HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96802

UNCLASSIFIED

(Confidential when enclosure (1) is removed)

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 April to 30 April 1969

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.1A
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8A

Encl: (1) 2d Combined Action Group Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Enclosure (1) is downgraded at 3 year intervals. Declassified after 12 years. DOD Directive 5200.10

E. L. LEWIS

DECLASSIFIED
FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 2d CAG ltr 3/MJD/gbs 5750 of 20 Jun 1969

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 April to 30 April 1969 (U)

1. Forwarded.

R. H. Barrow
By direction

Copy to:
CO, 2d CAG
PERMANENT RETENTION
Report Destruction to HQ Classified Files Sect. (Code ABQ)

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UNCLASSIFIED

(Unclassified upon removal from basic letter)

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, 2d CAG ltr 3/MJD/gbs
5750 of 20 June 1969

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1-30 April 1969

1. The subject chronology has been reviewed for completeness and
is forwarded herewith.

R. D. WHITE
By direction

Copy to:
CO, 2d CAG
CG, III MAF

---

HIST

C911215

DECLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1 April 1969 to 30 April 1969

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<td>3-1</td>
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DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS: DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12-YEARS

DECLASSIFIED
PART I
ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. Designation
   Commander

   2d Combined Action Group  LtCol E. L. LEWIS
   Date: 1Apr69  30Apr69

   SUBORDINATE UNITS

   1st Combined Action Company  Capt. J. E. SEITZ
   Date: 1Apr69  30Apr69

   2d Combined Action Company  Capt. J. W. BORSHMAN III
   Date: 1Apr69  30Apr69

   3rd Combined Action Company  Capt. A. H. MOORE
   Date: 1Apr69  30Apr69

   4th Combined Action Company  Capt. D. A. VOEGELGESANG
   Date: 1Apr69  30Apr69

   5th Combined Action Company  Capt. J. D. NIKOTIS
   Date: 1Apr69  30Apr69

   7th Combined Action Company  Capt. D. D. DEAN
   Date: 1Apr69  13Apr69

   GySgt J. L. COUCH
   Date: 14Apr69  25Apr69

   Capt. G. E. BROWN
   Date: 26Apr69  30Apr69

   8th Combined Action Company  Capt. A. P. TOKARZ
   Date: 1Apr69  30Apr69

   9th Combined Action Company  1stLt. R. A. CROVIN
   Date: 1Apr69  13Apr69

   Capt. D. D. DEAN
   Date: 14Apr69  30Apr69
ATTACHED UNITS

Detachment, Scout Dog Platoon, 3rd M.P. Battalion
Detachment, Kit Carson Scouts, 3rdMarDiv G-2 (C-1)
Detachment, ARVN Interpreters/Translators, III MAF
Detachment, Medical Section, HQ, III MAF

2. Locations

1 April 1969 to 30 April 1969

HQ 2d CAG
CACO 2-1
CACO 2-2
CACO 2-3
CACO 2-4
CACO 2-5
CACO 2-7
CACO 2-8
CACO 2-9

District III, Danang Special Sector, RVN
Hieu Duc District, Quang Nam Province, RVN
Dai Loc District, Quang Nam Province, RVN
Bien Ban District, Quang Nam Province, RVN
Hieu Nhon District, Quang Nam Province, RVN
Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province, RVN
Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province, RVN
Hoa Vang District, Quang Nam Province, RVN
Duc Duc District, Quang Nam Province, RVN

3. Staff Officers

Executive Officer/Civic Action Officer, S-5

Major R. O. BROAD JR. 1 Apr 69 - 30 Apr 69

1stLt. H. NAGAI 1 Apr 69 - 30 Apr 69

Major M. J. DUBE 1 Apr 69 - 30 Apr 69

1stLt. P. E. CASWELL 1 Apr 69 - 30 Apr 69

1stLt. R. L. BURTON 1 Apr 69 - 10 Apr 69

Capt. C. A. BURR 11 Apr 69 - 30 Apr 69

4. Average Strength. The average strength of the 2d Combined Action Group during the month of April 1969 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>On Rolls</th>
<th>Chargeable/Effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USMC 575</td>
<td>552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the reporting month, there was a slight increase in the number of junior noncommissioned officers on rolls but the Group Operations remain handicapped by an approximate ratio of 2 to 1 authorized/on hand.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th># of CAPs</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>ENL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAG Hq</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Includes 20 Marines newly arrived from CONUS who are on orientation course prior to being assigned CAP School and further assignment to companies.
1. Personnel Administration.

a. Joined and Transferred. During the month of April, the 2d Combined Action Group joined and transferred the following number of personnel listed in the four categories below:

(1) Joined

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Rotated CONUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Transferred within WestPac Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Transferred by SR w/sick (out of country hospitals)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Awards

(1) Award recommendations during the reporting month were processed and forwarded to FMFPac for approval as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heroic</th>
<th>End of Tour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USMC BS MM NAM</td>
<td>USN BS BS BS BS BS BS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS 2 BS 3 NCH 1</td>
<td>BS 1 BS MM 4 4 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Two Bronze Stars awards were approved from FMFPac and delivered to personnel during the reporting month.

(3) Personnel of the Group also received 29 Purple Heart medals as a result of combat wounds received during the month.

c. Casualties. Casualties during the month of April were as follows:

ENCLOSURE (1)
d. CONJRTS/SPLINTS/WEAR. This command received and processed one Congressional interest letter during the reporting month. The inquiry concerned a Marine who extended his tour of duty in Vietnam and after taking his 30 days Special leave, wanted to cancel his extension to take advantage of the current early release program offered certain enlisted Marines in various MOS. There was one other Congressional interest letter received at Headquarters VII MAF, which concerned a Marine in this organization. He was on legal hold beyond his RTD due to his being a witness for a Special Court-Martial. No special interest letters were received by this organization during the month. Five welfare reports were processed during the month primarily concerned with parents worried about their son's welfare due to lack of correspondence from individual Marines.

e. Administrative Assistance.

(1) Administration assistance to every individual Marine and companies seeking assistance continues to be provided as expeditiously and as completely as possible.

(2) Two Administrative discharges by reason of unsuitability were processed during the month. Both were approved and one Marine was transferred CONUS for discharge and the other was placed on legal hold due to disciplinary actions pending against him.

(3) The following Group directives were promulgated during the reporting month. Copies of these orders are located in the document section (Section IV) of this Chronology.

(a) Group Order 1080.1: Personnel musters within Combined Action Companies.

(b) Group Order 1601.3: Control of Transient Personnel in 2d Combined Action Group Compound.

f. Legal. Legal activities during the reporting month were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article 32 Investigations</th>
<th>Informal Investigations</th>
<th>NJP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCM</td>
<td>SPCM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2-2
g. Morale and Welfare. The morale of the unit continues to be high and recreational activity is available to all hands. The beach adjacent to the Group Compound has been opened for swimming during the month and is a tremendous boost on morale during these hot, humid days.

h. The following Rest and Recuperation leave quotas, out of country and in country were received and utilized:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Out of Country R&amp;R - Quotas</th>
<th>Utilized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In Country R&amp;R - Quotas</th>
<th>Utilized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the above, 70 additional personnel that were joined from various units in Vietnam were sent on in country R&R prior to being assigned to the Combined Action Program School.

I. Mail. Daily average bags of mail were processed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letters</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incoming</td>
<td>Outgoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>½ bag</td>
<td>½ bag</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Packages</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incoming</td>
<td>Outgoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 bags</td>
<td>½ bag</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: One bag of letters represents approximately 2,000 letters.

j. Promotions. 41 promotions were effected during the month of April as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Meritorious Combat</th>
<th>Meritorious</th>
<th>regular</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cpl</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCpl</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
k. Hospital Visits. Weekly hospital visits were made by designated officers of the command in addition to those made daily by the Hospital Corps representative and the commanding officer. No significant problems were encountered.

l. Informational Services. One hundred twenty four Fleet Newspaper releases were forwarded to the III MAF Combat Information Bureau during the reporting month. These included information on promotions, joinings and decorations.

m. Career Planning

(1) During the month of April, thirty-seven Career Planning interviews were conducted, with the following rank breakdown:

(a) Sergeants ................... 8
(b) Corporals ................... 6
(c) Lance Corporals ............... 10
(d) PFC's ........................ 13

(2) No career reenlistments or extensions resulted from these interviews. A six-month and one three-month extension were affected. Ten Marines extended their overseas tours.
2. CIVIC ACTION/PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

a. During the month of April, civic action personnel within the Group continued to initiate and further develop self-help civic action projects. Increased contact as a result of the mobile CAP concept has brought about a better understanding between the Vietnamese people and the CAP Marines, enabling new ideas in civic action to become a success for both.

(1) With increased interest and a fuller understanding among CAP Marines of the self-help idea, projects such as no cost/non-material have become routine procedures with the CAPs, readily accepted and employed by the Vietnamese people in areas of CAP influence.

(2) Agricultural projects are becoming more and more important to the CAPs because of the importance they hold in the future. At the present time, Civic Action NOOs are working closely with the farmers experimenting with seeds, hoping to find those vegetables which the farmers will accept and start raising in quantity. The Civic Action NOO of CAP 2-5-4, for example, has been receiving larger quantities of a variety of seeds with instructions on growing them from interested people in his home state. With many of the CAPs spending considerable time in the development of these vegetable crops, it is hoped that those most beneficial to the people will be identified so that the CAPs can narrow their attention and concentrate in these specific areas.

b. A major attempt was introduced during the month to modify a long-standing concept of civic action as a giveaway program. The attempt was predicated on a fundamental question: "What have we taught the people that they will continue to benefit from after our departure?" Lengthy discussions were held by the Civic Action NOOs throughout the Group, and, beginning with a basic assumption that much of the civic action efforts of the past will be insignificant when we are no longer here, a program for the future was put into the planning stage.

(1) A major error has been the concept of what the Vietnamese people of the hamlets and villages need from the CAPs, and the extent of their involvement in getting it. CAP Marines are willing to build schools using materials from their own sources, or to introduce better health and sanitation practices, but with few exceptions, that same Marine was willing to have the villagers fail to participate in the acquisition of the materials, and thus gain nothing but the immediate benefit of the school or MedCap. In the following week, another school or MedCap is needed, the fulfillment of the need will be dependent upon the presence of the CAP to get the material or provide the corpsman again the people will be in no better position to look after their own needs. The CAPs in the new approach will try to work within the framework of gradually instilling the motivation to accept the major part of the responsibility on the part of the people, and will lead them by the hand, if necessary, to ensure that they know how to go about the effort. A fundamental requirement in this program is patience on the part of the people, since it is not reasonable to assume that, having been given every need for so long, the village is suddenly going to cooperate in getting things for himself. Education of the people is a major part of this program, but education of the CAP Marine is an even greater part.
c. Commodities distributed during the month of April were as follows: food 2500 pounds; soap 2000 bars; clothing 200 pounds; blacksmith kits 23; school kits 1000; woodworking kits 2; care kits 30; farm aid kits 5; masonry kits 10; midwife kits 6.

d. During April, CAP personnel of the Group assisted Vietnamese civilians in completing the following projects: fences 6 1/2 dwellings 7 1/2 public heads 1 1/2 wells 3 1/2 pagodas repaired 2; school roofs repaired 3; dams 1; family bunkers 2; foot bridges 4 1/2 dispensaries 3.

e. Medical assistance in support of civic action saw MedCap resulting in the treatment of 14,939 Vietnamese civilians. Twenty-five dental cases were treated.

(1) 36 Vietnamese children and 22 adults were medically evacuated during the month.

(2) CAP medical corpsmen administered 30,000 civilian immunizations in April. Water buffalo and cattle were inoculated in several of the CAPs areas.

(3) CAP hospitalmen continued to train Vietnamese civilians in the basics of first aid. During the month, 37 such civilians were undergoing training.

f. Psychological operations activities employed by the Group in April included airdropped leaflets and hand dissemination of leaflets and Vietnamese newspapers.

(1) During the month, and following the last major offensive, CAPs were primarily concerned with introducing a greater awareness of the rewards system into the hamlets and villages.

(2) Approximately 90,000 ANTI-VC CADRE/INFRASTRUCTURE leaflets were airdropped.

(3) Approximately 30,000 Chieu Hoi leaflets were airdropped during the month.

(4) All CAPs in the Group distributed awards leaflets during the month. The total number of such leaflets approached 45,000.

(5) All CAPs in the Group distributed Vietnamese newspapers and magazines. 40,000 newspapers were distributed to civilians in Quang Nam Province.
a. General. During the month of April the Combined Action Group S-3 continued with the additional duties as the Group S-2. 1st Lieutenant was assigned as the assistant Group S-3/S-2 Officer during late March 1969 and will be expected to assist the S-2/S-3 Officer in all facets of the varied duties of this joint office. Approval for proposed T/O changes and additional personnel to the S-3/S-2 and S-2/S-3 have been forwarded to CIC through normal channels.

b. Intelligence Information Chain. Once again the widely deployed elements of 2d CAG continued to provide timely and accurate information that has saved lives and enabled local and ground commanders to cope with the enemy situation in fluid and increasingly mobile combat. The numerous small unit actions, initiated by both sides, host of the internal problems in CIA-controlled hamlets and villages where we are receiving increasing amounts of accurate and timely information on enemy movements or deployment. The civilians in these hamlets are putting more and more trust and confidence in the CIA and are pointing out body counts, losses and are disclosing enemy sightings in ever increasing frequency. All of the information is immediately and expeditiously processed through TM and other PHAP channels. Parallelism of the submission of information through both chains ensures that it gets to appropriate units for timely action. Combined Action Company Commanders are in good position at District Headquarters to ensure timely action is taken or that PACOM Commanders are immediately notified of any pertinent information to their areas of responsibility. They are also in a position to relay information or to insert it into the Vietnamese chain at their level. The local District Intelligence Operations Coordination Centers (DIOCCs) cooperate very closely with all CACOs and exchange of information is provided on a continuous basis.

c. Counter Intelligence. The 2d CAG Headquarters continues to receive valuable information from the 5th and 9th Counter Intelligence Teams. Prisoner interrogation reports and readouts are provided on all prisoners captured by 2d CAG units. These in turn disseminated to CACOs and CIA. These CIIs assist us in exerting all possible pressure in our efforts to uproot enemy infrastructures throughout CAP hamlets.

d. General Enemy Situation. The general enemy situation during the month of April 1969 again changed from the previous month of March. At the close of the last reporting period it was evident that CAP units would once again become prime targets in the event the 2d Phase of the offensive was commenced. The general level of enemy activity throughout 2d and 12d TACOs dipped substantially lower than that experienced during the last three weeks in March.
The 1st week in April the number of enemy initiated contacts with CAPs decreased to a point lower than the period just prior to the Easter Offensive in February. This represents a new low for the year. Incidents of terrorism in CAP Hamlets, attacks by fire on CAP bases or compounds also decreased to new lows. The enemy forces appeared to be avoiding all contacts and seemed satisfied to rely on booby traps and mines around CAP TAOCs. The latter part of the 1st week produced one significant terrorist incident in CAP TAOCs. On 4 April 1969 ten civilians and PFS were killed and 31 others were wounded when a VC terrorist threw a satchel charge into the midst of an audience watching a local talent show put on by the civilians and PFS soldiers of Binh Ky Village (HTS50G98), eight kilometers south of the DANANG Air Base.

CAP 2-7-5 was assisting in the security of the area when the terrorist somehow made his way past PFS checkpoints and got within range of the stage area. Vigorous exploitation was made of this incident by DIOCCS leaders. By the end of the 1st week of March it was too early to tell whether the disruption of enemy activity was a momentary pause or a signal of the warning of the NVA/VC offensive against CAP units in the Province. It should be noted that both large scale and small scale enemy initiated attacks against other I Corps units were also marked down. There continued to be a number of agent reports flowing from HCMC co-located with CAP headquarters indicating that there would be renewed offensive efforts by the enemy in the coming weeks. At the end of the 1st week it became evident that the enemy intended to maintain a level of offensive activity above that which characterized the Pre-Easter period but without any major offensive efforts which might provoke retaliation or action on the part of TAOC commanders. CAP units continued to receive information on enemy threats to villagers if they associated the moves with or rendered any assistance to CAP units.

The second week saw the tempo of activities remain basically the same. Battalion operations around CAP TAOCs continued to make significant contacts with NVA Forces. None of these NVA units made a move to isolate or attack CAP units in the vicinity during the period. The local VC seemed satisfied to disrupt the pacification effort and to influence the resettlement of refugees into VC controlled areas. CAPs, meanwhile assisted in countering the VC efforts in these areas by extending TAOCs to encompass refugee hamlets and by providing increased protection in these areas. While the tempo of enemy activity was at reduced levels, additional intelligence sources reported that a renewed offensive effort was probable. Estimates ranged from mid April to mid May for the beginning of renewed activity against CAPs in Quang Nam Province.

The third week's activity picked up somewhat from the lows of the first two weeks. The enemy started to make his presence known by initiating joint contacts with CAP units in the Province. The effects of this increase of activity was concentrated primarily in the southern DANANG TAOCs, however CAPs throughout the Province reported increased sightings and small contacts. There was a significant increase in enemy booby trap and mining incidents and better yet there were increases in incidents of local civilians pointing out these rigged booby traps to CAP members.

On April 15th, CAP 2-8-3 eleven kilometers Northwest of the DANANG Airfield
spotted 35 NVA crossing the river at 904821. The CAPs, in a neatly
executed ambush, opened fire and killed seven NVA and captured 2
weapons. Two more bodies were found the next day to bring the total to
seven NVA killed. The results of this engagement prompted C.O. III to send
a message to the CAP unit for recognition of superior efforts and results
while not suffering any casualties themselves. Although there were
increases in activity the enemy still avoided major combat in apparent
effort to retool or retain units for a possible resumption of offensive
operations. Enemy agents continued to pass the word through local
civilians that some CPA units in the Bien Hoa and Bien Hoa Districts would
be targets for all out assaults by fire as well as ground attacks.

The month of April terminated with another decrease in enemy
activities. It appears that enemy units were concentrating their efforts
on collecting taxes and attempting to collect rice and other foodstuffs
to sustain themselves for covert operations. Local civilians reported
many cases of enemy groups coming out of the hills ordering the people
under threat of death, to provide them with food, salt and medical sup
plies. On many incidents the people responded by informing the local
activities and CAP units countered the increased enemy efforts by
vigorous patrolling and harassment throughout their areas. There were
increased enemy sightings reported by CAP units at Bien Hoa and Bien
Hoay but for the most part the enemy chose not to engage.

(1) Enemy Plans and Policies. As the month of April came to an
end it was again apparent that CAP units would continue to be prime targets
whenever the enemy launched another phase of his attacks. All indicators
point to this as enemy agents continued to attempt to persuade local
civilians to abandon the CAPs and to threaten these civilians with death
if they assisted the CPA in any way. Increased surveillance was the
order of the day as the reporting period ended and all CAP units continued
in their preparations to cope with forecasted increased enemy pressure.
The predicted pattern of attacks has not changed since the March report,...
attacks by fire directed at CAP units and simultaneous ground attacks on
CAP sites to isolate our positions as they group or mass units for attacks
on other larger U.S. or other WNAP installations.

d. Interrogator/Translators. During the month of April 1969 all
detainees or prisoners were either processed through the various District
Headquarters or were forwarded through USIS units for processing by their
assigned CITs. As mentioned in the counter intelligence section of this
report, 2d CAP units continue to enjoy a cooperative relationship
with the 5th CIT. Our units report to their requests for assistance in checking out leads and in investigating possible enemy
suspicion or activities disclosed through their interrogation teams.

f. Interpreters. Second CAP had seven enlisted interpreters on
the rolls during the month of April 1969. The senior interpreter/Liaison
Officer was transferred for duty during the reporting period. One en-
listed man was assigned to CAP headquarters in NAM working in the
S-2/3 office while the other six are assigned to specific Districts.
Headquarters as required as well as interpreters for the Mobile Training Team assigned to Dien Ban District. These interpreters are performing generally well and are a definite asset to CACOs in effecting coordination with the District Chiefs, their staffs, or PF, unit leaders.

g. Enemy Statistics. Enemy statistics for the month of April 1969 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>POW</th>
<th>Detainees</th>
<th>Hoi Chan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Weapons and Ordnance Captured.

