SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, 2d CAG ltr 3/LEN/gbs over 3000 of 31Oct69

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code HD)

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 August to 31 August 1969

1. The subject chronology has been reviewed for completeness and is forwarded herewith.

R. B. WHITE
By direction

Copy to:
CO, 2d CAG
CONFIDENTIAL (Unclassified upon removal from the basic letter)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 2d GAG ltr 3/LEH/gbs over 3000 of 31Oct69

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 August to 31 August 1969

1. Forwarded.

L.E. Pogge Meyer
BY DIRECTION

Copy to:
CO, 2dGAG

DECLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602
3/LEN/jbs
3000
31 October 1969

UNCLASSIFIED
(Unclassified when enclosure (1) is removed)

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO30)
Via: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 August to 31 August 1969

Ref: (a) 300-2750.1A
(b) FAPAC 9750.1A

Encl: (2) 2d Combined Action Group Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is reprinted.

2. Enclosure (1) is downgraded at 8 year intervals. Declassification after 12 years. 500 Directive 5200.10

S. C. Christiansen
G. F. CHRISTENSEN

DECLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS  
2d Combined Action Group  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
1 August 1969 to 31 August 1969

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<th>Page</th>
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</tbody>
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UNCLASSIFIED  
INELIGIBLE FOR ARCHIVAL RETENTION:
S.A.A. NOT MORE THAN 12 YEARS

DECLASSIFIED
### PART I

#### ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2d Combined Action Group</td>
<td>LtCol E. L. LEMIS</td>
<td>1 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### SUBORDINATE UNITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. J. E. SEITZ</td>
<td>1 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capt. H. A. BAKER</td>
<td>8 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Combined Action Company</td>
<td>1stLt. P. E. EBAUGH Jr.</td>
<td>1 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. W. J. CAMPBELL</td>
<td>1 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. D. A. VOELKESBANG</td>
<td>1 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Maj. A. H. MOORE</td>
<td>1 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. G. E. BROWN</td>
<td>1 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. A. P. TOWNSZ</td>
<td>1 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capt. R. D. TOMLIN</td>
<td>15 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Combined Action Company</td>
<td>Capt. D. D. DEAN</td>
<td>1 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### ATTACHED UNITS

- Detachment, Scout Dog Platoon, 3rd M. P. Battalion
- Detachment, Kit Carson Scouts, 1st MarDiv G-2 (C-I)
- Detachment, ARVN Interpreters/Translators, III MAF
- Detachment, Medical Section, HQ, III MAF
2. Locations.

1 August 1969 to 31 August 1969

- 2d CAC
  - CACO 2-1
  - CACO 2-2
  - CACO 2-3
  - CACO 2-4
  - CACO 2-5
  - CACO 2-6
  - CACO 2-7
  - CACO 2-8
  - CACO 2-9

Hieu Nhơn District, Quảng Nam Province, RVN
Hieu Duc District, Quảng Nam Province, RVN
Dai Loc District, Quảng Nam Province, RVN
Đîn Ban District, Quảng Nam Province, RVN
Hieu Nhơn District, Quảng Nam Province, RVN
Hoa Vang District, Quảng Nam Province, RVN
Hoa Vang District, Quảng Nam Province, RVN
Hoa Vang District, Quảng Nam Province, RVN
Duc Duc District, Quảng Nam Province, RVN

5. Staff Officers.

Executive Officer/Civic Action
S-5 Officer

Major J. A. McCAPTY  1 Aug - 31 Aug 69

S-1 Officer

1stLt. H. NAGAI  1 Aug - 31 Aug 69

S-2/S-3 Officer

Major L. E. NUGENT  1 Aug - 31 Aug 69

Asst S-2/S-3 Officer

1stLt. P. E. CASWELL  1 Aug - 31 Aug 69

S-4 Officer/Supply Officer

Capt. C. A. BURN  1 Aug - 31 Aug 69

4. Average Monthly Strength.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>ENL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>ENL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DECLASSIFIED

PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. Personnel Administration.

   a. Joined and Transferred. During the month of August, the 2d Combined Action Group joined and transferred the following number of personnel listed in the four categories below:

      (1) Joined
          Officers                      Enlisted
           2                            124

      (2) Rotated CONUS
          Officers                      Enlisted
           1                            80

      (3) Transferred within WestPac Command
          Officers                      Enlisted
           1                            4

      (4) Transferred by SR w/sick (out of country hospitals)
          Officers                      Enlisted
           0                            28

   b. Awards.

      (1) Award recommendations during the reporting month were processed and forwarded to FMFPac for approval as follows:

          Heroic                              End of Tour

          USMC                                 USN
          BS          NOM          BS          BS          NOM          NOM
          0            1            0            2           15           12

      (2) Fifty one personnel of the Group also received Purple Heart medals as a result of combat wounds received during the month.

   c. Casualties. Casualties during the month of August were as follows:

          KIA       DOW       DAI       WIA       WIANs      NBC

          USMC      4         1         0         29         20         1
          USN       1         0         0         1          1         0

1-3

DECLASSIFIED
d. Comprints/Splints/Welfare. This group did not process any congressional or special interest correspondence during the month of August. However the Administrative section did process a total of 11 welfare reports during the reporting period.

e. Legal. Legal activities during the reporting month were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article 32 Investigations</th>
<th>Informal Investigations</th>
<th>NIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOC: 8  SPC: 0

f. Morale and Welfare. The morale of the unit continues to be high and recreational activity is available to all hands.

g. The following Rest and Recuperation (R&R) leave quotas, out of country, were received and utilized:

1) Out of Country R&R - Quotas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Utilized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

h. Promotions. Promotions affected during the month of August were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meritorious</th>
<th>Regular</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L/Pl1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. INTELLIGENCE

a. General. The proposed T/O changes in the Operations Section for a Lieutenant, Assistant S-3/S-2 and a S/NCO, as an Intelligence Chief are still pending at this time.

b. Enemy Situation. For the first week in August enemy activity remained at a low level, continuing the "tall" which had existed for the past two months. Contact was usually limited to CAP activities initiating fire on enemy troops moving in small groups. However, a significant terrorist attack occurred on 5 August when 2 grenades were thrown into a meeting of village elders 1 km S.W. of Hoi An.

During the second week the enemy began his well-publicized Summer-Fall Campaign. The CAP's made contact with larger groups of enemy than in the week previous, as the VC/NVA were setting up for attacks. Particularly heavy contact was made on the nights of 11 and 12 August.

The enemy continued his offensive into the third week. Contacts by the CAP's remained at the same high level. Also 2 CAG Headquarters and the CACO 2-2 CP became targets on the night of the 16th as 2d CAG received 7 RPG's and CACO 2-2 took 3 rounds of 82mm mortar incoming.

During the final week the high level of ground contact prevailed, and there was an increase in terrorist attacks. On 25 August a boobytrap was detonated, blowing off the legs of a Village Chief 1 km E. of Hoi An; two days later the VC/NVA mortared a hamlet 2 km S. of Dien Ban causing 2 VN civilians KIA, 7 VN civilians WIA(E) and 10 VN civilians WIA(D).

c. Enemy Plans and Policies. The enemy modus operandi for the first two weeks of August was consistent with the pattern of the two previous months. Emphasis was placed on those activities designed to destroy or otherwise render ineffective the local Government administration and pacification assets. Propaganda themes centered on the appeal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government. The Summer-Fall Offensive, beginning in the second week, brought ground attacks and attacks by fire, along with stepped up terrorism and propaganda. These attacks, and selective assassinations of SVN sympathizers and low level officials continued until the end of the month.

d. Interrogator/Translator. During the month of August 242 detainees, 23 POW's (5 NVA, 23 VC) and 6 Hoi Chanh's were turned over by the CACO's to their respective District Headquarters for processing through the DIROCC. Feedback of information produced as a result of these interrogations was provided 2d CAG and the capturing CACO's.
e. Counter Intelligence. Timely and accurate counterintelligence support was supplied to 2d CAG by the 3rd, 5th and 9th Counter Intelligence Teams. Blacklists, agent reports, and interrogation reports were provided to augment the counterintelligence activity of the DIOCC's.

f. Interpreters. 3 Interpreters were employed by 2d CAG during the month of August. 7 were assigned to CACO's and 1 remained at 2d CAG Headquarters.

g. Enemy Statistics. Enemy statistics for the month of August were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>POW</th>
<th>DETAINERS</th>
<th>HOI CHANH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Weapons and Ordnance Captured.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1 Carbine</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, 9mm</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-2 Rocket Launcher</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-79</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordnance</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M-26 grenades</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicom grenades</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-14 rifle grenades</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoke grenades</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-61 grenade</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165mm round</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Quantity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm round</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82mm rounds</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm rounds</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm rounds</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9mm round</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 rounds</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-7 rounds</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-40 rounds</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm boosters</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-79 rounds</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-72 LAW M2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 lb bomb</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 lb charge</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 lb TNT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 lb C-4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 lb shrapnel shell</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-111 mines</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50 cal. roto.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panji stakes</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Equipment Captured**

- Binoculars, pair: 1
- Canteen & belt: 1
- M-1 rifles, m.1: 2
M-16 magazines    4
BAR magazines    2
Packs    4
Bayonet    3
E-Tool    1
3. OPERATIONS.

a. General. During the month of August, with the beginning of the enemy’s Summer-Fall Campaign, the CAP’s of 2d CAG contended with increasing propaganda, terrorism and ground activity.

