters.

(1) Two XM-31's partially functioned as only 1/4 of the wire came out. The wire in both cases had jammed at the mouth of the cannister when barbs had ripped into the can and blocked the rest of the wire. One of these cans was almost ruptured by the force of the backed up wire and the individual firing it almost dropped the can in fright.

(2) Four XM-31's functioned only after tapping and in some cases, pounding on sides, bottom, etc., trying to get the wire started. None of the four cans were considered to be excessively dented or damaged. The prybars just didn't release the wire in all 4 cans.

f. The device has proven not to be durable in its present configuration.

(1) The container is made out of soft metal and cannot take normal field wear and tear. Dropping the XM-31 one time is enough to cause the wire to malfunction or to be only partially effective.

(2) The pull rings on top came off in two cases requiring use of pliers to open the tops.

(3) Most test Marines recommended that the container be made of harder more durable materials, or that the can be ribbed for additional outside protections.

g. The features of the wire gun appear to be compatible with the skills and aptitudes of CAP troops. All troops thought it was easy to understand and to operate.

h. The actual conditions under which the wire gun was to be employed were prescribed in enclosure (1). Test units carried the wire for approximately two weeks waiting to test it during actual enemy contact. Unfortunately none of the contacts occurred with any of the units carrying the wire. After a set date the wire was used in defensive perimeters around night sites and daylight sites as well as around fixed CAP compounds to enable us to submit this report.
The wire gun can be effective when used in relatively open areas or areas consisting of light, low vegetation such as small scrub or waist high foliage or grass. Use of this device in pairs would be advisable where a Marine on each flank of a position could cross-fire their shots and make them much more effective. Its effectiveness in the defense because of its demoralizing effect on attacking forces foreseenly entangled as they attempt to overrun CAP sites, can be measured as outstanding in value. The enemy forces usually know every square yard of terrain around their sites before they attack. Laying wire with the X-61's at the first warning of an attack would certainly raise havoc with their plans.

J. The X-61 definitely has tactical value to the Marine Corps in South-East Asia. It is relatively light for the protection afforded, has no explosives to cause additional accidental discharge headaches and has definite possibilities in defensive as well as offensive employment. Some of these are:

1. Employment by selected personnel in an ambush to cordon off the killing zone after an ambush has been sprung. Cannisters could be pre-rigged in trees and be tripped from a distance by a remote pull wire rig.

2. Protection (hasty defense) during meeting engagements.

3. Protecting for CAP's or CAP day and night sites (not popped until attack begins).

4. Clearing paths through mine fields or in booby trapped areas by firing the device and tagging on the wire or dragging it across the ground.

5. Hasty replacement of breached wire during enemy attacks on fixed positions to prevent infiltration.

6. Covering routes of withdrawal during darkness when an enemy force is in hot pursuit of a small activity.

K. The X-61, providing its existing deficiencies in the container are corrected, has a place in the Marine Corps Arsenal. Strict controls in its use around friendly villages and hamlets would have to be promulgated as the local citizenry could very easily tire of getting wrapped up or entangled in haphazardly deployed wire.

1. CAP's, in their relatively vulnerable sites could put this item to outstanding use when ever their sites are attacked. A CAP should be issued two cans per team. An allowance of 1.0 cans per CAP per month is considered adequate to support the mobile CAP concept.
(2) The allowance for infantry units should be three per infantry squad with normal replacement factor based on usage data during further troop tests on that level.

R. O. BROAD JR.
Acting
MARCIAUD
From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Complacent attitude in GIs

1. This newspaper item was copied from the editorial pages of the
stars and Stripes. This complacency is exactly what we have been
preaching these past few months. Our GI units rely on their alert-
ness for survival. This is a matter of continuous concern for all
commanders.

S.R. A. MARSHALL

BREACHLESSNESS OF THE AMERICAN FIGHTER

Some weeks ago a Washington correspondent quoted me as saying:
40 per cent of U.S. casualties in Vietnam stem not from enemy's
cleverness but from America's own mistakes.

