CONFIDENTIAL  (Unclassified when enclosure (1) is removed)

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Vias: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 February to 28 February 1969

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.1A
(b) FMFPac 5750.9A

Ends: (1) 2d Combined Action Group Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Enclosure (1) is downgraded at 3 year intervals. Declassified after 12 years. DOD Directive 5200.10.

E. L. LEWIS
CONFIDENTIAL (Unclassified upon removal from the basic correspondence)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 2d CAG 1tr 3/MJD/jmm 5750 Ser: 0411869 of 28 Apr 1969

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 February to 28 February 1969 (U)

1. Forwarded.

ROBERT H. BARROW
By direction

Copy to:
CO, 2d CAG
CONFIDENTIAL. Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, 2d CAG ltr 3/MJD/Jmm 5750
Ser: 0411869 of 28 Apr 69

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 February to 28 February 1969

1. The subject chronology has been reviewed for completeness and is forwarded herewith.

[Signature]
R. D. WHITE
By direction

Copy to:
CO, 2d CAG
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1 February 1969 to 28 February 1969

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<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. Designation  | Commander  | Date       |
---------------|------------|------------|
2d Combined Action Group  | LtCol E. L. LEWIS | 1 Feb 69  
                           |             | 26 Feb 69  |

SUBORDINATE UNITS

1st Combined Action Company  | Capt. J. E. SNITZ | 1 Feb 69  
                            |             | 26 Feb 69  |
2d Combined Action Company   | Capt. J. W. BORHMAN | 1 Feb 69  
                            |             | 26 Feb 69  |
3rd Combined Action Company  | Capt. A. H. MOORE  | 1 Feb 69  
                            |             | 26 Feb 69  |
4th Combined Action Company  | Capt. D. A. VOGHLANG | 1 Feb 69  
                            |             | 26 Feb 69  |
5th Combined Action Company  | Capt. J. D. NIOTIS  | 1 Feb 69  
                            |             | 26 Feb 69  |
7th Combined Action Company  | Capt. D. D. DEAN    | 1 Feb 69  
                            |             | 26 Feb 69  |
8th Combined Action Company  | Qysgt D. H. WILSON  | 1 Feb 69  
                            |             | 26 Feb 69  |
9th Combined Action Company  | 1stLt. R. A. CRONIN  | 1 Feb 69  
                            |             | 26 Feb 69  |

ATTACHED UNITS

Detachment, Scout Dog Platoon, 3rd M. P. Battalion
Detachment, Kit Carson Scouts, 1st Marine Division C-2 (C&I)
Detachment, ARVN Interpreters/Translators, III MAF
Detachment, Medical Section, Hq III MAF

2. Location

1 February 1969 to 28 February 1969

Hq 2d CAG  
GACO 2-1  
GACO 2-2  
GACO 2-3  
GACO 2-4  

District III, Danang Special Sector, RVN  
Hieu Duc District, Quang Nam Province, RVN  
Dai Loo District, Quang Nam Province, RVN  
Dien Ban District, Quang Nam Province, RVN  
Hieu Nhon District, Quang Nam Province, RVN
CAOC 2-5
Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province, RVN

CAOC 2-7
Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province, RVN

CAOC 2-8
Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province, RVN

CAOC 2-9
Dau No District, Quang Nam Province, RVN

3. Staff Officers

Executive Officer/Civic Action Officer-S-5
Major R. C. BROAD JR. 1 Feb 69 - 28 Feb 69

S-1 Officer
1stLt H. NAGAI 1 Feb 69 - 28 Feb 69

S-2/S-3 Officer
Major M. J. DUBE 1 Feb 69 - 28 Feb 69

S-4 Officer
1stLt R. L. BURTON 1 Feb 69 - 28 Feb 69

4. Average Strength. The average strength for the reporting period was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>On Rolls</th>
<th>Chargeable/Effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>557</td>
<td>542 526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td></td>
<td>40 37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. The effective strength of the 2d Combined Action Group declined during the month of February due to casualties suffered during the post TET Offensive and the lack of input to offset these normal combat losses.

b. The average effective strength by units are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th># of GAPs</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF ENL</td>
<td>Off Enl</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENCL 1
PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. Personnel Administration.
   
   a. **Joined and Transferred.** During the month of February the 2d Combined Action Group joined and transferred the following number of personnel listed in the four categories below:

   (1) **Joined.**
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Off</th>
<th>Enl</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (2) **Rotated CONUS.**
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Off</th>
<th>Enl</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (3) **Transferred within WestPac Command.**
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Off</th>
<th>Enl</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (4) **Transferred by SR while sick (out of country hospitals).**
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Off</th>
<th>Enl</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. As enumerated above, 2d CAG lost more Marines through normal rotation and transfer by service records than personnel joined for duty. At the end of the reporting period, 2d CAG was operating below the authorized Manning level of 13 Officers and 583 enlisted Marines by as much as one effective officer and 72 effective enlisted personnel.

   c. Fourteen Marines extended their overseas tours during the reporting period.

   d. **Awards.**

   (1) During the month of February, 2d CAG forwarded 3 end of tour awards to FMFPac for approval as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Navy Commendation</th>
<th>Navy Achievement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (2) The following awards were received by personnel of the 2d CAG for heroism, meritorious service and wounds during the month of February 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Navy Comm</th>
<th>Purple Heart</th>
<th>Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

9. Casualties: During the month of February, 2d CAG incurred the following casualties, with the majority suffered during the period 21-28 February 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>DAL</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>WIAK</th>
<th>REC</th>
<th>WIA/MRC RCT TO 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. CONFOINS/SELINS/VIETNAM: This command did not have any Congressional Interest, Special Interest or Welfare Reports during the month of February 1969.

11. Administrative Assistance:

(1) Most of the Marines assigned in the Group S-1 office are relatively inexperienced in handling administrative duties in the Marine Corps. Every effort is being made toward training these Marines to fully support the Marines of the Group.

(2) Three Group directives were published during the reporting month. They were as follows (Copies are provided in section 19 herein).

(a) Group Order 1050.1; Off Limits Area and Curfew. To promulgate and inform personnel of off limits and curfew as published in 1001 1050.5c.

(b) Group Order 4050.1; Handling of Personnel Effects. To establish procedures in handling personal effects of personnel wounded or killed in action and personnel evacuated out of country.

(c) Group Bulletin 1710; Wearing of Civilian Clothing while traveling on R&R Aircraft.

(3) There were 14 overseas extensions approved during the month of February listed by rank below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O-1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-01</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. Legal: 2d CAG had the following legal activities during the month of February.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Informal Investig</th>
<th>Register</th>
<th>SOF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Art 32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the three article 32 investigations, two were originated during the month of January. One investigation was completed and forwarded to CQ, MFC and two investigations were still pending at the end of the reporting period. One was due to the nonavailability of Vietnamese National witnesses, the other due to the nonavailability of qualified counsel for the accused.

13. Mail: Mail continues to be sorted and distributed expeditiously. The mail room was inspected by the III MAF Postal Officer and received a rating of satisfactory with no discrepancies. Daily average bag of mail.
3. Promotions. Twenty-eight enlisted promotions were effected during the month of February 1969 as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Normal Promotions</th>
<th>Exceptional Promotions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1stLt</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cpl</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lcpl</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) The lack of promotion quotas for Lcpl and Cpl continues to have a deleterious effect on personnel who are eligible and qualified for promotion to the next higher rank and are unable to keep abreast of contemporaries in the Marine Divisions.

k. Hospital and Brig Visits. Weekly hospital and brig visits are made regularly by the Commanding Officer of the Group and a designated officer, as well as daily visits by the Headquarters Hospital Corpsman. No major morale or welfare problems were uncovered.


(1) Morale continues at a high level despite the hardships inherent in a continuous tactical posture and the living conditions of the Combined Action Platoon personnel. Entertainment of personnel by a 2d CAG volunteer talent show was initiated during this reporting period and was a tremendous success. In addition, civilian variety shows contracted by MC Club system, continue to be the highlight with entertainment scheduled on Sundays, tactical situation permitting. Sunday barbecue cookouts with two hours free beer/soda were also initiated. A minimum of two men from each CAP, tactical situation permitting, are brought in and given an opportunity to relax and enjoy themselves in the Group Compound.

(2) The following in-country, out-country R&R quotas were received and utilized as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quota</th>
<th>Utilized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-country</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-country</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also, four annual leaves were granted to the various R&R sites.
During the month of February, 126 Hometown News Releases were submitted to the Combat Information Center, III Marine Amphibious Force for processing and release.

1. Career Planning,

(1) A screening program, conducted during the month of February, revealed that a substantial number of the Marines and Navymen in 2d Combined Action Group could benefit by taking the High School General Educational Development Test (GED). This test, which measures high school level achievement and can lead to the issuance of a high school diploma, was found to be available through the Naval Support Activities Education Office at Camp Chan She sandy, DaNang. Arrangements were made with the Education Office to test 2d CAG personnel on a regular basis at the sites of their company headquarters in the field. Testing will commence in March. Many of the members of 2d CAG will thereby have an opportunity to achieve high school equivalency which would not otherwise be available to them. It is estimated that in excess of 150 members of the Group will benefit from this program. The cooperation of the NSA Education Office in agreeing to take their facilities to the field will be of significant benefit to the 2d CAG.

(2) A total of 48 Career Planning interviews were conducted during the month. These interviews were held both at the Career Planning Office at the CAG Headquarters, and at CACO and CAP sites in the field.

(a) The breakdown of ranks interviewed during February is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Sargent</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Corporal</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Lance Corporal</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Privates F/C</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Privates</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>48</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) No career reenlistments or extensions resulted from these interviews. A one-year extension and two six-month extensions were effected.

(3) A new Career Planning Office was constructed, centrally located in the 2d CAG Headquarters Compound. The office is comfortably furnished and well-identified by appropriate signs. The ready availability of, and adequate facilities for, career planning, should serve to elicit more ready response on the part of enquiring Marines.