**Weapons:**
- M-16: 1
- AK-47: 16
- 7.62 Pistol: 1
- M-2 Carbine: 1
- Chech Rifle: 1
- SKS: 3
- Anti-Aircraft MG 12.7: 1

**Ordnance:**
- M-26: 9
- 105 rounds: 2
- M-79 rounds: 2
- 60mm: 7
- Shells: 14
- 60mm Mortar: 14
- 81mm Mortar: 9
- 60mm N. rounds: 1
- 81mm Illum: 4
- LAAN: 2
a. General. The level of activity decreased again during the month of April as described in the intelligence section. Emphasis continued in the area of coordination at all levels in preparation for increased enemy efforts. The realization that the enemy had the capability to mass for general attacks at any given day prompted CAP units to review their current plans, study past trends and to further prepare for the predicted attacks. There were more occasions of CAP ambushes and patrols sighting enemy units before they sighted the CAPs and engaged them. All CAPs have been reacting to local timely intelligence provided by the District and Province Staffs Plans for activities or operations within assigned TAOCs are usually submitted one week prior to execution date to TAOR Commanders and are changed as required dependent on the intelligence flow. CAPs have been careful not to overreact to some of this information as planted information has in the past been used to steer CAP units away from proposed enemy operations. As in previous months, the majority of assistance rendered by reaction forces came from adjacent CAP units as a result of closely coordinated intra-unit reaction plans. The tactics used continue to be fixing the enemy, engaging him and if and when his forces are too large, massing several CAPs to cope with their size. In the event additional assistance is required the pre-planned TAOR Commander's reaction force is alerted and committed as necessary. The flexibility of all of these plans provided us with the capability of pulling CAPs out of potential "hot spots" shortly after engagement or reinforcing them on short notice.

b. Mobility. 2d CAG units continue to reap benefits from the mobile concept. The CACO commanders have stressed local security and vigorous patrolling and ambushes during the reporting period. The increased security is evident in the face of the local citizens who are getting friendlier as they see that the CAPs are in fact providing much better and more flexible security with the mobile concept. The increased success of this concept can be directly attributed to an intensive PSYOPS effort to indoctrinate people on the CAP mission and plans. This has been accomplished in the form of air dropped leaflets as well as PSYOPS teams combined with CAP troops and representatives from the District Chiefs' office. These teams thoroughly explain the mechanics of a CAP and assist them in preparing their local civilians to accept the fact that the CAP unit will mingle with them, be continuously on the move, never setting patterns to their activities but always keeping the enemy on balance with their flexibility.

(1) At the termination of the reporting period 2d CAG had twenty-nine mobile CAPs operating in Quang Nam Province. Four of these were redesignated as Mobile CAPs from static CAPs during the month of April. The CAPs changing status during the reporting period were:

(UNCLASSIFIED)
CAP 2-5-4 was relocated to southern Hoa Vang as part of the general 2d CAG reorganization plan. A number of CAP TADGs were readjusted during the month. Combined Action Company Commanders are striving to provide contiguous boundaries for each CAP to facilitate coordination as well as enable them to be mutually supporting. Individual letters reporting changes in status as well as coordination effected for their execution are located in section IV of the Chronology. (Supporting Documents).

C. Coordination. As mentioned in the March Chronology the coordination and liaison performed on the CAP level is time consuming but it pays off in terms of lives saved. The coordination measures initiated during March in the form of multi-lingual, jointly signed letters proved extremely effective. The trial project that was started in Hoa Vang District was also initiated in two other districts during the month of April. These documents have assisted us immeasurably in effecting excellent coordination with and receiving increased cooperation from our CAP Popular Force Soldiers. The original format of these joint letters simply presented the CAP Commanders and the PF leaders with a document stating forth their duties, their missions, and provided guidelines for their operations. The improved version of the initial documents were used during April. These were published in an operation order format, translated, and issued to each CAP. The end product provided both the U.S. and Vietnamese elements with all of the information previously supplied in the jointly signed letters but being in an operation order form they appeared more official to the PFs. Whenever coordination difficulties are encountered the order is referred to by either the CAP commanders or the PF platoon leaders and any unresolved areas are smoothed out at the district headquarters. The additional interest displayed by district Chiefs and members of their staffs to the CAP efforts are very evident. These coordinating steps have made the PFs feel like someone is really aware of their problems and are looking out for their welfare. Copies of the combined orders (originally 8x13 size but condensed to 8x10 1/2 for this chronology) are provided in section IV of this chronology. These are a representative group of orders depicting the efforts in one District. All orders issued for other districts have not been appended to this chronology as they are too voluminous and the reduction in size process is too time consuming for the current reproduction capabilities.
(1) Training Plans. The training plans submitted on request for the month of April were executed during this reporting period with minor modifications made to adjust to the tactical situation. Emphasis remains in aggressive practical application of basic tactics involved in patrolling, ambush techniques, briefing and debriefing procedures, weapons indoctrination, fire support coordination, and language training. Emphasis will continue throughout the planned training cycles commensurate with the volume of enemy activity during the forthcoming month.

(2) Outside Assistance Training. The 7th engineers provided instruction to CAP units on demolitions and use of these demolitions in destroying enemy fortifications. Individual Combined Action Companies have coordinated with their TAOR Commanders and have requested and received expert instruction on Mortars, Artillery, and other supporting arms. Excellent cooperation has been received by all 1st Marine Division units in these areas.

(3) CAG Mobile Training Team. The 2d CAG MTT is still assigned to the 3d Combined Action Company in Dien Ban District. During April, the MTT trained one PF platoon and started training another at the end of the month. All training continues to be well received and is well supported at the district level. The MTT still has three more platoons to train in Dien Ban before reassignment.

e. Inspections. The regular schedule of inspections by staff members was accelerated during the month of April. All staff officers and their representatives commenced a coordinated program of visits geared towards providing the best possible support to the field units. Improvements are very apparent in all areas. Technical assistance by contact teams and special administration teams provided on site support to the troops in the field.

f. Conferences/Meetings.

(1) Staff Conferences. The weekly staff conferences continued through the month of April. These conferences are scheduled the day prior to the CACO Commanders weekly meetings to provide staff members with adequate time to prepare agenda items to be presented during CACO meetings. All matters requiring multiple staff action are coordinated thoroughly and courses of action are presented for commanders approval and final implementation by CACOs. During these April meetings plans were finalized for the beginning of rehabilitation of the Vietnamese compound at Hoi An and its conversion into the new 2d CAG headquarters.
COMBINED ACTION COMPANY COs' meetings. All Combined Action Company Commanders met every Sunday during April to discuss past areas, forthcoming operations, coordination, new policy or changes to the existing ones and whatever plans were made for the next week. These meetings are our best method of providing standard guidance to all subordinate Commanders and ensuring that all efforts are paralleled. Inspection results and discrepancies are discussed and each staff officer is available to provide required support.

(3) CAP Commanders Conference. The monthly CAP commanders conference was held during the last week of April 1969. Agenda items were again submitted by CAP commanders several days preceding the conference on matters relating to their own specific operations or problem areas. These agenda items were screened, assimilated into logical discussion sequences as provided to the CAP commanders for discussion during the conference. This monthly meeting of all the "working leaders" is the best method available of passing on information, exchanging ideas and approaches to solving problems common to all CAPs. The response to these conferences continues to be outstanding. The CAP commanders look forward to the opportunity of meeting all of their contemporaries and exchanging professional knowledge. All participants continue to praise this conference as a key to the increased proficiency evident throughout the Group. Notes kept in the form of minutes of the April conference are located in section IV of this Chronology.

g. Special Operations

(1) Kit Carson Scouts. Scouts assigned to 2d CAG units again produced excellent results during April. The Group now has ten scouts assigned. Three of these scouts were joined during the reporting period. These scouts were assigned in areas where they previously operated as VC. They provided valuable information on enemy tactics, weapons, enemy hiding places and were especially proficient in pointing out booby traps and new mining techniques to the CAPs. We still have an outstanding request for six more of these scouts to provide each CACO with two to be assigned or rotated among their CAPs.

(2) Scout Dogs and Handlers. As mentioned in the March Chronology, a shortage of scout dog handlers during the month of March prompted 2d CAG to offer the services of CAG Marines to be trained as handlers by the 3d M.P. Battalion. Training progressed rapidly and seven 2d CAG Marines graduated from the school during April. These handlers were immediately assigned to CACOs where they have been operating in the same manner as teams previously assigned from the Scout Dog Platoon, 3d M.P. Battalion. These teams have already located numerous booby traps and have alerted on enemy units during patrols and ambushes. The Marines and PPs have nothing but high praise for these new additions to an already effective supporting element.
h. **Voluntary Information Program.** The voluntary information program was again successful during April. A total of 341,930 plasters were expended in support of the program during the reporting period. This represented a decrease in total expenditures from the month of March but did not reflect a slowing down of efforts. The differences were caused by reductions in prices paid per items of ordnance turned in. These reductions were necessitated by a shortage of funds to adequately support the program. The reduction simply directed CAP units to pay minimum payments whenever possible to stretch the allotted money as far as possible. Prices paid were still within the ranges provided in current orders. The amount of ordnance turned in is shown in section IV (supporting documents section) of this chronology.

i. **Artillery Support.** During the month of April 2d CAG units adjusted over 900 rounds of artillery fire on suspected or known enemy targets. The majority of these missions were in direct support of 2d CAG CAPs. In addition to the supporting artillery approximately 500 rounds of mixed 60mm and 81mm mortar were adjusted on the enemy by CAPs and CACOs.

j. **Air.**

(1) **Fixed Wing.** A total of 7 missions totalling 23 sorties were flown in support of CAP operations during April. Most of these missions were flown in the Hieu Duc and Dien Ban District areas of operations.

(2) **Flareships and Gunships.** A total of 7 missions were flown during the reporting period. (Three flareship and four gunship missions). Reaction time is excellent and the support remains outstanding in all respects.

(3) **Medical Evacuation Missions.** A total of 28 medical evacuation missions were controlled by 2d CAG CAP units during the period. These included missions called in to evacuate Vietnamese civilians, PFSs and Marines. Timely MedEvacs continue to be a large morale factor in all units.
5. **Services.**

a. During April, acquisition of new and replacement property continued at a normal rate. The following property was added to the Special Services inventory:

   (1) Basketball nets . . . . . 25
   
   (2) Basketball rings . . . . . 10
   
   (3) Weight Sets (200#) . . . . . 4

b. Weight sets were added to the inventory for the first time and have proven popular. These sets are used at the Group Headquarters, at the Company Headquarters, and at the few remaining CAPs which are located in compounds.

c. During the month, the pre-recorded tapes made available by III MAF Special Services continued at the normal rate of purchase. Thirty tapes were purchased by members of the Group.

d. Beer and soda issues to the field numbered 210 cases of beer and 360 cases of soda.

e. On 30 April, Special Services provided support for the 8-4 Section of the Headquarters at a Section Beach Party. Beer, soda, and light refreshments were provided.
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The overall logistics status of 2d CAG has not changed appreciably during this reporting period. As reported on several previous reports under the FQ/STAT reporting system, 2d CAG was rated as being in a C-2 category in Equipment/Supplies on hand, and C-1 in Equipment Readiness. The C-2 category rating is a result of the lack of receipt of T/E equipment.

a. Significant Events

(1) During the reporting period a special section and Force Engineers, for preparation of re-conditioning an old ARVN compound in Hoi An. An on the spot survey was conducted by 2d CAG S-4 of the Hoi An compound, and a sketch of office spaces, living quarters, mess hall and motor transport areas were drawn up.

(2) The group S-4 organized a conference of all HQ Sections for the purpose of relocating sections within the Hoi An compound. General agreement was made with minor changes on purpose billeting and office space. A workable blue print for mess hall, S-1, supply and motor transport facilities will require an on site inspection by section heads. Section heads were then instructed by the S-4 to perform an inspection tour of the Hoi An compound, and follow up their inspection with a diagram for consideration in re-construction of facilities.

b. Damage to Weapons Due to Enemy Action. No weapons were reported as being damaged as a result of enemy action during this reporting period.

c. Motor Transport

(1) During the reporting period the vehicles of the group motor transport section compiled a total of 34,244 miles. In addition they transported 300,000 lbs. of cargo to the companies in the field.

(2) A total of nine (9) vehicles were deadlined for second echelon repairs during the reporting period. A breakdown by vehicle type is as follows:

(a) three (3) M151A1 1 1/2 ton Truck (Cargo)
(b) three (3) M37B1 3/4 ton Truck (Cargo)
(c) three (3) M35A2C 2 1/2 ton Truck (Cargo)

The average deadline time was (4) four days.
A total of (2) two vehicles were deadlined for third echelon repairs during the reporting period. A breakdown by vehicle type is as follows:

(a) One (1) M151B1 1/4 ton Truck (Cargo)
(b) One (1) M38B1 3/4 ton Truck (Cargo)

The average deadline time was 26 days.

d. Air Lift. No air lifts were conducted during this reporting period.

e. Food Service.

(1) The Headquarters messhall served a total of 15,785 meals during the reporting period.

(2) 1,110 meals were served during the reporting period during Sunday barbecues which have been exceedingly well received by all hands.

(3) 3,455 meals of "M" rations were distributed to the CACOS during the reporting period.

(4) "A" rations were provided CACOS and were picked up on a daily basis or as available.

f. Armory.

(1) During this reporting period, a total of fifty-five (55) weapons were repaired by the Group Armory. Forty-one (41) weapons were taken to 1st FSB for repair. The turnaround time at 1st FSB is five (5) days.

g. Miscellaneous Services.

(1) Adequate Plumbing and facilities repairs were received from Maintenance Section, China Beach Public Works, Naval Support Activity, Danang East, SVN. In addition several buildings were painted and screen doors and window screens were replaced. Also the installment of a gate at South end of compound has been completed during the reporting period. The Motor Transport Vehicle Staging Area and compound grounds were graded and leveled during this reporting period as requested.

(2) The Force Logistics Laundry Platoon has continued to provide good support for both 2d CAG Headquarters and its companies during the reporting period.
i. Problem Areas.

1. Supply. The same problem areas exist as reported in several previous reports. The lack of receipt of TE items is responsible for this unit continuously reporting a C-2 rating in the area of Equipment/Supplies on hand as reported under the FORSTAT System. Examples of shortages are as follows:

(a) Telephone Set, TA/312  83
(b) Telephone Set, TA-1/PT  190
(c) Radio Control Group, AN/GRA-39  26
(d) Generator Set, PU-482  2
(e) Address Plate Machine  2
(f) Embossing Machine, Address Plate  1
(g) Wrist Watch  103
(h) Binoculars, 6x30  61
(i) Mount, Tripod, M122  39
(j) M3 Mount f/50 cal, MG  9
(k) Truck, cargo, 3/4 ton, M37B1  3
(l) Night Vision Scopes  31
(m) TIR, 1/4 ton, M416B1  11

2. Communications. Basically the same problems exist as previously reported. The turn-around time for direct exchange items still is approximately ten (10) to fifteen (15) days.

3. Motor Transport. During the reporting period there was considerable improvement in availability of second echelon repaired through the supply system. The lead time for vehicles undergoing third echelon repairs has increased.
c. General. Emphasis on training of selected Marines and Popular Forces Soldiers were highlighted during the Month of April. These Marines were acting as Hospital Corpsman in Combined Action Platoons where there were no Corpsman available. They provided first aid treatment to casualties and have maintained the medical logs. The use of salt tablets during the hot weather and the use of iodine tablets for water purification were emphasized and supervised at all levels.

b. Personnel:

(1) Medical Department Representative: HMC H. L. MITCHELL, USN

(2) Administrative/Sick Call Petty Officer: HM2 G. E. FALIER, USN

(3) Supply/Sick Call Petty Officer: HM2 G. C. LANIER, USN

(4) Hospital Corpsman Personnel Statistics for the Month of April 1969:

(a) Detached 3

(b) Joined 5

(c) TAD Personnel Attached 2

(d) TAD Personnel Terminated 1

(e) Casualties:

(1) KIA 0

(2) WIA 2

(3) Twice WIA & Evacuated out of RVN 0

(4) Died of Wounds 0

(f) During the Month of April 1969 the 2d Combined Action Group (CAG) 2d Station treated 820 USMC/USN personnel at routine sick call, including 378 personnel from the tenant Combined Action Program School and the Vietnamese Language School.

Medical Civic Action Program (Med Caps):

(1) During the Month of April 1969, CAP Corpsman treated 14,939 Vietnamese civilians at daily routine Med CAPS. This is an increase of 1,359 over the Month of March. There were also 75 Vietnamese civilians treated for wounds sustained as a result of hostile action.
d. **Training**

(1) During the Month of April, CAP Corpsman conducted a total of 67 classes resulting in a total attendance of 941 Vietnamese civilians and Popular Forces Soldiers. This is an increase of 532 over the Month of March.

(2) **Continued efforts in training of Popular Forces Corpsman in routine Med CAP treatment of the Vietnamese civilians are being made.**

e. **Sanitation**

(1) Routine sanitation inspections were conducted within the 2d CAG Headquarters Compound during the Month of April. Discrepancies noted were acted upon and resolved satisfactorily.

(2) The chlorination of the 2d CAG water system was remedied by Batch Chlorination of the water as it arrives in the large 5,000 gallon tank. Chlorine is added to the water at the rate of 4 oz. every two hours. This gives a 5 PPM (parts per million) chlorine ratio in the tank and 2.5 PPM chlorine ratio coming from the taps throughout the compound.

f. **Noteworthy Items**

(1) During the Month of April there were 30 2d CAG personnel admitted to hospitals with intestinal disorders as compared to 17 in March. Continued emphasis on sanitation is being stressed to combat the situation.

g. **Inspections**

(1) **HMH MITCHELL** conducted monthly inspections of the CAP units in 2d CAG during the Month of April. The most outstanding discrepancy noted during these inspections was that personnel were not using Iodine tablets to purify the water. A special effort is underway to combat this situation and to supervise daily use of these purifying agents.
8. Communication.

(a) Security. Three security violations were received from 3rd Radio Battalion during the month of April. These were the use of mild manner, the disclosure of a friendly activity, and linkage between a superceded and effective call sign. CACOS and company communication NCO's were briefed and operating personnel are continuing to be instructed in transmission security during staff visits and inspections.

1. Call signs and frequency designators were changed on 1 April with no difficulty.

2. A notification of compromise of the effective numerical code and authentication system (QAL) was received on 5 April from III MAF. III MAF NPS issued its reserve on board and it was immediately re-issued to users within 2d CAG.

3. A message was received from Naval Security Group on 19 April in reference to the brevity code suggested in January. The message suggested two minor changes; that the substitution rate be 48 hours vice 30 days and that we increase the vocabulary. Also a request to review our requirements for possible employment of the 168.

   a. A meeting was held by G-6 III MAF and it was decided the LY-13B could not be employed at the CAP level due to security risks but could be used at the CACO to CAG level. A message to Naval Security Group was originated by G-6 III MAF requesting the brevity code be constructed and issued on a priority basis.

(b) Staff Visits. On 16 and 17 April CACO's 2-1, 2-2, 2-5 and the proposed C.G. for CACO 2-7 were visited. Preventative Maintenance, operating conditions and completeness of equipment were checked, with the following results reported:

1. 2-1. The equipment at CACO Headquarters was complete and in good operating condition. Records and logs are maintained properly and the operating site (TOC) is excellent. Preventative Maintenance was satisfactory.

2. 2-2. Communication in general was outstanding. Equipment was complete and well cared for at CACO Headquarters and at all CAPs. The communication personnel were well informed on all aspects of their mission.

3. 2-5. The equipment at CACO Headquarters was in good operating condition. However the three CAP's visited 2-5-2, 2-5-4 and 2-5-7 reflected no apparent preventative maintenance program and all three CAP's were missing components of AN/PRC-25 radio sets which are and have been available for sometime a CAG communication supply. The CACO has difficulty in communicating with CAP's 2-5-2 and 2-5-7. Recommendations were made to correct deficiencies and immediate remedial action was taken to effect direct supervision for future maintenance.

2-22

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(c) Equipment Status. An RT-524 with powersupply was installed in CA CO 2-5 TSC. This increased communications capabilities with CAP'S 2-5-2 and 2-5-7.

(d) Combat Operation Center. Overall communications traffic again decreased approximately 10% over the two previous months. The following communications traffic was passed through the combat operations center over various Nets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incoming Messages</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgoing Messages</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spot Reports</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intell. Reports</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty Reports</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIR Reports</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Traffic</td>
<td>818</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) Communications Supply. Components of end items were in adequate stock throughout the entire month with the exception of whip antennas for the radio set AN/PRC-25. The following list reflects requisition status of communication items:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requisitions Submitted</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requisitions completed</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Requisitions outstanding</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*15 from February and March.

(f) Maintenance. Excellent maintenance support on repair of components of end items was provided by Electronics Maintenance Company 1st Force Service Regiment however RT-505 radio sets again were not in adequate supply in the direct exchange system causing a 6 to 10 day delay in turn around time. Total support provided by 1st Force Service Regiment was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of work requests submitted</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of requests completed</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of requests code &quot;H&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of requests outstanding</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1 Apr  CAP 2-1-6 was designated as a Mobile CAP to operate in the vicinity of AT9074, AT9075 and AT9076. The old 2-1-6 compound was turned over to the District Chief to do with as he deems necessary.

CAP 2-4-1 was designated as a Mobile CAP to operate in the vicinity of BT1759; BT1859 and BT1958. The old 2-4-1 compound has been completely demolished and all salvageable materials redistributed to other CAP's.

2 Apr  CACO 2-1. Tactical areas of coordination assigned to CACO 2-1 were changed to provide contiguous boundaries for the entire company. The contiguous areas of operation enable all CAP's to become mutually supporting and provide quick inter unit reaction capabilities. The new TAOC's also enable the CAP to support RD activities throughout CACO 2-1's area of operations.

CAP 2-3-1 While sweeping the area of a previous night's contact at BT065674 found (1) VC KIA, captured (1) M-16 rifle and apprehended (1) VC suspect. Results: (1) VC KIA, (1) M-16, (1) VCS.

CAP 2-3-2 While checking area of previous contact found (2) LAAM's, (2) RPG rounds with boosters and (5) VCS were captured. At grid BT057606.