Although the first week of August saw a continuation of the previous two month "lull", CAP activities made 8 significant contacts, killing 5 NVA and capturing 2 terrorists who had thrown grenades into a meeting of village elders. 5 suspects were also picked up for suspicion of providing food and money to the VC. Also 4 bunkers were found and destroyed during the period.

The second week began as CAP’s 2-9-1 and 2-9-2 on a sweep with RF elements picked up 200 VCS on 8 August. On the 11th and 12th the enemy began to step up activities; there were 18 significant contacts altogether during the week, as the CAP’s killed 12 enemy, took 1 prisoner and captured 4 VCs. 2 NVA were Ho Chi Minh’s.

The offensive continued into the third week, but the CAP’s killed 16 enemy in 16 contacts and had 2 VC Chieu Hoi to them.

Activity tapered off at the end of the month. However the CAP’s managed to kill 9 more enemy to up the monthly total to 42, an increase of 18 from the month previous.

Mobility. At the end of the reporting period, 2d CAG had thirty-three (33) mobile CAP’s and three (3) static CAP’s operating in Quang Nam Province, two CAP’s (CAP 2-7-5 and CAP 2-8-2) were converted from static to mobile during the reporting period. It is anticipated that one more CAP will be converted from static to mobile next month.

c. Training. Training plans for the month of August were submitted for approval to the Commanding Officer, 2d CAG by all CAG’s in accordance with Group Bulletin 1,500. Emphasis remained on training all Marines and PFN’s primarily in general military subjects such as patrolling, setting ambushes and listening posts, and calling for fire support.

(1) 2d CAG Mobile Training Team. During August the Mobile Training Team (MTT) was utilized as a security element for the 2d CAG Compound. The MTT was also used for security patrols, running 20 daylight patrols, capturing (1) M-19 Carbine, (1) NVA pack, (2) BAR magazines, (2) M-16 magazines and (2) AK-47 bayonets. The MTT was deactivated on 20 August 1969.
d. Inspections. During the month of August a regular schedule of staff inspections was conducted throughout the CAP's. These inspections consisted of detailed critiques of undesirable trends and were submitted to CACO's so they could take corrective action. Also inspected were records being kept and co-ordination accomplished on both the CACO and CAP levels. Supply and communications inspections were also conducted in order to evaluate the state of readiness at the CAP and CACO level, based on usage data compiled at 2d CAP Headquarters.

e. Conferences/Meetings.

(1) Staff Conference. 2d CAP Headquarters continued to hold weekly staff meetings where matters of multiple staff cognizance were discussed.

(2) Combined Action Company C.O.'s Meeting. During the month of August a meeting was held on a weekly basis for all Combined Action Company Commanders and the Headquarters Staff. These meetings are specifically designed for the purpose of working out problems of support and coordination in addition to promulgating command guidance. At each of these meetings the individual CACO CO or his representative gave a projection from the DIOC (District Intelligence/Operations Control Center) concerning intelligence in their area for the coming week.

(3) CAP Commander Conference. The monthly CAP Commanders Conference was held on the first Sunday in August. All agenda items were submitted by the individual CACO Commanders several days prior to the scheduled conference for review. The suggested agenda items were evaluated, arranged in a logical sequence, and distributed at the conference to the individual CAP Commanders as a guide for discussion. The main purpose for this meeting was to provide an opportunity for discussion of problem areas, such as training techniques for PFS and Marines. Among other problems discussed special attention was given to the PP-Marine relationship in the field and group support of civic action projects.

f. Special Operations.

(1) Kit Carson Scouts. There were 9 Kit Carson Scouts deployed in 2d CAP units during August. They participated in 210 day and night patrols, killed 4 enemy, apprehended 2 suspects and recovered 1 weapon. In addition 3 booby traps and 3 arms caches were found. In one incident KCS Le Van Hien, when his unit was taken under fire, moved to the fire line and helped to direct fire on the enemy positions. As one Marine was being medevaced, KCS Hien stayed at the rear to cover the movement to the medevac to the LZ. After the contact KCS Hien led the Marines back to the area of contact and ambushed 2 enemy bodies.
(2) Scout Dogs and Handlers. During the month of August 2d CAG operated with 4 organic Scout Dog Teams, assigned to CACO's, 2-1, 2-5, and 2-7. They were effective in locating caves, tunnels, and booby trapped areas; in detecting enemy movement and in warning of enemy ambushes.

g. Voluntary Information Program. The total amount of funds expended as rewards to Vietnamese Nationals during August for information pertaining to enemy activity and/or enemy equipment and ordinance was 226,000$VN. This represents a decrease of 109,300$VN from July and a decrease of 218,705$VN from June.

h. Artillery Support. During the month of August 2d CAG units called in (22) artillery fire missions and (15) 81mm mortar missions on either suspected or known enemy targets.

i. Air.

(1) Fixed Wing. During August no missions were flown in direct support of 2d CAG operations against the enemy.

(2) Flareships and Gunships. A total of 6 missions were flown in direct support of 2d CAG operations during the reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basketball Missions</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spooky Missions</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Medical Evacuation Missions. A total of (45) medical evacuation missions were requested/controlled by 2d CAG units during August. These missions included medevac for Vietnamese civilians and PPs as well as Marines.
4. LOGISTICS

b. Significant Events

(1) There were no significant events to report during this period.

c. Damage to Weapons Due to Enemy Action

(1) No weapons were damaged during this period.

d. Motor Transport

(1) The Group Motor Transport section drove a total of 37,804 miles during the reporting period.

(2) A total of five (5) vehicles were deadlined for second echelon repair during the reporting period. A breakdown by vehicle type is as follows:

(a) M37H1 Truck Cargo, (2)
(b) M35AC2 Truck Cargo, (3)

(3) No vehicles were deadlined for 3rd echelon maintenance. Average deadline time: 2nd echelon, three (3) days.

e. Air Lift

(1) No air lifts were scheduled during this reporting period.

f. Messhall

(1) Approximately 19,750 meals were served during this reporting period by the Group Messhall.

(2) "B" Rations in the amount of forty (40) cases were issued to the field units. "A" Rations were issued on a daily basis to all companies that requested them. A total of 3,600 meals were issued.
. Armory

(1) During this period, the armory repaired 67 weapons. Thirty-four (34) weapons were sent to Ordnance Maintenance Company, 1st FM, for repair.

h. Miscellaneous Services

(1) Continuous garbage and trash pick-up was provided by Vietcong through contract service.

(2) The Laundry Platoon at FLC continued to provide adequate support to this command.

j. Supplies

(1) No major items of equipment were received during this reporting period. Spare parts and miscellaneous supplies essential to this unit's operation were received in time, eliminating unnecessary hardships. Lack of T/E items previously ordered, are still responsible for the unit's C-2 MARES/FORSTAT rating.

j. Problem Areas

(1) Supply - The unit operated without a logistics chief and a warehouse chief during August. The jobs were filled by the supply chief. This hindered the effectiveness of the supply office. Rotation of other personnel without replacements put additional burden on the supply section. Also lack of trained personnel continues to hamper the 3-4 section. In addition, T/E deficiencies continue to keep this unit at a C-2 MARES/FORSTAT rating. Examples of shortages are shown below:

(a) Telephone Set, 7A-512
    87
(b) Telephone Set, 7A-3-PT
    190
(c) Radio Control Group AN/GA-59
    26
(d) Generator Set, FU-482
    2
(e) Address Plate Machine
    2
(f) Embossing Machine Address Plate
    1
(g) Binoculars 6X30
    61
(h) Mount Tripod, M122
    39
(i) Truck Cargo 3/4T M37B1
    3

3-11
(3) Night Vision Scope
(4) TRLS, T, M1681
(1) TRLS, Water 400 gal, M149
(m) Duplicating Set, Spirit Process
(n) Duplicating Set, Stencil Process

1. Motor Transport - Due to the fact that 2d CAG has been unable to obtain spares for rail- and vehicles there are unsatisfactory periods for Motor Transport. Additionally, the failure of supporting units to provide replacement vehicles puts increased requirements on remaining explosive equipment.

3. Communications

a. The main problem in this area is the lack of T/E items. Direct exchange, though, is working at a satisfactory level.

4. New Equipment

a. The unit has a 3,000 lb capacity forklift now operating; however, during the reporting period, the vehicle was idled for 12 days because of the inexperience of the operator. It is felt a competent team should inspect this vehicle at least once every two weeks.
5. CIVIC ACTION/PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

a. During the month of August, Civic Action NCO's from the eight companies of the 2d CAG continued their efforts to act as liaison between hamlet, village, and district officials in initiating civic action and community development projects. As a result of the recent offensive, many CAPs have concentrated on the tactical situation and were still able to help in many ways to rebuild destroyed homes, schools and pagodas. Civic Action has continued at an acceptable level despite enemy activity during the period.

b. Continued emphasis has been put on no cost/no material projects, which has resulted in an advantageous form of civic action for mobile CAPs, in particular, wherein the Marines profit from living among the people, realizing their needs, and profiting from gaining their respect and friendship.

(1) An example of the no cost/no material approach is the emphasis which has been put on health and sanitation. It has become routine with the mobile CAPs to have police calls in their hamlets and villages, swim and bathe calls, and physical education programs in the form of organized sports.

c. Since being expanded in August, agricultural civic action projects have rapidly become promising. Because of the adaptability of such projects to the Vietnamese economy, they have been readily accepted.

(1) The 2d CAG Civic Action NCO has made available to all the CAPs various kinds of seeds. CAP 2-9-1 has started a joint garden and has gotten a lot of cooperation from the villagers.