(4) A periodic bulletin is being published and distributed to the CAPs in Quang Nam Province to increase the awareness of available programs and to provide for more positive dissemination of timely career information. A judgment of the value of the bulletin cannot be measured at this early date, but will be a subject of future assessment.
2. **Civic Action/Psychological Operations**

a. During the month of February, Civic Action NGOs from the 2d Combined Action Group continued their efforts to act as liaison between hamlet, village, and district officials in initiating civic action and community development projects. Despite an increase in combat activity in the latter half of February, civic action efforts in RoomCap, education, distribution of commodities, personal response, and construction projects continued at an acceptable level. In areas where the mid-February offensive was concentrated, civic action came temporarily to a standstill, but returned to normal as the operational situation stabilized.

b. "No-cost/non-material" civic action projects continued to be utilized by all CAPs in the Group. These projects are proving themselves ideal for the twenty-five mobile CAPs. "No-cost/non-material" projects are such that CAPs no longer encounter problems of storage of material and can direct their efforts easily as they move from hamlet to hamlet.

1. To improve relations and further understanding, many CAPs have been conducting English language classes for Vietnamese civilians. During February, 102 such classes were held in Quang Nam Province, with 952 Vietnamese nationals attending regularly.

2. The Tet holidays provided an opportunity for CAPs to work closely and profitably with Vietnamese civilians of all ages. Many CAPs participated in such activities as the decoration of main roads and trails through the villages and hamlets, and many CAP Marines were invited into private homes for traditional Tet holiday celebrations and the exchange of gifts.

3. A productive example of "no-cost/non-material" civic action was an arrangement for the III MAF Band to perform at some of the villages served by 2d Combined Action Group CAPs. The band performed at CAPs 2-5-4 and 2-7-6 on 11 February 1969, and at CAPs 2-6-1 and 2-8-2 on 13 February 1969. These performances were attended by hundreds of local Vietnamese and their enjoyment of the program was obvious. The band performed selections of American music intermingled with Vietnamese songs and concluded each program with the Vietnamese National Anthem. The success of the band visit warrants future performances, and it is hoped, eventually, to have the band perform at all units of the 2d Combined Action Group.

a. As a result of the thoughtfulness and support of the City of Martin's Ferry, Ohio, 2000 pounds of goods were made available to the Group for distribution to Vietnamese during Tet. The items were all donated by citizens of Martin's Ferry in response to an appeal from a CAP Marine, PFC Joseph J. Roberts, whose home is there and whose interest in civic action is active and imaginative. On the day following Tet, a truck laden with the gifts traveled to the hamlet of Vinh Phouc in Phuoc Ben District, where hundreds of Vietnamese greeted the truck with anticipation. With the assistance of the District Chief and local GVN officials, the Marines of CAP 2-3-6 presented local children with games, coloring books and crayons, writing tablets and pencils, clothing and candy. Adults received canned goods, soap, hygiene articles and clothing. The result of the generosity of Martin's Ferry was a brighter Tet for several hundred Vietnamese and a significant achievement for the 2d Combined Action Group civic action program.
d. Commodities distributed during the month of February were as follows: food 2752 pounds; soap 1563 bars; clothing 231 pounds; blacksmith kits 56; school kits 100; woodworking kits 1; canteen kits 90; farm aid kits 1; masonry kits 4.

e. During February, CAP personnel of the Group assisted Vietnamese civilians in completing the following projects: fences 111; dwellings 9; public heads 2; wells 5; pagodas repaired 5; school roofs repaired 1; dams 5; family bunkers 4.

f. Medical assistance in support of civic action saw MedCaps treating 20,442 Vietnamese civilians. 95 dental cases were treated by CAP Corpsmen.

  (1) 125 Vietnamese children and 58 adults were medically evacuated during the month.

  (2) CAP hospitalmen administered 36 typhoid immunizations during the first week in February. The hospitalmen at CAP 2-1-5, working in coordination with the 29th Civil Affairs Company, inoculated 900 Vietnamese civilians living in proximity of the CAP for typhoid, plague, and cholera.

  (3) CAP hospitalmen continued to train Vietnamese civilians in the basics of first aid. During the month, 70 such civilians were undergoing training. These aides assist in MedCaps and serve as interpreters for the hospitalmen.

g. Psychological operations activities employed by the group during the month of February included the use of air-dropped leaflets and hand dissemination of leaflets and Vietnamese newspapers.

  (1) Because February was the month of TET, a heavy concentration of TET material was disseminated over the holiday period. All CAPs in the Group were covered during the period.

  (2) Approximately 1,050,000 TET Greeting, Family Reunion, and GVN Image leaflets were airdropped as requested by CACO Commanders.

  (3) Approximately 100,000 Chiieu Hoi leaflets were airdropped in early February as requested by CACO Commanders.

  (4) All CAPs in the Group distributed Vietnamese newspapers and magazines to Vietnamese civilians living within their TAOCs on a weekly basis during the month of February.
3. Intelligence.

a. General. During the month of February the Combined Action Group S-3 continued with the additional duties as the Group S-2. There are still no intelligence MOS personnel assigned under the present T/O. A study on the requirements for changes in the present T/O was made during this reporting period and recommendations have been presented on proposed changes that would provide a Lieutenant as an assistant S-3/S-2 and also provide a SNO as the S-2 Chief. These requirements were considered to be bare operating necessities to adequately support eight Combined Action Companies in the field and to assist in the collection and dissemination of intelligence information. The recommended T/O changes were thoroughly discussed at the monthly CAG S-3 conference and forwarded as agenda items for discussion and approval at the next CAG Commanding Officers' conference during March 1969.

b. Intelligence Information Chain. The Combined Action Group intelligence information chain has again provided timely data and sound intelligence. The value of this information chain was displayed during the rapid buildup of enemy forces just prior to the 25 February offensive. CAP units throughout Quang Nam Province reported enemy unit movements or numerous enemy units moving in their Tactical Area of Coordination (TAC). Combined Action Platoons were receiving intelligence data from their hamlet residents, informers, informers, and through their own sightings during activities. Mobile CAPs, especially successful in getting closer to the civilian population, gained the civilians' trust and confidence and kept the intelligence flowing as a result of this closer association. All of the information was passed simultaneously through appropriate SVN and other FWAP channels. The CAP units have continued working very closely with local interrogator/translator teams, Counter Intelligence Teams, and all supporting unit intelligence sections. Intelligence summaries from all sources were disseminated throughout all of our units, as appropriate. There were many cases where intelligence information was originated through strictly Vietnamese sources and agents and then passed to the Combined Action Company (CAC) headquarters which is co-located with the ARVN District Chiefs in each district. The CAC then passed all such information directly through the nearest U.S. unit, usually the commander of the TAD in which the company was operating and the information then proceeded rapidly up the U.S. chain of command. The intelligence was also passed to CAG headquarters who notified III MAF of all matters of interest.

c. Counter Intelligence. The CAG headquarters again had occasions to work closely with the 5th CIT located adjacent to the 2d CAG compound. The CIT has provided blacklists and prisoner or suspect interrogation readouts to CAP units throughout the reporting period. The 5th CIT has accompanied CAP units on local operations based on intelligence they procured as a result of prisoner interrogations. Some of these sweeps have been extremely successful and were culminated by brief but violent action as the CAPs searched bunkers, spider holes, and tree lines reportedly harboring enemy forces. This type of coordination and cooperation greatly assists in the overall pacification program as the local VC infrastructure is uprooted and systematically destroyed.

d. General Enemy Situation. The general enemy situation during the month of February changed considerably. The month began as slow as the
The first two weeks found all friendly units 
or units being the most noticeable. This slight upward trend from January was re-
resentative of random enemy efforts rather than any recognizably coordinated 
efforts. Generally, however, this first week remained at the previous low 
level of activity we encountered throughout the 2d CAG TAOCs during January. 
Moderate ground action was reported during this week by U. S. Marine TAOR 
Commanders and ARVN units South of DaNang. Our CAPs were not harrassed by 
these enemy units as their efforts were directed at larger, compound based 
units. The second week saw a sharp decrease in the tempo of all enemy 
activities. Mines and booby traps constituted the majority of incidents 
throughout 2d CAG units as CAP activities encountered very few enemy units. 
With the approach of the 1969 Tet holiday period there continued to be a 
mounting body of intelligence information alluding to the commencement of 
the more mentioned "Winter-Spring" offensive in concert with the general 
offensive throughout Vietnam. In this respect, all CAP units in Quang Nam 
Province continued to be mentioned as prime enemy targets. An increase in 
reports of enemy sightings were reported but generally all enemy forces 
chose not to engage any CAP units unless they were completely surprised. 
The period 16-22 February saw the Tet holidays come and go without any 
rise in the level of enemy initiated activity. Contrary to the large amount of 
intelligence alluding to attacks on CAP units in the southern Quang Nam 
Province area, enemy activity remained generally quiet except for occasional 
sniper fire and light attacks of two or three 60mm mortar or 81mm rocket 
rounds fired against some of our static CAPs. CAPs in the Bien Hoa and Bien 
Phu Districts were the only exceptions as they engaged the enemy on several 
occasions with excellent results. Reports continued to come in from all 
sources that small enemy units were being spotted frequently throughout the 
TAOCs or in adjacent areas. The enemy forces, however, generally still 
chose not to engage. Despite these failures by the enemy to initiate any 
significant action against 2d CAG CAPs during the holiday period there were 
increased indications that they were preparing the battlefield for a push of 
some unknown intensity. All CAP units remained alert against impending 
attacks. Many agents, captured enemy and documents indicated that the CAPs 
would still be primary targets whenever the offensive commenced.

The long awaited "Winter-Spring" offensive finally began on the 23rd of 
February at about 0230H. As if on signal, several CAPs came under intense 
enemy small arms fire. The type and description of these attacks were as 
predicted and as previously reported through intelligence circuits. All 
CAPs were aggressively patrolling and ambushing within their TAOCs and 
consequently sprung ambushes and contacted enemy forces who were enroute 
to attack larger forces. Needless to say the tempo of activities flared up 
considerably and stayed that way during the remainder of the reporting 
period. Actions occurring after 22 February will be described in the oper-
ations section of this chronology. The intelligence provided by all sources 
clearly indicated that the CAPs would come under heavy attack and necessary 
plans were formulated to prepare for this threat. As a result of this in-
telligence the CAPs were prepared to cope with the sudden increase in activ-
ity on 23 February.