CAP 2-7-5 Vietnamese children turned in (12) M-26 grenades, (16) M-79 rounds, (1) illum. grenade and (1) M-16 magazine with (10) rounds. Ordnance was blown and VIP award fund was paid.

- 4 Apr  CAP 2-4-2 While at day haven site was attacked by approximately (1) Company of VC/NVA at BT041815H. The CAP received heavy automatic fire, SAF, M-79 fire and rockets. Reaction forces from CACO 2-4 and CAP 2-4-4 joined 2-4-2. A sweep of the area resulted in (2) NVA KIA and (5) VCS captured.

CAP 2-1-3 killed (1) NVA at grid AT938700.

CAP 2-4-1 Patrol captured (4) VCS while on sweep of grid BT181591.

5 Apr  CAP 2-1-4 Vietnamese boy showed location of (1) 60mm HE round at grid AT957695. Round was blown in place and a VIP reward fund payment made.
6 Apr  CAP 2-3-1 A PF from 2-3-1 found (1) AK-47 rifle buried in the raid at grid B1057563.

7 Apr  CAP 2-1-2 Spotted (2) NVA at grid AT925714 and took them under fire. (1) NVA KIA and (1) 9mm pistol was found.

CAP 2-7-5 Vietnamese children turned in (13) M-26 grenades, (18) M-79 HE rounds, (1) 60mm illum rounds, (1) 60mm WP rounds, (2) pop-ups, (1) CS grenade, (1) LAAM, (1) 3.5 HE round, (156) 5.56 rounds, (1) 50 cal. round, (1) 105 fuse, (1) M-16 magazine and (1) pencil flare. A VIP reward payment was made.

8 Apr  CAP 2-9-1 Patrol found a 500 lb. bomb at AT881230. EOD was called and bomb destroyed.

CAP 2-9-1 Village Chief turned over (1) VC female he had apprehended while she was obtaining rice at grid AT887467.

CAP 2-4-3 Vietnamese child turned in (2) booby trapped M-79 rounds. Rounds were destroyed and a VIP reward payment made.

9 Apr  CAP 2-9-1 Patrol captured (1) VC at grid AT891483.

CAP 2-1-5 While blowing bunkers and probing ground at AT945675 found (1) 12.7mm anti-aircraft machine gun.

10 Apr  CAP 2-1-5 While on sweep at AT954667 captured (2) VCS box mines.

CAP 2-7-5 Vietnamese children turned in (19) M-26 grenades, (17) M-79 rounds, (3) 60mm illum rounds, (2) 81mm illum rounds and (30) 5.56 rounds. VIP reward payments were made.

CAP 2-7-6 was designated as a Mobile CAP to operate in the vicinity of BT0670, BT0770 and BT0870. The old 2-7-6 compound was turned over to the District Chief for use by a PF platoon not associated with CAP.

CAP 2-8-1 was designated as a Mobile CAP to operate in the vicinity of AT9050, AT9180 and AT9281. The old 2-8-1 compound was turned over to the District Chief. He intends to turn the facilities over to the Village Chief for use as a Headquarters.
11 Apr
CAP 2-7-5 Vietnamese turned in (19) M-26 grenades, (8) M-79 rounds
(HE), (1) 81mm illum round, (2) LAAW warheads, (1) LAAW, (1) 106
timing device and (1) bayonet. VIP reward payments were made.
CAP 2-1-5 Patrol destroyed (7) booby trapped box mines at AT954667.
(2) VCS were also captured.

12 Apr
CAP 2-4-2 While on patrol apprehended and detained (11) VCS at
grid BT127557.

15 Apr
CAP 2-5-2 Made contact with approximately (45) NVA at grid
AT932723. A sweep of the area resulted in (2) NVA KIA, (1) AK-47
and (1) carbine captured.
CAP 2-8-3 Ambush spotted (15) NVA crossing river at AT904821.
CAP opened up killing (5) NVA and capturing (1) AK-47 and (1)
assault rifle. A sweep of the area at first light revealed two
more KIAs for a total of (7) NVA KIA, (1) AK-47 and (1) assault
rifle captured.

16 Apr
CAP 2-9-1 was notified by Vietnamese civilian of the location of
a 500 lb. bomb. EOD was notified and blew bomb in place.

17 Apr
CA CO 2-4 resupply vehicle had a command detonated mine explode (5)
meters from vehicle. Minor damage was caused to vehicle. Com-
unication wire used to detonate mine was followed and (1) confirmed
VC captured at grid BTO30645.
CAP 2-1-5 While on sweep encountered (4) NVA in spider traps at
AT956668. NVA threw grenades at patrol, patrol returned fire
killing (4) NVA and capturing (2) SKS, (1) AK-47, (6) 81mm rockets,
(2) Chicom grenades and assorted personal equipment.

22 Apr
CAP 2-4-5 Vietnamese child turned in (1) 60mm illum round and (2)
81mm HE rounds. Rounds were blown and rewards payment made.
CAP 2-3-2 Patrol found a 250 lb. bomb at BT056591. EOD was called
and bomb was removed.
CAP 2-4-1 observed (9) VC moving towards their day haven at BT181589.
2-4-1 fired on the enemy with SAF and M-79 fire. An artillery
mission was called and an aerial observer came on station. AO
confirmed (3) VC KIA.

23 Apr
CAP 2-2-3 An NVA 1st Sgt Chigui Hoi'd to a 2-2-3 patrol at AT920615.
Results: (1) Hoi Chanh, (1) AK-47 captured.
2-3-2 Patrol found and destroyed in place a 81mm pressure booby trap at DT053595. Continuing on patrol 2-3-2 found another 81mm booby trap 75 meters from the first. Results: (2) 81mm booby traps destroyed.

CAP 2-4-1 A Vietnamese child turned (1) Claymore mine in to CAP 2-4-3. Mine was destroyed and a VIP reward payment made.

CAP 2-4-5 Vietnamese turned in (1) 81mm HE round and (1) 81mm blank round. Rounds were blown and VIP reward payments made.

CAP 2-2-1 Security at day haven stopped and searched a Vietnamese male at AT978507. (6) M-26 grenades were strapped to Vietnamese waist. Results: (1) VC KIA. (6) M-26 grenades captured.

CAP 2-4-1 A Vietnamese child reported the location of a booby trapped M-79 round. M-79 round blown in place and a VIP reward payment made.

24 Apr CAP 2-4-2 Spotted (5) VC at AT7535018 and took them under SAF, M-79 and LAAA fire. Resulting in (1) VC KIA (2) AK-47, (2) AK-47 magazines and assorted 782 gear captured. A sweep at first light netted an NVA KIA who Chief HoI'd to sweep team. Results: (1) NVA KIA, (1) NVA POW, (1) AK-47's with (2) magazines and assorted 782 gear captured.

CAP 2-4-5 Vietnamese children turned in (4) 60mm HE rounds and (4) 81mm HE round. Rounds were blown and VIP reward payments were made.

CAP 2-4-2 Vietnamese civilians reported seeing (30) VC at AT8686595. Patrol was dispatched and AO called on station. (12) VC were spotted at grid AT8755006 and fired on by AO killing (5). An artillery mission was also called killing (1) VC. Results: (6) VC KIA.

25 Apr CAP 2-3 While checking CAPs, CACO 2-3 Gy/Sgt. was approached by a Vietnamese child who informed him of a small weapons cache at DT063585. Results: (1) SKS, (1) Bangalore Torpedo, (1) VC claymore and (1) Chicom grenade captured. A VIP reward payment was made.

CAP 2-7-6 Patrol found (2) SVDS consisting of an 81mm HE round and a claymore mine at grid DT073707. Both mines were blown in place.
27 Apr
2-3-6 while sweeping the area in vicinity of grid BTO60602. (1) Engaged (5) VC killing (2) VC and capturing (2) AK-47's. With sweep of the area turned up additional ordnance. Results: (2) VC KIA, (2) AK-47's captured, (1) 35 lb. rock mine, (1) 30 lb. booby trap (mine), (1) M-26 booby trap and (1) Chicom grenade destroyed.

CAP 2-1-2 Sitting in night time position spotted (3) VC and opened fire on them at grid AT920718. Results: (2) VC KIA, (1) AK-47, (1) SKS carbine captured.

CAP 2-1-1 Spotted (5) NVA at AT904726 and took them under fire killing (2) and capturing (1) 7.62mm Chicom pistol.

28 Apr
CAP 2-3-3 Patrol apprehended and questioned (2) Vietnamese females who had run from the patrol at grid AT918864. While being questioned (1) of the women admitted to being VC. Results: (1) VC POW, (1) VCS captured.

CAP 2-3-4 While checking areas of previous nights contact at grid BTO68572 found (1) AK-47 and (7) Chicom grenades.

CAP 2-3-3 Previously assigned in a TAOC in the vicinity of BTO457, BTO557 and BTO558 was shifted to an adjacent TAOC in the vicinity of BTO357, BTO458 and BTO558. This move was effected in order to give the CAP more flexibility and maneuver room.

29 Apr
CAP 2-5-6 While on patrol at grid AT995698 sighted (3) VC who fired when they sighted the patrol. The patrol opened fire killing (1) VC and capturing (2) Chicom grenades and (2) M-26 grenades. (2) VCS were also captured and turned over to district.

30 Apr
CAP 2-5-3 Noticed some strange persons in their TAOC and detained (4) VN as VCS. Under interrogation by district officials it was found that the VCS were VC Sappers. Results: (4) VC POW's.

2-5-6 (2) VCS captured the day before led 2-5-6 to a tunnel at grid AT995698. (4) VCS were picked up in area of tunnel and the tunnel searched. A VC medical kit was found in the tunnel. Under interrogation by district the (4) VCS were found to be VC. Results: (4) VC POW's, (1) VC medical kit captured.

CAP 2-4-2 (2) VN males turned themselves in to 2-4-2 as Hoi Chahs at grid AT128562. Results: (2) Hoi Chahs.
PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. GrpO, 1020.1 of 18 April 1969 (Personnel Musters)

2. GrpO, 1601.3 of 13 April 1969 (Transient Personnel)

3. C.O. Congratulatory Msg to CAP 2-8-3

4. Pictures of Hoa Vang District Chief & CACO signing joint orders

5. Mobilization Letter CAP 2-4-1

6. 2d CAO Frag Order 1-69

7. 1969 Military Plan for Hoa Vang District (Hoa Vang CACO 2-5 joint order with separate annexes for each CAP)

8. Mobilization of CAP 2-1-6 ltr from C.O. 2d CAC to Province Chief, Quang Nam Province

9. Modification of TAOCs in CACO 2-1

10. Change in Combined Action Group Status letters

11. Notes from CAP Commanders Conference held 27 April 1969

12. VIP ORDNANCE turned in during April 1969
GROUP ORDER 1080.1

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Personnel Musters within Combined Action Companies

1. Purpose. To direct, and establish procedures for, daily personnel musters within the Combined Action Companies of this Group.

2. Information. Personnel accountability is a Command responsibility. In the Combined Action Companies, positive accountability of personnel is rendered more difficult by physical separation of operating CAP's from respective CAG Headquarters. It is imperative that accurate musters be conducted frequently in order to confirm strengths and detect absentees.

3. Action

   a. Combined Action Company Commanders will require a muster by each CAP Commander, or Assistant CAP Commander in the absence of CAP Commander, twice daily, at 0800 and 1800. Under no circumstances will these musters be excused, unless a CAP is engaged in combat with the enemy.

   b. Combined Action Company Commanders will report daily by radio, at 0900 and 1900, to CO, 2d CAG (Attn: E-1), the names of all absentees, whether or not previously or otherwise reported, and the reasons therefor, negative reports are required.

   [Signature]

   E. L. Lewis

DISTRIBUTION: "A"
GROUP ORDER 1601.2

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Transient Personnel

1. **Purpose.** To publish instructions on control of transient personnel in the Headquarters, 2d Combined Action Group Compound.

2. **Background.** The 2d Combined Action Group compound has an average daily total of approximately 50 transient personnel aboard for various reasons from units within the Group, i.e., processing for rotation, medical hold, R&R etc.

3. **Instructions**

   a. All transient personnel arriving in the 2d Combined Action Group compound will report to the Group S-1 immediately for further processing and instructions.

   b. All personnel will log out with the Group S-1 when leaving the compound.

   c. When remaining overnight or for a longer period, they will check in with the Sergeant of the Guard for assignment of billeting in the transient barracks. All transients will muster at 0730, 1300, and 1800 daily in front of the Guard house. The Sergeant of the Guard will be charged with the responsibility for the muster.

   d. Transient personnel desiring to leave the compound for any reason will obtain an authorization from the Group First Sergeant or S-1 and will log out to their destination and log in upon their return, in the log book maintained for this purpose in the S-1 office.

   e. Combined Action Company administrative vehicle drivers will check with the Group S-1 daily for personnel to be returned to their respective companies.
f. Weapons of transient personnel will be turned into the guard house with name and serial number tagged on the weapon. Weapons will be drawn from the guard house at 1800 daily and retained overnight in individual possession until turned in the following morning. Weapons will be carried by everyone departing the compound for whatever reason.

4. Action

a. Company Commanders will ensure dissemination of this order to all personnel under their cognizance.

b. The contents of this order will be reiterated to all transient personnel by the Sergeant of the Guard at the time they check in.

E. L. Lewis

DISTRIBUTION: "A"
Congratulatory message from CO, III MAF to CO, 2d CAG

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commanding Officer, 2d Combined Action Group

UNCLASSIFIED
Combined Action Program

1. The highly effective efforts of Combined Action Platoon 2-8-3 in their ambush during the night of 15 April, deserve recognition for the skill and professionalism shown by the Marines and Popular Forces Soldiers of the CAP. In a well planned and executed ambush of an NVA squad, the CAP killed 7 NVA and captured 3 individual weapons. There were no friendly casualties. This action proved once again the soundness of the Combined Action concept. A "well done" to the Marines and Popular Forces Soldiers of CAP 2-8-3. LtGen. Nickerson sends.
From: Hieu Nhon Subsector Commander/Commanding Officer, 4th Combined Action Company, 2d Combined Action Group
To: Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1

Subj: Mobilization of Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1

Encl: (1) Tactical Area of Coordination overlay

1. Organization.
   a. A Combined Action Platoon composed of Popular Forces Platoon O01 and U. S. Marines from the 4th Combined Action Company, 2d Combined Action Group is hereby activated as mobile Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1 to protect the people of Tan Thanh Hamlet and Cam An Village from the terrorist tactics of enemy infrastructure, from enemy forces attempting to infiltrate into the hamlets, and other missions mutually agreeable to the Hieu Nhon Subsector Commander and the Commanding Officer of the 4th Combined Action Company.

   b. This order and all future orders concerning the mission, concept of operations, Tactical Area of Coordination (TAOC) and coordination with adjacent Vietnamese and U. S. Units will refer to Popular Forces Platoon O01 and the U. S. Marines assigned to work with them as Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1. This order and all future orders will be signed by the Hieu Nhon Subsector Commander and the Commanding Officer, 4th Combined Action Company.

2. Mission. Provide security from VC/NVA throughout entire Tactical Area of Coordination as assigned by enclosure (1) to include but not limited to the following tasks:
   a. Destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure.
   b. Protect the friendly political/social structure.
   c. Conduct patrols and ambushes within the assigned Tactical Area of Coordination.
   d. Conduct vigorous civic action and psyops programs to obtain the trust and confidence of local populace.
   e. Organize local intelligence units.
   f. Report military intelligence immediately to the District DIOC and adjacent Vietnamese and U. S. Units.
   g. Train and assist the hamlet Peoples Self Defense Force.
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b. Participate in combined operations with the ARVN and/or other RVNAF units.

3. Execution.

e. Concept of Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1 will operate in all of the hamlets within its assigned tactical area of operation on a staggered basis, never setting patterns in location, on a day to day basis and will change its night and day command post/base of operations daily. The command post/base of operations will be composed of several different houses in the hamlets to enable the Combined Action Platoon to disperse. One third of Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1 will remain at the day command post/base of operation to conduct local MedCaps, work on civic action, conduct training, plan night activities, effect necessary coordination with adjacent units, and conduct patrols. After dark Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1 will move to a preselected command post/base of operations and conduct patrols and ambushes throughout the entire TAOC. All patrols, ambushes, and other operations will be integrated down to the squad level.

b. Patrol/Ambush/Command Post Operations.

(1) Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1 will conduct their patrols, ambushes, and command post operations as follows:

(f) Conduct a minimum of two integrated squad size patrols and/or ambushes daily between the hours of 1900 and 0700.

(2) Conduct a minimum of one integrated squad size patrol daily between the hours of 0700 and 1900.

(c) Change the command post location/base of operation every 24 hours, command posts will not be public buildings or concrete structures.

(d) Once every 24 hours patrol or ambush every hamlet in the assigned TAOC without using the same routes, trails, and setting a pattern to operations.

c. Additional Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1 will conduct additional operations as directed by the Hieu Phuon Subsector Commander and the Commanding Officer, 4th Combined Action Company.

d. Planning.

(1) Patrol routes, ambushes, and other GAP operations will be based on paragraph 3, e, and b, above, current enemy intelligence or anticipated plans, and then infiltration routes or other previous enemy locations be checked or interdicted daily throughout the entire TAOC.

(2) All planning will be accomplished by the respective Popular Forces Platoon Commander and the GAP Leader of the U.S. Marines. Disagreement as to location, frequency and size of patrols and ambushes or other activities will be referred to the Hieu Phuon Subsector Commander and the Commanding Officer, 4th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives for decision. In all cases of disagreement the Popular Forces Platoon leader and the Marine GAP Leader will promptly report to the Hieu Phuon District Headquarters. In no case will a disagreement be allowed to go unresolved.
before 1000H the day the patrol or activity is to be conducted.

(3) All patrols/ambushes and OP locations will be planned in advance and submitted to the Hieu Nhon Subsector Commander and the Commanding Officer, 4th Combined Action Company on Saturday for Monday through Sunday of the next week. Changes to the planned operations may be authorized by the Hieu Nhon Subsector Commander and the Commanding Officer, 4th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) The assigned operating area, Tactical Area of Coordination enclosure (1) is assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1 to properly identify its respective area and to assist in overall coordination. All patrols, ambushes, or other operations within the assigned TAOC will be coordinated with the Commanding Officer of the 10th Company, 3rd KMC Battalion, 2d KMC Brigade and the other ARVN and FMARAF units as necessary.

(2) Fire support and reaction forces will be coordinated through the Commanding Officer, 2d Korean Brigade.

4. Administration/Logistics.

a. Administration and logistics for Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1 will be through the respective ARVN or Marine Commander at Hieu Nhon District Headquarters except as modified in existing orders.

b. Members of the GAP 2-4-1 will ensure to maintain good conduct and to keep the houses and areas they use in a clean and neat condition.

5. Command/Communications.

a. Command of the Popular Forces and U. S. Marines assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-4-1 is exercised separately by their respective Commanders. Unity of command is dependent upon mutual cooperation and coordination.

b. The Popular Forces and U. S. Marines will be responsible for their own communications with Hieu Nhon District Headquarters.
Đại diện hội họp 4
Đề nghị đoàn Lý-Ương Hồn-Hợp
Đề Tam Lý-Ương thủy-Bồ

3/112/65s
3000
01-04-1969

Nơi để: Chủ Khu Trưởng, Chủ Khu Hiệu-Hơn/Đại Trưởng, Đại Đại Hồn-Hợp 4, Đề nghị
Đoàn Lý-Ương Hồn-Hợp

Nơi nhận: Trung Đại Hồn-Hợp 2-4-I

Trích yếu: V/v Lưu động của Trung Đại Hồn-Hợp 2-4-I

Phối hợp của khu vực chiến thuật.

I. Thành lập

a. Một trung Đại Hồn-Hợp gồm có Trung Đại Nghị-Hòa
quận 001 và các T.J.L.C. Hồn-Kỳ của đại đại 4, Đại Đại
Hồn-Hợp thuộc đề nghị đoàn Lý-Ương Hồn-Hợp, được chỉ
dính để thành lập một trung Đại lưu động 2-4-I kể từ
01-04-1969, để bảo vệ dân chúng thuộc xã Cẩm-Anh,
dp Tâm-Thanh thuộc khu vực không bờ cửa hảng có số
dịch hoặc cách quân dụng lại nằm xa nhà bộ và tổ
những nhiệm vụ khác. Chủ Khu Trưởng Chủ Khu Hiệu-Hơn
và Đại Đại Trưởng Đại Đại Hồn-Hợp 4 sẽ đồng ý chấp thuận
và ban hành.

b. Lệnh này và những lệnh khác trong tương lai
liên quan đến nhiệm vụ trên, những ý nghĩa hành quan,

GIỮ: XIN

4-9
Khu vực phối hợp chiến thuật và những phối hợp của Việt-Nam hay Hoa-Kỳ cần cố gắng chi định cho trung đội 2-4-I, lĩnh vực và những lãnh đạo tại khu vực chiến thuật chung với các đơn vị khác (xem bản đồ kế I). Nhiệm vụ này còn có những phần việc sau đây:

a. Phá vỡ hệ thống cơ sở Việt-công.

b. Bảo vệ các căn bộ chính trị và cơ sở xã hội.

c. Sắp xếp tuần tiều và phục kích trong khu vực chiến thuật chi định.

d. Duy mạnh công tác dân sự và chương trình ân ủi Chiến sĩ để tạo niềm tin trong dân chúng cũng như đối lại lòng tin nhiệm vụ của họ.

e. Tổ chức đơn vị tỉnh báo địa phương.

f. Báo cáo những tin tức quân sự ngay tức khắc cho trung tâm tỉnh báo tại quân và các đơn vị Việt-Nam cũng như Hoa-Kỳ ở gần đó.

g. Huấn luyện và giúp đỡ nhân dân dân tư về trong thốn áp.

h. Tham dự những cuộc hành quân hỗn hợp với đơn vị Việt-Nam hay các đơn vị đồng minh khác.