(2) The raising of rabbits has met with enthusiasm. Although few of the people have had the experience of eating rabbit, they are fully aware of the high price of rabbit on the market. The money which can be made from selling rabbits is a prime motivator. For fast dissemination or rabbits among others in a village, a method is planned wherein the first two litters of each doe must be given to a family previously selected by the hamlet chiefs. In this way, eventually, the rabbit population will be generalized throughout the village, and every family which desires rabbits will have them.

(3) Agricultural civic action projects being developed include the raising of hops, chickens, and new varieties of vegetable crops. The results have been satisfactory, although costs and difficulty in acquiring needed materials prevent the progress desired. The potential of these projects is great and long-lasting.
1. Commodities distributed during the month of August were as follows: food, 2458 pounds; soap, 528 pounds; clothing, 164 pounds; and personal hygiene kits, 200.

c. During August, CAP personnel of the Group assisted Vietnamese civilians in completing the following projects: culverts 8; fences 17; wells 10; public heads 1; wells 10; pagodas 14; bridges 1; family bunkers 5; and public showers, 2.

d. MedCaps held resulted in the treatment of 14,284 Vietnamese civilians; in addition 164 dental cases were treated. 153 Vietnamese children and 48 adults were medically evacuated during the month.

e. CAP corpsmen continued to train Vietnamese civilians in the basics of first aid. During the month, 48 such civilians were underjoin training. These aides assist in MedCaps and serve as interpreters for the corpsman.

f. The CAPs put up more bulletin boards this month, in support of psychological operations. The bulletin boards show recent news, planned events, and any news the villagers want to pass along as well as psychological operations material.
C. COMMUNICATIONS

a. Problem areas:

(1) The same problem areas still exist as were reported in several previous reports. Lack of T/E items.

(a) Telephone Set, TA-512  68
(b) Telephone Set, TA-1  120
(c) Radio Control Group, CRA-39  26

SCOA PDA message 25140Z June 1968 stated 66 TA-512's being shipped.

(2) The turn-around time for Direct Exchange items is improving. It is taking an average of (15) to (20) days vice (20) to (25) days.

b. Communications:

(1) Security: Call signs were changed on the 15th of August.

(a) 5 security violations were received from 1st Radio Battalion during the month of August. These were disclosure of proposed sites, disclosure of proposed fire mission coordinates, disclosure of friendly units approximate location, disclosure of a unit's location and the compromise of a call sign. CACO's and company communication NCO's were briefed and operating personnel are continuing to be instructed in transmission security during staff visits and inspections.

(2) Inspections: From 2-29 August all CACO/CAP's were inspected. Preventative Maintenance and operating conditions were checked with the following results:

(a) A build up of dirt in hard to get at spots.
(b) Frayed or torn handsets.
(c) Messages being held for more than 6 months.
(d) Batteries being left in field phones and radios that are not in use.
(e) Recommendations were made for immediate action to affect direct supervision for future maintenance.

(3) Radio Relay: POC-1 radio relay equipment was installed for period of 7-17 August and the AN/GHC 10 radio relay equipment from 18-31 August. Down time for the POC-1 was 30 hours; 30 hours, frequency
block, 1 hours, bad coax cable and 1 hour, bad control unit.

(a) Down time for the AN/GRC-10 was 2 hours and that was for a frequency change and movement of antennas.

(b) The POG-1 was not operating properly; an AN/PQC-10 was installed and good phone communication was established and has prevailed since.

(4) **Combat Operation Center:** Overall traffic increased slightly. The following communications traffic was passed through the Combat Operation Center over various nets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incoming Messages</th>
<th>660</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outgoing Messages</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spot Reports</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty Reports</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intell Reports</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIR</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Traffic</strong></td>
<td>1,176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) **Communication Supply:** Components of end items were in adequate stock throughout the month. The following reflects requisition status of communication items:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requisitions Submitted</th>
<th>20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requisitions Completed</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requisitions Outstanding</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Requisitions Outstanding</strong></td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) **Maintenance:** Support or repair of components of end items and the RT-505 radio set by the Direct Exchange System at FLC is improving. The average turn-around time for the RT-505 is 2 weeks, the H-189 handset is 1 week and the LS-454 loudspeaker is 3 weeks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work Requests Submitted</th>
<th>103</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work Requests Completed</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Requests Outstanding</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

a. General. Emphasis on the training of selected Marines and Popular Forces Soldiers to act as Corpsmen in the event that a Corpsman is not available in the CAP was again stressed during the month of August. These Marines and Popular Forces Soldiers treated battle casualties and, in many cases, held MedCaps with the Vietnamese civilians. There was an increase in the use of Iodine tablets and as a result the number of hospital admissions due to intestinal disorders decreased considerably. The use of Malaria tablets was also emphasized. Log books were maintained by each of the platoon corpsmen to record daily sick calls, ensure immunizations were up to date and ensure that each Marine took his Malaria tablet.

b. Personnel:

(1) Medical Department Representative: HIC T. J. WILLIAMS, USN

(2) Administrative/Sick Call Petty Officer: 1ST C. C. KERSTEL, USN

(3) Supply/Sick Call Petty Officer: HLM C. J. HEBB, USN

(4) Hospital Corpsman Personnel Statistics for the month of August 1969:

(a) Attached 1

(b) Joined 2

(c) TAD Personnel Attached 0

(d) TAD Personnel Terminated 0

(e) Casualties:

1. KIA 1

2. WIA 2

3. Twice WIA and evacuated out of RAM 0

4. Died of Wounds 0

(f) During the month of August the 21 combined action troop MT Station treated 194 MSc/HIl personnel at routine sick call.


c. **Medical Civic Action Program (MedCap's)**

(1) During the month of August 1969, CAP Corpsmen treated 1,702 Vietnamese civilians at daily routine MedCaps. This was an increase of 1,601 from the month of July. There were also 77 Vietnamese civilians treated as a result of hostile action.

(2) The 2d CAG Headquarters Medical Section treated a limited number of Vietnamese civilians due to our new location. The 2d CAG Headquarters Medical Section has supplied organizations with medical supplies for their own use.

d. **Training**

(1) During the month of August 1969 CAP Corpsmen conducted a total of 64 classes resulting in a total attendance of 585 Vietnamese civilians and Popular Forces Soldiers. This represents a decrease of 1 class and a decrease of 177 people attending. Corpsmen were instructed to increase classes and encourage attendance.

e. **Sanitation**

(1) Routine sanitation inspections were conducted within the 2d CAG Headquarters Compound during the month. All problems that were encountered were of a minor nature and were rectified immediately. For the month of August the sanitation in the 2d CAG Headquarters Compound was excellent.

f. **Noteworthy Items**

(1) During the month there were six 2d CAG personnel admitted to hospitals with intestinal disorders. This is a decrease of four from the month of July and a decrease of twelve from the month of June.

There were 8 cases of Fever of Unknown Origin during August, a decrease of 7 from the month of July.

On 3 August 1969 405 J. J. MILL was WIA while on ambush with CAP 3-3-3.

On 12 August 1969 405 J. J. MILL was WIA while at a doctor's call with CAP 2-3-3.

On 20 August 1969 405 S. N. WEA was KIA while at a doctor's call with CAP 2-3-3.


Inspections:

(1) HQ T. 4. HADAF conducted routine monthly inspections of CAP units of 2d OAG during the month of August. Most of the discrepancies noted were of a minor nature and corrected immediately. Emphasis was placed on medical log books, Iodine tablets, Malaria tablets and personal hygiene done in all CAPs.
6. SPECIAL SERVICES

a. The month of August started slowly, but picked up considerably towards the end of the month. Special Services was still a little disorganized by the move of Headquarters from Danang to Hoi An. Also there was a change of Custodians and a change of the Special Services NCO.

b. The most popular single items handled through Special Services is the weekly issue of beer and soda. The nature of the Combined Action Program is such that water supply is restrictive, and the beer and soda help to alleviate the problem. Soda is consistently more popular than beer in this regard. During the month, 310 cases of soda and 230 cases of beer were issued to the eight companies of the Group.

c. Special Services continued its function of handling monthly orders for pre-recorded tapes under the program provided by III Marine Amphibious Force Special Services. During August, Marines and Navy of 2d MAC purchased 41 tapes.

d. Almost 500 paperback books were received during the month of August, from donors in the United States. The paperback books were distributed to all the CAPs.

e. August was a bad month for Hong Kong trips. Special Services had one trip to Hong Kong during the month, but had some difficulty in selling the merchandise from the retailers. But this problem should be solved in the near future.
PART III

Sequential Listing of Significant Events

1 Aug 69

A CAP 2-3-1 patrol detonated a booby-trapped grenade 2km N.E. of Bien Ban, causing 1 USMC WIA(E), 1 PF WIA(E) and 5 USMC WIA(X). Two hours later, in approximately the same location, a second booby-trapped grenade was tripped, causing another USMC WIA(E). Continuing the patrol, the CAP found 2 bunkers and 2 more booby-trapped grenades, which were destroyed.

3 Aug 69

A CAP 2-1-3 ambush initiated organic weapons fire on 20 NVA moving N. at AT956699. The NVA returned fire wounding 4 PF's accompanying the CAP and causing minor wounds to 2 USMC. After 2 hours of exchanging fire the NVA broke contact. A subsequent sweep of the area by the CAP found numerous blood trails.

A CAP 2-1-4 ambush initiated organic weapons fire on an USEF 6.5km S. of DaNang air base. A sweep of the area revealed 1 NVA WIA and miscellaneous 782 gear.