Numerous editorial writers then voiced the hope that the Pentagon
would take note. One father whose son had died in Vietnam wrote the
White House. An infantry captain, returned from Vietnam, penned an
indignant letter.

To put the subject in perspective, I say now that the correspondent
did not misquote me. I said "35 to 40 per cent," but that is irrelevant.
The point is mainly this: I did not blame this on the training system.

To the contrary, I said the training system was better than ever
in our history. There are enough criteria in Vietnam to support this,
we have far more competent leaders in battle than ever before. The
number of new replacements who acquire themselves like seasoned veterans
proves that training is far better now than in either of the world
wars or Korea. Our soldiers are not unprepared.

But when data indicates that some 90 per cent of casualties occur in
the first five to 10 minutes of action, one is hard put to ask why. The figures are about the same
whether the troops are surprised during a march or have come into
action in a defensive perimeter. The duration of the battle has
nothing to do with it.
CONFIDENTIAL

This is nothing new. The American fighter has always been greatly impulsive and extremely careless. He acts as if life has no importance. Give him a few hours of respite from fire and he will behave as if it would never come again. Put him adrift for a week during which he feels no danger and he will relax all vigilance precipitously. That almost euphoric attitude toward the unknown was mainly marked in our average warrior in Central Pacific operations during World War II. General Bill Dean in his memoir that followed the Korean War wrote of how this all-around nonchalance continued to baffle him.

It was not terribly costly in the earlier wars of this century. A relatively few men died foolishly, were decently buried, and became heroic figures to kinsfolk if not the neighborhood and the next county. We happen to be caught up in a war the nature of which makes the penalty excessive in terms of lives lost unnecessarily and the exploitation of that loss by every man in military life who would use it to his personal advantage and by every other public opinion-forming group or individual that has determined to get rid of the war at whatever cost. Their numbers increase daily as the men in the White House should have been able to foresee in 1961, '65 and '69.

But what's to be done about it? Nothing very much that has practical value. The in-country conditioning period for junior officers could be eliminated wholly, with scouting being committed to units of six or eight men. Proven WCOs could be made company officers, inspired reserve lieutenants could be promoted and professional captains could be directed to spend as much time in the combat line as the men they command. With all of these things, the overall consequence to the effectiveness of operations and the conserving of life would still be marginal.

LOS ANGELES TIMES/WASHINGTON POST

2. Continuous supervision and thorough indoctrination of all personnel in all facets of CAP work remains our best method of combating complacency. We are not immune! Records disclose that 2d CAP units also suffer most casualties during initial moments of enemy attacks. Continue emphasizing alertness and sound security in CAP day or night sites and activities.

M. J. Dunleavy
By Direction

Distribution
All CAPs (5 copies)
All CACs (4 copies per CAP) 4-18

DECLASSIFIED
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, Quang Da Special Zone, Danang, RVN

Subj: Request for Reaction Forces to support CAPs.

1. It is requested that the 59th Regional Force Battalion be task-
ed with providing a reaction force to respond to the needs of CAPs
2-7-1, 2-7-2, 2-7-3, and 2-7-4 in Southern Hoa Vang District.

2. The 59th R.F. Battalion is the nearest unit in the proximity
which can provide quick reaction to engaged CAP units in this
area, should they be confronted with enemy units large enough to
require assistance.

3. Previous liaison has been established between my 7th Combined
Action Company Commander and the C.O. 59th R.F. Battalion and the
C.O. of the 59th R.F. Battalion, indicates that, he can provide
the support in the event we need it. An order from your head-
quarters is requested to make this support official.

4. It is requested that direct liaison for detailed planning
be authorized for the 59th R.F. Battalion Commander and my
7th Combined Action Company Commander, Captain G. E. Brown.

Z. L. LEWIS

Copy to:
Senior Advisor, Quang Da Special Zone (1)
C.O. 59th R.F. Battalion (1)
MEMORANDUM

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Indiscriminate firing of weapons and use of fireworks

Ref: COMUSMACV Msg 2408542 June 69

1. There have been numerous incidents in the past during which rifles, machine guns and other assorted weapons have been indiscriminately fired in celebration of some special event. Reference (a) addresses this matter and enjoins commanders to take preventive measures to positively restrain such actions, pointing out that this practice is wasteful, is possibly helpful to the enemy, endangers friendly troops and civilians and is clear evidence of lack of discipline.