III. Thi hành

a. Tinh hành quân: Trung đội hỗn hợp 2-4-I
sẽ hoạt động trong tất cả thôn áp trong khu vực chiến thuật chỉ định và trại khám phá ở một nòng trên, dùng bao giữ đảm bảo vào thời quan, công việc phải thay đổi luôn, giữ gìn không nhất định, những điểm đồng quân ban ngày và đêm phải khác nhau thay đổi luôn. Bộ chỉ huy trung đội gồm các nhà ở khác nhau ở trong áp để cho trung đội hỗn hợp có thể phân tán được. Một phần ba (1/3) cỗ trung đội hỗn hợp sẽ ở lại nội trú đồng ban ngày của Bộ chỉ huy trung đội để chữa bệnh và phân phát thuốc men cho dân chúng, làm công tác dân sự v.v., hướng dẫn huấn luyện, hoạch định kế hoạch hoạt động ban đêm, thực hiện những phối hợp cần thiết với các đơn vị lân cận, thay đổi sắp xếp các cuộc tuần tiêu. Sau khi trở lại, trung đội hỗn hợp 2-4-1 sẽ đi chuyển đến địa điểm đồng quân ban đêm để được lựa chọn trước và hướng dẫn tuần tiêu, phục kích và các hoạt động khác phải được cắt xén khoảng một tiêu dãi gom có cả Nghĩa-quận và T.Q.L.C/ Hòa-Kỳ.

b. Tuần tiêu/Phục kích/ Địa điểm Bộ chỉ huy trung đội

(1) Trung đội hỗn hợp 2-4-1 sẽ xếp đặt tuần tiêu phục kích và địa điểm Bộ chỉ huy trung đội như sau:

a) Sắp xếp tối thiểu là hai cuộc tuần tiêu, hay phục kích cấp tiểu đội hỗn hợp (Kỳ và N.Q.) hàng ngày trong khoảng từ 1900 giờ và 0700 giờ.

b) Sắp xếp tối thiểu là một cuộc tuần tiêu cấp tiểu đội hỗn hợp hàng ngày vào khoảng 0700 giờ và 1900 giờ.
c) Phải luôn luôn they đối B.C.H. trung đối cuộc 12 tiếng đồng hồ they đối một lần và không được để trong những nơi khả có công đang hay trong những công sự xây cất bằng đề-tông.

d) Trong vòng 24 tiếng đồng hồ mỗi cuộc tiền-tiêu, phục kích trong khu vực chiến thuật chỉ định phải dùng con đường mòn khác, lối khác và không dùng theo một mâu mực như đã thực hiện.

C. Những hoạt động khác

Trung đối hồn hợp 2-4-1 phải thi hành những hoạt động khác mà Chi khu Trưởng, Chi khu Hiếu-Nhơn/Đại đối Trưởng, đại đối hồn hợp sẽ ban hành.

D. Kế hoạch

(1) Còn đường tiền tiêu, phục kích và những hoạt động khác của CAP phải thi hành như đoạn 3a và 3b ở trên. Tình hình dịch quân hiện nay hay kế hoạch dự liệu của dịch, tất cả con đường xâm nhập hay khu vực dịch hoạt động mạnh, mọi nơi trong khắp hết khu vực chiến thuật chỉ định phải kiểm soát ngay chẩn

báo cáo ngày về Bộ chỉ huy Chi khu Hiếu-Nhơn. Mọi trường hợp bất động phải được giải quyết trước 10.00H để công tác được thi hành nghiêm chỉnh.

(3) Tắt cả cuộc tuần tiếu, phục kích và tố că của Bộ CH. trung đội phải được soạn thảo trước và đề trình CH. Khu Trưởng Chí Khu Hiếu-Nhơn và Đại đội Trưởng, đại đội Họn-hợp 4 vào ngày thứ Bảy về kế hoạch hoạt động từ thứ hai cho đến thứ Bảy của tuần kế tiếp. Những vị đại diện của hai giải chức tham quyền trên có thể được phép sửa đổi kế hoạch hoạt động của CAP.

E. Huấn thị phối hợp

(1) Khu vực chiến thuật chỉ định hoạt động xem dinh kèm (I) được chi định cả trung đội hội họp CAP 2-4-I chính trung đội này phải biết chính xác khu vực mình để có thể yêu cầu sự trợ giúp phối hợp của các đơn vị bên khác. Tắt cả cuộc tuần tiếu, phục kích và các hoạt động khác phải liên lạc phối hợp với chỉ huy trưởng đại đội IO. tiêu đoàn 3..reducer 2 T.Q.L.C./Đại-Hàn và các đơn vị Việt-Nam cũng như đồng minh khi cần thiết.

(2) Hào lộc yểm trợ và lực lượng tiếp ứng sẽ liên lạc với Chỉ huy trưởng Lữ đoàn 2 T.Q.L.C./Đại-Hàn

IV. Quản trị và tiếp vấn

a) Quản trị và tiếp vấn cho trung đội hội họp 2-4-I sẽ thuộc về Quản đội Việt-Nam và sĩ quan Hòa Kỳ tại bộ chỉ huy Chí Khu Hiếu-Nhơn ngoại trừ trưởng họp có sự sửa đổi huấn luyện hiện tại.

b) Các quản nhân thuộc trung đội hội họp 2-4-I phải

Gửi: in
thi hành nghiêm chỉnh và giữ gìn phả của công như khu vực đã đến phải sạch sẽ và không được gây tổn thất.

V. Chỉ huy và liên lạc


Đại úy Phan Đình-Dương

Đại úy D. Vogël-Gaings

Chi Khu trưởng, Chi Khu Hiếu-Nhơn
Đại đội trưởng

Đại đội hồn hợp 4

- Chỉ huy trưởng Đội Nhắm L.L.H.H. (2)
- Chỉ huy trưởng khu vực trách nhiệm (I)
- Đại đội trưởng, Đại đội H.H.
- Toàn trưởng T.Q.L.C./HK

Phản dịch và sao giá:
- Bộ Chỉ Huy Chi Khu Hiếu-Nhơn (2)
- Trung đội trưởng N.Q. (I)

Sử: Kính
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HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

2d CAG PHAB Order 1-69

From: Commanding Officer
To: Combined Action Company Commander 2-5
 Combined Action Company Commander 2-7
 Combined Action Company Commander 2-8

Subj: Relocation of Combined Action Company 2-7 Headquarters and Redesignation and Reorganization of Combined Action Platoons within Hoa Vang District

Encl: (1) Overlay, CAPs, Hoa Vang District
(2) Overlay, Proposed Relocation Phase III

1. The present location and disposition of some Combined Action Platoons relative to their Combined Action Company Headquarters makes communication and control difficult in some companies. A complete redesignation of Combined Action Platoons assigned to various Combined Action Companies is required to facilitate control and to centrally locate headquarters in the same vicinity of Combined Action Platoons.

2. Coordination has been effected on the Combined Action Group level with the District Chief, Hoa Vang District and Commanding Officer, 1st Marines. All plans have been approved with the exception of enclosure (2) which is still under consideration. The Commanding Officer, 1st Marines has concurred with the relocation of Combined Action Company 2-7 command post from Camp Paddock to the Regimental Command Post 1st Marines.

3. The changes will be executed in three phases.

   a. **Phase I.** (Times/dates to be announced)

      (1) Combined Action Company 2-8 will remain at its present headquarters and will retain Combined Action Platoons 2-8-1, 2-8-2 and 2-8-3 in TAOCs as described in enclosure (1).

      (2) Combined Action Company 2-7 will release Combined Action Platoons 2-7-5 and 2-7-3 to Combined Action Company 2-8.

      (3) Combined Action Company 2-8 will officially pick up Combined Action Platoon 2-7-3 and redesignate it as Combined Action Platoon 2-8-4 and pick up Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5 and redesignate it Combined
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Action Platoon 2-8-5.

(4) All personnel currently on the rolls of Combined Action Platoons 2-7-3 and 2-7-5 will be transferred to Combined Action Company 2-8 effective upon receipt of order to execute Phase I.

(5) All equipment signed out to Combined Action Platoons 2-7-3 and 2-7-5 will be invoiced by the 2d Combined Action Group S-4 to Combined Action Company 2-8 on order.

(6) Combined Action Company 2-7 Headquarters will remain at Camp Paddock until its new location in the 1st Marine Command Post is established. Combined Action Company 2-7 will retain Combined Action Platoons 2-7-6 and 2-7-7 with their present designation until Phase II is ordered executed.

b. Phase II. (Times/dates to be announced)

(1) Move Combined Action Company 2-7 Headquarters to 1st Marine Regiment Command Post. Order to execute will be promulgated by message.

(2) Combined Action Company 2-5 will drop Combined Action Platoons 2-5-3, 2-5-4, 2-5-5 and 2-5-6 to the Combined Action Company 2-7 effective on order. Combined Action Company 2-5 will retain Combined Action Platoons 2-5-2 and 2-5-7.


(4) Combined Action Company 2-7 redesignate Combined Action Platoons as follows on order:

CAP 2-5-3 as CAP 2-7-1
CAP 2-5-4 as CAP 2-7-2
CAP 2-5-5 as CAP 2-7-3
CAP 2-5-6 as CAP 2-7-4
CAP 2-7-7 as CAP 2-7-5
CAP 2-7-6 retained as CAP 2-7-6

(5) Transfer all personnel from Combined Action Company 2-5 Combined Action Platoons redesignated as Combined Action Company 2-7 Combined Action Platoons on order from this headquarters.

(6) Transfer of equipment will be effected by the 2d Combined Action Group S-4 on order.

c. Phase III. (Times/dates to be announced)

(1) On order, relocate new Combined Action Platoons designated as 2-7-5 and 2-7-6, vicinity of Nui Kim Son and Binh Ky, to central Southern Hoa Vang District. (See enclosure (2) for contingency plan)
(2) Shift TAOCs as designated in Phase III plans to be issued separately. (See enclosure (2) for consular plans.)

E. L. Lewis

DISTRIBUTION:
AG of S, CAP (2)
1st Mar Div (1)
CO 1st Mar (4)
Province Chief VN Province (1)
Senior Advisor, Quang Nam Province (1)
District Chief, Hoa Vang District (2)
Senior Advisor, Hoa Vang District (2)
CA CO 2-5 (2)
CA CO 2-7 (2)
CA CO 2-8 (2)
Files (10)
ENCLOSURE (2)
OVERLAY OF PROPOSED
REORGANIZATION OF
ALL CAPS CACO 2-7

LEGEND

CACO HEADQUARTERS

MOBILE CAPTROC BOUNDARIES
From: Sea Yang Subsector Headquarters
To: QNM 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44
59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, and 66.
Commanding Officer, 5th, 7th, 8th, Combined Action Company

Memo: Quan Van Sector Commander
Quan Da Zone Commander
C.O. 59th & 60th BR.
C.O. 61st 
C.O. 62nd 
C.O. 63rd 
C.O. 64th 
C.O. 65th 
C.O. 66th 
C.O. 67th 

Organization. This order is published in order to clearly define the mission, concept of operations and Tactical Areas of Coordination of the QNM Platoons and the U.S. personnel assigned to work with them as Combined Action Platoons. See Annex A for location of Combined Action Platoons Tactical Areas of Coordination. A Combined Action Platoon will consist of a QNM Platoon assigned by the Sea Yang Subsector Commander and U.S. personnel assigned by the Commanding Officer, Combined Action Company 5, 7, and 8. The U.S. personnel will be integrated into each QNM Squad.

Date 27 March '69

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2. Mission: Provide security against VC/NVA throughout entire Tactical Area of Coordination as assigned by Annex 1 to include but not limited to the following tasks:

a. Destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure.

b. Protect the friendly political/social structure.

c. Conduct patrols and ambushes within the assigned Tactical Area of Coordination.

d. Conduct vigorous civic action and pacification programs to obtain the trust and confidence of the local populace.

e. Organize local intelligence units.

f. Report military intelligence immediately to the District DIROCC and adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. units.

g. Train and assist the hamlet Peoples Self Defense Force.

h. Participate in combined operations with the ARVN and/or other PAVN Units.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operation. The Hanoi Yang District Combined Action Platoons will operate as static or mobile CAPs.

b. The QNM Platoons and the USMC personnel assigned to work with them will execute their mission in accordance with Annex B through N.

(1) QNM Plt. 50 and USMC personnel from 5th MRCG are hereby designated as Mobile CAP 2-5-3 and will conduct operations in accordance with Annex B.
(2) QM Pt. 12 and USMC personnel from 6th CAG are hereby designated as Static CAF 2-5-4 and will conduct operations in accordance with Annex A.

(3) QM Pt. 37 and USMC personnel from 5th CAG are hereby designated as Mobile CAF 2-5-5 and will conduct operations in accordance with Annex B.

(4) QM Pt. 56 and USMC personnel from 5th CAG are hereby designated as Mobile CAF 2-5-6 and will conduct operations in accordance with Annex C.

(5) QM Pt. 48 and USMC personnel from 5th CAG are hereby designated as Mobile CAF 2-5-7 and will conduct operations in accordance with Annex D.

(6) QM Pt. 39 and USMC personnel from 7th CAG are hereby designated as Mobile CAF 2-7-5 and will conduct operations in accordance with Annex E.

(7) QM Pt. 36 and USMC personnel from 7th CAG are hereby designated as Static CAF 2-7-5 and will conduct operations in accordance with Annex F.

(8) QM Pt. 38 and USMC personnel from 7th CAG are hereby designated as Mobile CAF 2-7-6 and will conduct operations in accordance with Annex G.

(9) QM Pt. 52 and USMC personnel from 7th CAG are hereby designated as Static CAF 2-7-7 and will conduct operations in accordance with Annex H.

(10) QM Pt. 45 and USMC personnel from 8th CAG are hereby designated as Mobile CAF 2-8-1 and will conduct operations in accordance with Annex K.

(11) QM Pt. 42 and USMC personnel from 8th CAG are hereby designated as Static CAF 2-8-2 and will conduct operations in accordance with Annex L.
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5. Command/Communications

a. Command of the CM Platforms and U.S. Marines assigned to Combined Action Platforms is exercised separately by their respective Commanders. Daily of Command is dependent upon mutual cooperation and coordination.

b. This order and all future orders concerning the mission, concept of operations, Tactical Areas of Operation, and coordination with adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. units will be signed by the Phu Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

Platoons and U.S. Marines will be responsible for their own communication with Phu Vang District.

[Signatures]

Captain, J.D. Metis
Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer
5th Combined Action Company
ANNEX TO HOA YANG
1969 COMBINED ACTION PLATOON
MILITARY PLAN 667

From: Hoa Yang Subsector Headquarters
To: Combined Action Platoon
Re: MAP INDOCHINA: Sheet 6640 VIII A 664 I

1. Organization

a. A Combined Action Platoon composed of QM Platoon 66 and
T.C. Marines from the 5th Combined Action Company, 2nd Combined
Action Group is hereby designated as mobile Combined Action Platoon
2-5-3 to protect the people of Hoa Gian Sach hamlet(s)
from the terroristic tactics of enemy infrastructure. From enemy
troops attempting to infiltrate into the hamlets, and other missions
mutually agreeable to the Hoa Yang Subsector Commander and the Senior
Coordinator/Commanding Officer of the 5th Combined Action Company.

b. This order and all future orders concerning the mission,
concept of operations, Tactical Area of Coordination (TACO) and
coordination with adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. Units will refer to
QM Platoon 66, and the U.S. Marines assigned to work with them as
Combined Action Platoon 2-5-3. This order and all future orders
will be signed by the Hoa Yang Subsector Commander and the Senior
Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

2. Mission. Provide security from VC/NVA throughout entire Tactical
Area of Coordination as assigned by Appendix (*) to include
but not limited to the following tasks:

a. Destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure.

b. Protect the friendly political/social structure.
a. Conduct patrols and ambushes within the assigned Tactical Area of Coordination.

b. Conduct vigorous civic action and propaganda programs to obtain the trust and confidence of local people.

c. Organize local intelligence units.

d. Report military intelligence immediately to the District BIDOC and adjacent Vietnamese and PAVN units.

e. Train and assist the hamlet People's Self Defense Force.

f. Participate in combined operations with the ARVN and/or other PAVN units.

5. Execution

a. Concept of Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-5-3 will operate in all of the hamlets within its assigned tactical area of coordination on a staggered basis, never setting patterns in location, on a day to day basis and will change its night and day command/post/base of operations daily. The command/post/base of operations will be composed of several different houses in the hamlets to enable the Combined Action Platoon to disperse. One third of Combined Action Platoon 2-5-3 will remain at the day command/post/base of operations to conduct local medics, work on civic action, conduct training, plan night activities, effect necessary coordination with adjacent units, and conduct patrols. After dark Combined Action Platoon 2-5-3 will move to a preselected command/post/base of operations and conduct patrols and ambushes throughout its entire AO. All patrols, ambushes, and other operations will be integrated down to the squad level.

b. Patrol/ambush/Command Post Operations

(*) Combined Action Platoon 2-5-3 will conduct their patrols, ambushes, and command post operations as follows:

(a) Conduct a minimum of two integrated squad sizes.

6. Security

a. Sapper teams, security platoons to cover the area.

b. Security platoons to cover the area, and selected teams to cover the area.

c. Security platoons to cover the area, and selected teams to cover the area.

d. Security platoons to cover the area, and selected teams to cover the area.

7. Execution

a. In order to cover the area, the security platoons 2-5-3 will be divided into three sections on the day of the patrol, never setting patterns in location, on a day to day basis and change its night and day command/post/base of operations daily. The command/post/base of operations will be composed of several different houses in the hamlets to enable the Combined Action Platoon to disperse. One third of Combined Action Platoon 2-5-3 will remain at the day command/post/base of operations to conduct local medics, work on civic action, conduct training, plan night activities, effect necessary coordination with adjacent units, and conduct patrols. After dark Combined Action Platoon 2-5-3 will move to a preselected command/post/base of operations and conduct patrols and ambushes throughout its entire AO. All patrols, ambushes, and other operations will be integrated down to the squad level.

b. Command post operations

(*) Combined Action Platoon 2-5-3 will conduct their patrols, ambushes, and command post operations as follows:

(a) Conduct a minimum of two integrated squad sizes.

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petrols and/or ambushes daily between the hours of 0000 and 0700.

(b) Conduct a minimum of one integrated squad size patrol daily between the hours of 0700 and 0900.

(c) Change the command post location/base of operations every 6 to 12 hours, command posts will not be public buildings or concrete structures.

(d) Once every 24 hours patrol or ambush every hamlet in the assigned TAOC with out using the same routes, trails, and setting a pattern to operations.

c. Additional Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-5-3 will conduct additional operations as directed by the Hoa Xang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

d. Planning.

(1) Patrol routes, ambushes, and other CAP operations will be based on paragraph 3.a. and 3.b. above, current enemy intelligence or anticipated plans, and that all infiltration routes or other previous enemy locations be checked or interdicted daily throughout the entire TAOC.

(2) All planning will be accomplished by the respective QNN Platoon Commander and the CAP Leader of the U.S. Marines. Disagreement in location, frequency and size of patrols and ambushes or other activities will be referred to the Hoa Xang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives for decision. In all cases of disagreement the QNN Platoon Leader and the Marines CAP Leader will promptly report to the Hoa Xang District Headquarters. In no case will a disagreement be allowed to go unresolved before 1000 the day the patrol or activity is to be conducted.