(1) Enemy Plans and Policies. The large scale assaults by fire 
and ground contacts terminated at the end of the reporting period. It is 
appeared that some CAPs in isolated areas will continue to make contacts
and that generally the level of activity will progressively decrease until the enemy has regrouped for phase II of the "Winter-Spring" offensive. All intelligence points toward the same basic characteristics in future attacks. We expect a lull in CAP activities followed by general attacks against CAPs throughout Quang Nam Province in conjunction with the enemy's overall plans to conduct heavy attacks against fixed installations throughout the Da Nang area. There are already indications of increased enemy terrorism in the form of booby traps, minings and threats to CAP headquarters because of the civilians' participation in thwarting the attacks of 23 to 26 February.

e. **Interrogator/Translator.** During the month of February 1969 all detainees or prisoners were either processed through the various district headquarters or were forwarded through USMC units for processing by their attached CITs. As mentioned earlier in this report, 2d CAG CAP units worked closely with the 5th CIT and accompany this team to investigate possible enemy locations disclosed by their interrogation teams.

f. **Interpreters.** 2d CAG had seven interpreters on the rolls during the reporting period. Two more interpreters were assigned during the month of February. One officer and one enlisted man are assigned to 2d CAG Headquarters working out of the S-3 office and the other six are assigned to the MIT and specific District Headquarters. These men assist the Combined Action Company Commanders in communicating with PF leaders on the CAP and District levels as well as translating official correspondence for the CAG or CACO headquarters. They have provided the CACO Commanders with a valuable link with his PF Commanders and have assisted in overall coordination efforts.

8. **Enemy Statistics.** Enemy statistics for the month of February 1969 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>POW</th>
<th>Detainees</th>
<th>Ho Chi Minh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>176</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) **Weapons and Ordnance Captured.**

**Weapons:**

- AK-47: 42
- AK-44: 1
- SKS: 4
- M2 Carbines: 2
- M-79 Grenade Launcher: 1
- Communist Assault Rifle: 1
- Chicom Anti-aircraft Machine gun: 1
- 12.7mm: 2
- Anti-Aircraft Machine Gun: 4
- French Light Machine Gun: 3

**Ordnance:**

- Chicom grenades: 54
- M-26 grenades: 10
- Rifle grenades: 2
- 60mm mortar rounds: 19
- 82mm mortar rounds: 1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Box mines</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-40 Rocket rounds</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm rounds</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-79 rounds</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122mm rocket rounds</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122mm rocket launcher</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC mines</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claymore mines</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand popup</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm illumination round</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Operations

a. General. The 2d Combined Action Group has continued to emphasize coordination at all levels of command. This coordination was a major factor in the successful encounters with enemy forces during the period 23 to 28 February. Each Combined Action Company as well as its Combined Action Platoons were thoroughly familiar with their areas of operations, and coordinated their integral plans with all adjacent units. The CAPs melded their planes with the TAOR Commanders, Revolutionary Development Cadres, Regional Force, Self Defense Forces and other district controlled regular forces units to provide increased security and flexibility within their assigned TAOCs. Reaction plans were prepared well in advance of the offensive and TAOR and reaction force commanders were well briefed on the CAP areas of operations. These plans had been formulated well in advance of the anticipated Tet offensive and as expected proved to be invaluable, once the heavy contacts were initiated. The emphasis placed on internal CAP security of both the mobile and the static CAPs paid off in lives saved and enemy casualties sustained. The readjustment of some CAP TAOCs provided these CAPs, previously restricted to a small area, much more flexibility and did not allow enemy forces to monitor activities or determine established trends or patterns in the conduct of operations. Many contacts resulted in CAPs requesting assistance from TAOR commanders or adjacent units. The previously coordinated contingency plans enabled us to counter every enemy threat successfully. The extent of these contacts will be further described in this operations section and in Part III of this chronology (sequential listing of significant events).

b. Mobility. As described in previous chronologies, mobility has been the answer to most of our problems. The civilian reception to mobile CAPs has been excellent as they have quickly realized that the mobile CAPs are providing much more intensive security. CAPs which previously had little or no contacts prior to 23 February became active because of their broad coverage of assigned TAOCs. The constantly heavier patrol and ambush activity resulted in increased contacts and disruption of enemy plans. We reaped many additional benefits during the reporting period as CAPs gathered a large amount of information on enemy moves and the disposition of their forces. The people responded by providing information and assisting their CAPs in protecting assigned hamlets. One of the most important aspects of the mobile CAPs has been the continuing destruction of the Viet Cong infrastructure. These local VC have not been able to maintain contact with hard core enemy units thereby decreasing these organized units' capabilities to reinforce or resupply themselves through the local units.

(1) At the end of the reporting period 2d CAG had twenty-three mobile CAPs operating in Quang Nam Province. Four of these were redesignated as mobile CAPs from static CAPs during the month of February. The CAPs changing status during the period were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAP</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Date Mobilized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-1-3</td>
<td>Hieu Duc</td>
<td>3 Feb 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3-1</td>
<td>Dien Bien</td>
<td>6 Feb 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-9-2</td>
<td>Duc Duc</td>
<td>8 Feb 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4-3</td>
<td>Hieu Nhon</td>
<td>20 Feb 1969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Individual letters reporting the changes in status are located in Section IV of this chronology (Supporting Documents).

(2) CAP 2-5-7 previously located at grid (K120/Y27) in Hoa Vang District was relocated within the district to the village of Hoa Thinh in the vicinity of grids AT9371, AT9471 and AT9470 during February. This CAP had accomplished its mission at the old location and its TACO was considered completely pacified. The Marine element of the CAP was shifted to its new location to operate in targeted hamlets under the 1969 Pacification Program. The CAP Marines are presently working with a new PF platoon from the new area and are aggressively conducting operations within their assigned TACO. The movement of this CAP into areas having contiguous boundaries with CAP 2-5-7 and the Hieu Duc District CAPs across the river, will provide better interdiction of known enemy infiltration routes into Southwestern DaNang city as well as assist in the overall pacification of the area.

c. Activity. The overall level of activity and number of enemy contacts increased considerably as a result of the 23 to 26 February enemy offensive actions. The month started slowly as noted in the Intelligence section of this chronology. The first week of February saw all ODCOs reporting a sharp decrease from the previous month's light contacts. Reported enemy sightings were always at long range and contacts were limited to exchange of small arms fire from long range and to pursuit by fire from organic and supporting arms. All CAP units were alert to the anticipated offensive expected to coincide with the Tet holidays. Sightings of platoon and squad size enemy units indicated that the battlefield was being extensively prepared for ground attacks and attacks by fire. During the second week the situation remained relatively stable but contacts or sightings in the Bien Han/Hieu H doen Districts increased. These were characterized by sharp, violent engagements of small size usually made in ambushes or night patrols. The CAPs in the Northern DaNang area however, remained quiet. All indications pointed towards Bien Han and Hieu H doen CAPs being the primary target areas for the forthcoming offensive. The level of activity stabilized to occasional light contacts of interdicted or surprised enemy units. No enemy force marched toward a CAP unit with recognizable efforts of attacking or engaging the CAP. All the contacts seem to surprise the enemy while they were en route to other locations.

CAP units continued their extensive preparations for execution of well planned activities in anticipation of the push. The long heralded offensive first encountered CAPs in Quang Nam Province shortly after 0200H on the morning of 23 February. The engagements during the ensuing five days followed an almost set pattern as CAP plans were vigorously executed. As previously mentioned, extensive preparation for possible heavy enemy contacts had been made with all units. Revolutionary Development troops, self defense forces, adjacent Regional Forces and U. S. units had all been contacted and had been briefed on CAP plans. RFs were provided with security forces to accomplish their specific missions within our TACOs. Self Defense forces and Regional Force personnel were indoctrinated on available support CAPs could provide in the event the enemy forces entered our TACOs. Reaction forces provided by supporting units or TACO commanders had been briefed extensively on CAP TACOs and possible reaction plans. Supporting fires both pre-planned and pre-registered had been coordinated at the FSCO level. All CAPs were thoroughly familiar with casualty evacuation procedures.
Internal mutually supporting reaction plans were prepared so that CAPs could mass on a contact until other reaction forces were available. All of these preparations eventually proved to be our salvation and were directly responsible for the overwhelming success in every engagement. At one time during the period 23-25 February, all CAPs in Niu Bac District were in contact. These contacts were typical of most engagements throughout the offensive. Any dissection and evaluation of these contacts would reveal the following general concept. All CAPs conducted increased saturation patrolling and ambush activity in anticipation of the offensive. CAPs made contact with numerous NVA units attempting to penetrate through the TAOCs enroute to attack larger U. S. compounds or hamlet areas. RAd units working with the CAPs or the CAPs themselves spotted enemy forces and alerted adjacent units. The CAP Commander would then engage the enemy force and develop the situation. He attempted to contain the enemy force and bring all available supporting fires to bear on the enemy. If the situation required assistance the CAP Commander would contact GACO headquarters who would order adjacent CAP units to mass and assist the CAP in contact. If further assistance was required then the GACO would call on "Big Brother's" reaction forces from U. C. and TAOC Commanders. Every reaction plan was executed in support of the CAPs. Briefly then the sequence of events: contact, find the enemy, fix his position, determine his size, pound him with supporting arms, attempt to destroy him by ground attack and to call on reaction forces whenever the going got too rough.

Throughout all this action, emergency re-supply and medical evacuation missions were conducted with speed and efficiency. As the FF and Marine combined forces pitted themselves against NVA forces and systematically destroyed them they gained mutual confidence and respect for each other and formed indomitable bonds. The smoothly operating CAP machinery proved that a well trained, well equipped, machine can surmount heavy odds and accomplish difficult tasks. The CAPs gained stature in the eyes of the villagers and U. S. units adjacent to them. There were numerous accounts of individual bravery throughout both the FF and Marine ranks. It was a common sight to spot FFs running through heavy fire to drag a wounded CAP Marine friend to safety or Marines doing the same thing for "their" FFs. The soundness of preparation was evident by the fact that not a single CAP was pushed out of its PAOC. No hamlet or village controlled by the CAPs was occupied by the attacking forces. These small CAPs grew in stature to the point where they were ten feet tall in the eyes of the villagers and everyone who witnessed their successes in every engagement with the determined enemy force.

d. Training.

(1) Training Plans. The training plans for the month of March 1969 were submitted for approval to the Oo, 2d CAG by the CACOs. Additional emphasis is being placed on calls for fire support, patrols, ambushes, and organization of a defensive position as was stated last month. The extensive enemy contacts disrupted training considerably. The next month's training will reflect the same emphasis as stated for February.