2. With the approach of the 4th of July commanding officers and supervisory personnel at all levels are to again instruct all personnel that firing of any weapons in celebration is strictly prohibited and that possession or use of fireworks by U.S. personnel is in direct violation of orders. We must also never place ourselves in a position of encouraging any such violations by Vietnamese personnel.

3. All commanders and supervisory personnel ensure thorough dissemination of the contents of this memorandum to all personnel of 2d Combined Action Group and attached units.

E. L. Lewis

Distribution:
CAOs: (2)
CAPs: (1)
Section Heads: (1)
From: Major A. H. Moore 083540/0302/0240 USMC
To: Director, Combined Action Program III MAF

Subj: Vietnamese Armed Forces Exhibition

Enclosure: (1) Narrative report on the III MAF input to the Vietnamese Armed Forces Exhibition.

1. On about 2 June, 1969 I was assigned as the III MAF project officer for the American input for the Vietnamese Armed Forces Exhibition scheduled to open 19 June 1969. An after action report in narrative and chronological form is contained in enclosure (1) and is submitted for possible use by future project officers for this annual event.

A. H. Moore

Copy to: CO, 2d CAG (less Appendices A and B)
After being assigned as the III MAF project officer for the Vietnamese Armed Forces Exhibition and instructed that the III MAF input would consist of a booth depicting the Combined Action Program in I CORPS, my first task was to locate the Vietnamese Officer in charge of the exhibition. This proved to be no small task since he had not been assigned and it had not been determined if the project would be handled by I CORPS HEADQUARTERS of QUANG DA SPECIAL SECTOR.

On 4 June, 1969 I contacted Major KHOA of the G-5 section of I CORPS who informed me that he was my contact for the project. He gave me the planned schedule of events for the exhibition which follows:

- 5 June, 1969 Vietnamese Engineers start work on buildings for booths.
- 12 June, 1969 Complete work on buildings.
- 17 June, 1969 Each unit complete their display booths.
- 18 June, 1969 Commanding General, I CORPS, to visit display booths.
- 19 June, 1969 Exhibits open to public.
- 22 June, 1969 Exhibition closes.
- 23 June, 1969 Each unit to remove their displays.

He also gave me other information which was necessary to commence planning for the CAP booth such as the size of area to be allocated to the CAP and the general theme of the overall exhibition.

Armed with the above information, I contacted the officers in III MAF who were familiar with how the project had been handled in 1968. I learned from the G-5 section of III MAF that there had been a large FWF participation in 1968 and that the VC/NVA used this fact in their propaganda argument that the GVN was a puppet of the US. With that in mind, I decided to make the CAP booth simple while still selling the program.

On 7 June, 1969 I attended a meeting at I CORPS. A representative was present from each agency participating in the exhibition and it was chaired by the I CORPS Chief of Staff. At this meeting each agency having a booth presented a brief of their plans for the space allocated to them. My plans were then approved generally by the I CORPS Chief of Staff and that evening and the next morning I had detail plans drawn up to present to the CAP Director for approval. Upon approval, I attended a meeting with Col. VINH, the Deputy Commander of I CORPS, where my plans were explained to him. He informed me of his ideas which were somewhat different from what I had planned and had started working on.
After receiving the new instructions, I had new plans drawn up and then approved by the CAP Director. Liaison was then made with III MAF Maintenance, G-3 Graphics and G-5 and my general plan was explained to them and full support was promised by each. The III MAF Combat Information Bureau and personnel from 2d CAG were meanwhile taking pictures throughout QUANG NAM to be used in the booth. The CAP Director also directed that the other 3 CAG's send pictures from their respective Provinces to be used.

On 12 June, 1969 the basic structures were complete. Upon inspection I found that the area for the CAP was too large, (Approximately 38 ft. by 17 ft.). Through liaison with I CORPS this area was reduced to a more manageable 25 ft. by 17 ft.