(3) All patrols/ambushes and OP locations will be planned in advance and submitted to the Hoa Xang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.
Phụ lục I và Mục B thuộc
Trương Đội Hỗ Hợ Hỏa Vang 1969
Trình 9787
Bộ Đề S6: 66401, 66411 III
Ty lực chích: 1/50,000

Appendix I To Annex Bof
Hau Vang 1969 Combine Action Platoon
Military Plan 687
Map Sheets: 66401, 66411
1:50,000

Thất To, Mai Xuan Hau
Chief Troop Control Officer
Dai XU6, D. Nho's Cong Su Viên
Co-Lead, CHI HAN THUONG
Dai Gai Hon Hop 5

Major MAI, XUAN HAU
Hau Vang Subsector Commander

Captain J. D. Nho's Senior
Coordinator/Commanding Officer
5th Combine Action Company
ANNEX I TO HOA VANG
1969 COMBINED ACTION PLATOON
MILITARY PLAN 597

From: Hoa Vang Subsector Headquarters
To: Combined Action Platoon
Ref: NAP INDOCHINA: Sheet 64–5

1. Organization

a. A Combined Action Platoon composed of QM Platoon and U.S. Marines from MCAC Combined Action Company, 2rd Combined Action Group is hereby designated as static Combined Action Platoon to protect the people of the hamlets from the terrorist tactics of enemy infrastructure, from enemy forces attempting to infiltrate into the hamlets, and other missions mutually agreed to by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and this Executive/Commanding Officer of the 5th Combined Action Company.

b. This order and all future orders concerning the mission concept of operations, Tactical Area of Coordination (TACO) and coordination with adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. Units will refer to QM Platoon and the U.S. Marines assigned to work with the Combined Action Platoon. This order and all future orders will be signed by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and this Executive/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

2. Mission: Provide security from VC/VNA throughout entire Tactical Area of Coordination as assigned by Appendix (1) to include but not limited to the following tasks:

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Appendix I to Annex C of
Hoa Vang 1969 Combined Action Platoons
Military Plan 637
Map Sheet: 66403X
1:50,000

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THỊ TRÌNH, MAI-XUÂN-HÀI
CHỦ H㯅 TRỌNG QUẢN VỮNG VÀNG
ĐẠI UYÊN D. NİTİS, CÔNG SUất VIỆT
CẢO CẤP CHỈ HỦY TRUNG
BỘ CHÍ HỮU HỘP S

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CONFIDENTIAL

AFT 2 TO HSA TANG
6/69 COMBINED ACTION PLATOON
MILITARY PLATOON 687

From: Hoa Vang Subsector Headquarters
To: Combined Action Platoon 2-5-5

Ref: MAP INDICATOR Sheet 6561 I & 6561 J

Organization

1. A Combined Action Platoon composed of 687 Platoon X7 and
   U.S. Marines from the 5th Combined Action Company, 2nd Combined
   Action Group is hereby designated as mobile Combined Action Platoon
   2-5-5 to protect the people of Phu Xuyen, Tonle Bati, and
   other hamlets in the geographic area of operations. This unit will be
   assigned to the 5th Combined Action Company, 2nd Combined
   Action Group.

2. This order and all future orders concerning the mission,
   conduct of operations, Tactical Area of Coordination (TACO) and
   coordination with adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. units will refer to
   687 Platoon X7 and the U.S. Marines assigned to work with them as
   Combined Action Platoon 2-5-5. This order and all future orders
   will be signed by the Hoa Vang Subsector Headquarters and the Senior
   Coordination/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

   Area of Coordination as assigned by Appendix (a) to include
   but not limited to the following tasks:

   a. Destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure.

   b. Protect the friendly political/social structure.

   (mitted text)

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CONFLICTUAL

petrol and/or ammunition daily between the hours of 1200 and 1700.

(2) Conduct a minimum of one integrated squad size
patrol daily between the hours of 1500 and 1800.

(3) Change the command post location/base of operations
every 12 hours. Command posts will not be visible buildings
nor concrete structures.

(4) Once every 24 hours patrol or ambush every base
in the assigned TAOC with out using the same routes, trails,
and setting a pattern to operations.

will conduct additional operations as directed by the 4th
Company Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer. 4th
Combined Action Company.

(6) Planning:

(1) Patrol routes, ambushes, and other CAP operations
will be based on paragraph 2 and 4, above. current enemy
intelligence or anticipated plans, and that all infiltration routes
or other previous enemy locations be checked or intercepted daily
throughout the entire TAOC.

(2) All planning will be accomplished by the respective
CAP Platoon Commanders and the CAP Leader of the U.S. Marines.
Disagreement as to location, frequency and size of patrols and/
ambushes or other activities will be referred to the 4th
Company Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer.
4th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives
for decision. In all cases of disagreement the CAP Platoon
Leader will promptly report to the 4th Marine
District Headquarters. In cases with a disagreement it will be allowed
to go unresolved before 0000 the day the patrol or activity is
to be conducted.

(3) All patrols/ambushes and CP locations will be
planned in advance and submitted to the 4th Company
Platoon Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer. 4th
Combined

(4) forty eight hour period beginning at 1900 and
continuing through the next day to 2300.

(5) Change the command post location/base of operations
every 12 hours. Command posts will not be visible buildings
nor concrete structures.

(6) Once every 24 hours patrol or ambush every base
in the assigned TAOC with out using the same routes, trails,
and setting a pattern to operations.

will conduct additional operations as directed by the 4th
Company Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer. 4th
Combined Action Company.

(8) Planning:

(1) Patrol routes, ambushes, and other CAP operations
will be based on paragraph 3 and 5, above. current enemy
intelligence or anticipated plans, and that all infiltration routes
or other previous enemy locations be checked or intercepted daily
throughout the entire TAOC.

(2) All planning will be accomplished by the respective
CAP Platoon Commanders and the CAP Leader of the U.S. Marines.
Disagreement as to location, frequency and size of patrols and/
ambushes or other activities will be referred to the 4th
Company Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer.
4th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives
for decision. In all cases of disagreement the CAP Platoon
Leader will promptly report to the 4th Marine
District Headquarters. In cases with a disagreement it will be allowed
to go unresolved before 0000 the day the patrol or activity is
to be conducted.

(3) All patrols/ambushes and CP locations will be
planned in advance and submitted to the 4th Company
Platoon Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer. 4th
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Cooperation Company on Saturday for Monday through Sunday of the next week. Changes to the planned operations may be authorized by the 6th Marine Subsector Commander and the Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company on their direct representatives.

2. Coordinating Instructions.

(a) The assigned operating area, Tactical Area of Coordination Appendix (A) is assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-5-5 to properly identify its respective area and to assist in overall coordination. All patrols, ambushes, or other operations within the assigned TACO will be coordinated with the Commanding Officer of the 1st Marines and the other ARVN and VCMF units as necessary.

(b) Support and reaction forces will be coordinated through the Commanding Officer of the 1st Marines.

4. Administration/Logistics.

(a) Administration and logistics for Combined Action Platoon 2-5-5 will be through the respective ARVN or Marine Commander at the 1st Marines Headquarters except as modified in existing orders.

(b) Members of the CAP 2-5-5 will ensure to maintain good conduct and to keep the houses and areas they use in a clean and neat condition.

5. Command/Communication.

(a) Command of the CAP 2-5-5 will be through the respective ARVN or Marine Commander at the 1st Marines Headquarters except as modified in existing orders.

(b) Members of the CAP 2-5-5 will be responsible for their own communication with the 1st Marines Headquarters.

6. Writings by Rear Admiral/Commanding General.

7. Coordinating with the 6th Marine Subsector Commander.

8. Note: This platoon is

(1) Co ordinated by the 1st Marines and the Commanding Officer of the 5th Combined Action Company.

(2) Support and reaction forces will be coordinated through the Commanding Officer of the 1st Marines.

9. Conclusion.

(1) The platoon will be under the direct control of the 1st Marines and the Commanding Officer of the 5th Combined Action Company.

(2) Support and reaction forces will be coordinated through the Commanding Officer of the 1st Marines.
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APPENDIX I To Annex D of Hoa Vang 1969 Combined Action Plan
Military Plan 627
Map Sheet 664015
1:50,000

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Major Hoa Vang
Head, Group Command

Capt. J. D. Moore
Comb Action Co. Army

Capt. J. E. Masters
Comb Action Co. Army

Capt. C. M. H. Major
5th Comb Action Co.
From: Xon Yang Subsector Headquarters
To: Combined Action Platoon 2-5-6

Ref: MAC INDUSTRIAL Sheet 6644

1. Organization

a. A Combined Action Platoon composed of 35 Platoon 26 and 1/2 Platoon 35
b. Combined Action Platoon 2-5-6 deploys on 1/2 of the area of action Platoon
   2-5-6 to conduct Operation "IDOL" (Operation 1) a search and destroy action around the hump
   on the left edge of the village which is known to be a "grab bag". The hamlet is a tactical
   base of operations of the 645th NVA and has been used as such for several years. The
   operation is to be executed by the 35th Platoon, additionally supported by the 26th
   Platoon of the 2-5-6 Combined Action Platoon.

2. Mission: To operate the area within AKM throughout the entire Tactical Area of Action
   and search and destroy by Operation IDOL (1) to include but not limited to the following tasks:
   a. Destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure.
   b. Protect the friendly political/social structure.

3. Time:

   a. Day: 13 April
   b. End Time: 2000 hours

4. Operation: To conduct Operation IDOL as scheduled.

5. Notes:

   a. The enemy is expected to react to the force as they are no other known contacts in the
      area.
   b. The enemy is expected to be engaged throughout the entire area of action.
   c. The enemy is expected to be strong and determined to the area.

6. Conclusion:

   a. The enemy is expected to react as such.
   b. The operation is to be conducted as scheduled.
   c. No further information available.
(b) Conduct a minimum of one integrated squad size patrol daily between the hours of 0700 and 0900.

(c) Change the command post location/base of operations every 12 hours, command posts will not be public buildings or concrete structures.

(d) Once every 24 hours patrol or ambush every hamlet in the assigned TAOC with out using the same routes, trails, and setting a pattern to operations.

Additional Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-5-6 will conduct additional operations as directed by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

d. Planning.

(1) Patrol routes, ambushes, and other CAP operations will be based on paragraph 3 a. and b. above, current enemy intelligence or anticipated plans, and that all infiltration routes or other critical enemy locations be checked or interdicted daily throughout the entire TAOC.

(2) All planning will be accomplished by the respective GNM Platoon Commander and the CAP Leader of the U.S. Marines. Disagreement as to location, frequency and site of patrols and ambushes or other activities will be referred to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives for decision. In all cases of disagreement the GNM Platoon Leader and the Marines CAP Leader will promptly report to the Hoa Vang District Headquarters. In no case will a disagreement be allowed to go unreported before 0000 the day the patrol or activity is to be conducted.

(3) All patrols/ambushes and CAP locations will be planned in advance and submitted to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

theo cấp 2 tiêu diệu phái bộ hàng ngày giao khoan/gian từ 19 giờ đến 07 giờ.

(b) Tổ thầu cơ sở tiêu diệu hổ trợ, cấp tiêu diệu di chuyển trong khoảng thời gian từ 07 giờ đến 19 giờ hàng ngày.

(c) Trong 12 tiếng thay đổi vị trí, cơ sở hàng ngày, giao khoan giao gian từ 07 giờ đến 19 giờ hàng ngày.

(d) Trong 24 giờ, tổ chức các hoạt động trong một khoảng thời gian được tổ chức từ 19 giờ đến 07 giờ hàng ngày, và tổ chức hàng ngày cho hoạt động giao gian khác.

e. Như đã cho biết trên. Trung ương Bộ Chính 2-5-6, cơ sở hệ thống hàng ngày, giao khoan giao gian các khu vực chiến dịch, Khu Trụ Cụ Bộ Tổng Chỉ Huy Đông Bắc và Bộ Tư Trụ Cụ Bộ Tổng Chỉ Huy Đông Bắc 5 chỉ định.


(1) Trung ương Bộ Chính 2-5-6, cơ sở hàng ngày của Trung ương Bộ Chính 2-5-6, cơ sở hàng ngày sẽ được điều hướng và sử dụng trong một thời gian và sau đó sẽ tăng cường, nhưng sẽ không sử dụng để hoạt động phái bộ kế hoạch, hoạt động của các khu vực chiến dịch, Khu Trụ Cụ Bộ Tổng Chỉ Huy Đông Bắc 5 chỉ định.

(2) Trung ương Bộ Chính 2-5-6, cơ sở hàng ngày của Trung ương Bộ Chính 2-5-6, cơ sở hàng ngày sẽ được điều hướng và sử dụng trong một thời gian và sau đó sẽ tăng cường, nhưng sẽ không sử dụng để hoạt động phái bộ kế hoạch, hoạt động của các khu vực chiến dịch, Khu Trụ Cụ Bộ Tổng Chỉ Huy Đông Bắc 5 chỉ định.

(3) Trung ương Bộ Chính 2-5-6, cơ sở hàng ngày của Trung ương Bộ Chính 2-5-6, cơ sở hàng ngày sẽ được điều hướng và sử dụng trong một thời gian và sau đó sẽ tăng cường, nhưng sẽ không sử dụng để hoạt động phái bộ kế hoạch, hoạt động của các khu vực chiến dịch, Khu Trụ Cụ Bộ Tổng Chỉ Huy Đông Bắc 5 chỉ định.

CONFIDENTIAL
e. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) The assigned operating area, Tactical Area of Coordination Appendix I is assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-5-6 to properly identify its respective area and to assist in overall coordination. All patrols, ambushes, or other operations within the assigned TACO will be coordinated with the Commanding Officer of the 1st Marines and the other ARVN and PAVN units as necessary.

(2) Fire support and reaction forces will be coordinated through the Commanding Officer of the 1st Marines.

4. Administration/Logistics.

a. Administration and logistics for Combined Action Platoon 2-5-6 will be through the respective ARVN or Marine Commander at Tao Yang District Headquarters except as modified in existing orders.

b. Members of the CAP 2-5-6 will ensure to maintain good conduct and to keep the houses and areas they use in a clean and neat condition.

5. Command/Communication.

a. Command of the QMN Platoon 36 and U.S. Marines assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-5-6 is exercised separately by their respective Commanders. Unity of command is dependent upon mutual cooperation and coordination.

b. The QMN Platoon 36 and U.S. Marines will be responsible for their own communication with Tao Yang District Headquarters.

Captain J.D. Mottis
Tao Yang Subsector Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer
54th Combined Action Company
Appendix I TACO 2-5-6 TAOC

Chi Khu Trung Chinh Khu Binh Duong va Dai Doc Trung Chinh Khu Binh Duong
hoanh cao vao Thu Thuc Dai Dien don o cho phep vu do kinh hoach hoat dong cu chung hinh quan.

6. Huan thich phoi hop.

(3) Khu vo tung hoat dong chi dinh, Thu Pho Hop Chinh Thuc theo pho loc (1) chi dinh cho Trung Doc Mon Hop do mot ro chat chinh kinh ve rieng cua sinh de gap anh trung ve pho hop vo truoc ca don vi huyen, tat ca meo quan tiem, phan khu ho nang hoat dong khac trong phan vi Thu Pho Hop Chinh Thuc chi dinh, se phai lien lac voi Chi Huy Truong Trung Doan 1 T.Q.L.C. My va o cung don vi Viet Nam cung nhu concentrating Kinh quan thiet.

(2) Hoi luong va roc tron va lu trong tiep tuc va lien lac voi Chi Huy Truong Trung Doan 1 T.Q.L.C. My.

7. Quan tri va tiep van.

a. Quan tri va tiep van cho trung doc Nghe Thua Quan QMN 36 va do quan doi Viet Nam va Huyen Quan Loc Chinh My tai Ho Chi Minh Chinh kieu Tao Yang va don truoc quan tiem luat cac pha ho doc, chinh chu ho anh trung ve pho hop va tiep van, cac meo quan tiem trong doc 2-5-6 se phai chao chan dan tu quan tiem nguyen co ke khac va gian giu cho o cach se va giam.

b. Chi huy va lien lac.

a. Viec chi huy, tra cap doc Nghe Thua Quan QMN 36 va cac T.Q.L.C. My duoc thu chinh doc Trung Doc Mon Hop 2-5-6 la do cac Chi Huy, tra cap Nghe Thua Quan va Toan Truong T.Q.L.C. My tiep liet chi, huy thuc thao ha Minh, viec tong hop chi huy se tiep theo co su ho tong ve hop tac va pho hop.

b. Trung Doc Nghe Thua Quan QMN 36 va cac T.Q.L.C. My phai chi huy va tra cap trong tiep tuc lien lac va da cho xuyen trong Khu Binh Duong.
Appendix I To Annex E of


Military Plan 687

Map Sheet: 6640 IV

1:50,000

Thìn Ta, Mai-Xuan-Ha

Chỉ Hành Quân Hợp Hợp Hợp Hợp

Hsupported Subsector Commander

Dác Vụ 1.Đ.Hoàoggle Content Cập Hợp Hợp Hợp

Captain J.D. Hoàoggle Content Senior

Cao Chế / Cao Hợp Hợp Hợp

Commander of Commanding Officer

Dệt Dệt Hợp Hợp Hợp Hợp

5th Combine Action Company
CONFIDENTIAL

a. Conduct patrols and ambushes within the assigned Tactical Area of Coordination.

b. Conduct vigorous civic action and payops programs to obtain the trust and confidence of local populace.

c. Organise local intelligence units.

d. Report military intelligence immediately to the District DCOC and adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. units.

e. Train and assist the hamlet People's Self Defence Force.

f. Participate in combined operations with the ARVN and/or other PAVN units.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-5-7 will operate in all of the hamlets within its assigned tactical area of coordination on a staggered basis, never setting patterns in location, on a day to day basis and will change its night and day command post/base of operations daily. The command/base of operations will be composed of several different houses in the hamlets to enable the Combined Action Platoon to disperse. One third of Combined Action Platoon 2-5-7 will remain at the day command post/base of operations to conduct local WinSaps, work on civic action, conduct training, plan night activities, effect necessary coordination with adjacent units, and conduct patrols. After dark Combined Action Platoon 2-5-7 will move to a preselected command post/base of operations and conduct patrols and ambushes throughout its entire TAOC. All patrols, ambushes, and other operations will be integrated down to the squad level.

b. Patrol/Ambush/Command Post Operations

1) Combined Action Platoon 2-5-7 will conduct their patrols, ambushes, and command post operations as follows:

(a) Conduct a minimum of two integrated squad size

2) Conduct a minimum of one integrated squad size
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(b) Conduct a minimum of one integrated squad size patrol daily between the hours of 0700 and 0700.

(c) Change the command post location/base of operations every 12 hours, command posts will not be public buildings or concrete structures.

(d) Once every 24 hours patrol or ambush every hamlet in the assigned TACO with out using the same routes, trails, and setting a pattern to operations.

(e) Additional Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-5-7 will conduct additional operations as directed by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

(f) Planning.

(1) Patrol routes, ambushes, and other CAP operations will be based on paragraph 3.a. and b. above, current enemy intelligence or anticipated plans, and that all infiltration routes or other enemy movement locations be checked or interrupted daily throughout the entire TACO.

(2) All planning will be accomplished by the respective QM Platoon Commander and the CAP Leader of the U.S. Marines. Disagreement as to location, frequency and size of patrols and ambushes or other activities will be referred to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives for decision. In all cases of disagreement the QM Platoon Leader and the Marines CAP Leader will promptly report to the Hoa Vang District Headquarters. In no case will a disagreement be allowed to go unresolved before 0000 the day the patrol or activity is to be conducted.

(3) All patrols/ambushes and CAP locations will be planned in advance and submitted to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

(a) The CAPs will be set up to leave the command post at 0700 and return at 1900.

(b) On the 2nd night of patrol or ambush, the CAP will conduct the planned ambush.

(c) On the 2nd night, the CAP will conduct the planned ambush.

(d) On the 2nd night, the CAP will conduct the planned ambush.

(e) On the 2nd night, the CAP will conduct the planned ambush.

(f) On the 2nd night, the CAP will conduct the planned ambush.
CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION COMPANY on Saturday for Monday through Sunday of the next week. Changes to the planned operations may be authorized by the AEC and Subsector Commander and the Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) The assigned operating area, Tactical Area of Coordination Appendix, is assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-5-7, to properly identify its respective areas and to assist in overall coordination. All patrols, ambushes, or other operations within the assigned TACO will be coordinated with the Commanding Officer of the SECE and the other AVN and FMAF units as necessary.

(2) Fire support and reaction forces will be coordinated through the Commanding Officer of the SECE.

4. Administration/logistics.

a. Administration and logistics for Combined Action Platoon 2-5-7 will be through the respective AVN or Marine Commander at Nha Trang District Headquarters except as modified in existing orders.

b. Members of the CAP 2-5-7 will ensure to maintain good condition and to keep the houses and areas they use in a clean and neat condition.

5. Command/Communication.

a. Command of the OAM Platoon 47 and U.S. Marines assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-5-7 is exercised separately by their respective Commanders. Unity of command is dependent upon mutual cooperation and coordination.

b. The OAM Platoon 47 and U.S. Marines will be responsible for their own communication with Nha Trang District Headquarters.

6. CAP 2-5-7 TACO

Chief of the Commanding Officer

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DECLASSIFIED
ANNEX L TO VQG-1

January 2, 1969

To: IX Corps
From: X Corps

SUBJECT: PLANNING

1. e. The Combined Action Platoon will conduct a variety of operations, including combat operations, to clear and develop the area for further military use. The platoon will also be responsible for developing and maintaining a local security force to control enemy activity in the area.

2. a. The Combined Action Platoon will conduct operations in a variety of areas, including small-scale skirmishes, ambushes, and patrols.

b. The platoon will also be responsible for developing and maintaining a local security force to control enemy activity in the area.

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1. Conduct patrols and ambushes within the assigned Tactical Area of Coordination.

2. Conduct vigorous civic action and payoffs programs to obtain the trust and confidence of local populace.

3. Organize local intelligence units.


5. Train and assist the hamlet People’s Self Defense Force.

6. Participate in combined operations with the ARVN and/or other MACV units.

7. Execution

8. Concept of Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-7-3 will operate in all of the hamlets within its assigned tactical area of coordination on a staggered basis, never setting patterns in location, on a day to day basis and will change its night and day command post/base of operations daily. The command/base of operations will be composed of several different houses in the hamlet to enable the Combined Action Platoon to disperse. One third of Combined Action Platoon 2-7-3 will remain at the day command post/base of operations to conduct local Medicago, work on civic action, conduct training, plan night activities, effect necessary coordination with adjacent units, and conduct patrols. After dark Combined Action Platoon 2-7-3 will move to a preselected command post/base of operations to conduct patrols and ambushes throughout its entire TAOC. All patrols, ambushes, and other actions will be integrated down to the squad level.