(2) Outside Assistance Training. The 1st Marine Division School's Mobile Training Team has provided expert instruction to the 3rd and 4th
Combined action companies during the month of February. The team is providing excellent instruction on the 60mm mortar, quick fire-quick kill techniques, zero of weapons, night firing techniques, patrols and ambushes, demolitions of bunkers and fortifications, and safety. All instruction includes practical application and familiarization firing of the weapons involved. This team is producing bonus effects as CAP Marines follow up by instructing their PFs on all the subjects taught by the team.

(5) 2d CAG Mobile Training Team (MTT). The 2d CAG MTT is still assigned to the 3rd Combined Action Company in Dien Bien District. Their mission is to train PF platoons in that district. During February, the MTT trained one PF platoon. All training has received the enthusiastic support of the District Chief and has been extremely well received by the PFs. They have four more platoons to train in this district prior to relocating to another district.

e. Inspections. The increase in staff visits and inspections have greatly assisted CAP and CACO Commanders in locating danger areas, isolating them and correcting them before units sustained casualties. All staff members continuously monitor these areas under their cognizance and make recommendations for improvements. The increase in efficiency is apparent. As interest is constantly generated for improvements, emphasis has been continued for more direct supervision at all levels. This one single element—supervision—remains the key element to success in the program. Technical assistance in the area of motor transport, medical, administration and logistics is provided by staff officers, Staff NCOs and contact teams.

f. Conferences/Meetings.

(1) Staff Conferences. We continued to hold weekly staff conferences during February. All matters requiring action by more than one staff member are coordinated thoroughly and courses of action are approved for implementation by the CACOs.

(2) Combined Action Company CAC meetings. All Combined action Company Commanders met every Monday but the 23 of February to discuss problem areas, forthcoming operations, orders and other events planned for the next week or future weeks. These meetings are very beneficial to both the staff members and CACs. All CACOs are realizing much better support as a result of the increased coordination. Inspection results were discussed at these meetings and coordination difficulties then smoothed out by the staff. The resulting exchange of ideas has greatly improved the overall performance of the CAP units. In recent weeks we have invited guest speakers to the CAC meetings to present timely information on special subjects such as the RD program, military police activities etc.

(3) CAP Commanders Conference. The monthly CAP Commanders conference again proved extremely beneficial in solving problems encountered throughout all CAPs. Agenda items were submitted on areas CAP Commanders wished to discuss and critical areas desired to be emphasized by the Commanding Officer. Copies of these agenda items were provided to each participating CAP Commander. Staff Officers were available to answer any questions brought up or to resolve any point brought up during the conference.
The Group 1st Sgt acted as moderator and controlled the general discussion. Minutes of the meeting were kept, reproduced and copies were provided for all participants. (A copy of the minutes is provided in Section IV of this chronology). Some excellent beneficial ideas were provided by CAP Commanders. The resulting free exchange was beneficial because less experienced CAP Commanders had a chance to learn from the more experienced CAP Commanders. Some of the topics discussed during the February meeting were the tactical situation at that time, readiness for the anticipated up coming offensive, selection of night and day sites, coordination with friendly units in TAOCs to include PPs, KPs, NUs and civilian defense groups, fire discipline, use of NUs and local defense groups, as part of the CAP overall defense plan, plans for reaction forces, pre-planned supporting fires, proper selection of ambush sites, setting patterns in operations, and weapons safety. All CAP Commanders support these monthly meetings and they all agree the exchange of ideas is extremely beneficial to all CAPs. All appear enthusiastic about the meetings and feel that this is one of the most helpful aids they have to assist them in increasing the proficiency of their units.

**Operational Aids.** The S-3 office still provides aid in the form of map boards, a reproduction capability for orders or bulletins, and training aids. During the month of February each CAP was provided laminated maps covering each TAOC. All types of graphic aids support and training aids are now available to the assignment of a trained draftsman to the S-3 section.

**Special Operations.**

1. **Kit Carson Scouts.** Scouts assigned throughout 2d CAO continued to produce excellent results during the month of February. There were seven Kit Carson Scouts assigned during this period. They provided instruction to the PPs and Marines on enemy weapons, tactics, and the enemy's use of the local area. Assignment of these scouts in pairs into CAO areas that they are familiar with has increased their productivity.

2. **Scout Dogs and Handlers.** An average of four scout dogs and handlers were assigned during the reporting period. They again performed admirably and have become an important part of our CAP activities. Although these scout dogs and handlers are assigned for only 15 days at a time they provide excellent service. All the handlers are enthused about working with CAP units and continue to volunteer for additional 15 days return TAD period with us.

(a) **Operations.** The teams have been especially useful in Dien Bien and Hieu Mihn Districts. The dogs have located numerous booby traps. The PPs and Marines have high praise for these teams. The morale of the CAPs having these teams assigned to them seems to increase whenever the dogs are present.

(b) **Indoctrination.** All Marines and PPs in CAPs having scout dog teams assigned are thoroughly briefed by the handlers. This is necessary every time a scout dog and handler is assigned because of the peculiar
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...ties of each dog. The handler becomes in effect a member of the CAP and as included in all briefings, debriefings and plans. The scout dog handler advises the CAP Commander on the proper employment of this valuable supporting arm. All new incoming PF and Marine personnel are also provided a thorough briefing.

(c) Reports. Questionnaire type reports were submitted by all handlers to provide 2d CAG with usage data and to provide us with sound information that can be used to better employ teams assigned in the future. A report on the handlers was submitted by each Combined Action Company Commander upon termination of the team's tour of duty. Pamphlets on scout dog operations were disseminated to all CACOs during the reporting period.

1. Voluntary Information Program. The Voluntary Information Program continued on its upward trend during the month of February. This is a system by which Vietnamese Nationals are rewarded for turning in information and ammunition of all types. During February over 277,000 plasters were expended by 2d CAG units in support of the VIP Program. This represents almost a 57% increase over January's 177,000 plaster total. The information provided as well as the ordnance recovered by this system continues to save countless troops from maiming and possible death. The ordnance, in most cases, was blown in place by EOD or CAP personnel thereby denying the enemy its use for booby traps or mines. All CAP units will continue to emphasize this program and we expect even larger amounts of ordnance and information in future months. The Voluntary Information Program takes a long time to get started but once it does, the ammunition flow is steady. The amount of ordnance turned in during February and pictures of some of this ammunition are shown in the document section of this chronology.

3. Artillery Support. During the month of February 2d CAG units adjusted over 2,000 rounds of artillery fire on suspected or known enemy positions. The majority of the missions were adjusted on targets acquired by CAP units. In addition to the supporting artillery approximately 1700 rounds of mixed 60mm and 81mm mortar were adjusted on the enemy by CACOs and units in support of CAP operations. Accurate and timely mortar support provided during the 23 to 28 February period assisted all units in the routing of the enemy forces.

k. A/C

(1) Fixed Wing. A total of 15 missions totaling 39 sorties were flown in support of CAP operations during February. Most of these missions were flown in the Hieu Dieu and Southern Hoa Vang Districts, while CAPs were heavily engaged during the offensive.

(2) Flareships and Gunships. A total of 17 missions were flown (11 missions, 19 sorties for flareships and 6 missions, 13 sorties for gunships) during the reporting period. We continue to receive outstanding support with excellent reaction times for all missions.

(3) Medical Evacuation Missions. A total of 52 medical evacuation missions were controlled by CAP units to provide speedy medical attention to wounded PFs and Marines as well as civilian sick and wounded.
Medsavs are a great morale booster. Despite periods of intense fire during the offensive Medsvac helicopters provided outstanding support.

1. Documents. The following documents were reproduced and promulgated during the reporting period (those listed are in addition to all those previously mentioned in the Operations section of this chronology).

   (a) Memorandum 3/WID and over 3120 of 11 Feb 1969, which provided commanders guidance on preventing indiscriminate discharge of weapons during celebrations.
a. The Special Services program in the 2d Combined Action Group continues to grow, with the steady acquisition of items intended for, and appropriate to, Marines and Navy men in the Combined Action Platoons. During February, shipments of sweatshirts, gym shorts, and tennis shoes were received and distributed to CAP Marines and Navy hospitalmen.

(1) Short-sleeved sweatshirts carrying the CAP emblem and the 2d CAG designation have proved to be a popular item with all CAP personnel. Sufficient numbers have been placed in stock to ensure a gratifying issue to every member of the CAG, and to provide for issues to new members for several months in the future.

(2) Tiger-striped shorts, an extremely popular item, have been procured for issue on the same basis as the sweatshirts. These shorts are used by troops for sports, swimming, and sunning, and are particularly appropriate in that they provide a military appearance, in contrast to the variety of swimwear which is otherwise worn.

(3) Volleyballs, volleyball nets, and basketballs have been placed on order in sufficient quantity to satisfy the requirements of the Headquarters and the CAPs. Volleyballs are particularly useful, since volleyball is a favorite Vietnamese sport, and provides an excellent opportunity for Marines, Popular Force soldiers, and Vietnamese civilians to establish even closer working and social relationships.

(4) Twelve judo costumes were purchased for temporary issue to personnel who desire to take advantage of the offer of a qualified judo instructor in the Group to conduct regular classes in that martial art.

b. Special Services continued its function of handling monthly orders for pre-recorded tapes under the program provided by III Marine Amphibious Force Special Services. During February, Marines and Navy men of 2d CAG purchased 47 tapes.

c. Beer and soda continues to be issued to CAPs in the field in regular weekly allotments. During February, a total of 166 cases of beer and 169 cases of soda were distributed from the Recreation Fund.

d. The first of a proposed series of talent shows was held in February, utilizing the musical and other talents of CAG members and providing an excellent use for recently purchased musical instruments. The talent show was well-received, and plans are progressing to have more of them. As a side effect, the show demonstrated the availability of instruments to many of the Marines, and requests have been received for additional availability. As a result, inexpensive guitars have been ordered for issue to the Combined Action Companies, for the use of CAP Marines in their leisure time.
6. Logistics-General. The over-all status of logistics in 2d CAG did not change appreciably during this month. Under the FOXHOUND reporting system, 2d CAG was rated as being in a C-2 category in Equipment/Supplies on Hand, and C-1 in Equipment Readiness. The C-2 rating is a result of the lack of receipt of 1/2" equipment, and this problem has been pointed out in previous reports.

   a. Significant Events

   (1) During this period, an inspection of the organic supply account was conducted by a Field Supply Analysis office. Discrepancies were pointed out and corrected on the spot whenever possible. Recommendations were made as to correcting all other deficiencies. The corrections are now being acted upon by supply personnel and should be completed by the end of next month.