4 Aug 69

CAP 2-2-4 was informed that there was an abnormal amount of activity in a house 5km W. of Hai Loc. Checking the house, the CAP found 3 females and evidence that they had cooked food for about 25 personnel. A further search uncovered a bunker, various documents, currency and 782 gear. The 3 female suspects were turned over to District Headquarters.

5 Aug 69

Upon investigating 2 explosions 1km S.W. of Hon An, CAP 2-4-2 found 5 VN civilians KIA and 11 VN civilians WIA(X) by 2 grenades thrown into a meeting of village elders. The CAP eradicated the casualties and swept the area, detaining 1 male and 1 16 year old female as suspects in the incident. At District Headquarters interrogation by the D1000 revealed the VC had paid the suspects 600VN to throw the grenades.
3 Aug 69

CAP 2-9-1 initiated organic weapons fire on 8 VC 4km N.E. of An Hoa. A fire mission was called in and the VC fled to the N. without returning fire. A sweep of the area revealed 1 VC KIA.

7 Aug 69

The CAP 2-9-5 CP initiated organic weapons fire on 7 VC 7km N.W. of DaNang air base. The VC fled to the N. and the CAP swept the area with negative results. At first light the CAP swept the area again finding 2 bunkers, containing 5 bags of rice, 6 ponchos, 2 clay-com grenades, 2 first aid packs and cigarettes and candy. The CAP destroyed the bunkers.

A CAP 2-1-5 ambush detonated 1 claymore and initiated organic weapons fire on 10 enemy moving E. 5km S.W. of DaNang air base. The enemy fled and the CAP swept the area with negative results. In a re-sweep at first light the CAP found 2 NVA KIA and 2 clay-com grenades.

9 Aug 69

On a combined sweep with CAP 2-9-1 and 17th elements 3km N.W. of An Hoa, CAP 2-9-2 tripped a box mine, causing 1 USMC KIA(3) and 2 RP KIA(3). 200 VC were detained during the sweep and forwarded to District Headquarters.

A CAP 2-9-2 ambush initiated organic weapons fire on 10 NW. spotted 7km W. of DaNang air base. The NVA returned fire causing minor wounds to 1 USMC before fleeing E. A sweep of the area found 1 AK-47, 2 AK-47 magazines, 1 cartridge belt, 2 packs and 2 clay-com grenades. Moving to a new ambush site, the CAP received AWF from G A. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called for a reactionary force from 3/26. The CAP and the reactionary force assaulted the position causing the NVA to flee E. 1 CAP USMC was KIA. A sweep of the area found 2 NVA KIA and 3 AK-47s.

9 Aug 69

1 NVA Hoai Chanh turned himself into CAP 2-1-2 1km W. of DaNang air base. The Hoai Chanh was taken to District Headquarters.
A CAP 2-1-3 ambush initiated organic weapons fire on 21-59 NVA moving W, 7km S.W. of DaNang air base. The enemy returned SA&W and the CAP called in an 81mm mortar mission. A sweep of the area revealed 1 NVA KIA and 1 USMC was WIA(E). On a further sweep at first light the CAP found 1 NVA WIA who when interrogated said his unit's strength was 50 men and that 3 NVA KIA and 5 NVA WIA had been carried off after the fire fight.

12 Aug 69

CAP 2-4-2 was returning from its night ambush site when 15-17 VC initiated AW, RPG, and SA&W 7km S.E. of Dien Ban. The CAP returned fire and called an artillery mission causing the enemy to break contact and withdraw S.W. 1 USMC and 1 PF were WIA(E). A sweep of the area produced negative results.

Two USMC and 1 PF from CAP 2-7-6 were WIA(E) when they tripped 2 separate booby-traps in an attempt to destroy an NVA flag 5km S.E. of DaNang air base.

A CAP 2-7-5 patrol investigated an explosion 4km S.E. of the DaNang air base and found 1 NVA with multiple fragmentation wounds. The NVA had tripped 2 booby-trapped M-26 grenades. The POW was redeveloped for interrogation.

Acting on information provided by PF's, CAP 2-1-6 sent a patrol to reconnoiter the area 11 km S.W. of the DaNang air base. The patrol observed 20 enemy moving W. and initiated fire on them. Gunships were employed as the enemy withdrew. Contact was then made with 10 more enemy who withdrew as the CAP initiated fire; an artillery mission was called in and the CAP swept the area, finding 1 NVA KIA in a USMC camouflage shirt bearing the insignia of an NVA 1stLt.

CAPs 2-3-1, 2-3-2, 2-3-3, 2-3-4, 2-3-5, and 2-3-6 participated in a joint sweep 2km S.E. of Dien Ban. 16 suspects were detained, 4 were classified VGs by the DIAOC.
A CAP 2-8-3 element was moving to its ambush site when it received two grenades and SAF 12km N.W. of the Đà Nẵng air base. The CAP returned organic weapons fire causing the enemy to withdraw. 6 PF's were WIA(E) and 4 were WIA(M). A sweep of the area produced negative results.

In response to local information CAP 2-5-1 dispatched a patrol to pick up a VC who reportedly wanted to Chieu Hoi 3km S.W. of the Đà Nẵng air base. Upon arrival the patrol found 1 VC lying in a bush with a grenade in his hand. The patrol spent 20 minutes trying to talk the VC into surrendering. When he attempted to throw the grenade the patrol killed him.

A CAP 2-1-4 ambush was setting in when it received SAF from an USEF 9km S.W. of the Đà Nẵng air base. The CAP returned fire and the enemy broke contact. There were 1 USMC WIA(M), 2 PF's WIA(E) and 1 PF seriously wounded. A medevac helicopter was unable to land due to intensive SAF in the LZ. Gunships and Spooky were called in to strafe the area. The PF DOW. A sweep of the area disclosed 1 VC KIA, 5 20lb charges with electrical firing devices emplaced under a bridge on route 540, Blood trails, an "E" tool, and 1 bayonet were also found.

A CAP 2-1-2 ambush initiated fire on an USEF 9km S.W. of the Đà Nẵng air base. The enemy fled to the N.W. A sweep of the area found 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47.

A CAP 2-9-3 ambush initiated organic weapons fire on 7 NVA 11km W. of the Đà Nẵng air base. The enemy returned CAP and fled W. A sweep of the area produced 1 NVA KIA, 2 NVA civilians KIA, 1 AK-47, 1 pair of binoculars and 1 chico.

A CAP 2-1-5 patrol discovered 3 enemy bodies in shallow graves 5km S.W. of Đà Nẵng air base. 2 of the bodies were NVA and the third was identified by documents as VC. They had been killed by artillery.
A CAP 2-1-3 ambush initiated SAF on 2 NVA moving NE 8km S.W. of the DaNang air base. A sweep of the area revealed 2 NVA KIA and 4 chicos.

CAGO 2-2 received 8 rounds of 82mm mortar fire 1km N. of Dai Loc. 4 VN civilians were WIA(E). Negative action was taken due to the unknown location of the mortars.

6 VN children received VIP payments for informing CAP 2-4-1 of the location of 7 M-16A1 mines, 1 M-26 grenade, and 1 60mm illumin round. The ordnance was destroyed.

17 Aug 69

2d CAP Headquarters received 7 RPG's and sporadic AWM from an USARV 2km W. of Hoi An. The CP returned SAF, AWM and fired 60mm illumin. 2 USMC were WIA(M).

A CAP 2-1-5 sweep received SAF from 1 NVA in a spider hole 6km S.W. of the DaNang air base. The CAP returned organic weapons fire killing the NVA in the spider hole and 3 NVA spotted fleeing the area while pursuing other NVA observed in the area. The CAP received fire from 20 NVA who fled S.E. when the CAP returned fire. The CAP swept the area and found 4 AK-47's, 1 SKS, 10 chicom grenades, 1 8-40 rocket and documents.

A CAP 2-3-5 ambush received 4 8-40 rockets and SAF from 2 squad of NVA 2.5km S. of Dien Ban. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called an 81mm mission causing the NVA to withdraw to the S.W.. 2 USMC were WIA(F). A sweep of the area revealed 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47.

3 Aug 69

A joint CAP 2-1-3/RF ambush initiated organic weapons fire on an USARV spotted moving E. 8km S.W. of DaNang air base. The enemy returned SAF and 2 RPG's, causing 1 RF KIA, 6 USMC and 2 RF's WIA(E) and 2 USMC WIA(M). A CAP sweep at first light had negative results.
CAP 2-3-2 elements enroute to an ambush position set up a hasty ambush and initiated organic weapons fire on 3 VC spotted 2 km N. of Dien Ban. 1 VC was KIA and before fleeing N. the other 2 VC threw a chicom grenade causing minor wounds to 2 PPs. The CAP swept the area finding 1 M-14 and assorted documents.

An USMC detonated a claymore mine as CAP 2-2-1 elements were passing enroute to a night ambush site. 1 USMC and 1 PP were WIA(#). The CAP returned fire and swept the area finding 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47.

A CAP 2-3-1 ambush initiated organic weapons fire on 6 VC spotted 1 km E. of Dien Ban. 1 VC KIA was found on a sweep of the area.

20 Aug 69

A CAP 2-1-3 ambush initiated fire on 40-50 NVA moving N. 1.2 km N. of Bien Due District Headquarters. Artillery and mortar fire were fired on suspected withdrawal routes. 1 NVA was found KIA on a sweep at first light.