9. Patrol/Ambush/Command Post Operations

(a) Combined Action Platoon 2-7-3 will conduct their patrols, ambushes, and command post operations as follows:

(b) Conduct a minimum of two integrated squad size

10. Sixp zept tien, phu kich trong phan vi Khu Phoi Hop Chien Thuat chinh danh.

11. Duy manh dag ta danh sai va chu chung trinh tiep chien de ta dao duoc sai tin thong cua danh chung dia phuong vao mot ta.

12. To chu phap vi tinh bao dia phuong.

13. Bao cao mot tin tinh bao quan su lap tu cho Trung Tinh Bao Don Hop tat quan va co don vi Viet Nam cong nhu 08 gian lam.

14. Huan luyen va gip de Khan Dan Tu Vong trong thien ap.

15. Than cong cao cuc bao quan hoi hop voi don vi Chinh quy Viet Nam hay don vi Dong Minh H.Q.U.C.

16. Thi hinh.

(a) Trung Doi Son Hop 2-7-3 se hoat dong tai nhung ap nha trong khu phoi hop chien thuat chinh danh cho danh tieu quyen tai lon dung danh khet mat, chung bao goc tap nam mot sau von, hoat dong trong nhung trang mat v, moi motiv phai chung chinh phuc chinh hung ngay va dem cùng cac hoat dong cam ben bang nha. Chong dong bo nhi phan va hoat dong thong hop co nhiem nhu khoa nhuan trong tho chinh de trung di, hoat hop on the than mien ra. Mot phan biet trung Doi Son Hop 2-7-3 se o lat bo nhi phan dia lam trong cac phan phat thuoc men che dong bao dia phuong, cong tac dam sau vu, huan luyen, lai ke bao hoat, cong dam, lieu luong cua thiet viet cac don vi ben ke oan va tuan tiem. Sau khi troi Trung Doi Son Hop 2-7-3 se di o tuong dan hoa Chinh Thuc va oan cu hoat, do nhu da che nhiet va di tuan tiem, phu kich trong khoi Khu Phoi Hop Chien Thuat oan minh. Tat ca cuo tuan tiem, phu kich va cac hoat dong khoa se phai phat hop xung cay tiem den.

(b) Trung tu tiem, phu kich, noi dong bo chi hay

(a) Trung Doi Son Hop 2-7-3 se di tuan tiem, phu kich va choi not dong bo chi hay nhu sau:

(a) Toi thanh phai co hai cuo tuan tiem hay phu kich
Coordinating Instructions.

a. The assigned operating area, Tactical Area of Coordination Appendix (1), is assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-7-3 to properly identify its respective area and to assist in overall coordination. All patrols, ambushes, or other operations within the assigned TACO will be coordinated with the Commanding Officer of the 26th Marines and the other ARVN and PAVN units as necessary.

b. Support and reaction forces will be coordinated through the Commanding Officer of the 26th Marines.

4. Administration/Logistics.

a. Administration and logistics for Combined Action Platoon 2-7-3 will be through the respective ARVN or Marine Commander at Vung Tau District Headquarters except as modified in existing orders.

b. Members of the CAP 2-7-3 will ensure to maintain good conduct and to keep the houses and areas they use in a clean and neat condition.

5. Command/Communication.

a. Command of the CAP Platoon 2-7-3 and U.S. Marines assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-7-3 is exercised separately by their respective Commanders. Unity of command is dependent upon mutual cooperation and coordination.

b. The CAP Platoon 2-7-3 and U.S. Marines will be responsible for their own communication with Vung Tau District Headquarters.
ANNEX A TO HOA VANG
1969 COMBINED ACTION PLATOON
MILITARY PLAN 967

From: Hoa Vang Subsector Headquarters
To: Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5
Ref: MAP INDOCHINA: Sheet 6641 III

1. Organization
a. A Combined Action Platoon composed of QM Platoon X, and
U.S. Marines from the 2nd Combined Action Company, 2nd Combined
Action Group is hereby designated as static Combined Action Platoon
2-7-5 to protect the people of XAM LAM Hamlet(s) from the terrorist activity of enemy infrastructure, from enemy
forces attempting to infiltrate into the hamlet, and other mis-
Sions mutually agreed to by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and
the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer of the 5th Combined
Action Company.

b. This order and all future orders concerning the mission,
concept of operations, Tactical Area of Coordination (TAC) and
coordination with adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. Units will refer
to QM Platoon X, and the U.S. Marines assigned to work with
them as Combined Action Platoon 2-7-5. This order and all future
orders will be signed by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and
the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined
Action Company.

2. Mission. Provide security from VC/VNA throughout entire Tactical
Area of Coordination as assigned by Appendix (1) to include
but not limited to the following tasks:

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a. Destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure.
b. Protect the friendly political/social structure.
c. Conduct patrols and ambushes within the assigned Tactical Area of Coordination.
d. Conduct vigorous civic action and payoffs programs to obtain the trust and confidence of local populace.
e. Organize local intelligence units.
g. Train and assist the hamlet Peoples Self Defense Force.
h. Participate in combined operations with the ARVN and/or other PAVN Units.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations. Combined Action Platoon \(2-7-5\) will operate from a fixed installation called a CAP compound. The compound will be heavily fortified. The compound will contain living quarters for both CAP, Platoon personnel and Marines, fighting bunkers, a command bunker, ammunition bunker, and a small sick bay. The entire position will be interlinked with revetted trench lines connecting all major facilities. The entire compound will be mined by wire of all types, augmented by claymores, tri-2-7-5 flares and surprise firing devices. Combined Action Platoon \(2-7-5\) will defend their compound twenty four hours a day. One third of Combined Action Platoon \(2-7-5\) will remain at the CAP compound to conduct local McGap, work on civic action, plan night activities, effect necessary coordination with adjacent units, and conduct patrols. After dark one third of CAP \(2-7-5\) will remain in the compound and two thirds of CAP \(2-7-5\) will conduct patrols and/or ambushes throughout the entire TAOC. All patrols, ambushes, and other operations will be integrated down to the squad size level.

a. Pha vào hạ tầng cơ sở Việt Cộng.
b. Bảo vệ chi nhánh quân và cơ sở xã hội.
c. Đặt xấp tiến triển, phóng khoán trong phân vị Khụ Phổ Hợp Chủ Thất chí diện.
d. Hãy man công tạo đan sủ và chống trí tưởng của chiến dịch để tạo được sự tin tưởng của dân chúng địa phương vào nói ta.
e. Tổ chức đồn vị tình báo địa phương.
f. Nước sã molt tình tôi và tình báo quân sự tổ chức cho Trưng trọng, tỉnh đạo Hợp Hợp tài quản và các đơn vị Việt Nam cộng hòa Rm Lí 6 liên dân.
g. Khẩn ływ run và giúp đỡ nhân dân tụ về trọng thiên ấy.
h. Tham dự các cuộc hành quân hỗ trợ với đơn vị Chi nhánh Quân Việt Nam bộ các đơn vị trong Mạnh 7-0-210.

3. Thù Nhân

a. Một bản quan, Trưng Bộ bài "2-7-5", sẽ làm sơn hoạt động từ rói cơ sở địa phương ở làm Trưng Bộ Hợp Hợp. Họ may sẽ được nới nỗi kiến dỗ và gặp của biết bản án ở Quân vi 2-7-03. Họ sẽ nhận chiến đấu, hành chính, dân dạy và quản lý: Kho phan trong được lãnh đạo với nhiều bằng grac thông báo việc này. Họ sẽ nhận chiến đấu trong tương quan mạng lưới chiến đấu trên mặt trận, va được lãnh đạo chúng ta để lập các người trong quân và đồng đồng binh sĩ.CLANCY sẽ nhận chiến đấu và cô thể hay không. Trưng Trọng Bộ "2-7-5", và thể cảm kích điều, trong 24/24 ngày mới này. Họ phan là quân với cơ tuning chi đạo họ. Họ sẽ nhận mặt trận yếu nhân thường dân anh đào, hoa người dân và vây bản quân ở địa phương. Họ sẽ cấp đông, lên lão phong hay sai đơn vị hỗ trợ động cơ động và 21 tung, lòng khi trở sự phán phán và sự tham gia của chiến đấu trong quân đội và phát hiện lão qua quân ở tương đồ của họ, dây đi được., phan khácephy khu phán hỗ chính thể cơ mình. Quân đội sẽ ở cơ, tương tiếp, phóng khoán và cơ sở hành quân, trên phán và phán được
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Petrol/Amphib. Operations

(1) Combined Action Platoons 2-7-5 will conduct their patrols and ambushes as follows:

(a) Conduct a minimum of two integrated squad size patrols and/or ambushes daily between the hours of 1900 and 0700.

(b) Conduct a minimum of one integrated squad size patrol daily between the hours of 0700 and 1900.

(c) Once every 24 hours patrol or ambush every hamlet in the assigned ZMC without using the same routes, trails, and setting a pattern to operations.

d. Additional Operations. Combined Action Platoons 2-7-5 will conduct additional operations as directed by the 55th Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

d. Planning

(1) Patrol routes, ambushes, and other CAP operations will be based on paragraph 3 a. and b. above, current intelligence or anticipated plans, and that all infiltration routes or other previous enemy locations be checked or interdicted daily throughout the entire TAC.

(2) All planning will be accomplished by the respective CAP Platoon Commander and the CAP Leader of the U.S. Marines. Disagreement as to location, frequency and size of patrols and ambushes or other activities will be referred to the 55th Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives for decision. In all cases of disagreement the CAP Platoon Leader and the Marine CAP Leader will promptly report to the 55th District Headquarters. In no case will a disagreement be allowed to go unresolved before 0000 the day the patrol or activity is to be conducted.

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(3) All patrol and ambush locations will be planned in advance and submitted to the Hao Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company on Saturday for Monday through Sunday of the next week. Changes to the planned operations may be authorized by the Hao Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives.

E. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) The assigned operating area, Tactical Area of Coordination, Appendix (1) is assigned to Combined Action Platoon 7-5, to properly identify its respective area and to assist in overall coordination. All patrols, ambushes, or other operations within the assigned TACCC will be coordinated with the Commanding Officer of the 26th Marines and the other ARVN and MACV units as necessary.

(2) Firesupport and reaction forces will be coordinated through the Commanding Officer of the 26th Marines.

4. Administration/Logistics.

a. Administration and logistics for Combined Action Platoon 7-5 will be through the respective ARVN or Marine Command at Hao Vang District Headquarters except as modified in existing orders.

b. Members of the CAP 7-5 will ensure to maintain good conduct and to keep the compound and areas they use in a clean and neat condition.

5. Command/Communication.

a. Command of the CM Platoon and U.S. Marines assigned to Combined Action Platoon 7-5 is exercised separately by their respective Commanders. Unity of command is dependent upon mutual cooperation and coordination.

b. CM Platoon and U.S. Marines will be responsible for their own communication with Hao Vang District Headquarters.

(3) Tất cả các cuộc tuần tiện, phục kích, Nội đồng Bộ Chỉ Huy Trung Bộ phải báo danh trước và đề trình cho Chỉ Huy Trung Bộ trước愧 vai trợ lực ứng cứu. Tất cả các cuộc tuần tiệm và phục kích chỉ huy Trung Bộ phải báo danh trước và đề trình cho Chỉ Huy Trung Bộ. Định thời gian chủ yếu của việc tuần tiệm và phục kích chỉ huy Trung Bộ phải chính xác và rõ ràng để M.C. Unterstützung, Bộ Chỉ Huy Trung Bộ, Quân đoàn 5 có thể truy tìm và hỗ trợ kịp thời.

E. Chiến dịch chống bộ đội Bắc."
ANNEX II TO HOA YANG
1969 COMBINED ACTION PLATOON
MILITARY PLAN 587

From: Hoa Yang Subsector Headquarters
To: Combined Action Platoon 2-7-6

From: MAP INDOCHINA: Sheet 6644 II & 6640 I

A. Organization

a. A Combined Action Platoon composed of VC/MN Platoon 28 and T.S. Marines from the 7th Combined Action Company, 2nd Combined Action Group is hereby designated as mobile Combined Action Platoon 2-7-6 to protect the people of Tan Lan & Nui Kim Son hamlets from the terrorist tactics of enemy infrastructure, from enemy forces attempting to infiltrate into the hamlets, and other missions mutually agreeable to the Hoa Yang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer of the 5th Combined Action Company.

b. This order and all future orders concerning the mission, concept of operations, Tactical Area of Coordination (TACO) and coordination with adjacent Vietnames and T.S. Units will refer to VC/MN Platoon 28 and the T.S. Marines assigned to work with them as Combined Action Platoon 2-7-6. This order and all future orders will be signed by the Hoa Yang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer of the 5th Combined Action Company.

2. Mission: Provide security from VC/MN throughout entire Tactical Area of Coordination as assigned by Appendix (*) to include but not limited to the following tasks:

a. Destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure.

b. Protect the friendly political/social structure.

C. PROCEDURE

a. Destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure.

b. Protect the friendly political/social structure.
a. Conduct patrols and ambushes within the assigned Tactical Area of Coordination.

b. Conduct vigorous civic action and payoffs programs to obtain the trust and confidence of local populace.

c. Organize local intelligence units.

d. Report military intelligence immediately to the District DDIAC and adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. units.

e. Train and assist the hamlet People's Self Defense Force.

f. Participate in combined operations with the ARVN and/or other PAVN units.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-7-6 will operate in all of the hamlets within its assigned Tactical Area of Coordination on a staggered basis, never setting patterns in location, on a day to day basis and will change its night and day command post/base of operations daily. The command/base of operations will be composed of several different houses in the hamlet to enable the Combined Action Platoon to disperse. One third of Combined Action Platoon 2-7-6 will remain at the day command post/base of operations to conduct local Medcaps, work on civic action, conduct training, plan night activities, effect necessary coordination with adjacent units, and conduct patrols. After dark Combined Action Platoon 2-7-6 will move to a preselected command post/base of operations and conduct patrols and ambushes throughout its entire ZAOC. All patrols, ambushes, and other operations will be integrated down to the squad level.

b. Patrol/ambush/Command Post Operations

(1) Combined Action Platoon 2-7-6 will conduct their patrols, ambushes, and command post operations as follows:

(a) Conduct a minimum of two integrated squad size
(a) Reactivate all patrol and ambush areas daily between the hours of 1900 and 0700.

(b) Conduct a minimum of one integrated squad size patrol daily between the hours of 0700 and 1900.

(c) Change the command post location/base of operations every 12 hours, command posts will not be public buildings nor concrete structures.

(d) Conduct all patrol and ambush every 24 hours and base of operations with out using the same pattern, trails, and setting a pattern to operations.

3. **Additional Operations.** Combined Action Platoon 2-7-6 will conduct additional operations as directed by the Hoi Van Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

4. **Planning.**

(a) All patrols, ambushes, and other CAP operations will be based on paragraph 3 a. and b. above, current enemy intelligence or anticipated plans, and that all infiltration routes or other previous enemy locations be checked or interdicted daily throughout the entire TAOC.

(b) All planning will be accomplished by the respective QMN Platoon Commander and the CAP Leader of the U.S. Marines. Disagreement as to location, frequency, and size of patrols and ambushes or other activities will be referred to the Hoi Van Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives for decision. In all cases of disagreement the QMN Platoon Leader and the CAP Leader will promptly report to the Hoi Van District Headquarters. In no case will a disagreement be allowed to go unresolved before 1000 the day the patrol or activity is to be conducted.

5. (a) All patrols/ambushes and CAP locations will be planned in advance and submitted to the Hoi Van Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined

(b) The Office of the Director of Force Protection, Sergeant Major of the U.S. Army, will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(c) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(d) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(e) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(f) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(g) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(h) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(i) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(j) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(k) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(l) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(m) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(n) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(o) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(p) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(q) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(r) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(s) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(t) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(u) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(v) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(w) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(x) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(y) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.

(z) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of Defense Intelligence will be notified of all changes in the above operations.
Coordinating Instructions.

1. The assigned operating area, Tactical Area of Coordination Appendix 1 (1) is assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-7-6 to properly identify its respective area and to assist in overall coordination. All patrols, ambushes, or other operations within the assigned TACO will be coordinated with the Commanding Officer of the 1st Marines and the other ARVN and PAVN units as necessary.

2. Fire support and reaction forces will be coordinated through the Commanding Officer of the 1st Marines.

4. Administration/Logistics.

a. Administration and logistics for Combined Action Platoon 2-7-6 will be through the respective ARVN or Marine Commander at Howdang District Headquarters except as modified in existing orders.

b. Members of the CAP 2-7-6 will ensure to maintain good conduct and to keep the houses and areas they use in a clean and neat condition.

5. Command/Communication.

a. Command of the QMN Platoon 2-7-6 and U.S. Marines assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-7-6 is exercised separately by their respective Commanders. Unity of command is dependent upon mutual cooperation and coordination.

b. The QMN Platoon 2-7-6 and U.S. Marines will be responsible for their own communication with Howdang District Headquarters.

Major Pham Xuan Hai
Captain J.D. Nickel
Howdang Subsector Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer
5th Combined Action Company
Appendix I CAP 2-7-6 TACO
Phu lục I thôc Mục I vào Trung Đế Họn Hợp Hôa Yäng theo Kế Hỏa Quan Mục 687 Bản Đồ Mục: 6640I, 6641I Tũ Lệ Xích: 5/50,000

APPENDIX I To ANNEX I of Hôa Yäng 1969 Combine Action Platoon Military Plan 687 Map Sheets: 6640I, 6641I 1/50,000

Thiếu Tr, Mai-Xuân-Hậu CHI KHU TRƯỞNG Quân Hôa Yäng Đại Ý J.D. Niotis Cộng Sư Viên Cao Cấp/ Chế Hỏa Quân 5 Hôn Hợp S

MAJER MAI, XUAN-HAÜ HÔA YẲNG Subsector Commander

CAPTAIN J.D. NIOTIS Senior COORDINATOR/Commanding Officer 5th Combine Action Company
1. **Organization**

   a. A Combined Action Platoon composed of QM Platoon 52 and U.S. Marines from 2nd Combined Action Company, 2nd Combined Action Group is hereby designated as static Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7 to protect the people of Vinh Ky from the terrorist tactic of enemy infrastructure, from enemy forces attempting to infiltrate into the hamlets, and other missions mutually agreeable to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer of the 5th Combined Action Company.

b. This order and all future orders concerning the mission, concept of operations, Tactical Area of Coordination (TACO) and coordination with adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. Units will refer to QM Platoon 52 and the U.S. Marines assigned to work with them as Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7. This order and all future orders will be signed by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

2. **Mission** Provide security from VC/VNA throughout entire Tactical Area of Coordination as assigned by Appendix (1) to include but not limited to the following tasks:

---

**Appendix J to Hoa Vang**

1969 COMBINED ACTION PLATOON

MILITARY PLAN 687

From: Hoa Vang Subsector Headquarters

to: Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7

**1.** **Organization**

   a. A Combined Action Platoon composed of QM Platoon 52 and U.S. Marines from 2nd Combined Action Company, 2nd Combined Action Group is hereby designated as static Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7 to protect the people of Vinh Ky from the terrorist tactic of enemy infrastructure, from enemy forces attempting to infiltrate into the hamlets, and other missions mutually agreeable to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer of the 5th Combined Action Company.

b. This order and all future orders concerning the mission, concept of operations, Tactical Area of Coordination (TACO) and coordination with adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. Units will refer to QM Platoon 52 and the U.S. Marines assigned to work with them as Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7. This order and all future orders will be signed by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

---

**2.** **Mission** Provide security from VC/VNA throughout entire Tactical Area of Coordination as assigned by Appendix (1) to include but not limited to the following tasks:

---

**3.** **Organization**

   a. The Combined Action Platoon is composed of QM Platoon 52 and U.S. Marines from 2nd Combined Action Company, 2nd Combined Action Group. They are designated as static Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7 to protect the people of Vinh Ky from the terrorist tactic of enemy infrastructure, from enemy forces attempting to infiltrate into the hamlets, and other missions mutually agreeable to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer of the 5th Combined Action Company.

b. This order and all future orders concerning the mission, concept of operations, Tactical Area of Coordination (TACO) and coordination with adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. Units will refer to QM Platoon 52 and the U.S. Marines assigned to work with them as Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7. This order and all future orders will be signed by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

---

**4.** **Mission** Provide security from VC/VNA throughout entire Tactical Area of Coordination as assigned by Appendix (1) to include but not limited to the following tasks:

---

**5.** **Organization**

   a. The Combined Action Platoon is composed of QM Platoon 52 and U.S. Marines from 2nd Combined Action Company, 2nd Combined Action Group. They are designated as static Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7 to protect the people of Vinh Ky from the terrorist tactic of enemy infrastructure, from enemy forces attempting to infiltrate into the hamlets, and other missions mutually agreeable to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer of the 5th Combined Action Company.

b. This order and all future orders concerning the mission, concept of operations, Tactical Area of Coordination (TACO) and coordination with adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. Units will refer to QM Platoon 52 and the U.S. Marines assigned to work with them as Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7. This order and all future orders will be signed by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

