CONFIDENTIAL (Unclassified upon removal from the basic letter)

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, 2dCAG ltr 3/LEN/gbs over 3000 of 14Oct69

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1-31 July 1969

1. The subject chronology has been reviewed for completeness and is forwarded herewith.

R.D. WHITE
By direction

Copy to:
CO, 2dCAG
FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 2dCAG ltr 3/LESN/gbs over 3000 of 14Oct69

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 July to 31 July 1969

1. Forwarded.

Copy to:
CO, 2dCAG
CONFIDENTIAL (Unclassified when enclosure (1) is removed)

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A05D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
      (2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 July to 31 July 1969

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.1A
     (b) FMFnc 5750.6A

Encl: (1) 2d Combined Action Group Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Enclosure (1) is downgraded at 3 year intervals. Declassified after 12 years. DOD Directive 8200.10

E. L. Lewis

C917659

DECLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FFO San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1 July 1969 to 31 July 1969

INDEX

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DECORATED AT 5-YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12-YEARS

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. Designation

<table>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2d Combined Action Group</td>
<td>LtCol E. L. LEWIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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SUBORDINATE UNITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. J. E. SEITZ</td>
<td>1 Jul 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Jul 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Combined Action Company</td>
<td>1stLt. P. E. EBAUGH Jr.</td>
<td>1 Jul 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Jul 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. W. E. CAMPBELL</td>
<td>1 Jul 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Jul 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. D. A. VOGELG&amp;SANG</td>
<td>1 Jul 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Jul 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Major A. H. MOORE</td>
<td>1 Jul 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Jul 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. G. E. BROWN</td>
<td>1 Jul 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Jul 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. A. F. TOKARZ</td>
<td>1 Jul 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Jul 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. D. D. HEAN</td>
<td>1 Jul 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Jul 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ATTACHED UNITS

Detachment, Scout Dog Platoon, 3rd M. P. Battalion
Detachment, Kit Carson Scouts, 1st MarDiv G-2 (C-1)
Detachment, ARVN Interpreters/Translators, III MAF
Detachment, Medical Section, HQ, III MAF
2. Locations.

1 July 1969 to 31 July 1969

HQ 2d CAG

District III, DaNang Special Sector, RVN - 1 Jul 69

23 Jul 69

Hieu Nhon District, Quang Nam Province, RVN - 24 Jul 69

31 Jul 69

Hieu Duc District, Quang Nam Province, RVN

Dien Ban District, Quang Nam Province, RVN

Hieu Nhon District, Quang Nam Province, RVN

Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province, RVN

Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province, RVN

Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province, RVN

Duc Duc District, Quang Nam Province, RVN

3. Staff Officers.

Executive Officer/Civic Action Officer

Major R. O. BROAB JR. 1 Jul 69 - 26 Jul 69

Major J. A. MCCARTY 27 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69

S-1 Officer

1stLt. H. MAGUI 1 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69

S-2/S-3 Officer

Major M. J. DUBE 1 Jul 69 - 16 Jul 69

Major L. E. NUGENT 17 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69

Asst S-2/S-3 Officer

1stLt. P. E. CASWELL 1 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69

S-4 Officer/Supply Officer

Capt. C. A. BURR 1 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69

4. Average Strength. The average strength of the 2d Combined Action Group during the month of July 1969 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>On Rolls</th>
<th>Chargeable/Effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the month, there was a slight increase in the number of junior noncommissioned officers in the Group. The Group continues to grow in strength slightly.
a. Unit average effective strength is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th># of CAPs</th>
<th>USMC OFF</th>
<th>USMC ENL</th>
<th>USN OFF</th>
<th>USN ENL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAG HQ</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. Personnel Administration.
   a. Joined and Transferred. During the month of July, the 2d Combined
      Action Group joined and transferred the following number of personnel
      listed in the four categories below:

      (1) Joined
          Officers 2
          Enlisted 62

      (2) Rotated CONUS
          Officers 2
          Enlisted 58

      (3) Transferred within WestPac Command
          Officers 2
          Enlisted 8

      (4) Transferred by SR w/sick (out of country hospitals)
          Officers 0
          Enlisted 15

   b. Awards.
      (1) Award recommendations during the reporting month were pro-
          cessed and forwarded to PMPac for approval as follows:

          Heroic
          End of Tour

          USMC SS BS NCO USN BS NCO NAM
          0 3 0 0 53 2 5 28

      (2) Two Bronze Stars awards were approved from PMPac and de-
          livered to personnel during the reporting month.

      (3) Twelve personnel of the Group also received Purple Heart
          medals as a result of combat wounds received during the month.
c. Casualties. Casualties during the month of July were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>DOW</th>
<th>DAT</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>WIA/NBC</th>
<th>NBC</th>
<th>WIA/NBC RET TO DU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Congrants/Splints/Welrep. This group did not process any congressional or special interest correspondence during the month of July. However, the Administrative section did process a total of eight welfare reports during the reporting period.

e. Administrative Assistance. During the reporting period the Headquarters was relocated from Danang to Hoi An. Although required to close down the operation of the office for one day to accomplish the move, the Administrative Section did not suffer a great set-back.

f. Legal. Legal activities during the reporting month were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article 32 Investigations</th>
<th>Informal Investigations</th>
<th>NJP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Since this command is restricted from convening a Special Court-Martial from our own resources due to the number of officers assigned, geographic restrictions, and operational commitments, a request was made to CG, Force Logistic Command and CG, III Marine Amphibious Force for augmentation of officers on a standing basis to handle any cases which may be referred to trial by Special Court-Martial. This request has been approved and personnel have been provided by III MAF to constitute courts.

g. Morale and Welfare. The morale of the unit continues to be high and recreational activity is available to all hands. The beach adjacent to the Group Compound has been opened for swimming during the month and is a tremendous boost to morale during the hot, humid days.

h. The following Rest and Recuperation (R&R) leave quotas, out of country and in country were received and utilized:

(1) Out of Country R&R - Quotas Utilized
    40          32
(2) In Country R&R - Quotas Utilized
    20          15
i. Mail. Daily average bags of mail were processed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letters</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incoming</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 bag</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 bag</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Packages</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incoming</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 bag</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 bag</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: One bag of letters represents approximately 2,000 letters.

j. Promotions. Promotions effected during the month of July were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Meritorious</th>
<th>Regular</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cpl</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/Cpl</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

k. Hospital Visits. Weekly hospital visits were made by designated officers of the command in addition to those made daily by the Hospital Corps representative and the Commanding Officer. No significant problems were encountered.

l. Informational Services. One hundred twenty four Fleet Hometown news releases were forwarded to the III MAF Combat Information Bureau during the reporting month. These included information on promotions, joinings and decorations.

m. Career Planning.