   (2) Phase II of the Fiscal Budget was completed during this period and submitted to the Controller, Force Logistics Command. The total funds budgeted for all fiscal years in the Phase II Budget were reduced from those amounts budgeted in the Phase I Budget. Usage data, and future plans and requirements were the determining factors in the projection of fiscal funds. The total funds budgeted for FY69 were approximately $875,000.

b. Damage to Vehicles Due to Enemy Action. No weapons were reported as being damaged as a result of enemy action.

c. Motor Transport.

   (1) During the period, the twenty-nine vehicles of the motor transport section compiled a total of 19,937 accident free miles.

   (2) A total of nine vehicles were deadlined for second echelon repairs during the month. A breakdown by vehicle type is as follows:

           (a) Four M25 2 1/2 ton vehicles

           (b) Three M37E1 3/4 ton vehicles

           (c) One M35, 2 and 1/2 ton vehicle

           (d) One M274A2 1 1/2 ton vehicle

   (3) No vehicles were deadlined for third or fourth echelon repairs.

   (4) A total of 76,000 pounds of supplies were transported by the M35 Headquarters vehicles to all Companies. Cargo consisted of C-rations, ammunition, and field fortification materials.

d. Air Lift. No supplies were air lifted to the Companies during the reporting period.
1. The Headquarters messhall served a total of 12,375 meals during the month.

2. Preparations were made to have barbecues every Sunday for CAG and Group Headquarters personnel and for a minimum of two men from each CAP.

f. Supply.

1. Two contact teams from the 1st Force Service Regiment conducted inspections of weapons at the Headquarters. Limited technical inspections were made on 166 M-16 rifles, six 3.5" rocket launchers, and fifteen M-79 grenade launchers. Minor repairs were made on the spot and, when necessary, weapons were sent to 1st FSR for repair. The on-the-spot repairs saved many hours in the repair cycle.

2. During this period, a total of 27 weapons were repaired by the Group armorer and 61 weapons - 22 M-16s, 20 M-14's, 5 M-60 MG, 2 50cal MG, 1 30cal MG, 4 M-79s, 3 shotguns, 1 45cal pistol, 2 starlight scopes, and 1 60mm mortar - were delivered to 1st FSR for repair.

3. A change in the types and amounts of ammunition stocked at the Headquarters was initiated during this period. The types and amounts were reduced considerably with the decision to stock only for the Headquarters use. All Companies in the future procured all their ammunition from U. S. supporting battalions or directly from the FLC ammunition dumps.

g. Miscellaneous Services.

1. Adequate sewage, plumbing, and electrical repairs were received from Maintenance section, China Beach Public Works, Naval Support Activity, Danang. Some delay was experienced in the repair of light fixtures damaged during the month, but this may be attributed to the large number of repairs needed throughout the Danang East area.

2. The Force Logistics Laundry Platoon has continued to provide good support for both the Headquarters and the Companies. Present turn around time is approximately two days.

h. Supplies. The only noteworthy item of supply received during this period was rucksacks. This item was badly needed for individuals in the mobile CAPs. A sufficient quantity was received to outfit all mobile CAPs.

i. Problem Areas.

1. Communication. The same basic problem area of turn around time in excess of two weeks for the repair of AN/PRC-25 radios still exists. Liaison was made to establish a priority for this unit as was established for other units. Originally, it was agreed to establish priorities but further discussion with FSR revealed that no priorities had been established for this command. The repairs are now made on the basis of the oldest document of the highest priority submitted being repaired.
First, this system was implemented in the latter days of the report. It remains to be seen whether or not the situation improves.

(2) **Supply.** Basically, the same problem noted exists as reported in previous reports. The lack of receipt of T/F tickets is responsible for this unit being in a C-2 rating in the area of equipment/supplies on hand as reported under the FORSTAT System. Examples of shortages are as follows:

(a) Telephone Set, TH/31? 85
(b) Telephone Set TL/11? 190
(c) Radio Control Group, AN/GRA-39 26
(d) Generator Set, KV-452 2
(e) Address Plate Machine 2
(f) Embossing Machine, Address Plate 3
(g) Wrist watch 103
(h) Binoculars, 6x30 60
(i) Mount, Tripod, M22 39
(j) M3 Mount 1/50 Cal., MG 9
(k) Truck, cargo, 3/4 ton, M37 3
(l) Night Vision Scopes 30
a. General. In addition to the Corpsmen providing immediate life-saving medical care for the wounded and conserving the manpower of both Marines and Popular Forces soldiers by the prevention of disease and injury, the CAP Corpsmen have trained Marines and Vietnamese in the duties of a Hospital Corpsman. This emphasis on training selected individuals to perform as Corpsmen during periods when Corpsmen are not available has resulted in having several well-trained Marines and Vietnamese in each Company.

b. Personnel.

(1) Medical Department Representative: HMC H. L. MITCHELL USN

(2) Assistant Medical Department Representative: HMC G. S. RISHL USN

(3) Hospital Corpsman statistics at the end of February 1969.

(a) Detached 4
(b) Joined 5
(c) TAD Terminated 1
(d) Average on board strength 40
(e) Casualties:

(1) KIA 0
(2) WIA & Evaced out of HVN 2
(3) Thrice WIA & Evaced out of HVN 0
(4) Non-Battle Casualties 1

(f) During the month of February 1969 the 2d CAP Aid Station treated 653 USMC/USN personnel through routine sick call.

c. Medical Civic Action Program.

(1) During the month of February 1969 Combined Action Platoon Corpsmen treated 20,442 Vietnamese civilians through routine MedCaps and treated 95 dental patients. MedCap patients treated during February decreased by 6,662. It is felt the decrease in patients was due to the increase in the number of mobile CAPs, the Tet holidays and the increase in hostile action toward the latter part of February.

(2) The Headquarters Medical Section treated 560 Vietnamese civilians during February through daily MedCaps.

d. Training.

(1) During the month of February CAP Hospital Corpsmen conducted a total of 49 classes resulting in a total attendance of 896 Vietnamese civilians and Popular Force soldiers, an increase of 159 Vietnamese present at health and sanitation lectures.
(2) Continued efforts are being made to train Popular Forces Corpsmen in their duties and holding MedCaps.

e. Sanitation.

(1) Routine sanitation inspections were conducted within the Headquarters compound during the month of February. Minor discrepancies were noted and a report of inspections submitted to the Commanding Officer.

(2) Reports of sanitation inspections are submitted in a rough form to the 1st Sergeant and Police Sergeant so action can be taken the same day the discrepancies are noted.

f. Noteworthy items.

(1) The Preventative Medicine Unit of NSA Station Hospital performed a stool survey on 100 persons from CAPs in the 26, 7th and 8th Companies. The survey was conducted to find the percent of 2d CAG personnel with intestinal parasites. An earlier survey conducted in December 1968 revealed 42% of the personnel surveyed had some form of intestinal parasites.

g. Inspections

(1) LT PHODS, Medical Monitor for the Force Surgeon, and HMC M itchell inspected all the CAPs of 2d CAG during the month of February. Sanitation of permanent CAPs and the proper purification of drinking water in mobile CAPs were the most pronounced areas of concern. Corpsmen were instructed to use iodine only for purification of drinking water. Recommendations were also made for the sanitation in the permanent CAPs.
a. Security. A report of transmission security violations for the month of January was received from 1st Radio Battalion. The most serious violations were the disclosures of friendly positions and patrol routes. These violations would not have occurred if the numerical codes issued to all Combined Action Platoons had been utilized. The following corrective measures were taken:

(1) A meeting of all company communication NCOs was held at 2d Combined Action Group Headquarters. The use of the numerical codes and transmission security in general was discussed at length.

(2) Company Commanders were made aware of the violations and are continuing to indoctrinate their radio operators in the importance of proper operating procedures.

b. Combined Action Group Comm-Chief Conference. Comm Chiefs from 1st, 3rd and 4th Combined Action Groups were contacted and requested to submit agenda items to 2d GaG for a conference to be held in March.

c. Communication Insections. February's communication inspections reflected professionalism and close attention to proper maintenance which resulted in 100% communications during a period of increased enemy activity. In most cases all end items were completed and those missing parts were on order through headquarters comm.

d. Equipment Status. Three of the four AN/VRC-125 mounts acquired in January were put into operation. They were installed in the Executive Officer's and S-3 Officer's vehicles and Headquarters Combat Operation Center.

e. Combat Operation Center. Overall total communications traffic decreased by approximately 10% during February, however, spot reports and casualty reports increased approximately 25% due to accelerated enemy activity. The following communications traffic was passed through the Combat Operations Center on various nets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incoming Messages</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgoing Messages</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spot Reports</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Reports</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty Reports</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Traffic</td>
<td>983</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: The above information is documented in communications logs located in the Combat Operations Center.

f. Communications Supply. And items and components of end items were in adequate stock during the entire month. Requisitions for T/E items are still outstanding with the exception of one switchboard SB-22PL which was received and installed in the Combat Operations Center. Requisition status of component items are as follows:
h. Maintenance. A minimum of 10 pieces of equipment were in 1st FSR for repair throughout the month of February. This was due to inadequate float for KT-505 radio sets in the direct exchange system. Turn around time for KT-505's average 10 to 21 days which was inconvenient and highly unsatisfactory. Maintenance support provided by 1st FSR was as follows:

- Work Requests submitted: 78
- Work Requests completed: 62
- Work Requests code "H": 6
- Work Requests incomplete: 10

* 24 from December and January
PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1 Feb
CAP 2-7-4 and 2-6-4, Hoi Vang District, Quang Nam Province, were officially deactivated on 1 February 1969 at 1600H.

2 Feb
CAP 2-1-5 VN children turned in (9) 105 rounds. A VIP fund reward was paid.

3 Feb
CAP 2-1-3 previously located at AT945696 has been redesignated as mobile CAP 2-1-3 effective 1600H. The mobile CAP will operate in the vicinity of AT9370, AT9470 and AT9269.

4 Feb
CAP 2-1-5 patrol found (1) 122mm rocket warhead and (3) 122mm rocket propellants buried in the ground at AT954653.

CAP 2-5-7 was transferred from it's old location at BM010722 to new TACG vicinity of AT9371 and AT9471 and Northern section of AT9470 at 1200H.

6 Feb
CAP 2-5-5 VN children turned in (1) 155 round, (1) 106 round, (4) 105 rounds and (1) 3.5 WP round. A VIP fund reward was paid.