21 Aug 69

A CAP 2-1-4 USMC was WIA(#) when he tripped a booby-trapped claymore 7 km S.W. of Da Nang air base. A search of the area found 2 booby-trapped chicomsm which were destroyed.

A CAP 2-3-1 patrol spotted 3 bunkers 1 km E. of Dien Ban. 1 VC was KIA as he attempted to throw a grenade from one of the bunkers. A pack, miscellaneous documents, clothing, and 10 blasting caps were captured. The bunkers were destroyed.

22 Aug 69

A VN woman led a CAP 2-4-2 patrol to a VC who wanted to Chieu Hoa 2 km S.W. of Hoi An. The Ho Chinh was turned over to District Headquarters.

23 Aug 69

A CAP 2-2-1 USMC was WIA(#) when he tripped a booby-trapped chicom 1 km S. of Dai Loc.

A CAP 2-1-4 patrol tripped a booby trapped claymore causing 1 USMC and 1 PP WIA(#).
CAP 2-4-5 investigated an explosion at a village meeting house 1km E. of Hoi An. The CAP found the village chief with his legs blown off by a booby trap attached to the meeting house door.

CAP 2-4-5 received 1 homemade grenade at their ambush site 1km E. of Hoi An. 2 more incoming grenades resulted in 2 USMC WIA(E), 1 PF WIA(E) and 1 PF WIA(M).

VN children informed CAP 2-4-5 of the location of 3 M-72 LAAM's, 1 M-26 grenade, 1 M-79 rnd, 1 81mm HE rnd and 1 60mm HE rnd 1km E. of Hoi An. The ordnance was destroyed and a VIP payment was made.

A CAP 2-7-6 USMC was WIA(E) when he tripped a booby trapped M-26 grenade 500m S.E. of Da Nang air base.

A CAP 2-5-4 ambush received SAF from an USEF 1km S. of Dien Ban causing minor wounds to 1 USMC and 1 PF. The CAP returned SAF killing 1 NVA. 81mm mortars were called in on suspected enemy positions. The CAP swept the area finding 1 NVA WIA, 1 SKS, and 1 M-16.

CAP 2-5-5 was informed by villagers that their hamlet had been mortared and there were many casualties, 2km S. of Dien Ban. The CAP found 2 VN civilians KIA, 7VN civilians WIA(E). A sweep of the area disclosed 2 82mm mortar fin assemblies. PsyOps was initiated.

CAGO 2-9 Headquarters received SAF and AWF from an USEF 2km N.E. of An Hoa. The CAGO returned SAF, AWF, 60mm mortars and 81mm mortars, silencing the enemy.

1 VN civilian was KIA and 4 VN civilians were WIA(E) when an USEF set off a command detonated claymore mine 1km N. of Dai Loc. CAGO 2-2 Headquarters contacted PsyOps to exploit the incident.

A CAP 2-5-6 patrol received AWF and SAF from 2 VC 2km N. of Dien Ban. The CAP returned SAF causing the VC to flee to the N.W. A sweep of the area found 7 bunkers, 1 of which contained local cooking and miscellaneous documents. The CAP destroyed the bunkers and turned the documents over to District Headquarters.
A CAP 2-2-4 patrol detained 2 VN females carrying 75 lbs of rice into a treeline 8km W. of Dai Loc. The 2 VC's were taken to District Headquarters for interrogation.

4 VN children brought to CAP 2-9-2 1 105mm rnd, 6 61mm mortar rnds, 13 840 rockets, 5 M-79 rnds found 4 km N.E. of An Hoa. The ordinance was destroyed and VIP payments were made.

Acting on local intelligence, CAP 2-5-1 detained 1 VCS 6km S.E. of DaNang air base. The suspect was taken to District Headquarters where he was classified by the DIOCC as a VC security cadre leader.
HEADQUARTERS
II Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96002

3/1/66
3000
2 August 1966

Sub: Commanding Officer

CC: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attention Chief of Staff, Combined Action Program)

Subj: Readjustment of CAP Tactical areas of Coordination (TACO's), Dai Loc District

Encl: (1) Overlay of present Dai Loc CAP TACO's

(2) Overlay of proposed Dai Loc CAP TACO's

1. It is recommended that the CAP location in Dai Loc District be moved into those TACO's shown on enclosure (1).

2. Coordination has been made with the Province Chief, Long Nam District, and he has submitted a parallel request to I Corps. The proposed area will enhance the overall defensive plan of the area as well as the pacification of marginal areas. All confirmations and revisions so earned are in full agreement with the proposed moves to support the operation.

3. CAP 2-2-1 (see overlay, enclosure (1)). We propose shifting CAP 2-2-1 TACO on Ai Dong贺let to encompass part of CAP 2-2-2's 2-2-2-2 TACO area. The present CAP 2-2-1 TACO is too restricted in area. The new TACO will allow more flexibility of movement. It covers an area that was once extensively used by VC infiltrators and probably would be used again unless we maintain surveillance of the area.

b. CAP 2-2-2 (see overlay, enclosure (1)). The area presently occupied by CAP 2-2-2 will be covered by the new TACO for CAP 2-2-1. We recommend moving the CAP 2-2-2 TACO west across the river in the vicinity of grid X6987 and X7088. This area has a requirement to fragmented patrol and control vital routes of approach to Dai Loc. The northern part of this proposed TACO has been extensively as mortar sites to strike at District Headquarters and the American combat bases in the area of Hill 37, and X7. Locating CAP 2-2-2 in this area would deter the enemy's efforts to support enemy forces in Dai Loc.
c. CAP 2-2-3 (See overlay, enclosure (1)). CAP 2-2-3 in Hamburger An Khe, Phu Bai and Dong Naí has not made any significant contacts for nearly six months. CAP 2-2-3 has served its purpose as a fixed Compound CAP in this area and has accomplished its mission. We recommend that this CAP be assigned a mobile mission that will support the 1969 pacification plan and add to the overall security of the Dai Loc area. The new Mobile CAP will provide security for the Loc Chanh area in the vicinity of grids AT9069 and AT9160. It will also deny the enemy use of this area for mortar or rocket launch sites against Dai Loc.

d. CAP 2-2-4 (See overlay, enclosure (1)). The present TACG will change only slightly to add more maneuver room to the west in the vicinity of AT9457 which is an area the enemy uses constantly. The change in size will allow the CAP to better control avenues of approach from the West into Dai Loc.

E. L. LEWIS
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96802

3/LEM/Jul
3000
22 August 1969

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, Assistant Chief of Staff Combined Action Program

Subj: Noise Suppressors, Models E4A and NOL, Troop test of

Ref: (a) O3, III MAF ltr 30/map 3960 of July 1969 (NOTAL)

(b) AO of 3 GAP ltr 146PM:che 3530 of 26 July 1969

incl: (1) Information Sheet on Subject Tests with Extra Questionaires

(2) Instructions for the Completion of Subject Tests

1. The results of the troop test directed by reference (b) of noise suppressors, models E4A and NOL is provided below. Questions provided in enclosure (1) of reference (a) have been answered. The eight tests were conducted by four separate Combined Action Platoons representing two Combined Action Companies of 2d CAG.

   a. Tests were conducted in accordance with instructions contained in reference (a).

2. All suppressors received by units of 2d CAG were in excellent condition.

   a. Although three of the model E4A were assigned only one alignment tool was provided.

   b. Each suppressor also required a burned powder blow back shield to protect the firer from getting residue in his eyes. Two of these shields were provided for five suppressors.

3. e. Test No. 1 - Physical Characteristics

   (1) Purpose. To determine the noise suppressors suitability as configured.

   (2) Only one person felt that the suppressor was unsightly in the growth or any problem at all as far as weight and configuration are concerned. His dissatisfaction was with the NOL model, the larger of the two suppressors. There was no adverse evaluation in this category for the E4A model.
d. Test No. 2 - Ease of Operation

(1) Purpose. To determine if the suppressor is adequately simple to operate.

(2) Only one of the testers had used a muzzle attachment of any type before. The weapons were fired on both automatic and semi-automatic fire using from 20-300 rounds in each model. Every user felt that the weapon needed much more frequent cleaning with the suppressor installed. Two testers also complained of difficulty in cleaning their weapon. There seemed to be no distinctions made between the E4A and M6L models in this respect. One suppressor, the E4A model, was damaged due to keyholing (caused by the bullet hitting the end of the suppressor) with the only apparent explanation being that it was knocked down from a standing position. The alignment tool had been used to install the suppressor initially. The same weapon had been submerged in water but was not thought to have been damaged by it. No problems of keyholing were encountered with the M6L model. An alignment tool was used to install the suppressor on 4 of the weapons (2 M6L and 2 E4A). As was previously mentioned, in the only case of keyholing an alignment tool had been used.

c. Test No. 3 - Durability and Reliability

(1) Purpose. To evaluate the durability and reliability of the noise suppressor.

(2) Both models of the suppressor were subjected to a variety of weather conditions including wind, sand and dust, light rain and salt water. None of these conditions seemed to produce a particularly adverse affect on their operation. Approximately 60% of the testers described marked decreases in state of fire as the carbon built up in the chamber and on moving parts of the weapon. So heavy rains were present during the testing period. No safety hazards were discovered when the suppressor was attached except that without the shield placed behind the rear sight the carbon residue tended to blow back in the shooters eyes.

d. Test No. 4 - Operational Value

(1) Purpose. To determine if the noise suppressor has a definite operational value to the Marine Corps in Southeast Asia.