(1) During the month of July, 38 Career Planning interviews were conducted, with the following rank breakdown:

(a) Sergeants ..................... 3
(b) Corporals ..................... 9
(c) Lance Corporals ............... 14
(d) PFC's ........................... 12
2. **CIVIC ACTION/PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS**

   a. During the month of July, CAPs continued to further develop self-help projects. Personal relations during the month have brought the people from the villages and hamlets a much closer rapport with the CAP Marines. The village and hamlet people and CAP Marines have gained a greater understanding between them, which has helped Civic Action considerably.

   (1) Cleanliness has continued to be given increased attention, both personal cleanliness and village and hamlet care and sanitation. The hamlets and villages have been holding regular police calls, and keeping their area clean. The CAPs have been experimenting with making soap so that they can help supervise the people in making their own soap. The CAPs have continued with great interest on holding swim calls for the children to help keep them clean so that they can stay in a state of good health.

   (2) The "little brother program" has been a great asset to the CAP Marines, the little brothers have organised baseball games where they play against another CAPs little brothers. The village and hamlet people really enjoy watching the games. Before some of the games the CAPs arrange to have hot dogs for the people at the games. These projects have been a great success in winning the peoples help and understanding.

   (3) During the month of July several CAPs have had the III MAF Drum and Bugle Corps out to their hamlets to play for the people. The people of the different hamlets display their interest in the band by requesting they come again. The hamlets and villages have really enjoyed having the Band perform in their hamlets.

   The band played at CAP 2-1-1 at Phaue Hung and Hou-Pchu. There the Hamlet Chief and Village Chief were able to meet with the band leaders and some members, which has helped in bettering relations with the CAP Marines.

   (4) In all the CAP Hamlets and Villages they now have their Bulletin boards up and in use. The CAPs keep the people informed of the latest events. In addition different types of PsyOps information in which the people would be interested is posted.

   (5) During July several CAPs have had several meetings with their hamlet and village officials. CAP 2-8-2 set up a meeting with all the Hamlet, Village and District leaders to set up an orientation program on Self-help/Community Development for the Village and Hamlet Chiefs of Northern Hoa Vang District. A few of the subjects taught at this orientation were; Government/people relationship, Village Development Program, steps in decision making and community survey and evaluation. During the Orientation the Hamlet and Village Chiefs wrote down their problems and then
classes were given to help solve some of these problems. At the end of the Orientation the CAPs held a graduation exercise in which the District Chief handed out Certificates of Achievement to the Village and Hamlet Chiefs. They also held a party in behalf of the Chiefs, which aided in establishing a good relationship between CAP Marines and these officials.

b. Commodities distributed during the month of July were as follows: food, 3200 pounds; 2,000 bars of soap; clothing, 120 pounds; personal hygiene kits, 600; school kits, 300; masonry kits, 2; blacksmith kits, 1.

c. During July, CAP personal of the Group assisted Vietnamese in completing the following projects: fences, 5; dwellings; wells, 3; school roofs repaired, 4; foot bridges, 2; heads, 2; culverts, 1.

d. Medical assistance in support of Civic Action saw MedCaps resulting in the treatment of 10,585 Vietnamese civilians. Seventy-one dental cases were treated. One hundred and twenty children and ninety-six adults were medically evacuated during the month of July.

(1) CAP medical corpsman administered 1400 immunizations during July.

(2) CAP corpsman continue to train Vietnamese civilians in the basics of first aid. During July twenty such Civilians were undergoing training and sixty-five Vietnamese Civilians were assisting in the MedCaps.

e. Psychological operations activities employed by the CAPs in July included air dropped leaflets, hand dissemination of leaflets and hand bills along with Vietnamese newspapers.

(1) During July approximately 100,000 rewards leaflets were air dropped.

(2) Approximately 150,000 Anti-VC Cadre infrastructure leaflets were air dropped.

(3) Approximately 100,000 Chieu Hoi leaflets were air dropped.

(4) Approximately 75,000 "CAPs are here to help you" leaflets were air dropped.

(5) The CAPs distributed 50,000 Safe conduct passes, leaflets, and posters.
(6) Approximately 70,000 rewards cards were distributed.

(7) Approximately 70,000 Anti-VC posters were handed out by the CAPs.

(8) Approximately 150,000 newspapers were distributed to the Vietnamese people in the Quang Nam Province.
3. **INTELLIGENCE**

a. General. The proposed T/O changes in the Operations Section (S-3), for a Lieutenant Assistant S-3/S-2 and a S/NCO as an Intelligence Chief for the Section are still pending at this time. However, it should be noted that the Lieutenant billet has been filled since last March. It should also be noted that the billet for a S/NCO Intelligence Chief, which has not been filled, would be a contiguous factor in enhancing the successful operational function of this section.

b. **Intelligence Information Chain.** A strong intelligence chain is most effective when close coordination of the individual CAPs with the various village and hamlet populations is effectively employed in their respective TACO’s (Tactical Area of Coordination). This method of close contact between the CAP and the people has continually proved to be the very nerve center of the Intelligence chain. In consideration of the widely deployed elements of 2d CAC this method of close contact with the people enables these elements to continually provide timely and accurate intelligence regarding enemy activity, positions, movements etc. regarding its own TACO, or other areas as well. Once intelligence is originated on the hamlet level, it is then passed on up the Intelligence Chain and frequently has proven not only accurate, but life saving in numerous cases.

As noted previously, this valuable intelligence is usually originated in our CAP protected hamlets, through the continued enthusiasm of the civilian population in responding to the increased measure of security provided by the individual CAPs. This is clearly evident in the type of information being reported to the CAPs by the local population. As the local villagers gain more confidence in the security of their hamlets, as the effectiveness of the Marines and PFs in eliminating enemy activity in these areas and as the PFs confidence builds, the intelligence received increases. It is an evident factor, that with increased security intelligence previously received is communicated more readily and more voluntarily on the part of the village population. As a result, effective and efficient pacification of these areas is being achieved.