CAP 2-3-1 previously located at BM043621 has been changed to mobile Combined Action Platoon 2-3-1 operating in the vicinity of BM0656 and BM0755.

7 Feb
CAP 2-3-3 VN male civilian notified 2-3-3 of location of a Phantom 4 ejection seat. Area was checked for pilot and other plane parts with negative results. Proper authorities were notified. A VIP fund reward was paid.

8 Feb 69
CAP 2-5-4 VN civilians turned in (10) 81mm illum rounds, (2) 60mm illum rounds, (2) M-26 grenades and (7½) lbs of C-4. A VIP fund reward was paid.

CAP 2-7-5 VN civilian informed CAP of location of a 60mm mortar round. Round was blown in place. A VIP fund reward was paid.
CAP 2-9-2 previously located at AT865497 was changed to mobile CAP 2-9-2 operating in the vicinity of AT8648, AT8649 and the western half of AT8748.

CAP 2-5-4 a checkpoint set up by CAP 2-5-4 at AT986282 caught 6 VC who were on the local Blacklist. Results: 6 VC KIA

CAP 2-9-1 Village Chief brought a Chieu Hoi to CAP 2-9-1's compound. Results: 1 Chieu Hoi

CAP 2-8-3 patrol found 1 wounded NVA at grid AT907822. Results: 1 NVA POW

CAP 2-5-4 checkpoint captured 4 VC on the local Blacklist. Results: 4 VC KIA

CAP 2-2-2 spotted 2 VC approximately 300 meters from their blocking position. 2-2-2 opened fire killing both VC. Results: 2 VC KIA

CAP 2-5-4 checkpoint captured 1 VC on Blacklist. Results: 1 VC KIA.

10 Feb

11 Feb

Cap 2-5-5 VN children turned in (3) 105 rounds. Mounds blown in place. A VIP fund reward was paid.

CAP 2-2-4 civilians informed CAP 2-2-4 that some VC wanted to Chieu Hoi at AT 864573. 2-2-4 sent a patrol to investigate. Patrol found 5 VC had surrendered to PF's from 2-2-4. Two more VC turned themselves over to the patrol. Results: 7 Hoi Chans and 1 AK-47 captured.

CAP 2-2-4 a patrol from 2-2-4 was ambushed by 12 VC at grid AT859569. Patrol returned fire and a reaction force from 1/7 and 2-2-4 went to patrol's assistance. Villagers confirmed that 2 VC seen to fall during firefight were KIA. Results: 2 VC KIA.

12 Feb

CAP 2-5-4 picked up a VN male for questioning at AT982682. His name was on the Hoa Vang District Blacklist. Results: 1 VC POW.

CAP 2-4-1 apprehended 2 VC snipers at E166577. They had been identified by a sniper who had been apprehended by district officials earlier. Results: 2 VC POW.
CAP 2-3-6 2 VN children turned in (2) VC mines rigged as booby traps. Mines were destroyed in place. A VIP fund reward was paid.

14 Feb

CAP 2-3-5 ambushed 10 to 12 VC at B0706556 with small arms and M-79 fire. A sweep of the area turned up 2 VC KIA. A picture of 1 of the KIA's led to the apprehension of 2 VCS. Results: 2 VC KIA, 2 VCS, 1 SKS and 1 M-79 captured.

15 Feb

CAP 2-4-2 VN female informed CAP location of booby trapped 20mm round. Round was destroyed in place. A VIP fund reward was paid.

CAP 2-3-2 patrol spotted and opened fire on 8-10 VC at B050615. The VC returned fire then broke contact. A fire mission was called in and the area swept. Sweep force found 1 VC KIA. Results: 1 VC KIA.

18 Feb

CAP 2-9-2 killed 3 VC, when patrol checked on information received from civilians at AB662433. Results: 3 VC KIA, 2 AK-47's, 1 M2 Carbine, 5 chicom grenades and assorted 7.62 gear captured.

CAP 2-3-6 patrol ambushed a small group of VC at B065592. A sweep of the area revealed 3 VC KIA, 2 AK-47's and 1 SKS. Another sweep at first light resulted in 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47. Results: 4 VC KIA, 3 AK-47's and 1 SKS captured.

CAP 2-4-2 engaged and killed 1 VC that their patrol discovered hiding in a house. Five civilians were also in the house. One of them was KIA the other were taken as VCS. Results: 2 VC KIA, 4 VCS, 1 SKS, 2 M-26 grenades, and 2 chicom grenades captured.

19 Feb

CAP 2-3-3 patrol engaged approximately 1 squad of VC/NVA at B049579. A reaction force from 2-3-3 joined the fire fight and the enemy broke contact. Illumination was called and artillery was fired on possible routes of egress. Results: 2 NVA KIA, 1 AK-47, 2 chicom grenades, and numerous papers were captured.
CAP 2-7-5 4 VN children reported location of (2) 81mm illum rounds, (3) 60mm illum rounds (5) M-79 rounds and (1) M-26 grenade. Rounds were blown in place. A VIP fund reward was paid.

CAP 2-4-3 the pointman of the patrol spotted and opened fire on 1 VC. An estimated 10 to 12 concealed enemy opened fire on the patrol. The enemy broke contact before a reaction force from 2-4-3 arrived. Results: 1 VC KIA, 1 60mm mortar baseplate, 1 cigarette case bearing the name D. J. FOSHER.

CAP 2-4-3 previously located at BT177585 has been changed to Mobile Combined Action Platoon 2-4-3 effective at 1800H operating in the vicinity of BT1658 and BT1758.

CAP 2-5-5 VN boy turned in (1) NVA gas mask at BT016665. A VIP fund reward was paid.

22 Feb

23 Feb

CAP 2-3-6 ambushed a squad of VC at BT064586. VC returned fire then broke contact. Sporadic fire continued until daylight. A sweep was made at first light with the following results: 5 VC KIA, 3 AK-47's, 1 Chicom LMG, 1 Bangalore torpedo, 7 B-40 rocket rounds and 10 chicom grenades captured.

CAP 2-5-3 was attacked at BT02741. CAP returned fire. Contact continued until daylight. A sweep at first light resulted: in 7 VC KIA, 3 VC POW, 3 AK-47's, 5 B-40 rocket rounds and boosters, 1 Rocket launcher 1 satchel charge and 5 chicom grenades captured.

CAP 2-1-3 was called in as a reaction force by CAP 2-1-4 at 0625H. Reaction force engaged the enemy at 0645H. Received 4 RPG rounds and numerous small arms fire. 2-1-3 and 2-1-4 swept the area and found 1 NVA KIA and captured 3 bangalore torpedoes.

CAP 2-7-5 spotted and took under 500cal fire a VC rocket site at AT972571. The VC ceased firing rockets. A sweep by 1/26 led to 6 122mm rockets and 1 rocket launcher.

CAP 2-7-6 in search of previous night's contact found 1 NVA KIA, 1 NVA mine, 2 chicom grenades and a notebook at grid BT05703.
CAP 2-1-4 while on patrol made contact with the enemy at AT956688. Killed 2 NVA and captured 1 AK-47, 1 RPG launcher, 1 RPG round and 2 grenades.

CAP 2-4-3 made contact with 5 VC at grid BE168576. Results: 3 VC KIA. Search in morning revealed 2 more VC KIA for a total of 5 VC KIA.

CAP 2-1-6 VN civilians informed CAP to location of 6 mines buried in road vicinity of AT900716. Mines were removed and taken to 2-1-6's position and destroyed.

CAP 2-5-7 VN boy turned in 4 chicom grenades and a AK-47 magazine with 30 rounds. A VIP fund reward was paid.

CAP 2-4-2 while on patrol, observed 2 to 3 VC in a boat at BE18557. Opened fire killing 2 VC and destroying 1 boat.

CAP 2-1-6 received reports from the people's Defense Group that they had killed one NVA and captured his AK-47 at AT913733 and that there were more NVA in the area. The CAP began to sweep the area and came under small arms fire from unknown enemy force. CAP called an air strike which killed 5 NVA KIA and 3 AK-47's captured.

CAP 2-5-3 while on patrol after air strikes and artillery had been called in, found 1 pair of boots with feet and legs still in boots. Results: 1 VC KIA.

CAP 2-1-1 while patrol was sweeping area of previous battle found 10 NVA bodies, 1 anti-aircraft 50Cal machine gun and numerous grenades at AT934698.

CAP 2-2-4 was taken under fire by 6 VC. The CAP returned fire killing 1 VC woman and recovered 12 bottles of penicillin, 100 lbs of propaganda papers and 2 NVA flags.

CAP 2-1-5 swept area of previous engagement at AT947672 and AT945675. Came under heavy enemy fire resulting in 8 NVA KIA. Captured 1 anti-aircraft machine gun, 1 French light machine gun, 6 AK-47's, and 2 80 mm rockets and other miscellaneous ordnance and gear.
24 Feb

CAP 2-5-3 was credited with 14 VC KIA as 3/1 swept through the area where CAP 2-5-3 had directed tank fire on a rocket firing site. Results: 14 VC KIA.

CAP 2-4-3 was hit by an unknown number of enemy. The CAP returned M-79 rounds and SAF and requested an 81mm illumination mission. Results: 1 VC KIA.

CAP 2-5-6 VN children turned in (1) bangalore torpedo, (1) 8 inch round, (2) B-40 rockets, (1) 81mm WP round, and (1) Chicom grenade. A VIP fund reward was paid.

CAP 2-4-5 was attacked by an unknown size enemy force at BT167573. Results: 2 VC KIA, 1 Carbine and 1 AK-47 captured.

CAP 2-1-4 while sweeping area found 5 NVA KIA at AT946697. The scene of previous 2-1-4's fire mission.

CAP 2-7-5 sprung an ambush on 3 VC. 1 female VC was shot and others fled in all directions. Results: 1 VC KIA.

CAP 2-1-3 results of sweep conducted by 2-1-3 from 250920H to 251900H. Sweep came under heavy enemy fire at AT930698. 2-1-3 called in artillery, gunships and air strikes. 2-1-2 and 2-1-4 went to 2-1-3's aid. Results: 9 NVA KIA.

25 Feb

CAP 2-3-3 VN boy reported location of an AK-47 rifle. Rifle was captured. A VIP fund reward was paid.