(2) The M6L and E4A noise suppressor were tested in both day and night ambushes under weather conditions of wind, sand and high humidity with occasional light rain. These weather conditions are typical in the Danang area of I Corps during July and August. Therefore the operational usefulness of this weapon in the CAPs during the period tested was determined under typical operating conditions. The conclusion was that an M-16 equipped with either model noise suppressor would have limited value in an ambush because it could not deliver a continuous high rate of fire. However, it was also noted that during the day or night at distances greater than 100 meters the target was confused about the direction being fired from if the muzzle flash was

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concealed. Little or no reduction was observed in muzzle flash of the weapon compared to the flash without the suppressor. Several testers felt that a suppressor equipped M-16 would be very effective for a sniper particularly during the day at ranges greater than 100 meters from a concealed position. It was a limitation of these evaluations that no enemy contacts were made close enough to determine their reaction and very few suppressors were available for testing over a brief period of about fifteen days actual field time.

Several suggestions were made regarding the usefulness of the weapon. If the muzzle flash were further reduced, some method of reducing the rapid carbon build up; and some kind of lock nut were developed to help keep the suppressor in place it would be an excellent accessory for the M-16 rifle. Pending these improvements the consensus seemed to be that the suppressor had negligible value even for snipers.

e. Test No. 5 - Recommended allowance

(1) Purpose. If adoption by the Marine Corps is recommended to determine allowances for the test item.

(2) If the Marine Corps did adopt this weapon it is recommended that allowances be guided by the use of the weapon by snipers only pending further improvements.

E. L. LEWIS
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

From: Communications Chief
To: Commanding Officer, 2d Combined Action Group

Subj: Communications Chief Conference, 10 July 1969

Encl:  (1) Recommended changes to T/E
       (2) Recommendation for the CAP TACTICAL NET
       (3) Recommended steps to take for T/E shortages
       (4) Recommended changes for Direct Exchange System at Chu-Lai
       (5) Recommended changes to CAP school syllabus
       (6) Miscellaneous Items Discussed

1. The 2d Combined Action Group was host unit for a communications chief conference held 10 July, 1969. The communication T/E and Combined Action Program schools class on calling in artillery and medevacs were discussed at length, as were the status of PRC-88’s. Also discussed were the CAP tactical radio net, PLC’s direct exchange system and a shortage to I/O communications within the CAG’s.

2. The changes contained in enclosures (1) thru (6) are recommended by all Combined Action Group Communication Chiefs and are submitted for evaluation.

A. J. NADEAU

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ENCLOSURE (1)
2. The equipment listed below would be used at the 2d Headquarters to perform lst and 2d echelon maintenance on all communications electronic equipment organic to the CAG.

   a. Test Kit PK-902/JRE-12 (RT-524)
   b. Test Kit PK-905/JRE-25
   c. Multimeter ME-25A/M
   d. Test set, Radio Frequency Power AN/URR-430
   e. Battery Tester TS-183 B/H
   f. Signal Generator TS-505
   g. Tool Kit AN/USM-15

2. The equipment listed below would be used at CAG Headquarters and at CAGC Headquarters. It has a much greater operating range, better receiving capabilities, and in general is much more reliable than the "P/RE-29 now being used. It has increased our communications reliability from 70% to 90%.

   a. (1) AN/PRE-12 Radio Set
   (2) AN/PXC-12B, Radio Set
   (3) RP-295 3/A Power supply
Recommendations for CAP Tactical Net

1. It is recommended that the CAP Director be given additional frequencies from 3-6. One of the existing two frequencies cannot be used because of atmospheric conditions. A number of frequencies are desired.

   a. A TACAN 3-6 representative stated that the above requested frequencies would be given to the CAP Director.

   b. Existing call signs and frequencies have been distributed. Additional frequencies will be sent to the CAP's when available.

   c. The hours of the first test, to determine feasibility of frequency, will be on 19 July, from 0700-0800, 1500-1600, and 2000-2100. The CAP director will be net control.

   d. The power source will be two 12 volt vehicle batteries run in series.
1. Check with supply to ensure equipment ordered is a valid requisition.

2. If initial order was on a Priority 5 or higher it may help to drop the priority to a 2, providing it is combat essential.
1. The present repair time of communications equipment is unsatisfactory. Equipment is turned in to LSU-3 and then evacuated to FLX. 1st FLX is only able to operate satisfactorily because it has obtained extra equipment from nearby units. FLX A on 15 July 1969 will join LSU-3 into their organization. LSU-3 has three communications technicians but does not have a repair facility, test equipment, or parts.

2. Parts and equipment to operate a third echelon repair facility are recommended when LSU-3 and FLX A join.
1. After carefully considering the artillery and medevac class the foregoing conclusion has been made.
   
a. Artillery has two hours of lecture and four hours of actual application.
   
   (1) It is recommended that the class remain the same.
   
b. Helicopter support and medevac procedures have two hours of lecture and no application.
   
   (1) It is recommended that the classes remain the same.

2. It is felt that the students are getting adequate instruction. The individual, however, feels that he must call in an artillery mission and medevac chopper. Instruction given with large classes makes this untenable.
Miscellaneous Items Discussed

1. There are 405 PRC-88's scheduled for the Combined Action Program. SIG is the holder but III MAF G-3 does not want to issue them until component parts are received. The parts lacking are crystal sets and alignment indicators.

2. Representatives from G-6 informed the communications chiefs why there is such a long turn-around time on some items in the Direct Exchange System. There is not enough equipment in the system. SIG, G-3 Maintenance, is trying to increase the assets in this system.

3. The AS-2236 antenna was discussed at length. May CAB units order them? Will the AS-2236 do a better job than the RS-292 antenna?
   a. The AS-2236 antenna was designed for use with the VOC-1 and VOC-2 radio relay equipment. It is a special allowance item, but this does not restrict a unit from ordering. 2d and 3rd CAB's have already ordered several.
   b. The range of the RS-292 antenna with the VOC-2 radio set is approximately (20) miles. The AS-2236 antenna is omnidirectional to a range of (30) miles and directional up to (100) miles. Other differences being insignificant the latter would give such better service.

4. Personnel:
   a. In 1st CAB there is a need for more Sgts. with the MOS of 2331. Most CAB headquarters have O3s as communication NCO's. The quality of instruction would be much greater under the direction of a T/O 2331/Sgt.
   b. 2d and 4th CAB's are over T/O in communicators. Most of these Marines hold the position of Comm NCO at the CABO's but there are some O3s filling this job. Some of the 2's case into the program on a personal section is concerned the CABP's as O3s. As far as the III MAF personnel section is concerned the CABP's have communicators in their units that aren't doing their primary job. This is a command problem not theirs.
   c. 3d CAB is short (3) Sgts.
   d. Recommendations:
   (1) That the T/O be filled by rank.
   (2) That the communicators in the CABP's remain there without counting against the units T/O.
(3) That the CAG Commanders submit a roster of CAG communicators to the personnel officer III MAF and then fill the remaining gaps.

(4) It is felt that the existing rank for the T/O remain constant. Any deletion of ranking NOC's would significantly diminish the knowledge available to Marines in the field.
ANNEX 0 TO HOA YANG
1969 COMBINED ACTION PLATOON
MILITARY PLAN 687

From: Hoa Yang Subsector Headquarters
To: Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2
Ref: MAP INDOCHINA; Sheet 6641 III

1. Organisation

a. A Combined Action Platoon composed of QM Platoon 45 and U.S. Marines from the 8th Combined Action Company, 2d Combined Action Group is hereby designated as mobile Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2 to protect the people of Phuoc Phuc & Than Tung Son Hamlet (a) from the terrorist tactics of enemy infrastructure, from enemy forces attempting to infiltrate into the hamlets, and other missions mutually agreeable to the Hoa Yang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer of the 5th Combined Action Company.

b. This order and all future orders concerning the mission, concept of operations, Tactical Area of Coordination (TACO) and coordination with adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. Units will refer to QM Platoon 45 and U.S. Marines assigned to work with them as Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2. This order and all future orders will be signed by the Hoa Yang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

2. Mission. Provide security from VC/NVA throughout entire Tactical Area of Coordination as assigned by Appendix (I) to include but not limited to the following tasks:

3. Remarks. Cung cấp an ninh trong hầm kết quản của phi bộ chiến thuật cơ bản về việc giữ sát sau các hamlet trong khu vực của lực lượng mà của Bộ đội biz diễn hoạt động của địch trong khu vực.
a. Destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure.

b. Protect the friendly political/social structure.

c. Conduct patrols and ambushes within the assigned Tactical Area of Coordination.

d. Conduct vigorous civic action and payoffs programs to obtain the trust and confidence of local populace.

e. Organize local intelligence units.

f. Report military intelligence immediately to the District MACV and adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. Units.

g. Train and assist the hamlet Peoples Self Defense Force.

h. Participate in combined operations with the ARVN and/or other PMHAF Units.

3. Organization

a. Concept of Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2 will operate in all of the hamlets within its assigned tactical area of coordination on a staggered basis, never setting patterns in location, on a day to day basis and will change its night and day command post/base of operations daily. The command post/base of operations will be composed of several different houses in the hamlets to enable the Combined Action Platoon to disperse. One third of Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2 will remain at the day command post/base of operations to conduct local MedCaps, work on civic action, conduct training, plan night activities, effect necessary coordination with adjacent units, and conduct patrols. After dark Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2 will move to a preselected command post/base of operations and conduct patrols and ambushes throughout its entire TADOC. All patrols, ambushes, and other operations will be integrated down to the squad level.

b. Phù vô ha tăng có sê Việt-Công

c. Bảo vệ chính trị bản và các cơ sở xã hội của ta.

d. Sáp xép tuân tiên, phục kích trong phạm vi khu phối hợp chiến thuật chỉ định.

e. Đảm nhận công tác dân sự và chung việc trận lũy chiến để tạo được sự tin tưởng của dân chúng địa phương vào nội ta.

f. Tô chức dân và tình báo địa phương.

g. Hành lệnh và giúp đỡ nhân dân tự vệ trong chiến sự.

h. Thanh dọn các các hành quân phối hợp với đơn vị chính quy Việt Nam hay các đơn vị đồng minh T.Q.L.C.