---

**6.** **Mission** Provide security from VC/VNA throughout entire Tactical Area of Coordination as assigned by Appendix (1) to include but not limited to the following tasks:

---

**7.** **Organization**

   a. The Combined Action Platoon is composed of QM Platoon 52 and U.S. Marines from 2nd Combined Action Company, 2nd Combined Action Group. They are designated as static Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7 to protect the people of Vinh Ky from the terrorist tactic of enemy infrastructure, from enemy forces attempting to infiltrate into the hamlets, and other missions mutually agreeable to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer of the 5th Combined Action Company.

b. This order and all future orders concerning the mission, concept of operations, Tactical Area of Coordination (TACO) and coordination with adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. Units will refer to QM Platoon 52 and the U.S. Marines assigned to work with them as Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7. This order and all future orders will be signed by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

---

**8.** **Mission** Provide security from VC/VNA throughout entire Tactical Area of Coordination as assigned by Appendix (1) to include but not limited to the following tasks:

---

**9.** **Organization**

   a. The Combined Action Platoon is composed of QM Platoon 52 and U.S. Marines from 2nd Combined Action Company, 2nd Combined Action Group. They are designated as static Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7 to protect the people of Vinh Ky from the terrorist tactic of enemy infrastructure, from enemy forces attempting to infiltrate into the hamlets, and other missions mutually agreeable to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer of the 5th Combined Action Company.

b. This order and all future orders concerning the mission, concept of operations, Tactical Area of Coordination (TACO) and coordination with adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. Units will refer to QM Platoon 52 and the U.S. Marines assigned to work with them as Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7. This order and all future orders will be signed by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.
a. Destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure.

b. Protect the friendly political/social structure.

c. Conduct patrols and ambushes within the assigned Tactical Area of Coordination.

d. Conduct vigorous civic action and psyops programs to obtain the trust and confidence of local populace.

e. Organize local intelligence units.

f. Report military intelligence immediately to the District DOCC and adjacent Vietnames and U.S. units.

g. Train and assist the hamlet People’s Self Defense Force.

h. Participate in combined operations with the ARVN and/or other PAVN/NAVY Units.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7 will operate from a fixed installation called a CAP compound. The compound will be heavily fortified. The compound will contain living quarters for both QM Platoon personnel and Marines, fighting bunkers, a command bunker, ammunition bunker, and a small sick bay. The entire position will be interlaced with revetted trench lines connecting all major facilities. The entire compound will be ringed by wire of all types, augmented by claymores, trip flares and surprise firing devices. Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7 will defend their compound twenty-four hours a day. One third of Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7 will remain at the CAP compound to conduct local MedOpe, work on civic action, plan night activities, effect necessary coordination with adjacent units, and conduct patrols. After dark one third of CAP 2-7-7 will remain in the compound and two thirds of CAP 2-7-7 will conduct patrols and/or ambushes throughout the entire TACO. All patrols, ambushes, and other operations will be integrated down to the squad size level.

a. Pha về ba tang o c o Viet Cong.

b. Bao ve chinh trich lien va o c o so xa hop.

c. Sao kep tranh bien, phu kich trong pham vi Khu Hoi Hop Chien Thieu chi dinh.

d. Day manh cong tap tan su vu va chung trinh tan ly chien de
tao duoc su tin trong o c o den oh ng amusing vao noi ta.

e. To chinh den v c o i tin hon dia phuong.

f. Sao o c o giai tin tap va tin hon quan su tu khoa cho Trung
Tam Tin hop Noi Hop tai quan va can don v c o Viet Nam cung nho Hoa ky
6 can dan.

g. Huan luyn va gui o c o nhau dan tu v c c trong thoi ky.

h. That du o c o o cuong quan hon hop voi dan v c o Chinh quy Viet Nam hay o c o don v c o Cong hop T-9-L-C.

5. Nhiem

a. 1 nien hinh tran, Trung Nhi Hop 2-7-7 se us tinh hoat dung lao do c o c o trong 2-7-7. Nhi Hop 2-7-7

b. 2 nien hinh tran, Trung Nhi Hop 2-7-7 se us tinh hoat dung lao do c o c o trong 2-7-7.

3 nien hinh tran, Trung Nhi Hop 2-7-7 se us tinh hoat dung lao do c o c o trong 2-7-7.
(1) Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7 will conduct their patrols and ambushes as follows:

(a) Conduct a minimum of two integrated squad sized patrols and/or ambushes daily between the hours of 0500 and 0700.

(b) Conduct a minimum of one integrated squad sized patrol daily between the hours of 0700 and 1900.

(c) Once every 24 hours patrol or ambush every hamlet in the assigned TACO without using the same routes, trails, and setting a pattern to operations.

c. Additional Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7 will conduct additional operations as directed by the Hoa Yang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

d. Planning

(1) Patrol routes, ambushes, and other CAP operations will be based on paragraph 3 a. and b. above, current intelligence or anticipated plans, and that all infiltration routes or other previous enemy locations be checked or interdicted daily throughout the entire TACO.

(2) All planning will be accomplished by the respective QNM Platoon Commander and the CAP Leader of the U.S. Marines. Disagreement as to location, frequency and size of patrols and ambushes or other activities will be referred to the Hoa Yang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives for decision. In all cases of disagreement the QNM Platoon Leader and the Marine CAP Leader will promptly report to the Hoa Yang District Headquarters. In no case will a disagreement be allowed to go unresolved before 1000 the day the patrol or activity is to be conducted.
(5) All patrol and ambush locations will be planned in advance and submitted to the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company on Saturday for Monday through Sunday of the next week. Changes to the planned operations may be authorized by the Hoa Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives.

- Coordinating Instructions.

(7) The assigned operating area, Tactical Area of Coordination Appendix (1) is assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7 to properly identify its respective area and to assist in overall coordination. All patrols, ambushes, or other operations within the assigned TAOC will be coordinated with the Commanding Officer of the 1st Marines and the other ARVN and PAVN units as necessary.

(2) Fire support and reaction forces will be coordinated through the Commanding Officer of the 1st Marines.

4. Administration/Logistics.

a. Administration and Logistics for Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7 will be through the respective ARVN or Marine Commander at Hoa Vang District Headquarters except as modified in existing orders.

b. Members of the CAP, 2-7-7, will ensure to maintain good conduct and to keep the compound and areas they use in a clean and neat condition.

5. Command/Communication.

a. Command of the QNM Platoon 55 and U.S. Marines assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-7-7 is exercised separately by their respective Commanders. Unity of command is dependent upon mutual cooperation and coordination.

b. QNM Platoon 55 and U.S. Marines will be responsible for their own communication with Hoa Vang District Headquarters.

(3) Tất cả cuộc tiến tiễn, phục kích, đột phá đổ bộ Chí Hòa Trung Đông phải được chỉ định trước và được chỉ huy trực tiếp của Chỉ Huy Chí Hòa Đông và đại đội Trung Đông B do Bộ Bếp 5 và các lực lượng bộ binh của Bộ Bếp 5. Tất cả cuộc tiến tiễn, phục kích, đột phá đổ bộ Chí Hòa Đông đều được chỉ huy trực tiếp của Chủ tịch Hội đồng quân sự miền Nam Cộng hòa. (3) Ít nhất trong 24 giờ tiên tiễn, phục kích, đột phá đổ bộ Chí Hòa Đông phải được chỉ huy từ cấp Bộ Bếp 5. Tất cả cuộc tiến tiễn, phục kích, đột phá đổ bộ Chí Hòa Đông đều được chỉ huy trực tiếp của Chủ tịch Hội đồng quân sự miền Nam Cộng hòa.
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Major Mai-Xuan-Hau
Hoai Vang Subsector Commander

Captain C.D. Niotis
Senior Coordinator/
Commanding Officer
5th Combined Action Company

Chief Of 5th Combined Action Company

Appendix I CAP 2-7-7 TACC

Phu luc I Khu Phat Hop Chieu De
cong Trung Doi Hoi Hop (CAP) 2-7-7
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DECLASSIFIED
ANNEX X TO HOA VANG
1969 COMBINED ACTION PLATOON
MILITARY PLAN 687

From: Hoa Yang Subsector Headquarters
To: Combined Action Platoon 2-8-8
Ref: MAP INDOCHINA: Sheet 5641 III.

- Organization

1. A Combined Action Platoon composed of 257 Platoon 55 and
U.S. Marines from the 5th Combined Action Company. The Combined
Action Group is hereby designated as No. 5 Combined Action Platoon
2-8-8 to protect the people of the area.

2. This order and all future orders concerning the area are to be
acted upon by the Commanding Officer of the Special Operations
Group/Commanding Officer of the 5th Combined Action Company.

3. The area has been designated by the Commanding Officer of the
Combined Action Platoon, 2-8-8, and the U.S. Marines assigned to work with
the Combined Action Platoon 2-8-8. This order and all future orders will
be signed by the Hoa Yang Subsector Headquarters and the Senior
Coordination/Commanding Officer of the 5th Combined Action Company.

4. Mission: Provide security for 257 Platoon throughout the
designated area of operations. Forward area of Coordination (FAC) and
security for the area.

5. Destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure.

6. Maintain the local police/social structure.
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2. Conduct patrols and ambushes within the assigned Tactical Area of Coordination.

3. Conduct vigorous civic action and public programs to obtain the trust and confidence of local populace.

4. Organize local intelligence units.

5. Report military intelligence immediately to the District DIOCC and adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. Units.

6. Train and assist the hamlet People's Self Defense Force.

7. Participate in combined operations with the ARVN and/or other PAVN/PAF Units.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-8-1 will operate in all of the hamlets within its assigned tactical area of coordination on a staggered basis, never setting patterns in location, on a day to day basis and will change its night and day command post/base of operations daily. The command/base of operations will be composed of several different places in the hamlets to enable the Combined Action Platoon to disperse. One third of Combined Action Platoon 2-8-1 will remain at the day command post/base of operations to conduct local MACVPSA, work on civic action, conduct training, plan night activities, effect necessary coordination with adjacent units, and conduct patrols. After dark Combined Action Platoon 2-8-1 will move to a preselected command post/base of operations and conduct patrols and ambushes throughout its entire PAVN. All patrols, ambushes, and other operations will be integrated down to the squad level.

b. Patrol/Ambush/Command Post Operations

(i) Combined Action Platoon 2-8-1 will conduct their patrols, ambushes, and command post operations as follows:

(a) Conduct a minimum of two integrated squad size

2. Bộ sáp trên tiêu, phùng kích trong phạm vi Khu Phát Huy Chiến Thúc chỉ định.

3. Bộ sáp trên tiêu, phùng kích trong phạm vi Khu Phát Huy Chiến Thúc chỉ định.

1. Bộ sáp trên tiêu, phùng kích trong phạm vi Khu Phát Huy Chiến Thúc chỉ định.

CONFIDENTIAL
GENERAL

HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/10/69
3000
6 Apr 1969

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: Assistant Chief of Staff, Combined Action Program)

Subj: Modification of Tactical Areas of Coordination in 2d Combined Action Group

1. Tactical Areas of Coordination assigned to Combined Action Company 2-1 (CACO 2-1) in Hieu Duc District have been changed as indicated in enclosure (1) effective 2 April 1969.

2. These changes were effected by moving CAF 2-1-1 into a different TAOC and by shifting other CACOs 2-1 TAOCs to provide contiguous boundaries for the entire company.

3. All changes have been closely coordinated with U.S. TAOC commanders and were approved by the Hieu Duc District Chief. The contiguous areas of operation enable all CAPs to become mutually supporting and provide quick inter unit reaction capabilities. The new TAOCs enable the CAPs to support KD activities throughout CACO 2-1 area of operations.

E. L. LEWIS

ENCLOSURE (1)
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: Assistant
Chief of Staff, Combined Action Program)

Subj: Change in 2d Combined Action Group Status: Report of

1. The following change is reported:

   a. CAP 2-1-6, previously located at AT903766 has been changed to
      Mobile Combined Action Platoon 2-1-6 effective 18MAR 1 April 1969. The
      mobile CAP will operate in the vicinity of grids AT9074, AT9075, and AT9076.

      (1) CAP 2-1-6 retained the same PF Platoon number 132 in their Tactical
          Area of Coordination (TAOC).

      (2) The old CAP 2-1-6 compound has been turned over to the District
          Chief for use as he deems necessary.

Ltr 11. MAR 69

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ENCLOSURE (1)

4-102
DECLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
P.O. San Francisco, California 96602

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: Assistant Chief of Staff, Combined Action Program)

Subj: Changes in 2d Combined Action Group Status; Report of

Encs: (1) Overlay CAP Redesignations Phase I and II

1. The following changes are reported.

   a. CAP 2-7-6, previously located at BT07701 has been changed to Mobile Combined Action Platoon 2-7-6 effective 1600H 10 April 1969. The mobile CAP will operate in the vicinity of grids BT0670, BT0770, and BT0870.

      (1) CAP 2-7-6 retained their PF Platoon number 40 to operate in their same TAOC.

      (2) The old CAP 2-7-6 compound has been turned over to the Hoa Vang District Chief for use by a PF platoon not associated with the CAP Program.

   b. CAP 2-8-1, previously located at AT907784 has been changed to Mobile Combined Action Platoon 2-8-1 effective 1600H 10 April 1969. The mobile CAP will operate in the vicinity of grids AT9080, AT9180, and AT9281.

      (1) CAP 2-8-1 retained their PF Platoon number 44 to operate in their new TAOC.

      (2) The old CAP 2-8-1 compound has been turned over to the Hoa Vang District Chief. He intends to turn the facilities over to the Village Chief for use as a headquarters.

2. Boundaries of TAOCs in CAOC 2-8 area are as shown on enclosure (1) herein. Phase I was executed at 0800H 12 April 1969. Tentative execution of Phase II is set for 25 April 1969.

E. L. Lewis

DECLASSIFIED
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HEADQUARTERS
2d Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: Assistant
Chief of Staff, Combined Action Program)

Subj: Changes in 2d Combined Action Group Status; Report of

Ref: (a) CO, 2d CAG F/MAG Order 1-69 dated 10 April 1969

1. The following changes are reported:

   a. CAP 2-5-4 previously located at grid (AT994681) has been relocated
      in southern Hao Vang District in accordance with plans submitted
      in reference (a). This move is part of the phase II reorganization
      plan. For the present time the CAP will retain its designation as Mobile
      CAP 2-5-4 operating in the TAOC denoted in the plan with slight
      modifications in contiguous boundaries. On or about 30 April upon
      execution of Phase II of the plan this CAP will be the one redesignated
      as CAT 2-7-4 at that time. (This is also a change to the previous plans
      of redesignating 2-5-4 as 2-7-2).

   b. The old CAP 2-5-4 compound has been turned over to the District
      Chief and he has indicated that an RF unit will use it as a base of
      operations.

   c. The new CAT 2-5-4 (2-7-4 on 30 April) will be working with
      PF platoon CM 39 in their new TAOC working in the vicinity of grids
      DT0069, BT0169, and BT0170.

   d. Exact overlays of this and other adjacent TAOCs will be forwarded
      upon execution of all moves scheduled in phase II of reference (a).

E. L. LEWIS

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NOTES FROM CAP COMMANDERS CONFERENCE 27 APRIL 1968.

1. The 5th Monthly CAP Commanders Conference was held at 1100H 27 April 1968.

a. Major Dube, 2d CAG S-3 Officer, opened the meeting with a discussion on Leadership and general indoctrination on agenda items.

b. Major Dube emphasized the need for more NCO leadership throughout the CAP. "Lack of leadership is the biggest problem in the military today." CAP Commanders must remember that they are leaders and conduct themselves as such.

c. Major Dube then reviewed the Troop Leading Steps and Leadership Principles.

d. By applying the above and following them step by step you can accomplish any task ranging from playing football to conducting large scale military operations.

e. Major Dube also made the following comments.

1. In the way of information for new CAP Commanders, the monthly CAP Commanders Conferences are held in order to get an exchange of ideas between CAP Commanders. The agenda items discussed are submitted by CAG Commanders and by Headquarters Staff on subjects they feel need emphasizing.

2. All CAP Commanders, assistant CAP Commanders and team leaders should carry notebooks and use them. You can’t remember everything. Take notes!!

3. At the present time promotions are tight. If one of your men is doing an outstanding job, bring it to the attention of your CAGO. This will give him an edge over those doing a lesser job. Combat promotions are also available for those who excel in the field under fire.

f. Major Dube previewed agenda items to be covered and turned control of the discussion to 1st Sgt Jones, 2d CAG 1st Sgt.
1. Security around day and night havens.

(a) When choosing a haven site take fields of fire into consideration. Utilize machine guns on security to cover likely avenues of approach.

(b) **Security out of hand grenade range.** Security is to be kept beyond hand grenade range of haven sites in order to provide adequate warning and protection to the site.

(c) **Integrated security.** Don't have Marines on one side of site and PFs on the other. Keep your force integrated. If your PF leader refuses to integrate inform your CACO Commander and he can take the problem to District Officials.

(d) **Alarm system and signals.** Communication wire can be utilized as a means of alerting ambushes.

(e) **Availability of PFs during the day.** If PFs refuse to leave a sufficient number of troops at your day site inform your CACO so action can be taken to correct this.

(f) **Kids around sites.** Allowing Vietnamese children to run around your haven site is asking for trouble. They will steal your gear and ammo then turn the ammo in for VIP awards. Small children while playing around your gear could accidentally pull the pin off a grenade, it has happened before. Kids have also been known to be informers for the VC. Take appropriate steps to keep kids away from your sites. Your PF Noncho could easily be utilized for this. PFs are known to distrust children who frequent sites.

(g) **PFs digging at proposed night sites early in the day.** This speaks for itself. If you allow this you might as well send Charlie a copy of your overlays and plans for that nights activities.

(h) **Children moving packs from site to site.** This is a bad practice as again your giving your site away.

(i) **Weapons at arms length.** Marines should keep their weapons within arms length at all times. In the event of a surprise attack ten feet separating a man and his weapon could be the longest 10 feet of your life.

(j) **Weapons cleared.** While at day sites all weapons are to be cleared. It doesn't take that long to chamber a round. CAP Commanders can count on some of their weapons being checked by all 2d CAC inspection teams or when the Commanding Officer visits.

(k) **Slings on weapons.** No one in 2d CAC will have a sling on his weapon. An order has been published on this item. Enforce it!
(1) **Using houses as sites.** Stay clear of good looking or concrete buildings when selecting sites. Charlie knows the local's always look for comfort and he can narrow your positions down to several good looking houses.

(n) **Use of Claymores.** Many CAPs have discontinued their use since the claymore mine. These mines are very effective against ground troops. They should be utilized by CAPs at night sites and ambush sites.

(u) **Signals for activities returning to sites.** Have prearranged signals set up for activities returning to sites. Vary these signals extensively.

(o) **Reconning Sites.** Before entering a selected site send a few men forward to check it out completely before taking your entire CAP in. Chances are there might be booby traps or possible enemy troops in the area. Inside buildings, outside buildings and tree lines near buildings should be checked.

(p) **Wearing of body armor and helmets.** Body armor and helmets will be worn on activities and while on watch. This is mandatory. It is better to be uncomfortably warm than cold dead.

2. **Indoctrination of new men.**

   a. New men should be briefed on all facets of CAP work, also on proper conduct and appearance. Assign specific duties, introduce them to PFs and cross train them with other Marines. Have them fire all CAP weapons under supervision of the CAP Commander. Supervise them closely until you know their capabilities and limitations.

3. **Fire Discipline.** Ambushes are still opening up at ranges of 25-75 meters. Expect hundreds of rounds of ammo without getting any hits.

   a. Brief all troops including PFs on a set signal for opening an ambush. Have your men fire their rifles semi-automatically not fully automatically. A rifle can not be controlled well enough on automatic to get any hits. Have a method of alerting your entire ambush to the enemy's presence. Give proper briefings and assign one or two men to be in charge of springing an ambush.

4. **Marine/PF relationship.** Differences in education, background, custom, culture and military training between Marines and PFs make for some problems in their getting along together. It sometimes takes a lot of effort on both sides in order to keep things running smoothly.

   a. Remember, PFs do not steal, they **borrow** permanently. This was discussed at great length by Major Dube.
5. **Disciplinary problems in dealing with PPs.** CAP Marines are advisors to the platoon they work with, not commanders of these PPs. If you have a problem that you can’t solve through your PF, bring it to CACO and they can have District do something about it. Do not attempt to argue with PPs, it’s a lost cause and will only bring you bigger problems.

6. **Leadership exercised at CAP level.** Remember you are the CAP Commander, the man in charge. Demand respect and immediate execution of all orders, leave no doubt that you are the boss. Develop your men until each one of them is capable of being the leader himself.

7. **Communication Problems.** Inspect your communication gear to ensure it is being well cared for. Don’t allow your men to abuse communication gear. Communication gear is expensive and important equipment.

8. Major Dube then again took the reins and told of 2d CAG’s plans to have their own NCQ School geared to the CAG concept. This school is scheduled to begin operating in approximately 2 weeks.