CAP 2-5-6 2 VN boys turned in 1 60mm illumination round, 2 M-26 grenades, and 2 Chicom grenades. Ordnance was blown in place. A VIP fund reward was paid.

CAPs 2-1-2, 2-1-3 and 2-1-4 sweep by CAPs resulted in 4 NVA bodies found, 4 AK-47's, 1 SKS, 1 Chicom assault rifle, 1 Chicom light machine gun, 4 B-40 rockets and numerous grenades captured at AT930698, AT929698, and AT935695.

26 Feb

CAP 2-3-3 while on patrol in the vicinity of BT051572 found 2 NVA bodies. The CAP had been informed of the bodies by local VN civilians.
27 Feb

CAP 2-5-6 Six VN children turned in 1 AK-47 rifle, 1 AK-47 magazine, 161 rounds 7.62 short, 3 chicom grenades, 2 rifle grenades, 5 M-26 grenades, 1 M-79 round, 72 30-cal rounds linked and 70 7.62 rounds linked. A VIP fund reward was paid.

CAP 2-1-6 on a sweep found 2 NVA KIA and 1 VC KIA at AT902747. The bodies appear to have been hit by artillery fire. A further search discovered 10 NVA bodies buried in graves, and assorted ordnance and equipment. Results: 12 NVA KIA, 1 VC KIA, 1 chicom grenade, and 2 60mm rounds captured.

CAP 2-1-1 while on patrol in the vicinity of AT916711 found 4 NVA bodies. Results: 4 NVA KIA.

CAP 2-2-2 while on patrol received fire from an estimated VC squad in the vicinity of AT944574. The patrol returned fire killing 1 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA.

CAP 2-5-7 VN children turned in 8 chicom grenades, 1 AK-47 magazine and 200 rounds AK-47 ammo. A VIP fund reward was paid.

CAGO 2-3 called TOT on a suspected enemy position at BX0459. ARVN soldiers searched the area and found 8 NVA KIA. Results: 8 NVA KIA.
PART IV
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. Change in 2d CAG CAP Status Letters to CG, III MAF, 8, 9, 10, 11 Oct 1969

2. CAP Commanders Conference Notes 2 Feb 1969

3. CG, 2d CAG Memo 3/Mar and over 3/20 of 11 Feb 1969

4. Group Order 4050.1; Handling of Personal Effects, 11 Mar 69

5. Group Bulletin 1710; Wearing of Civilian Clothing while traveling on R&R Aircraft, 19 Mar 69

6. Group Order 1050.1; Off limits Area and Curfew, 20 Mar 69

7. Pictures of ordnance turned in under VIP

8. Ordnance turned in under VIP Funds

DECLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
PO San Francisco, California 96602

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: Assistant
Chief of Staff Combined Action Program)

Subj: Change in 2d Combined Action Group status; Report of

Ref: (a) CO 2d CAG ltr 3/MJD/jmm over 5300 of 1 Jan 1969
(b) CAG FTRAC No. 33

1. The following changes are reported.

a. CAPs 2-7-4 and 2-8-4, Hoa Vang District, Quang Ninh Province, were
officially deactivated on 1 February 1969 at 1600H in accordance with
references (a) and (b).

(1) The PF's from platoon number 39 will continue to man the old
2-7-4 compound until reassigned by the Hoa Vang District Chief.

(2) The PF's from platoon number 31 will continue to man the old
2-8-4 compound until reassigned by the Hoa Vang District Chief.

(3) The Marine element of CAP's 2-7-4 and 2-8-4 have been reassigned
throughout 2d CAG in accordance with tactical priorities established by
this Headquarters.

E. L. LEMIS
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: Assistant Chief of Staff Combined Action Program)

Subj: Change of CAP Status, Report of

1. The following change is reported.

   a. CAP 2-1-3 previously located at AT945698 has been redesignated as mobile CAP 2-1-3 effective 1600H 3 February 1969. The mobile CAP will operate in its assigned TAOC in the vicinity of grids AT9370, AT9470 and AT9269.

   (1) Cap 2-1-3 mobile retains the same PF platoon. The compound has been turned over to the District Chief, Hieu Duc District and will be used by the Village Chief of Tuy Loan as the village headquarters.

   [Signature]

   B. L. Lewis
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/18/69
31211
5 February 1969

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: Assistant Chief of Staff Combined Action Program)

Subj: Change in 2d Combined Action Group Status; Report of

1. The following change is reported,

   a. The Marine element of CAP 2-8-7 was transferred from its old location at HT010722 to a new TAOC vicinity of AT9371 and AT9471 and Northern section of AT9470 at 1200H 4 February 1969. The new mobile CAP 2-5-7 operating in this area has platoon number 47 assigned with them.

   b. The old 2-5-7 compound will continue to be manned by PF platoon number 52 until they are reassigned sometime this month by the Hon Yung District Chief.

   E. L. LEMS
From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: Assistant Chief of Staff Combined Action Program)  

Subj: Change in 2d Combined Action Group Status; Report of 

1. The following changes are submitted.

a. CAP 2-3-1 previously located at BT043621 has been changed to mobile CAP 2-3-1 effective 6 February 1969. The CAP will operate in the vicinity of BT0656 and BT0755 augmenting CAP 2-3-5 in their TACG until their new operating area vicinity of BT0758 and BT0759 is cleared after current operations. CAP 2-3-1 retained their old IF platoon in this move of TACG's. 

   (1) The old 2-3-1 compound has been turned over to IF units who are now guarding the Thanh Quoi bridge.

b. CAP 2-9-2 previously located at MS65487 was changed to mobile CAP 2-9-2 on 9 February 1969. They will operate in their same assigned TACG vicinity of AT048, AT049, and the western half of AT0748. CAP 2-9-2 (mobile) retains IF platoon number 121 in its present location.  

   (1) The old 2-9-2 compound has been leveled and is nonexistent except for barb wire which was not removed because of numerous unplotted old French mine fields within the wire.

[Signature]

E. L. Liles
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: Assistant Chief of Staff Combined Action Program)

Subj: Change in 2d Combined Action Group Status; Report of

1. The following change is submitted,

   a. CAP 2-4-3 previously located at BT177585 has been changed to mobile Combined Action Platoon 2-4-3 effective 1800H 20 February 1969. The mobile Combined Action Platoon will operate in the vicinity of grids BT1658 and BT1758.

   b. Combined Action Platoon 2-4-3 mobile retains the same RF Platoon. The compound has been turned over to the District Chief, Hieu Nhon District and will be used as a RF base of operations.

[Signature]
E.L. Lewis

UNCLASSIFIED
CAP Commanders Conference Notes 2 Feb 1969

Major DUHE opened the conference and discussed all agenda items stressing coordination, plans, supervision, security, alertness and professionalism. He described how all these essential items are blended together in the accomplishment of the CAP mission. The conference continued on discussions of items presented by Major DUHE. The CAG 1st Sgt acted as moderator to the general discussion period. At the termination of the conference, Lt Col LEWIS, 2d CAG Commanding Officer spoke to the assembled CAP Commanders and reiterated the necessity for professionalism and attention to details. Major DUHE closed the conference with an answer period and general remarks.

It was unanimously agreed that these monthly conferences are a big help as the free exchange of ideas helps all commanders. The CAP Commanders share on the voluminous experience of their contemporaries and problem areas are aired and ironed out.

General notes of topics:

Intelligence:

Intelligence sources disclose that the enemy is planning for another TET Offensive. According to sources there is to be an increase in enemy activity commencing 3 Feb and peaking around 12-15 February. This period will be an opportune time for Charlie to make his move as March is known for its overcast weather and there will be no moon at all during the period push is expected.

The enemy has selected small isolated units, such as CAPs, as prime targets. CAPs must be exceptionally alert. How a CAP comes out of this offensive rests on the professionalism of CAP Commanders and each of their men.

Every CAP in 2d CAG has an equal chance of being hit. During this time no one is immune. Due to this, priorities on personnel assignments in 2d CAG have been deferred to allow us to bring all CAPs up to an average strength. We will assign priorities commensurate with the tactical situation.

1. Coordination with friendly units: Daily coordination with all friendly units in your TAOC is a must. This includes RD's, EP's and local defense groups. Failure to coordinate could be disastrous, especially where mobile CAPs are concerned.

2. Use of local defense groups and RD's can greatly bolster your defense plan. However, it should be remembered, these persons receive very little if any training, don't rely completely on them. If possible get these people to train with you. If they are unwilling to train resolve this with your CACO's and he'll get action started on the District level.
3. Security in compounds at day and night sites and on activities is a must. No matter how good your wire and bunkers are or what type of weapons you have at your disposal, a lax security system will wipe you out. CAP Commanders must ensure that security is tight. Marine NCO's should be up and about at all times to ensure security is tight and alert.

4. Assigning dependable men to lead your activities is one method of being reasonably sure your activities are being run where they are suppose to. There's only one way to be absolutely sure, that's to take them out yourself. CAP Commanders should take activities out two or three times a week. There are no CAP orders prohibiting CAP Commanders from leaving activities or better yet accompanying activities to measure proficiency, correct deficiencies, and properly evaluate the level of training.

5. Sound preplanned supporting fires. Everyone knows the importance of this subject. The only issue brought up on this was that of Mobile CAPs if they should get in a position where it would be necessary to call VT on their position. It was mentioned that a good sturdy family bunker might prove sufficient cover if you are in a position to utilize such. Cons to this are your limited fields of fire danger of booby traps and possibility of VC being in bunker before you.

6. Reaction plans should be worked out in detail utilizing any friendly in striking distance. If you have no reaction force or your reaction forces from supporting units are unreliable develop an alternate plan. CAP's can react for each other, your own activity can react for your compound or haven site and vice versa. It might also be possible to work something out with AD's or civilian defense groups in your area. All available assets should be evaluated.

7. Basic safety procedures in and out of compounds should be stressed to all of your personnel - FF's and Marines. Preplanned pass words and signals should be utilized ensuring everyone fully understands the pass word or signal being used at that time. The pass word or signal should be changed daily. If you use a number code, don't cut the number in half. As an example if your number is 8 don't change with the number 4. Charlie might repeat what you said and give the answer you want.

b. Mobile CAPs

1. Selection of haven sites should be made well in advance and all appropriate units notified.

2. Setting of patterns is accomplished mostly through want of comfort. If the going is easier in one area than in another Marines tend to take the easy route and Charlie knows this.