3. Thời hạn

a. Thời hạn chính quân. Trung đội phối hợp 2-8-2 sẽ hoạt động tại những bản miền trong khu phối hợp chiến thuật chỉ định cho mình theo nguyên tắc linh động, linh hoạt, chúng bao giờ cũng nên ở mặt mực hoạt động giống như trong một vị trí vệ hiện phái thay đổi chỗ đóng bờ, chỉ huy, nghỉ và đúng cả các hoạt động can đảm bằng mọi cách. Chỉ đặng bờ chỉ huy và các hoạt động thường gian nhặt như các khu vực chiến đấu của trung đội phối hợp cơ thể trên miền. Một phần ba Trung đội phối hợp 2-8-2 sẽ địa bờ chỉ huy để đánh các đơn vị biểu hiện quân lũy bố hoặc hoạt động dân, liên lạc sản sắp về các đơn vị bân ke cần và tuân tiện. Sau khi chiều trung đội phối hợp 2-8-2 sẽ chuyển đến bố chỉ huy, và cần được hoạt động mà bố chỉ huy, và đơn vị đã chuẩn bị và di diển tiện, phục kích trong phạm vi khu phối hợp chiến thuật của mình. Tất cả các hoạt tiện, phục kích và các hoạt động khác sẽ phải phối hợp cùng cấp cùng đó.
B. Patrol/Ambush/Command Post Operations

1. Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2 will conduct their patrols, ambushes, and command post operations as follows:

(a) Conduct a minimum of one integrated squad size patrol daily between the hours of 1900 and 0700.

(b) Conduct a minimum of one integrated squad size patrol daily between the hours of 0700 and 1900.

(c) Change the command post location/base of operations every 12 hours, command posts will not be public buildings or concrete structures.

(d) Once every 24 hours patrol or ambush every hamlet in the assigned TADG without using the same routes, trails, and setting a pattern to operations.

C. Additional Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2 will conduct additional operations as directed by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined ARVN Company.

D. Planning

(1) Patrol routes, ambushes, and other CAP operations will be based on paragraph 3a. and b. above, current enemy intelligence or anticipated plans, and that all infiltration routes or other previous enemy locations be checked or interdicted daily throughout the entire TADG.

b. Tấn tiêu, phục kích đối địch bố chi bửu.

(1) Trùng dối bố bửu 2-8-2 sẽ di tuần tiêu, phục kích và bố bố bửu chi bửu như sau:

(a) Tội tiêu phải có hai cuộc tuần tiêu hay phục kích theo cấp 2 tiền đồi phái bộ hợp hàng ngày giao khoảng thời gian từ 19 giờ đến 07 giờ.

(b) Tội tiêu có một tiêu đồi bố bửu bộ, cấp tiến đối di di tuần tiêu trong khoảng thời gian từ 07 giờ đến 19 giờ hàng ngày.

(c) Cái 12 tiếng thủy di di tuần tiêu, cắp bố bố bửu, cắp bố bửu khái quan sẽ không động ở toàn miền có cắm cắm cắm không ở các xa bàng xã-xã.

(d) Trùng 24 tiếng, tuần tiêu hay phục kích trung mới ở khu phái bộ chỉ hiện thực chi đỉnh không động cùng một lời đồi được mơn, và mộtPhones lời gió giếc hoạt động giữa mơn.


d. Kế hoạch.

(1) Lế trình tuần tiêu, phục kích và các hoạt động khác của trung dối bố bửu sẽ căn cứ theo đoạn 3a. và b. ở trên, nằm tin tình báo hay các kế hoạch chi đỉnh và tất cả hoạt động khác hoặc những nơi mà trước đây dịch địa hoạt động phải kiểm soát, ngăn chặn hàng ngày khắp toàn bố khu phái bộ chi đỉnh thua của mình.
(2) All planning will be accomplished by the respective QM Platoon Commander and the CAP leader of the U.S. Marines. Disagreement as to location, frequency and size of patrols and ambushes or other activities will be referred to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives for decision. In all cases of disagreement the QM Platoon Leader and the Marine CAP Leader will promptly report to the Hoa Vang District Headquarters. In no case will a disagreement be allowed to go unresolved before 1000 the day the patrol or activity is to be conducted.

(3) All patrols/ambushes and CP locations will be planned in advance and submitted to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company on Saturday for Monday through Sunday of the next week. Changes to the planned operations may be authorized by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

e. Coordinating Instructions

(1) The assigned operating area, Tactical Area of Coordination Appendix (1) is assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2 to properly identify its respective area and to assist in overall coordination. All patrols, ambushes, or other operations within the assigned TACO will be coordinated with the Commanding Officer of the 26th Marines and the other ARVN and FMAF units as necessary.

(2) Firesupport and reaction forces will be coordinated through the Commanding Officer of the 26th Marines.

4. Administration/Logistics

e. Administration and logistics for Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2 will be through the respective ARVN or Marine Commander at Hoa Vang District Headquarters except as modified in existing orders.
b. Members of the CAP 2-8-2 will ensure to maintain good conduct and to keep the houses and areas they use in a clean and neat condition.

5. Command/Communication.

a. Command of the WNM Platoon 45 and U.S. Marines assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-8-2 is exercised separately by their respective Commanders. Unity of command is dependent upon mutual cooperation and coordination.

b. The WNM Platoon 45 and U.S. Marines will be responsible for their own communication with Hoa Vang District Headquarters.

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b. Các quân nhân thuộc trung đội hòn hộp 2-8-2 sẽ phải chắc chắn duy trì vệ sinh cho kẻ khác và giữ gìn chỗ ở sạch sẽ gọn.

5. Chỉ huy và liên lạc.


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Phụ lục I Khu phối hợp chiến thuật của trung đội hòn hộp (CAP) 2-8-2.
ANNEX H TO HOA VANG
1969 COMBINED ACTION PLATOON
MILITARY PLAN-597

From: Hoa Vang Subsector Headquarters
To: Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5
Ref: MAP INDOCHINA; Sheet 6641 I, 6640 IV, 6641 I, & 6641 III

1. Organization

a. A Combined Action Platoon composed of QNM Platoon 52 and U.S. Marines from the 7th Combined Action Company, 2d Combined Action Group is hereby designated as mobile Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5 to protect the people of Binh Ky Ba Tung Hamlet (a) from the terrorist tactics of enemy infrastructure, from enemy forces attempting to infiltrate into the hamlets, and other missions mutually agreeable to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer of the 5th Combined Action Company.

b. This order and all future orders concerning the mission, concept of operations, Tactical Area of Coordination (TAOC) and coordination with adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. Units will refer to QNM Platoon 52 and U.S. Marines assigned to work with them as Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5. This order and all future orders will be signed by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

2. Mission. Provide security from VC/NVA throughout entire Tactical Area of Coordination as assigned by Appendix (1) to include but not limited to the following tasks:

b. Lệnh nghĩa và các câu lệnh khác trong tương lai có liên quan nhiệm vụ, những yếu nhiệm hàng quân, khu phó bộ chiến tình (TAOC) và tiểu phó bộ với các đơn vị Việt-Khmer cùng nhà Hoa-Vang ở lán cận sẽ chỉ dẫn cho trung đội Nghĩa-quan QNM 52 và các quân nhân T.Q.LC.

1. Tổ chức

a. Một trung đội hỗn hợp gồm có trung đội Nghĩa-quan QNM 52 và T.Q.LC. Bộ chỉ huy đại diện hỗn hợp 7th thuộc liên quân lực mặt trận Hỗn hợp 2 được biệt phái đến trung đội hỗn hợp 2-7-4 từ đông để bảo vệ dân chúng ở Binh-Ky và Ba-Tung tránh kẻ địch chi tình buộc buộc bộ chỉ huy của các đơn vị chiến tranh khỏi dịch chỉ dịch cho thành phố và những nhiệm vụ khác được sự chấp thuận đúng như chỉ chỉ định của Chủ Trưởng Chí Quân Hoa-Vang và cộng sự viên cao cấp, Đại Trưởng Đại Đối Hổ Hợp 5 và ban hành.