All information which is provided through these numerous sources is expedited and processed through the proper SVN and FMAF channels. In addition, the intelligence feedback from interrogation of suspected VC has in many cases corroborated and supplemented friendly sources of intelligence. In order to strengthen the effectiveness of the Intelligence Chain, intelligence summaries from all sources are distributed throughout all of 2d CAG units. In conjunction with this the Combined Action Company Commanders (CABC’s) also have access to the U.S. Marine (TAOR) Commanders for prompt receipt of valuable intelligence concerning their individual areas, as well as processing of intelligence gathered by their CAP units.
The CGOC's access to all Vietnamese agencies data is provided through District Intelligence/Operations Command Centers (DIOCC's) completing the complex intelligence chain. This DIOCC is the first level of accumulation, interpretation and dissemination of all information. Once information is gathered from this source, it is quickly expedited up the individual CAF Intelligence Chain and in turn becomes part of a periodic intelligence report for all of I Corps.

c. Counter Intelligence. The 2d CAG Headquarters has continually received timely and accurate intelligence through the 5th and 9th Counter Intelligence Teams (CIT) Intelligence is accumulated, interpreted and finally disseminated by the CIT's to the CGOC's in the form of Black List of VC collaborators, routes of enemy supply and infiltration to target areas, enemy activity, enemy collection and dispersing agents and points of agent meeting. The close working relationship with these Counter Intelligence Teams has contributed in reducing enemy activity in hamlets protected by the CAF Platoons. In conclusion it should be noted that effective hamlet security is at a high level, due in part to the Intelligence received through the CIT's.

d. General Enemy Situation. The general enemy situation at the beginning of July experienced a considerable drop in VC terrorism. It was at the lowest level in months. During this period there was a marked increase in political and propaganda concentration. This overall pattern of counter intelligence activity can be interpreted as the normal pattern which precedes intensified enemy offensive efforts. Large enemy troop movement was observed during the first week of July. During the second week of July a sustained hull in enemy initiated activity was prevalent. Political and propaganda concentrations became most evident during this period, reaching a new high. This concurred with earlier reports regarding enemy concentration on political and propaganda activity. During this period it was also noted the VC terrorism, although selectively applied against GVN administrators and sympathizers, remained at a low level. There was a marked drop in enemy sightings during this period. The third week in July concurred with the predictions of earlier reports concerning enemy activity. During this period there was a moderate increase in enemy activity in conjunction with the intensive propaganda campaign which seemed to be in full swing. There was a marked increase in kidnappings and assassinations. The major part of the enemy strategy appeared to have continued focus on political and propaganda concentrations with some terrorist activity during the month of July.

(1) Enemy Plans and Policies. The enemy's modus operandi during the month of July was one of very moderate attacks on fixed installations, and more emphasis placed on political and propaganda concentration. They took active measures to reinforce their claims about the inability of the GVN to protect its people selectively applying terrorism against GVN administrators and sympathizers. The employed tactics of brief and repeated mortar attacks from rapidly dispersed small groups were moderately successful in substantiating previously stated propaganda claims. In
general, the enemy's plans and policies reflected those of political
fence mending, selective terrorist raids, and emphasis placed on pro-
paganda activity, which became quite evident at the close of this
period. Direct enemy activity was at a new low.

(2) **Interrogator/Translator.** During the month of July all de-
tainees or prisoners were either processed through the various District
Headquarters or were forwarded, to USMC Interrogator/Translator Teams
for processing. The feedback of intelligence concerning these detainees,
produced as a result of these interrogations, was provided to 2d CAG for
dissemination to the respective CACO's.

f. **Interpreters.** During this reporting period eight interpreters
were deployed throughout 2d CAG. Seven were assigned to various companies
and one to 2d CAG Headquarters. Included in these assignments were two
(2) interpreters with the additional duty of working with the mobile
training team (MTT). In conclusion all the interpreters assigned to 2d
CAG were employed advantageously and effectively.

g. **Enemy Statistics.** Enemy statistics for the month of July 1969
were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>POW</th>
<th>DETAINES</th>
<th>HOI CHAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) **Weapons and Ordnance Captured**

**Weapons**

- AK-47: 6
- Pistol, 9mm: 1
- Pistol, 7.62: 2
- M-1 Carbine: 1
- RPG Launcher: 1
- M-14 Rifle: 1

**Ordnance**

- Chicom Grenades: 15
- M-26 Grenades: 10
- RPG-2 Round: 1
4. OPERATIONS

a. General. During the month of July, 2d Cav CAP units contended effectively with the ever increasing political and propaganda activity which the enemy employed during the reporting period.

This was initially observed in the first week of July, when a definite decrease in direct enemy initiated activities and hostilities was encountered. The enemy concentration of effort was definitely in the direction of possible political fence mending, and selected methods of propaganda. This pattern is quite a normal sequence prior to a planned enemy offensive. Although enemy terrorist activity was very moderate, aggressive patrolling and alert use of supporting artillery, mortars and air support allowed the CAPs to effectively curtail enemy activity and successfully suppress enemy efforts to jeopardize hamlet security. CAP areas of operation in Hieu Duc and Hoa Vang Districts lie across enemy access routes to the Da Nang area and serve as an ever increasing impediment to the enemy's ability to move freely through the area. It was also reported, during this reporting period, that the close relationship experienced between CAP Marines and PFs in conjunction with the villagers, has once again proved to be an invaluable factor in successful operations against the enemy. Through the intelligence received by the local villagers many supplies, and food caches were discovered and impounded before they could be deployed to enemy units hiding in the hills and mountain regions. Increasing pressure was brought to bear on the enemy during this period, which caused him to continually move food caches, supply distribution points, and meeting places. This effectively employed continual harassment and resulting disorganization of enemy activity in turn enabled the CAPs to provide effective hamlet security in their respective TaOC's (Tactical Area of Coordination).

Toward the end of this reporting period an increase in enemy initiated attacks on selected units was observed. The CAPs effectively contended with the enemy initiated activity, through the comprehensive and detailed coordination which is exercised on a continuing basis by the Combined Action Companies and Platoons within their individual areas of operation. This afforded the Marines and PFs the necessary opportunity of exposing the enemies false claims by effectively demonstrating to the people their abilities, as military professionals, in carrying out their stated intention of protecting the people and successfully sustaining hamlet security, and as a result, building the confidence of the local population in the effectiveness of the Marines and PFs. In conclusion many Marines and Vietnamese lives were saved due to this combined action effort during the month of July. As a result of this combined action effort successful operations against the enemy where initiated effectively with a minimum of casualties.
The continued cooperation of the villagers with the individual CAPs in supplying timely and accurate intelligence on enemy movements, activities, supply storage and VC infrastructure, in conjunction with the ordnance received through the VIP program, indicated that the enemy had little success in effectively persuading the people with their propaganda.

b. Mobility. At the end of the reporting period, 2d CAG had thirty-one (31) mobile CAPs and five (5) static CAPs operating in Quang Nam Province. Although significant plans were being developed for the relocation and mobility of several CAPs during the month of July no additional CAPs were moved or converted from static to mobile type operations. It is anticipated that several CAPs will be relocated during the month of August.

c. Coordination. The innovation of the bilingual format order, which has been discussed and recorded in previous chronologies, has proven to be most effective in coordination of new plans and directives between 2d CAG and the Vietnamese Popular Force platoons which support the CAP mission.

d. Training. Training plans for the month of July 1-68, were submitted for approval to Commanding Officer, 2d CAG by all CACOs in accordance with Group Bulletin 1500. Emphasis remained on training all Marines and PFs primarily on general military subjects such as patrolling, ambushes, listening posts and calling for fire support. This training will continue to be exercised in all areas concerned, commensurate with the enemy's strategy, tactics and activity during the period.