9. Lt. Col. Lewis, 2d CAG Commanding Officer made the closing statements:
   
   a. Keep your men well informed on all subjects pertaining to them and the CAPs.

   b. It is a well known fact that Commanders lead lonely lives, be friendly towards your troops but do not get too friendly as to be considered a buddy.

   c. Many of the NCQs in the service today have had responsibilities pushed on them prematurely. This is why 2d CAG is initiating an NCQ school to give these men guide lines to follow so they can be NCQs and handle themselves accordingly.

   d. How CAPs operate in the CAP Commanders absence shows to what extent your Marines are trained. Don’t be afraid to take a night off and stay at CAGO. Give your assistant a chance at the reins and see what he can do.

   e. 2d CAG is getting new men fresh from ITR. How these men work out depends on how well we train them.
petrols and/or ambushes daily between the hours of 1900 and 0700.

(b) Conduct a minimum of one integrated squad size patrol daily between the hours of 1900 and 0700.

(c) Change the command post locations/bases of operations every 12 hours, command posts will not be public buildings nor concrete structures.

(d) Once every 24 hours patrol or ambush every hour in the assigned ROAC with out using the same routes, trails, and setting a pattern of operations.

(e) Additional Operations. Combined Action Platoons 2-8-1 will conduct additional operations as directed by the Eo Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

3. Planning.

(a) Petrol routes, ambushes, and other CAP operations will be based on paragraph 3 a. and b. above, current enemy intelligence or anticipated plans, and that all infiltration routes or other previous enemy locations be checked or interdicted daily throughout the entire area.

(b) All planning will be accomplished by the respective OCM Platoon Commander and the CAP Leader of the U.S. Marines. Disagreements as to location, frequency and sizes of patrols and ambushes or other activities will be referred to the Eo Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives for decision. In all cases of disagreement the OCM Platoon Leader and the Marines CAP Leader will promptly report to the Eo Vang District Headquarters. In no case will a disagreement be allowed to go unresolved before 0700 the day the patrol or activity is to be conducted.

(c) All petrols/ambushes and CP locations will be planned in advance and submitted to the Eo Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

4. Reports.

(a) All patrols and ambushes conducted by the OCM Platoon will be reported to the Eo Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

(b) All reports will be submitted to the Eo Vang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.
Coordinating Instructions.

(1) The assigned operating area, Tactical Area of Coordination Appendix (1) is assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-8-1, to properly identify its respective area and to assist in overall coordination. All patrols, ambushes, or other operations within the assigned TACO will be coordinated with the Commanding Officer of the 26th Marines and the other ARVN and NVPAF units as necessary.

(2) Fire support and reaction forces will be coordinated through the Commanding Officer of the 26th Marines.

4. Administration/Logistics.

a. Administration and logistics for Combined Action Platoon 2-8-1 will be through the respective ARVN or Marine Commander at Hoa Vang District Headquarters except as modified in existing orders.

b. Members of the CAP 2-8-1 will ensure to maintain good conduct and to keep the houses and areas they use in a clean and neat condition.

5. Command/Communication.

a. Command of the QMN Platoon 43 and U.S. Marines assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-8-1 is exercised separately by their respective Commanders. Unity of command is dependent upon mutual cooperation and coordination.

b. The QMN Platoon 43 and U.S. Marines will be responsible for their own coordination with Hoa Vang District Headquarters.

Captain O. Komma
Hoa Vang Subsector
Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer
5th Combined Action Company
Appendix I CAP 2-8-1 TAOC

Chi Khu Trưởng: Đại tá Phú Thái

[Signature]

Chi Khu Trưởng: Đại tá Phú Thái
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APPENDIX I TO ANNEX K OF
Hoa Vang 1969 Combine Action Platoon
Military Plan 687
MAP Sheet: 6641 III
1:50,000

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UNCLASSIFIED

THIẾC TÔ MAI-XUÂN-MÃU
Chi H rack Taing Quân Hoa Vang
Đại Uy 1, D. Nitiê Cong Su
Chi H rack Taing đế Bộ Nhapk 5
4-78

MAJOR MAI, XUÂN-HUY
Hoa Vang Subsector Commander

CAPTAIN J. D. NIETIS Senior
Coordinator/Commanding Officer
5th Combine Action Company
Patrol/Attack Operations

(a) Combined Action Platform Leader will conduct their patrols and attacks as follows:

(b) Conduct a minimum of two integrated squad-sized patrols daily between the hours of 0700 and 0700.

(c) Conduct a minimum of one integrated squad-sized patrol daily between the hours of 0700 and 2200.

(d) Conduct a minimum of one night-time patrol daily between the hours of 0700 and 2200.

(e) Once every 24 hours patrol or ambush every beachhead in the assigned area without using the same routes, trails, and setting a pattern to operations.

(g) Additional Operations: Combined Action Platform Leader will conduct additional operations as directed by the NCO Defense Commander and the Senior Coordination/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

(h) Patrolling

(1) Patrol routes, ambushes, and other OAP operations will be based on information 7 in. and 10 in. above, current intelligence, or on additional plans, and that all limitations routes to other positions, any locations be checked or instructed daily throughout the entire COA.

(2) All patrolling will be accomplished by the platform commander and the NCO leader of the NCO Platoon/Platoon Leader or the Marine platoon leader. All positions, new routes, and other activities will be referred to the NCO Defense Commander and the Senior Coordination/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company, or their direct representatives for approval. In all cases of disagreement, the NCO Defense Leader and the Marine OAP Leader will promptly report to the NCO Defense Platform Headquarters. If no consensus is reached or disagreement be allowed to remain beyond 0700 the day the patrol or activity is to be conducted.
Appendix I To Annex L of
Ho Chi Minh Current Plan
Military Plan 687
Map Sheet: 664/1 III
1:50,000

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Thieu Tru Mai-Xuan-Huu
Chi Khau Dieu Chuon Hon Vang
Dai Doi D. Nhot Cong Su Viem
Can Chu / Chi Hung Truong
Dai Doi Hon Hap 5

Major MAI, XU, HUU
Ho Chi Minh Sub-Region Commander

Captain J.O. Nioteis
Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer
5th Combined Action Company
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a. Conduct patrols and ambushes within the assigned Tactical Area of Coordination.

b. Conduct rigorous civic action and pay close attention to the trust and confidence of local populace.

c. Conduct local intelligence units.

d. Report military intelligence immediately to the District DCO and adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. units.

e. Train and assist the hamlet People's Self Defense Force.

f. Participate in combined operations with the ARVN and/or other PMWF units.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-5-2 will operate in all of the hamlet within its assigned Tactical Area of Coordination on a sporadic basis, severe setting patterns in location, on a day to day basis and will change its night and day command post/base of operations daily. The command/post of operations will be composed of several different bases in the hamlet to enable the Combined Action Platoon to disperse. One third of Combined Action Platoon 2-5-2 will remain at the day command post/base of operations to conduct local security, work on civic action, conduct training, plan night activities, effect necessary coordination with adjacent units, and conduct patrols. After dark, Combined Action Platoon 2-5-2 will move to a preselected command post/base of operations and conduct patrols and ambushes throughout its entire DANG. All patrols, ambushes, and other operations will be integrated down to the squad level.

b. Patrol/Ambush/Command Post Operations

(1) Combined Action Platoon 2-5-2 will conduct their patrols, ambushes, and command post operations as follows:

(a) Conduct a minimum of two integrated squad size
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Action Company on Saturday for Monday through Sunday of the next week. Changes to the planned operations may be authorized by the 3rd Marine Division Commander and the Commanding Officer, 9th Combined Action Company on their direct representatives.

Coordinating Instructions

1. The assigned operating areas, Tactical Areas of Coordination Appendix (1) are assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-5-2 to properly identify its respective area and to assist in overall coordination. All patrols, ambushes, or other operations within the assigned TACO will be coordinated with the Commanding Officer of the 26th Marines and the other ARVN and PAVN units as necessary.

2. Support and reaction forces will be coordinated through the Commanding Officer of the 26th Marines

3. Administration/Logistics

a. Administration and logistics for Combined Action Platoon 2-5-2 will be through the respective ARVN or Marine Commander at Phu Yen District Headquarters except as modified in existing orders.

b. Members of the CAP 2-5-2 will ensure to maintain good conduct and to keep the houses and areas they use in a clean and neat condition.

4. Command/Communication

a. Command of the CAP 2-5-2 is exercised separately by their respective Commanders. Unity of command is dependent upon mutual cooperation and coordination.

b. The CAP 2-5-2 will be responsible for the overall coordination with Phu Yen District Headquarters.

Maj. H. L. O. W. K. 125
Phu Yen Sector
Senior Coordination/Commander
Commander 9th Combined Action Company

Appendix I CAP 2-5-2 TACC
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Pha loc 1, thung Man Dinh
Thanh Doi Hien Hop Hoa Vang (1969)
thung Kep Hoa Quan Su C87
Ban do `ao`: 6640 IX
Ty `ao` khi: 1/50,000

APPENDIX I TO ANNEX IV
Hoa Vang 1969 Combined Action Plan
Military Plan 637
Map Sheet: 6640IX
1:50,000

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Thieu Tu Ma-nhuan-Hinh
Chu Kham Thanh Quan Hoa Vang

Major MAI-XUAN-HUAU
Hoa Vang Subsector Commander

CAPTAIN J.D. NITIS
Senior
Coordinator/Commanding Officer
5th Combined Action Company

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ANNEX 0 TO USA VUNG TAU
1969 COMBINED ACTION PLANNING
MILITARY PLAN 597

From: Vung Tau Subsector Headquarters
To: DAP 2-8* (QNM 29), FDC 3/70,
NQM 56 and QNM 40

Rec: DNOCTA Map Sheet 564* (II)
Quang Nam Pacification Plan 1969
Vung Tau Subsector Combined Action Platoon
MILITARY PLAN 597

To: Quang Nam Sector Commander
Commander, 1st Marine
O.O. 2nd CAB
O.O. 5th Marines
O.O. 1st Marine
O.O. 8th Marines

Para No. 2/39/39/39
PAKIFICATION PLAN 597

As of 3/70/59

In order to support the pacification of the Dung Sai and Vung Tau Province as directed in Quang
Nam 1969 pacification plans established a unified command of the forces assigned to this District and the
Marines in consequence plan to support this area. In (QNM 45) DAP 2-8-7
(114/66) and DAP 2-8-6 (QNM 39) a separate force

Special Forces is presently established. All missions assigned
to QNM 29 must be executed to the DAP Commander of 2-8-7 and
in accordance with Annex K to Vung Tau Subsector Combined
Action Platoon Military Plan 597.

Tien Organization:
- DAP 2-8-7 (QNM 29)
- FDC 3/70
- QNM 56
- QNM 40
2. Mission. Support the Pervasion of Boi Phuoc Village and provide security from the VC/PAF throughout entire Tactical Area of Coordination as assigned by Appendix (1) to include but not limited to the following tasks:

a. Destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure.
b. Protect the friendly political/social structure.
c. Conduct patrols and ambushes within the assigned Tactical Area of Coordination.
d. Conduct vigorous civic action and propoganda programs to obtain the trust and confidence of local populace.
e. Organize local intelligence units.
f. Report military intelligence immediately to the District DIKO and adjacent Vietnamese and U.S. Units.
g. Train and assist the hamlet People's Self Defense Force.

2. Execution.

b. Concept of Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-8-1 (QNM 29) DPAQ 3/170 will operate in all of the hamlets within its assigned Tactical Area of Coordination on a staggered basis, never setting patterns in location, on a day to day basis, and will change its command post/base of operation daily. The command post/base of operation will be composed of several different houses in the hamlet to enable the Combined Action Platoon 2-8-1 (QNM 29) and DPAQ 3/170 to disperse.

a. Support the Pervasion of Boi Phuoc Village and provide security from the VC/PAF throughout entire Tactical Area of Coordination as assigned by Appendix (1) to include but not limited to the following tasks:

2. Execution.

b. Concept of Operations. Combined Action Platoon 2-8-1 (QNM 29) DPAQ 3/170 will operate in all of the hamlets within its assigned Tactical Area of Coordination on a staggered basis, never setting patterns in location, on a day to day basis, and will change its command post/base of operation daily. The command post/base of operation will be composed of several different houses in the hamlet to enable the Combined Action Platoon 2-8-1 (QNM 29) and DPAQ 3/170 to disperse.
The command post of CAP 2-8-1 (QHM 29) and DPQ 3/170 will be located at all times. At least one third of CAP 2-8-1 (QHM 29) and DPQ 3/170 will remain at the day command post/base of operation to conduct local searches, work on civic action, conduct training, plan night activities, maintain necessary coordination with adjacent units and conduct patrols. After dark Combined Action Platoon 2-8-1 (QHM 29) and DPQ 3/170 will move to a preselected command post/base of operations and conduct patrols and ambushes throughout its entire TACO. All patrols, ambushes and other operations will be integrated down to the squad level.

b. QHM 56 will protect Van Dong Hamlet. QHM 40 will protect Trung Son and Xuan Thieu Hamlets. In order of the Plt. Commander of DPQ 3/170 will conduct day and night operations outside of their assigned hamlets. Operations will be conducted so that Van Dong and Trung Son Hamlets are protected at all times by one of the units in the Northern Hoa Yang Special Force.

c. CAP 2-8-1 (QHM 29) and DPQ 3/170 will provide reaction forces for CAP 2-8-2 (QHM 45) and CAP 2-8-3 (QHM 46) and CAP 2-8-4 (QHM 39), an order of the Hoa Yang District Chief and Senior Coordination/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

d. CAP 2-8-1 (QHM 29) will conduct a mobile mission in accordance with Annex K of the Hoa Yang District Military Plan 687, and on order reinforce CAP 2-8-2 (QHM 45), CAP 2-8-3 (QHM 46) and CAP 2-8-4 (QHM 39).

e. DPQ 3/170 will conduct a mobile mission in accordance with this order and on order reinforce CAP 2-8-2 (QHM 45) 2-8-3 (QHM 46) and 2-8-4 (QHM 39).

f. QHM 56 will protect Van Dong Hamlet and on order of the Plt. Commander 3/170 conduct night and day operations outside of Van Dong Hamlet and be prepared to reinforce CAP 2-8-2 (QHM 45).

g. QHM 40 will protect Trung Son and Xuan Thieu Hamlets. On order of Plt. Commander DPQ 3/170 conduct day and night operations outside of Trung Son and Xuan Thieu Hamlets on order of the 5th Combined Action Company.

b. QHM 56 will conduct a mobile mission in accordance with Annex K of the Hoa Yang District Military Plan 687, and on order reinforce CAP 2-8-2 (QHM 45), CAP 2-8-3 (QHM 46) and CAP 2-8-4 (QHM 39), an order of the Hoa Yang District Chief and Senior Coordination/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

c. CAP 2-8-1 (QHM 29) and DPQ 3/170 will provide reaction forces for CAP 2-8-2 (QHM 45) and CAP 2-8-3 (QHM 46) and CAP 2-8-4 (QHM 39), an order of the Hoa Yang District Chief and Senior Coordination/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

d. CAP 2-8-1 (QHM 29) will conduct a mobile mission in accordance with Annex K of the Hoa Yang District Military Plan 687, and on order reinforce CAP 2-8-2 (QHM 45), CAP 2-8-3 (QHM 46) and CAP 2-8-4 (QHM 39).

e. DPQ 3/170 will conduct a mobile mission in accordance with this order and on order reinforce CAP 2-8-2 (QHM 45) 2-8-3 (QHM 46) and 2-8-4 (QHM 39).

f. QHM 56 will protect Van Dong Hamlet and on order of the Plt. Commander 3/170 conduct night and day operations outside of Van Dong Hamlet and be prepared to reinforce CAP 2-8-2 (QHM 45).

g. QHM 40 will protect Trung Son and Xuan Thieu Hamlets. On order of Plt. Commander DPQ 3/170 conduct day and night operations outside of Trung Son and Xuan Thieu Hamlets on order of the 5th Combined Action Company.
operations outside of Trung Son and Xuan Thieu Hamlets and be prepared to reinforce CAP 2-8-3 (QMN 46) and CAP 2-8-4 (QMN 39). QMN 40 will maintain one squad to defend their compound at all times.

b. Additional Operations. The Northern Hoa Yang Special Force will conduct additional operations as directed by the Hoa Yang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company.

1. Planning.

(1) Petrol routes, ambushes, and other Northern Hoa Yang Special Force operations will be based on paragraph 3a, b and c above and Annex X to Hoa Yang District Military Plan 677.

(2) All planning will be accomplished by the respective R.P. Platoon Leader and the CAP Commander. Disagreement as to location, frequency, and size of patrols and ambushes or other operations will be referred to the Hoa Yang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company or their direct representatives for decision. In all cases of disagreement the R.P. Platoon Leader and CAP Commander will promptly report to the Hoa Yang District Headquarters. In no case will a disagreement be allowed to go unresolved before 0000 the day the patrol or activity is to be conducted.

(3) All patrols/ambushes, operations, and CP locations will be planned in advance and submitted to the Hoa Yang Subsector Commander and the Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer, 5th Combined Action Company on Saturday for Monday through Sunday of the following week.

2. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) The assigned operating area, Tentral Area of Coordinating, Appendix (4) is assigned to the Northern Hoa Yang Special Force to properly identify its respective area and to assist in overall coordination. All patrols, ambushes, 

dôi QMN 40 luôn luôn phải có hệ thống điều độ 24 giờ.

řb. Trực tiếp đột kích. Lực lượng Bộ Chỉ Huy Bộ Đội Hoa Yang sẽ tham gia các tác chiến đột kích, thiết lập và giữ các căn cứ, lập hệ thống điều độ 24 giờ.

1. Kế hoạch.

a) Cao doang các đơn vị, tổ chức các đột kích và các hoạt động khác cho các Lực lượng Bộ Đội Hoa Yang sẽ cần có, theo đơn vị, b, c trong và khu vực Quân đội Hoàng Kỳ Hoa Phát Quân 677.

b) Các đơn vị, tổ chức, cơ sở hoạt động của Bộ Đội Hoa Yang sẽ cần phải tham gia các chiến dịch, đột kích, nhằm tiêu diệt các mục tiêu, và giữ gìn an ninh tại các căn cứ, và khu vực Quân đội Hoàng Kỳ Hoa Phát Quân 677.

2. Kiểm soát, điều độ qua Quân đội và Bộ Đội Hoàng Kỳ Hoa Phát Quân 677 sẽ đảm bảo các hoạt động đột kích, và các mục tiêu, theo kế hoạch, đảm bảo an ninh và giữ gìn an ninh tại các căn cứ, và khu vực Quân đội Hoàng Kỳ Hoa Phát Quân 677.

b) Các đơn vị, tổ chức, cơ sở hoạt động của Bộ Đội Hoa Yang sẽ cần phải tham gia các chiến dịch, đột kích, nhằm tiêu diệt các mục tiêu, và giữ gìn an ninh tại các căn cứ, và khu vực Quân đội Hoàng Kỳ Hoa Phát Quân 677.

1. Kế hoạch.

a. Cao doang các đơn vị, tổ chức các đột kích và các hoạt động khác cho các Lực lượng Bộ Đội Hoa Yang sẽ cần có, theo đơn vị, b, c trong và khu vực Quân đội Hoàng Kỳ Hoa Phát Quân 677.

b. Các đơn vị, tổ chức, cơ sở hoạt động của Bộ Đội Hoa Yang sẽ cần phải tham gia các chiến dịch, đột kích, nhằm tiêu diệt các mục tiêu, và giữ gìn an ninh tại các căn cứ, và khu vực Quân đội Hoàng Kỳ Hoa Phát Quân 677.

c. Các đơn vị, tổ chức, cơ sở hoạt động của Bộ Đội Hoa Yang sẽ cần phải tham gia các chiến dịch, đột kích, nhằm tiêu diệt các mục tiêu, và giữ gìn an ninh tại các căn cứ, và khu vực Quân đội Hoàng Kỳ Hoa Phát Quân 677.
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or other operations will be coordinated with the Commanding Officer, 26th Marines and the other ARVN and FMAR units as necessary.

(2) Fire support and reaction forces will be coordinated through the Commanding Officer, 26th Marines.

(3) The Tactical Areas of Coordination of Northern Hoa Yang District Combined Action Platoons is shown in Appendix II.

4. Administration/Logistics.

a. Administration and logistics for the Northern Hoa Yang Special Force will be through the respective ARVN or Marine Commanders at Hoa Yang District Headquarters except as modified in existing orders.

b. All personnel of the Northern Hoa Yang Special Force will ensure good conduct and maintain the barracks and areas they use in a clean and neat condition.

5. Command/Communication.

a. Command of the Northern Hoa Yang Special Force and the U.S. Marines assigned to Combined Action Platoon 2-8-1 is exercised separately by their respective commanders. Unity of command is dependent upon mutual cooperation and coordination.

b. The Northern Hoa Yang Special Force and the U.S. Marines will be responsible for their own communication with Hoa Yang District Headquarters.

 Maj. Hai Xuan Han
Hoa Yang Subsector Commander

Appendix I Northern Hoa Yang Special Force T.A.O.G.
Appendix II Northern Hoa Yang CAP T.A.O.G.'s

Captain J.D. Nittis
Senior Coordinator/Commanding Officer
5th Combined Action Company

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL (Unclassified upon removal from basic letter)

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, 2D CAG ltr 3/LEN/gbs over 3000
dtd 19 July 1969

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1-30 May 1969

1. The subject chronology has been reviewed for completeness
   and is forwarded herewith.

R.D. WHITE
By direction

Copy to:
CO, 2D CAG
CG, III MAF