Some CAP's are restricted in movement due to the terrain they operate in. As was brought out in the meeting this can sometimes be corrected by traveling the miserable routes such as crossing through
3. When using a village as a haven that you have used before don't use the same houses as you did the time before. Perhaps you haven't used this site in sometime and feel it's safe. If you stay in the same house you're setting a pattern Charlie will use it against you.

4. When in your haven site do not pick the best looking or best built homes to stay in. Americans are known for their love of comfort and wanting the best of everything. The enemy is well aware of this. If he expects your in a particular area he'll probably check the best homes first.

5. Utilize not only your own people but through proper coordination all friendly units in your TAOC to ensure a good tight defense system throughout your TAOC. Don't have all your assets bunched into one area leaving the remainder of your TAOC open.

6. A solid communications plan and alternate communications plan is a must for every combat unit. This is essential in the event you must split your force into more elements than you have communications gear. Any number of means can be used to accomplish this, example: radio and flares, voice and flares, whistle etc.

7. It is very important to keep everyone up to date on anything that could affect your unit. Such as friendly and enemy situation in area, who is going on activities and where activities will be. Every last man on activities must be thoroughly briefed.

8. Insure everyone knows their chain of command down to and including the last man on all activities. In the event of casualties you always have someone in charge.

9. Assign assistant gunners throughout your chain of command for all crew served weapons. In units lacking sufficient strength, properly trained PF's serve adequately as assistant gunners.

10. The key to the success of our mission is PROFESSIONALISM. Don't settle for anything less from your men. The lives of all, too often rest with the action or lack of action of one man.
MEMORANDUM

From:  Commanding Officer
To:    All Combined Action Company Commanders

Subj:  Discharge of Weapons Indiscriminately

Ref:   (a) CC III NAF/SA I CORPS 060912Z Feb 69
       (b) CC III NAF/SA I CORPS 020014Z Jan 69

1. There have been numerous instances in the past in which rifles, machine guns and flares have been indiscriminately fired into the air in celebration or otherwise. Reference (a) addresses this matter and enjoins commanders to take preventive measures to restrain such actions, particularly during TET, pointing out that this practice is wasteful of ammunition, is possibly helpful to the enemy, endangers friendly troops and civilians and is a clear evidence of lack of discipline.

2. Reference (b) cited a recent order from CC I CORPS which makes indiscriminate firing by ARVN members a court-martial offense. We must never place ourselves in a position of encouraging such violations by ARVN, by being permissive or lax in fire discipline among U.S. units. It is therefore vital that U.S. commanders (Combined Action Company commanders) re-examine their orders, instructions and overall guidance to prevent indiscriminate firing and to ensure that violations are treated as serious infractions of discipline.

E. L. Lewis
GROUP ORDER 4050.1

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Handling of Personal Effects

Ref: (a) MO 4050.3B
(b) FOxO 4050.1B

1. Purpose. To establish procedures for the processing of personal effects of members of this organization.

2. Background. The control of the personal effects of personnel medical evacuated or otherwise involuntarily separated from their effects is a command responsibility. The increasing number of discrepancies in the handling of personal effects necessitates increased command interest and attention on all levels.

3. Action. Personal effects of individuals concerned will be processed in the following manner.

   a. When an individual is separated from his unit for a period in excess of one week or med-evac from the field for any period, his personal effects must be turned in.

   b. A thorough search will be conducted to insure that all of the individual's gear is recovered.

   c. CACO/CAP Commanders will ensure that personal effects are properly tagged with the individual's name, rank and med-evac number, and will sign that tag, attesting to the fact that all of the individual's personal effects are included.

   d. Personal effects will be turned into the 2d CAG warehouse not later than 48 hours following an individual's departure. Rifles and magazines will be receipted for at the Armory. All other gear will be receipted for at the warehouse.
e. Personal effects will be inventoried and shipped upon notification that the individual has been transferred from this Organization. In cases where an individual is returned to duty, his personal effects will be returned to him as they were received from the unit.

f. In accordance with references (a) and (b), all government property and non-shipable items will be removed prior to shipment. All containers will be banded immediately after inventory.

g. One copy of the inventory, plus a copy of the orders will be filed, all remaining copies will accompany the personal effects to place of shipment.

h. Receipts from the shipper will be filed with the individual's copies of inventory and orders.

i. Company Commanders will insure strict compliance with time frames and procedures established herein commensurate with the tactical situation.

E. L. LEWIS

DISTRIBUTION: "A"
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

GROUP BULLETIN 1710

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Wearing of Civilian Clothing while traveling on R&R Aircraft

Ref: (a) COMUSMACV msg 100341Z FEB 69

1. PURPOSE. To promulgate instructions for wearing of civilian clothing while traveling on R&R Aircraft.

2. INFORMATION.

   a. Effective 15 February 1969 Civilian Clothing is authorized for optional wear by all personnel on R&R Aircraft (including leave) destined for all R&R sites except Hong Kong and Taipei. Appropriate authorized service uniforms will continue to be worn by military personnel aboard R&R Aircraft to and from Hong Kong and Taipei.

   b. Personnel desiring to wear civilian clothes aboard R&R Aircraft may wear civilian attire while at the R&R processing center.

   c. There will be no mixing of distinctive military uniform items with civilian clothes, except that military low quarter shoes may be worn.

   d. Personnel departing on R&R aircraft whether in uniform or civilian attire, carry with them the responsibility of representing the military in the eyes of the public, dress must be suitable to the occasion and must not bring discredit upon the United States.

   e. The following standards of civilian attire will be adhered to, personnel not meeting these standards will not, repeat will not, be issued a boarding pass.

      (1) Shirts-Dress shirts and sport shirts are acceptable. Unacceptable are sweet shirts, athletic shirts, shirts with printed novelty slogans, and white or camouflage colored T-shirts normally worn as undergarments. Only shirts with a squared bottom may be worn outside the trousers.
GrpRol 1710
19 Feb 1969

(2). Trousers-Slacks may be worn. Unacceptable are: Blue-jeans, shorts, cotton khaki uniform trousers.

(3). Footgear and socks must be worn: civilian shoes, military low quarters, tennis shoes/sneakers, and sandals. Unacceptable, boots, shower shoes, and other generally unacceptable footwear.

(4). All clothing must be clean, in good condition, and present a good appearance within the guidelines set forth above.

f. Utilities will be worn when departing the compound for the R&R center. Ample facilities are available at the R&R center to change to appropriate civilian attire prior to boarding the R&R Aircraft.

3. Self-Cancellation. This bulletin is self-canceled on 31 August 1969.

[Signature]
R. G. BROAD
By direction

DISTRIBUTION: "A"
GROUP ORDER 1050.1

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Off Limits Area and Curfew

Ref: (a) ICCI 1050.50

Memo: (1) Authorization to depart Compound

1. Purpose. To establish policy and disseminate information concerning areas that are off limits and curfew as required by reference (a).

2. Cancellation. Group Order 5050.1

3. Background

   a. Reference (a) establishes policy relative to curfew and off limits areas within ICTZ. Change 1 thereto recognizes the existence of a unique situation within the Combined Action Program, and exempts "CAP personnel who will wear their CAP badges prominently displayed to insure ready identification."

   b. It is imperative that the spirit of this exemption be borne in mind. A close social relationship with the people of the villages to which CAP’s are assigned is directly contributory to the CAP mission. At the same time, particular care must be exercised to ensure that the personal conduct of CAP Marines is never brought into question, either by Vietnamese civilians, or Vietnamese or American Military Personnel. A strong sense of responsibility on the part of every CAP Marine, and daily supervision and guidance by every CAP Commander is mandatory.

4. Action

   a. Group Headquarters

      (1) Curfew for Group Headquarters Compound personnel is from 1800 to 0600 daily, except for personnel on official business, or when specifically authorized by the Commanding Officer on an
individual case-by-case basis.

(2) The Old China Beach access road to the Group Headquarters is off limits to foot traffic at all times, except for authorized Combat patrols.

(3) The following are off limits at all times:

(a) Cities, villages, and hamlets in the Danang Area, except on official business or when specifically authorized by the Commanding Officer on an individual case-by-case basis.

(b) All restaurants, cafes, night clubs, street vendors, and catering places serving food and/or beverages, except those specifically operated by U.S. Forces or approved by a Flag or General Officer for use by Government personnel. All such establishments operated by U.S. Forces or by U.S. Government Agencies are authorized places.

(c) All markets, stores, shops, booths, artifacts stands, and other retail outlets for merchandise not operated by the AAFES or under license by a U.S. Government Agency.

(d) All establishments not under direct U.S. Government Agency supervision which render individual services, such as car washes, barber shops, shoe shines parlors, Turkish baths, massages, tattoo parlors, or bawdy houses.

(e) All places of entertainment such as theaters, dance halls, brothels, fortune tellers, etc., unless under direct U.S. Government Agency operation or supervision.

(f) All Vietnamese military cantonments, quarters, areas and business areas within or adjacent to them.

(g) All forms of Vietnamese civilian transportation.

b. Combined Action Companies/Platoons

(1) All establishments not under direct U.S. Government Agency supervision which render individual services, such as car washes, barber shops, shoe shines parlors, Turkish baths, massages, tattoo parlors, or bawdy houses.

(2) All places of entertainment such as theaters, dance halls, brothels, fortune tellers, etc., unless under direct U.S. Government Agency operation or supervision.
(3) All forms of Vietnamese civilian transportation.

c. Combined Action Company Commanders will establish and publish curfew and off limits guidelines for CAPs commensurate with the mission requirements of each.

d. Company Commanders/Section Heads will effect maximum dissemination of this order to ensure that all personnel are familiar with and adhere to this order.

e. The Group First Sergeant will ensure the contents of this order are explained to all Combined Action Program School Students upon the convening of each class.

f. Should the necessity arise for any member of the Command in the rank of Sergeant or below, to exit the Combined Action Group Compounds in other than a duly dispatched military vehicle, he will obtain authorization in the form of enclosure (1) which will be signed by an Officer or his designated Staff Noncommissioned Officer.

E. L. LEWIS

DISTRIBUTION: "A"

UNCLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORIZATION TO LEAVE THE DANANG COMBINED ACTION GROUP COMPOUND

DATE: __________________________

TIME: __________________________

1. ___________________________ is authorized to leave the CAG compound to conduct official business in accordance with Opn 1050.1

2. MISSION/DESTINATION: ________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________

U.S. SE

Enclosure (1)
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