(1) 2d CAG Mobile Training Team. During the month of July the Mobile Training Team (MTT) finished training PF platoon QNM-25 with a strength of thirty-three (33) and PF platoon QNM-24 with a strength of twenty-six (26). The total PFs trained by the MTT during the month of July was fifty-nine (59).

During their training period, PF platoon QNM-24's activities resulted in (5) VC KIA, (2) AK-47's captured and (1) RPG-2 captured. There are (2) PF platoons left to be trained in Bien Ban, PF platoons QNM-15 and QNM-23. The training methods used in training these PFs consists primarily of a series of lectures, use of visual training aides, and numerous demonstrations on various military subjects and weapons.

e. Inspections. During the month of July a regular schedule of staff inspections was conducted throughout the CAPs. These inspections consisted of a detailed critique on undesirable trends and were submitted to CACOs so that they could take corrective action before compromises in the CAP mission could occur. In addition these detailed inspections in-
cluded a study of records being kept and coordination accomplished on both the CAGO and CAP levels. A supply and communications inspection following the same guidelines was accomplished in order to accurately inform CAGOs of their state of readiness based primarily upon usage data compiled at the 2d CAG Headquarters. In order to assist in maintaining a high efficiency rating, a permanent record is being kept at 2d CAG Headquarters.

f. Conference Meetings.

(1) Staff Conference. 2d CAG Headquarters continued to hold weekly staff meetings where matters of multiple staff cognizance could be discussed. Due to detailed prior planning in the past weeks, a smooth transition was in effect for Headquarters to move to its new location in Hoi An. The first element of Headquarters, the advance party, arrived at the new headquarters on 15 July 1969 as scheduled. The remainder of Headquarters arrived at the new headquarters on 22 July 1969. The projected completion date for completion of the move had been set for 23 July 1969.

(2) Combined Action Company CO's Meeting. During the month of July a meeting was held on a weekly basis for all Combined Action Company Commanders and the Headquarters Staff. These meeting are specifically designed for the purpose of working out problem of support and coordination in addition to corresponding command guidance. At each of these meetings the individual CACO CO or his representative gave a projection from the DIACC (District Intelligence/Operations Control Center) concerning intelligence in their area for the coming week. These meetings continued to be most effective and beneficial to all concerned. It affords all CACO CO's and Headquarters Staff members the opportunity for face to face dialogue in order to discuss in detail operations and critical problem areas.

(3) CAP Commander Conference. The monthly CAP Commanders conference was held on the first Sunday in July. All agenda items were submitted by the individual CACO Commanders several days prior to the scheduled conference for review. The suggested agenda items were evaluated, arranged in a logical sequence, and distributed at the conference to the individual CAP Commanders as a guide for discussion. The main purpose for this meeting was to provide an opportunity for discussion of problem areas, such as training techniques for PFs and Marines. Among other problems discussed special attention was given to the PF Marine relationship in the field and group support of civic action projects. This conference was an excellent opportunity for group discussion and debate on problem areas common to all CAP Commanders. The conferences continue to be effective in these areas, and unanimously supported by all concerned as time well spent in an effort to bring about the success of operations supporting the CAP mission.
g. Operational AIDS. The 2d CAG Combined Action Companies continued to receive sufficient replenishment maps. All maps were plastic laminated.

h. Special Operations.

(1) Kit Carson Scouts. There were eight Kit Carson Scouts deployed in 2d CAG units during the month of July. In general, their performance was outstanding as they participated effectively in 209 day and night patrols, conducted (10) PsyOps broadcasts, captured (4) enemy or VC8 and captured (2) weapons. In one incident a Kit Carson Scout, Nguyen Gia Phi, serial no. 409, went into a bunker and attempted to talk a wounded VC into giving himself up. The attempt failed but he was able to recover several pieces of gear including a pack, an AK-47 and a B-40 rocket launcher. This is just one incident in which the Kit Carson Scout has performed his job thoroughly and conscientiously. Two other Kit Carson Scouts were also reported favorably for their enthusiastic attitudes. In conclusion these Kit Carson Scouts provide the CAPs with valuable information concerning enemy tactics, booby trap techniques, and hiding places. They also instruct CAP Marines and PFs on enemy booby traps and have continually proven themselves valuable and effective in operations against the enemy. Several companies have requested an additional Scout as they seem to work better in pairs.

(2) Scout Dogs and Handlers. During the month of July 2d CAG operated with (4) organic Scout Dog Teams. These Scout Dog teams have been a definite asset in the CAPs. They are directly responsible for the increasing number of caves and tunnels being detected in individual CAP TACOs. In addition, they have been extremely effective in locating booby trapped areas, warning of enemy ambushes and detecting enemy movement. It should be noted that the use of these Scout Dog Teams has proven to be a valuable supporting arm to 2d CAG in fulfilling its mission. In using this supporting arm the CAPs found it necessary to adopt more effective techniques in patrolling and ambushes in order to effectively employ this valuable component with their other security and detection measures. Each time a Scout Dog Team was assigned to a CAP, there was a marked increase in confidence and morale. Scout Dog Teams continue to be an increased safety factor in CAP operations.

(3) Troop Test of the M-16 Noise Suppressor Models E4A and NOL. A complete report on the troop test of the M-16 Noise Suppressor, models E4A and NOL is provided in detailed analysis in the Supporting Document Section of this chronology. The noise suppressors were subjected to various tests under normal combat conditions. In addition, this new accessory was subjected to all types of weather conditions and produced no significant adverse affects on their operation. However at least 60% of the testers described a marked decrease in the rate of fire. Carbon
build up in the chamber and moving parts of the weapon was more than usually experienced without the noise suppressor. No safety hazards were discovered when the suppressor was attached except that without the shield placed behind the rear sight the carbon residue tended to blow back into the shooter's eye. This particular indication can prove fatal in combat situation. The general conclusion about its operational and tactical value in a field combat situation was that an M-16 equipped with either model noise suppressor would be of limited value in an ambush because it could not deliver a continuous high rate of fire.

i. Voluntary Information Program. The total funds expended as rewards to Vietnamese Nationals for information pertaining to enemy activity and/or enemy equipment and ordnance was $35,500. The amount which was expended for July dropped slightly from June's amount of $440,705 but at the same time remained well above the largest amounts expended in months prior to May 1969. 2d CAG has continually stressed the importance of this program because of the many casualties prevented from enemy booby traps.

j. Artillery Support. During the month of July 2d CAG units requested 115 artillery fire missions which expended (240) rounds on either suspected or known enemy targets. The majority of these missions were in direct support of 2d CAG elements.