2. Nhiệm vụ: Cung cấp an ninh tại to trong khu vực của khu phó bộ chiến tình để tránh khỏi các quân chính quy đột chi chân vào các chỉ định theo phụ lục (1) và những phần việc khác sau:
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a. Destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure.

b. Protect the friendly political/social structure.

c. Conduct patrols and ambushes within the assigned Tactical Area of Coordination.

d. Conduct vigorous civic action and payops programs to obtain the trust and confidence of local populace.

e. Organize local intelligence units.

f. Report military intelligence immediately to the District DIHQ and adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. units.

g. Train and assist the hamlet People's Self Defense Force.

h. Participate in combined operations with the ARVN and/or other FWNAV units.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5 will operate in all of the hamlets within its assigned Tactical Area of Coordination on a staggered basis, never setting patterns in location, one day to day basis and will change its night and day command post/base of operations daily. The Command post/base of operations will be composed of several different houses in the hamlets to enable the Combined Action Platoon to "disperse." One third of Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5 will remain as the day command post/base of operations to conduct local Med Caps, work on civic action, conduct training, plan night activities, effect necessary coordination with adjacent units, and conduct patrols. After dark, another Action Platoon 2-7-5 will move to a preselected command post/base of operations and conduct patrols and ambushes throughout its entire TAOC. All patrols, ambushes, and other operations will be integrated down to the squad level.

b. Phá vỡ hạ tầng cơ sở Việt-Công.

c. Bảo vệ chính trị bản và các cơ sở xã hội của ta.

d. Săn xép tấn tiểu, phục kích trong phạm vi khu Phủ Họp Chỉ Huy trưởng chỉ định.

e. Hãy mánh, công tác dân sự vũ và chiến trình tấn lự chien để tạo được sự tín tượng của dân chúng địa phương vào ta.

f. Tổ chức đơn vị tình báo địa phương.

g. Báo cáo mọi tình tình báo quân sự lập tức cho trung tâm tình báo Hợp tác tại quân và các đơn vị Việt Nam cùng như của dân cán bộ.

h. Tập luyện và giúp đỡ nhân dân tự vệ trong thôn làng.

3. Thực hành.

a. Ở nhiệm phận quân. Trung điệp Hợp tác 2-7-5 sẽ hoạt động tại những lần như trong khu Phủ Họp Chỉ Huy trưởng chỉ định cho mình, theo nguyên tắc lưu động đánh bất ngờ, chúng bị so giao tạo nên một mạng lưới hoạt động đồng nghĩa cần trong một vị trí, sẽ gây ra hiệu ứng đặc biệt chống dịch chủ yếu và các hoạt động canh bắn hàng ngày. Chủ động bố trí chốt, huỷ và các hoạt động chúng tạo cơ nhân lí khác nhau trong thời gian áp đặt khủng bố Hợp tác cơ thể tàn nhẫn ra, kết phán bằng Trung điệp Hợp tác 2-7-5 sẽ di chuyển bố trí chủ yếu và các hoạt động canh thắt với các đơn vị bản cảnh và tăng cường. Sau khi tới trung điệp Hợp tác 2-7-5 sẽ di chuyển đến bố trí huỷ và các hoạt động mà đã chọn trước và điều thắt, phục kích trong khắp khu Phủ Họp Chỉ Huy trưởng chỉ định. Tất cả cuộc chiến thế trận, phục kích và các hoạt động khác sẽ phải Phủ Họp nâng cấp tiến tính.
b. Patrol/Ambush/Command Post Operations

(1) Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5 will conduct their patrols, ambushes, and command post operations as follows:

(a) Conduct a minimum of two integrated squad size patrols daily between the hours of 1900 and 0700.

(b) Conduct a minimum of one integrated squad size patrol daily between the hours of 0700 and 1900.

(c) Change the command post location/base of operations every 12 hours, command posts will not be public buildings nor concrete structures.

(d) Once every 24 hours patrol or ambush every hamlet in the assigned TAOC without using the same routes, trails, and setting a pattern to operations.

c. Additional Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5 will conduct additional operations as directed by the Hoa Yang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

d. Planning.

(1) Patrol routes, ambushes, and other CAP operations will be based on paragraph 3 a. and b. above, current enemy intelligence or anticipated plans, and that all infiltration routes or other previous enemy locations be checked or interdicted daily throughout the entire TAOC.

b. ẩn tiêu điểm khe khích, để động bộ chi huy.

(1) Trung đội hỗn hợp 2-7-5 sẽ đi tuần tiễu, phục kích và chốt động bộ chi huy chi sau:

(a) Tới chiến phần cuối cùng tuần tiễu bắn phục kích theo cấp 2 tiễu đội của hổn hợp bằng ng窈 khoảng thời gian từ 07 giờ đến 07 giờ.

(b) Tới chiến cuối cùng tuần tiễu, cấp tiễu đội đi tuần tiễu trong khoảng thời gian từ 07 giờ đến 19 giờ hành ngày.

(c) Cơ sở 12 tiennie thay đổi nội chỉ huy, các hoạt động thường bờ chi huy sẽ không động cơ hồ nhà công cộng mà cộng không các nhà xưởng hành xưởng.

(1) Trong 24 tiếng đồng hồ, tuần tiễu bắn phục kích trung đội áp chế khi phi binh diễn thứ chỉ thi binh, không được dùng cùng một loại đạn, đồng vẫn và một dòng đạn gỡ các hoạt động phòng không.

c. Những hoạt động khác. Trung đội hỗn hợp 2-7-5 sẽ chỉ huy những hoạt động khác khi Chủ tịch Trung Chỉ Khu Hoa Yang và Đại diện trưởng đại diện số 5 chỉ chỉ binh.

d. Kế hoạch

(1) Tận tiêu động, bộ phòng kích và các hoạt động khác của trung đội hỗn hợp sẽ cần cụ thể đến 4a và b. trên, nhưng tính tổng hổ bắn bộ, bộ phòng kích và tất cả các đường sống phụ thuộc vào việc nói trước giải điểm để hoạt động phi kiếm soát ngăn chặn hàng ngày trên khắp toàn bộ Khu Phối hợp chiến thuật của mình.
(2) All planning will be accomplished by the respective QM Platoon Commander and the CAP Leader of the U.S. Marines. Disagreement as to location, frequency and size of patrols and ambushes or other activities will be referred to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives for decision. In all cases of disagreement the QM Platoon Leader and the Marine CAP Leader will promptly report to the Hoa Vang District Headquarters. In no case will a disagreement be allowed to go unresolved before 0000 the day the patrol or activity is to be conducted.

(3) All patrols/ambushes and CP locations will be planned in advance and submitted to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company the day before for Monday through Sunday of the next week. Changes to the planned operations may be authorised by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

e. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) The assigned operating area, Tactical Area of Coordination Appendix (1) is assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5 to properly identify its respective area and to assist in overall coordination. All patrols, ambushes, or other operations within the assigned TAOC will be coordinated with the Commanding Officer of the 1st Marines and the other ARVN and PAVN units as necessary.

(2) Firesupport and reaction forces will be coordinated through the Commanding Officer of the 1st Marines.

4. Administration/Logistics

a. Administration and logistics for Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5 will be through the respective ARVN of Marine Commander at Hoa Vang District Headquarters except as modified in existing orders.

(2) Trung đối Trưởng Phòng Quân và toàn trưởng T.Q.L.C.


e. Liên tiếp hợp đồng

(1) Khi việc hoạt động chỉ định, Khu Phái Hợp Chính Thường theo phân luộc (1) chỉ định cho trung đội họ họp 2-7-5 để biết rõ chức chẩn kí việc riêng của mình để giúp mình trong việc phối hợp với các đơn vị bạn. Tất cả cuộc tuần tiệc, phục kích hay những hoạt động khác trong phạm vi quân đội hợp chính mình chỉ định sẽ liên lạc với Chỉ huy Trưởng Trung Bộ I T.Q.L.C. Mỹ và các đơn vị Việt - Nam cũng như Bộ Männ khi cần thiết.

(2) Hòa lực vũ trang và lực lượng tiếp đạn sẽ liên lạc với Chỉ huy Trưởng Trung Bộ I T.Q.L.C. Mỹ.

4. Quan trắc và tiếp vận.

a. Việc quan trắc và tiếp vận chỉ trong đói họ họp 2-7-5 do quan đội Việt - Nam và T.Q.L.C. Mỹ và bộ chỉ huy chu kỳ Hòa-Vang riêng biệt đảm trách, ngoài trừ trường hợp mà đội lãnh này.
5. Command/Communication.

a. Command of the QM Platoon 52 and U.S. Marines assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5 is exercised separately by their respective Commanders. Unity of command is dependent upon mutual cooperation and coordination.

b. The QM Platoon 52 and U.S. Marines will be responsible for their own communication with Hoa Vang District Headquarters.

Appendix I CAP 2-7-5 TAOC
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>155mm rnd.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140mm rnd.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm rnd.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82mm H.E. rnd.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm H.E. rnd.</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61mm H.E. rnd.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm rnd.</td>
<td>94</td>
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<tr>
<td>57mm rnd.</td>
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<td>3.5&quot; m. radius</td>
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<tr>
<td>M-72 LAW</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>M-79 H.E. rnd.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-79 canister</td>
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<td>B-40 rnd.</td>
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<tr>
<td>B-40 Booster</td>
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<tr>
<td>M-26 grenade</td>
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<td>Chicom grenade</td>
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<td>CS grenade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Illumination grenade</td>
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<td>Rifle grenade</td>
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</tr>
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<td>M-53 grenade</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Pineapple&quot; frag grenade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Homemade grenade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Claymore Mines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Claymore Wire</td>
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<tr>
<td>Claymore &quot;Hell Bases&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>50lb. Box Mine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unknown weight Box Mines</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Bouncing Betty&quot; mines</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det cord, roll</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blasting Cap</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb fuse</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-4, 2 lb. blocks</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trip Elate</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft illum canister</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Compass</td>
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<tr>
<td>.50 cal rnds.</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.62 linked rnds.</td>
<td>500</td>
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<tr>
<td>.50 cal linked rounds.</td>
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<td>5.56 rnds.</td>
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<td>AK-47 magazine</td>
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<tr>
<td>M-16 Magazine</td>
<td>4</td>
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