On 13 June, 1969 III MAF Maintenance began to panel the inside of the display area with 1/4 inch plywood. During this same time other personnel of Maintenance were beginning to prefab the arch to go in front of the booth, (See Appendix A). During the meeting with Col. VINH on 8 June, he had stated that he wanted me to have a sand table model of a typical hamlet defended by a CAP. Between that time and this I had been able to get 1st Engineers to build a table for the model but had been unable to locate anyone to build the model. With promises of material support by myself, the Vietnamese of I CORPS stated that they could build the model. Arrangements were made to have the booth manned by 2 Marines, 2 Corpsman, 2 PF soldiers and 2 PF Corpsman on alternating shifts.

On 14 June, 1969 the Vietnamese began working on the CAP model which turned out to be a compound with members of the CAP on patrol around it. Statistics for the Combined Action Program were received from the Director's office and a booklet explaining the program written in Vietnamese was given to Force Reproduction to have 4,000 copies made. G-3 Graphics was given the statistics and requested to prepare charts in Vietnamese and to make maps of I CORPS for the display. All pictures had been received by this date and were turned over to Col. VINH to have captions made (Col. VINH's desire).

The time between 15 and 17 June, 1969 was spent coordinating the work which was being done by the various agencies which were supporting my efforts. Paneling and painting of the inside of the booth was completed and the arch was completed and put up. The pictures were received from I CORPS with a Vietnamese caption written on the back of each. The night of 16-17 was spent interpreting the captions into English and having them typed in Vietnamese and English on 3"x5" cards. The display booth was not completed on 17 June, 1969 as originally scheduled, because of the captions for the pictures not being finished.
On 1 June, 1969 the finishing touches were made to the booth by the personnel who were going to man it during the days of the exhibition. At this time I had 3 Marines, 1 Corpsman, 2 PF soldiers (not from CAP) and 2 PF Corpsman (one of which was from a CAP).

At about 0900 on 19 June, 1969 the exhibition was opened by the official party consisting of the CC III MAJ, CC I CORPS and other senior officers in I CORPS. After their departure, the exhibition area was opened to the public. For two hours in the morning and two hours in the afternoon, Med-CAPs were held in the booth. About 300 people were treated by the USN Corpsman and the PF Corpsman working together. In all, about 15,000 people visited the booth during the first day. The PFs manning the booth had been assigned from Khe Vang District and as stated earlier, were not from the CAP's. The District Chief was informed that these men should be changed with CAP PF's. This was done 21 June, 1969.

The exhibition was scheduled to last from 19 June to 22 June. Each day was like the one before with an average of 300 people treated by the Med-Caps and the crowd averaged off at about 10,000 per day. During this time I found it necessary to have two men assigned at all times handling out newspapers and leaflets along with the CAP handouts. In this regard, 4,000 CAP handouts was not enough and they were given out indiscriminately to the older people who showed genuine interest. On the evening of 21 June, 1969 I received a notice that the exhibition would be extended one day to 23 June, 1969.

During the period from 18 to 23 June, 1969 the personnel manning the booth remained in the DaKang stadium. Chow, water, ice, soda etc, were provided for them and these items were stored behind the booth necessitating a guard there at all times. For communications, they were provided a PRC-25 and operated on my Company net.

No unusual problems were encountered in preparing the display booth, however, once the work had been allocated out, there was a constant requirement to check with each of the agencies doing the work to ensure that in the end, the separate projects would come together on schedule and as planned. I was fortunate in that I received outstanding support from all of the agencies previously mentioned.

On 23 June, 1969 the display was dismantled and the items borrowed by the Vietnamese were returned. By the last day, about 2/3 of the toy figures on the CAP model had been removed by kids during the previous days. This happened even though there was someone assigned at
all times to walk around in the booth keeping visitors from tampering with the model or the weapons on display.

The approved plans for the CAP booth are at Appendix A. Pictures on the booth are at Appendix B.
VIP ORDNANCE TURNED IN FOR JUNE 1969

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