In addition to the supporting artillery approximately twenty-seven (27) 81mm mortar fire missions were requested resulting in (270) rounds expended on either suspected or known enemy targets by individual CAPs and CACOs. The majority of all fire missions requested during this reporting period displayed excellent target coverage.

k. Air.

(1) Fixed Wing. During the month of July a total of three (3) missions were flown in direct support of 2d CAG operations against the enemy. The support and target coverage remained an outstanding factor.

(2) Flareships and Gunships. During the month of July a total of (7) missions were flown in direct support of 2d CAG operations against the enemy, and once again the reaction time was excellent and support and target coverage remained outstanding in all respects.

Spooky missions: (4)
Basketball missions: (3)
(3) Medical Evacuation Missions. A total of (49) medical evacuation missions were requested/controlled by 2d CAG units during the month of July. These included missions called in to evacuate Vietnamese civilians and PPs as well as Marines. The effort exercised in timely medevacs continues to be a large morale factor in all units.
5. **SPECIAL SERVICES**

a. The month of July was a slow month for Special Services due to the move of 2d CAG HQ to Hoi An. But the schedule is sure to get back under way in the near future. The Hong Kong trips were resumed as usual this month.

b. During the month of July, Special Services continued to order pre-recorded tapes from Force Special Services, III Marine Amphibious Force. During the month 68 tapes were purchased.

c. The heavy buying schedule of recent months has resulted in an inventory of property which is nearing adequacy and of satisfactory variety. It is planned that more long-range projects can now be considered for the future success of the Special Services program.

d. One organizational party was held by the S-1 section. The beer and soda were furnished by Special Services along with baseballs and volleyballs.

e. Also during the month of July the regular, weekly ration of beer and soda to the CAOs and CAPs was continued. During this period 469 cases of beer and soda were issued to the field units.

f. About 1,000 paperback books were received during the month of July. The books came from donors in the United States. The paperback books were distributed to all the CAPs.

 g. Three USO shows were held during the month and both contained some of the best entertainment ever held in the Headquarters. The entertainment was sponsored by Force Special Services, III Marine Amphibious Force.
6. LOGISTICS-GENERAL

The over-all Logistic Status of the 2d Combined Action Group did not change during the reporting period. As previously reported, this organisation is still in a C-2 category under the MARES/FORSTAT Reporting System for Equipment/Supplies on hand due to the fact that we did not receive the Table of Equipment material from the supply system. Examples of the shortages of equipment are shown under paragraph (1) Problems Areas.

a. Significant Events

(1) The move to Hoi An was completed on the 22nd of July 1969, utilizing forty-five vehicles to transport a total of 250 tons of cargo. The following units supplied transportation for this command in making its move:

   (a) Trucks and trailers from Truck Company Force Logistics Command.

   (b) Trucks from H&S Company, First Marine Air Wing.

   (c) Trucks and trailers organic to the Second Combined Action Group.

Additionally, it should be noted that the proficient co-ordination of the support received from these units resulted in the expeditious receipt and arrival of transport vehicles.

(2) Liaison was made with the Industrial Relations Section of Public Works in DaNang, as well as CORES in Hoi An, for the hiring of indigenous workers for the new compound. Priority was focused on the messhall workers, who would soon relieve the Marines from spending vital man hours on mess duty. The 2d CAG Headquarters was authorized 15 mess personnel, 11 laborers and 4 carpenters.

b. Damage to Weapons due to Enemy Action

No weapons were damaged due to enemy action during this reporting period.

c. Locomotive Transport

(1) The Group Locomotive Transport Section drove a total of 36,472 accident-free miles during the reporting period.

(2) A total of eight vehicles were deadlined for second echelon repair during this reporting period. A breakdown by vehicle type is as follows:
(a) Four (4) M151A1 ½ ton Truck Cargo
(b) Three (3) M37BL 3/4 ton Truck Cargo
(c) One (1) M35A2G 2½ ton Truck Cargo

The average deadline time was three days.

(3) No vehicles were deadlined for third echelon repairs during this reporting period.

d. Air Lift

No air lifts were scheduled for this reporting period.

e. Food Service

(1) A total of 30,000 meals were served during this reporting period by the Group messhall. This figure includes 1,900 meals served during the Sunday Barbecue as a direct result of the Big Brother Campaign launched by 2d CAO, CACOs and 2APs.

(2) "B" Rations totaling 1,800 meals were distributed to all compounds in the field. Additionally, "A" Rations were furnished to the compounds for pick up on a daily basis.

f. Armory

(1) During the month, the Group Armory repaired 75 weapons at the armory. Sixty (60) weapons required third echelon maintenance and were sent to Ordnance Maintenance Company at 1st FSR. The average turn around time at FSR was five (5) days.

g. Miscellaneous Services

(1) Adequate plumbing and plaster repairs were received from Public Works, Naval Support Activity, DaNang East, RVN. Additionally, liaison was established with the Industrial Relations Section of CCORC at Hoi An to contract with the Vietnamese for garbage and trash pick up at the new compound.

(2) The Force Logistic Command's Laundry Platoon provided adequate support for the Group Headquarters Supply Section and the operational companies during this period. The average turn-around time is two days.

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h. Supplies

(1) No major items were received during this period. Due to the move to the new compound, the T/E deficiencies are presently having an adverse effect on this Command's capabilities. Rotation of key personnel in the supply section without replacements is also affecting this operation.

i. Problem Areas

(1) Supply - The same problem areas exist as reported in several previous reports. The failure to receive T/E items is responsible for this unit constantly reporting a C-2 rating in the area of Equipment/Supply on hand as reported under the MARINES/FO:STAT System. Examples of shortages are shown below:

(a) Telephone Set, TA-312 83
(b) Telephone Set, TA/1-PT 190
(c) Radio Control Group AN/GRA-59 26
(d) Generator Set, PU-482 2
(e) Address Plate Machine 2
(f) Embossing Machine Address Plate 1
(g) Binoculars 6 x 50 61
(h) Mount Tripod, M122 39
(i) Mount Tripod, M3 4
(j) Truck Cargo 3/4 ton M37E1 3
(k) Night Vision Scope 51
(l) TA51, 7/16 ton, M418E1 11
(m) T:LT, Water 400 gal, ML40 4
(n) Duplicating Set, Spirit Process 1
(o) Duplicating Set, Stencil Process 1

(2) Motor Transport - As stated in previous reports, repair parts through the supply system were, and still are, a continuing problem.
(3) Communications - Basically the same problems as previously reported. Problems still exist in that the turn-around time for direct exchange items is approximately ten to fifteen days.

(4) Heavy Equipment Support - The primary problem faced during the move from DaNang to Hoi An involved the acquisition and continued use of a 6,000 lb. Rough Terrain forklift. The justification for having such a vehicle was evidenced by the necessity to off load several high tonnage loads such as fully packed conex boxes and 400 pound crates.

Though there had been initial preparations made between the 3-4 2d CAG and Force Engineers to acquire a forklift at the Hoi An site, lack of communications within Force Engineers caused a delay of four days before the receipt of the vehicle. Even after receipt was accomplished, the requirement that the same forklift be used to load vehicles at DaNang and unload vehicles at the compound site caused further problems.

Due to the double work load incurred by the forklift, time was at a premium. Thus, in an effort to on and off load cargo during the relatively short time allotted for the use of the vehicle, gear was rapidly and often indiscriminately placed after the off loading procedure. Because the construction of the compound was concurrent with the unloading, an inordinate amount of improperly staged cargo was damaged by construction vehicles attempting to maneuver around the crates. Subsequent delivery of a second 6,000 pound forklift at DaNang alleviated the problems created by this abbreviated time frame.
7. MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

a. General. Emphasis on the training of selected Marines and Popular Forces Soldiers to act as Corpsmen in the event a Corpsman is not available in the CAP was again stressed during the month of July. These Marines and Popular Forces Soldiers are treating battle casualties and, in many cases, holding MedCaps with the Vietnamese civilians. The use of Iodine Tablets and Malaria Pills continues to be emphasized. It is hoped to keep non-battle casualties decreasing. Also the continued use of Salt Tablets was stressed due to the rise in temperature.

The move to our new compound in Hoi An was accomplished with a minimum of delay and confusion. Sick bay was operating effectively within a few days after our arrival.

b. Personnel:

(1) Medical Department Representative: HM1 M. A. RINEILL, USN

(2) Administrative/Sick Call Petty Officer: HM3 D. B. MICHAEL, USN

(3) Supply/Sick Call Petty Officer: HM3 A. M. GARDNER, USN

(4) Hospital Corpsman Personnel statistics for the month of July 1969:

(a) Detached 2
(b) Joined 4
(c) TAD Personnel Attached 0
(d) TAD Personnel Terminated 0
(e) Casualties:

1. KIA 0
2. WIA 5
3. Twice WIA and Evacuated out of RVN 0
4. Died of Wounds 0
(f) During the month of July the 2d Combined Action Group (CAG) Aid Station treated 585 USMC/USN personnel at routine sick call, including 72 personnel from the tenant Combined Action Program School and the Vietnamese Language School.

c. **Medical Civic Action Program: (MedCaps)**

(1) During the month of July 1969, CAP Corpsman treated 18,294 Vietnamese civilians at daily routine MedCaps. This is a decrease of 4,524 from the month of June. There were also 71 Vietnamese civilians treated as a result of hostile action.

(2) The 2d CAG Headquarters Medical Section treated 187 Vietnamese civilians at daily routine MedCaps during the month of July 1969.

d. **Training:**

(1) During the month of July 1969 CAP Corpsmen conducted a total of 65 classes resulting in a total attendance of 550 Vietnamese civilians and Popular Forces Soldiers. This is an increase of 7 classes, but a decrease of 200 people attending.

e. **Sanitation:**

(1) Routine sanitation inspections were conducted within the 2d CAG Headquarters Compound during the month of July 1969. Some major problems were encountered at the old compound and attempts were made to rectify them. At the new compound most discrepancies were of a minor nature and were rectified immediately.

f. **Noteworthy Items:**

(1) On 4 July 1969 HM2 M. J. MURRAY was WIA while on ambush with CAP 2-4-1.

(2) On 14 July 1969 HM RATHBURN, W. R. was WIA while on patrol with CAP 2-7-6.

(3) On 20 July 1969 HM2 P. D. HENDRIX was WIA while on patrol with CAP 2-3-1.

(4) During the month of July there were ten 2d CAG personnel admitted to hospitals with intestinal disorders. This is a decrease of 8 from the month of June.
g. Inspections:

(1) HML RINELL conducted monthly inspections in the CAP units of 2d GAG during the month of July. Most of the discrepancies noted were of a minor nature and were rectified immediately. The CAPs are continuing to use Iodine Tablets and the number of intestinal disorders continues to drop.
8. **COMMUNICATIONS**

   a. **Problem areas:**

   (1) The same problem areas exist as were reported in several previous reports. Lack of T/E items:

   (a) Telephone Set, TA-312  
   *35

   (b) Telephone Set, TA-1  
   190

   (c) Radio Control Group, GRA-39  
   28

   Note: * - MCSA Phila message 251410Z June 1969 stated 65 TA-312's being shipped.

   (2) Another problem again exists that has been previously reported. The turn-around time for direct exchange items still is approximately twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) days.

   b. **Communications:**

   (1) **Security**: Call signs were changed on 12 July with no difficulty.

   (2) **Inspections**: Only three (3) CAGOs were inspected during the month of July. Preventative Maintenance and operating conditions were checked with the following results reported.

   (a) In general it was found that operable handsets with frayed cords continue to be used, that daily preventative maintenance is not being performed and that accessories such as antennas are operable but broken. It is the policy of the inspector to inform the CAGO Commander, Company Sunny Sg t. and the Company Comm. NCO of such violations.

   (3) **Move to Hoi An**: The first of the month found Communications split between two compounds. The capability of radio communications was duplicated at the advance base of Hoi An. During the middle of the month a 25 pair telephone cable was laid from 2d CAG compound at Hoi An, by 7th Comm. EN, to their detachment located on the AOKMC base. The telephone cable gave 2d CAG phone communications with Det. 7th Comm. BN. and MACV Hoi An. Also a radio relay site was established in 2d CAG COC bunker with two channel telephone communication to III MAF. On 23 July all communication personnel and equipment completed the move to Hoi An. The Tech shop was closed for approximately (12) days vice the proposed (5) days. No major difficulties were encountered.
(4) Combat Operations Center: Overall traffic decreased slightly. The following communications traffic was passed through the Combat Operation Center over various nets during the month.

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<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incoming Messages</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgoing Messages</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spot Reports</td>
<td>239</td>
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<tr>
<td>Casualty Reports</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intell Reports</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIR</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Traffic</td>
<td>1,106</td>
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(5) Communications Supply: Components of end items were in adequate stock throughout the month with the exception of tape antenna's for the radio set PRC-25. The following reflects requisition status of communication items:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requisitions Submitted</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requisitions Completed</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requisitions Outstanding</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total requisitions outstanding</td>
<td>25</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(6) Maintenance: Poor Maintenance support on the repair of components of end items and the RT-505 radio set by the Direct Exchange System at FLC. The average turn around time for the RT-505 radio set is (5) weeks, the H-189 handset is (2) weeks and the LS-454 loudspeaker a month.

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work Requests Submitted</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Requests Completed</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Work Requests Outstanding</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Work Requests Outstanding</td>
<td>54</td>
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Sequential Listing of Significant Events

1 July 1969
CAP 2-3-5 triggered an ambush on an unknown size enemy force moving along a trail about 2km south of Dien Ban. The enemy returned fire with small arms and fled. The CAP swept the area immediately after contact and a pin at first light. Results were Negative.

CAP 2-3-6 ambush called an 81mm mortar fire mission on 3 VC spotted northwest of the CAP ambush site 1km north of Dien Ban. After the mission the CAP exchanged small arms fire with the VC force and employed 60mm fire on the VC position causing the force to flee. A sweep of the area was conducted with negative results.

3 July 1969
CAP 2-2-2 patrol discovered a booby trapped 175mm round, 1km east of Dai Loc. An SBD team was requested and destroyed the booby trap.

CAP 2-3-5. A Vietnamese boy reported finding a Vietnamese body dressed in plaid shorts and a green utility jacket 3km south of Dien Ban. The CAP recovered the body and swept the area for equipment and weapons with negative results. The body was that of a VC wounded by CAP 2-3-5 on 312325 July 1969.

4 July 1969
CAP 2-4-1 ambush received (3) incoming grenades about 3km northeast of Dai An. The grenades appeared to come from a group of houses north west of the CAP's position. The CAP checked the area and swept again at first light with negative results on both sweeps.
5 July 1969

An element of CAP 2-4-2 initiated small arms fire and automatic weapons fire on movement in elephant grass about 1.5 km southwest of Hoi An. The enemy returned SAP, broke contact and evaded the CAP units. The CAP unit requested illumination and conducted a sweep in an attempt to regain contact. Results were negative.

6 July 1969

CAP 2-5-1 in a daytime site, a Marine discovered a blueprint of the runway lighting at Phu Bai airstrip displayed on the wall of a house about 1 km east of Dien Ban. A further search revealed an AM/FM radio. (2) occupants of the house were taken to National Police for questioning. Results (2 VCS.

8 July 1969

CAP 2-1-3 triggered an ambush on approximately (25) NVA about 7 km southwest of the DaNang airstrip. (1) PF was KIA and (1) PF WIA in the contact. The CAP swept the area finding (5) NVA KIA. The CAP swept the area again at first light and found (1) more NVA KIA, (3) AK-47's and (2) Chicom grenades.

CAP 2-3-1 swept, found and destroyed complexes about 1.5 km north of Dien Ban. The CAP also found and destroyed cooking gear and (100) lbs of rice unfit for salvage.

9 July 1969

CAP 2-7-5 initiated organic weapons fire and 60mm mortar fire on (30)-(35) VC, spotted north of the CAP's compound. The VC returned SAP and RPG rockets. Artillery was called by CAP and Spooky was employed in area. Negative results.

10 July 1969

CAP 2-1-4 while on patrol received approximately (50) rounds AK-47 fire from an USAP approximately (125) meters east of the CAP position at AT92697, 7 km southeast of the DaNang airstrip. A sweep was held under 60mm illumination with negative findings.
A patrol from CAP 2-7-5 moved into a hamlet 4km SE of the DaNang airstrip, near the CAP compound to tell the civilians to put out their lights. One male was observed entering the village from the S. The male was warned by a VN female and broke and ran before the CAP could get in position to make an apprehension. The female was detained as a VCS. A second patrol departed the compound and was ambushed about 50 meters outside the wire by an estimated (2) VC using grenades. The patrol returned fire and withdrew to the compound with (2) USMC WIA(M). The patrol again departed the compound to search the area of the previous contact and to continue the scheduled route. Approximately 100 meters from the compound AK-47 fire was received from an USSF and movement was observed outside the hamlet to the N, E, and S. The patrol again returned to the compound and the compound was brought under SAF. The CAP returned fire with organic weapons and called Spooky who worked out in the area. Spooky reported seeing 20 to 30 separate muzzle flashes while on station. The CAP swept the entire area under illumination finding (4) blood trails and several drag marks. Footprints indicated the enemy force to have been from 20 to 30 strong. Results (1) RF WIA(S), (2) USMC WIA(K) and (1) VCS.

CAP 2-9-2 patrol received SAF from USSF about 4km northwest of An Hoa. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and swept the area with negative results. (1) FF was WIA(S) in the contact.

CAP 2-9-3 ambush initiated organic weapons fire and employed claymore against (5) VC spotted about 10km northwest of DaNang airfield. The CAP swept the area with negative results.
15 July 1969

The first element of 2d CAG Headquarters, the Advance Party, arrived at the new 2d CAG Headquarters in Hoi An.

16 July 1969

CAP 2-8-3 patrol spotted and pursued (2) VC into a bunker about 3km southeast of Nam Bridge. The MG opened fire established a base of fire and assaulted the bunker killing (1) VC. (1) MG and (1) PF were MIA's in the contact. A search of the area found (1) VCS, (2) Chicom grenades, (2) battle dressings. The bunker was destroyed by assaulting forces.

17 July 1969

CAP 2-1-3 coordinated A0 controlled Air strikes on bunkers 2km northeast of Dien Ban destroying and estimated 19 bunkers. Three VC were observed running into treeline and were fired upon by aircraft resulting in (5) probable KIAs being reported by A0.

19 July 1969

CAP 2-7-4 while checking a house in the vicinity 3km south of DaNang airstrip. CAP 2-7-4 detained (1) Vietnamese male who was a stranger in the hamlet. Results (1) VCS.

CAP 2-1-5 ambush employed organic weapons fire and claymore on (12) NVA spotted at 7km south-west of the DaNang airstrip. The NVA force fled in an unknown direction without returning fire. The CAP swept the area under illumination and found (1) VCS, KIA in a green uniform, (1) content, (1) poncho and (1) helmet.

20 July 1969

CAP 2-8-3 patrol found a booby trapped 1-28 on a trail 1.5km north of Dien Ban. The VC blew the booby trap in place.
22 July 1969
CAP 2-4-5. (2) Marines received minor wounds when CAP 2-4-5 ambushed received (2) incoming grenades from an U.S. CMBF, 1.5 km east of Hoi An and the CAP requested illumination and swept the area but were unable to make contact with the enemy.

2d CAG Headquarters moved from DaNang to Hoi An.

23 July 1969
CAP 2-1-3 elements initiated organic weapons fire on (5) VC spotted moving across rice paddies 9km southwest of DaNang airstrip. The VC didn’t return fire and fled in and unknown direction, a sweep of the area at first light had negative results.

24 July 1969
CAP 2-4-1 spotted VC across river digging a hole near a mangrove swamp, 5km north east of Hoi An. The CAP initiated organic weapons fire and called a fire mission receiving excellent target coverage. The CAP was unable to sweep due to the river.

25 July 1969
CAP 2-4-3 while on patrol located and destroyed (2) bunkers, 3' x 6' x 2' in a tree line 1km northeast of Hoi An.

27 July 1969
CAP 2-3-2 patrol detained (1) female VC 2km northeast of Dien Ban. The woman was taken to District Headquarters and later reclassified as a confirmed VC.

28 July 1969
CAP 2-4-5 initiated organic weapons fire on (5) VC moving southeast 1.5km east of Hoi An. Artillery and 81mm mortar were also employed. A sweep of the area found footprints heading northeast.

29 July 1969
CAP 2-7-3. In a house 7km south of DaNang airstrip, CAP 2-7-3 uncovered a box which contained medical supplies and blasting caps. A Vietnamese male occupant of the house was turned over to District authorities for interrogation.
30 July 1969

CAP 2-3-4 was informed by PPs of a booby trap emplaced near an empty house 7km west of Hoi An. The CAP found (2) Chicoms grenades rigged with string to a bench next to the house. The grenades were blown in place.

31 July 1969

CAP 2-1-3 ambush initiated organic weapons fire on (16) NVA moving southwest about 8km southwest of the DaNang airstrip. The enemy returned SAF before breaking contact. A sweep of the area found several blood trails.
Part IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS SECTION

1. CO 2d CAG's ltr of 11 July 1969 to Director, Combined Action Group (Ambush effectiveness, improvement in) 4-1 - 4-2

2. CO CACO 2-4 ltr of 27 July 1969 to CO 2d CAG (Report of blasting cap explosion) 4-3 - 4-4

3. CAG FRAG #63, Change 1 of 15 July 1969 4-5

4. List of VIP ordnance turned in during July 1969 4-6
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96502

5/WD/gbs
11 July 1969

From: Commanding Officer, 2d Combined Action Group
To: Director, Combined Action Group

Subj: Ambush effectiveness, improvement in

Ref: (a) AC of 3 CAP ltr 14:JCD:ted, 5120 dated 1 July 1969

1. This report is submitted in accordance with reference (a).

2. The following are recommendations concerning the improvement of instruction in ambushing techniques taught at the CAP School.

   a. That additional time be allotted to techniques of ambushing and the inherent problems caused by having PEs as members of these activities.

   b. That at least a half day of application be spent in the field on practical application of lessons learned.

   c. That a demonstration of proper ambush techniques be provided as part of the field training.

3. 2d CAG has taken these remedial measures to refine its CAP ambush tactics.

   a. To date, 52 2d CAG NCO's have received a two hour block of instruction at the 2d CAG NCO School in ambushing and patrolling. This excellent instruction by the CAG X.o. was specifically designed to develop their leadership abilities in this vital area of CAP activity. 2d CAG NCO School will continue on a bi-monthly schedule. 2d CAG also sends NCO's to 1st MarDiv NCO Leadership School which curriculum includes 4 hours on Ambushes and Counter Ambushes, 2 hours Scouting and Patrolling and 1½ hours Quick-Fire and Quick-Kill.

   b. At the monthly CAP Commanders meeting of 6 July 1969 and previous meetings, a focal agenda item discussed has been; "How to improve ambushing and patrolling techniques". A permanent record of subjects discussed at these conferences is compiled and distributed to each CAP Commander and CACO C.O.

   c. It is 2d CAG policy to require detailed after action reports for any incident in the CAPs involving noteworthy/unsatisfactory results from ambushing and/or patrolling techniques. These reports become permanent records for training purposes, with well and badly executed ambushes/patrols becoming the subject of discussions and with command guidance provided at all levels.
d. A Combined Action Company Commanders meeting is held weekly. These meetings provide a routine forum for discussion of CAP Activities. Ambushes and patrolling is a regular item on the agenda. S-5 notes concerning matter discussed are distributed to each company and become a permanent reference.

e. An average of two Combined Action Companies each month receive training from the Division Mobile Training Team in Quick-Fire, Quick-Kill techniques. We have currently re-scheduled all CACOs for this vital instruction. During the past 6 months the 1st MarDiv MTT has conducted 65 hours of patrol instruction and 72 hours of ambush techniques with 2d CAG Marines.

f. The 2d CAG Mobile Training Team has trained 13 Popular Force Platoons to date. Considerable time and effort during this instruction is devoted to teaching proper ambush and patrol techniques.

E. L. LEWIS
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

From: Combined Action Company 2-4
To: Commanding Officer 2d Combined Action Group
Via: S-3


1. Approximately 1600 on 22 July 1969 Sgt. B. R. CARPENTER, 2172303 the CAP Commander of CAP 2-4-1 was giving a class on the strobelite and Claymore mine. HM2 EGGUIK and PFC LUEDERS were the only other members of the class.

2. Sgt. CARPENTER had completed the portion on the strobe light, and was instructing on the Claymore mine. Sgt. CARPENTER and HM2 EGGUIK were sitting on a bench facing one direction, PFC LUEDERS was standing facing them. The blasting cap was laying on the bench. The cap was hooked up to the electrical wire. Sgt. CARPENTER had finished explaining how to operate the hand device, the wire safety and how to plug the wire into the hand firing device. At this point with the safety wire in place, Sgt. CARPENTER plugged the female plug of the wire into the male plug of the firing device. Immediately on contact of the two plugs the blasting cap exploded resulting in very minor fragmentation wounds to the three personnel.

3. In my opinion one of two things caused the blasting cap to explode:
   a. The day had been rainy, damp and cloudy, and there was enough static electricity in the air to cause the cap to explode.
   b. That during the class Sgt. CARPENTER had depressed the hand activator sufficiently to create electricity within the hand activator, upon connecting the two plugs, there was still sufficient current within the handset to cause the cap to explode.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
4. The blasting cap was not an original cap that came with the Claymore mine. It was from a separate supply.
   1375-756-1865-M130
   700 each
   A/4-6/63 1/64
   WT 103 GF 39
   Lot No. Dnp-19-1
   Cont. No. Da 11-173-AMC-93 (A)

5. In my opinion there was no misconduct or negligence involved on the part of Sgt. CARPENTER.

D. A. VOGELGESANG
CAG PRAG #63, Change 1

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, Combined Action Program
To: Distribution List

Subj: III MAF Combined Action Program

1. Purpose. To transmit a pen and ink change to the basic order.

2. Action. In subparagraph 5.e.(2) after the entry "7 ea MAGAZINE, M-16" add the words "with 18 rounds of 5.56mm ball ammunition per magazine".

C. R. BURROUGHS

DISTRIBUTION:
1st CAG (3)
2d CAG (3)
3d CAG (3)
4th CAG (3)
Force Surgeon (2)
CAP School (5)
Language School
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