HEADQUARTERS
1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
PPO, San Francisco, California 96602

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code HD)
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Combined Action Force
      (2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
      (3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 May 1970 to 31 May 1970

Ref: (a) HCC 5750.1A
     (b) HHFACO 5750.8B
     (c) CAFO 5750.1

Encl: (1) 1st Combined Action Group Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b), and (c),
enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Downgraded at 3-year intervals, declassified after 12 years, DOD Dir
   5200.10.

D. F. SEILER

DECLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS
1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1 May 1970 to 31 May 1970

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. DESIGNATION

1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
F-0, San Francisco, California 96602

COMMANDER

LtCol D. F. SELER
1 May 70 - 31 May 70

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Combined Action Company 1-1

Captain R. J. DALTON
1 May 70 - 31 May 70

Combined Action Company 1-2

Captain J. E. KNIGHT
1 May 70 - 31 May 70

Combined Action Company 1-3

Captain D. L. LAPRAH
1 May 70 - 31 May 70

Combined Action Company 1-4

1stLt W. R. HALL, JR.
1 May 70 - 31 May 70

ATTACHED UNITS

1. None.

2. Locations

HQ 1st CAG

CA CO 1-1

Chu Lai, Ky Tin District, Quang Tin Province, RVN

CA CO 1-2

Ky Tin District, Quang Tin Province, RVN

CA CO 1-3

Dinh Son District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN

CA CO 1-4

Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN
3. **Staff Officers**

   **Executive Officer**
   Major G. N. ROBILLARD JR.
   1 May 70 - 31 May 70

   **Adjutant/S-1/HQComdt**
   Captain J. E. TYLER
   1 May 70 - 31 May 70

   **S-2/S-3/Comm**
   Major R. L. PADGETT
   1 May 70 - 31 May 70

   **S-4/Supply**
   Captain E. P. WAHL
   1 May 70 - 31 May 70

   **S-5/Special Services**
   Major G. N. ROBILLARD JR.
   1 May 70 - 31 May 70

   **ladi**

   **EC**

   **EC**

4. **Average Monthly Strength**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OFF</strong></td>
<td><strong>ENL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   **Other**

   **OTHER**

   **10**

5. **End-of-Month Unit Diary Strength**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OFF</strong></td>
<td><strong>ENL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   **OTHER**

   **ENCLOSURE (1)**
2. Neutralization of Enemy Forces

a. NVA KIA - 27
b. VC KIA - 57
c. NVA POW - 2
d. VC POW - 9
e. VCI POW - 0
f. Hoi Chanh - 28

(1) NVA - 0
(2) VC - 10
(3) VCI - 18

3. Casualties Sustained

a. USMC KIA - 1
b. USMC WIA(E) - 2
c. USMC WIA(H) - 11
b. USMC WIA - 0
e. USN KIA - 0
f. USN WIA(E) - 1
g. USN WIA(H) - 1
h. USN WIA - 0
i. CAP PF KIA - 3
j. CAP PF WIA(E) - 29
k. CAP PF WIA(H) - 5
l. CAP PF WIA - 0

4. New Techniques Employed: None

5. Command Relationships

a. WN: Daily contact between the CACO CO's and the District Chiefs was maintained. The Group CO and S-3 made frequent visits to District and Province, coordinating with the District Chiefs, District Senior Advisors, Province Chiefs, Province Senior Advisors and their respective Staffs.

b. Local MWAF Units: Constant liaison was maintained throughout the reporting period between the CACO CO's and their proximate USA battalions and between the Group and the 196th and 198th Brigades and the Americal Division.
c. Significant Problem Areas: None

6. Significant Accomplishments of Attachments: The Kit Carson Scouts accounted for (19) caves and tunnels found. They also went on (250) ambushes and assisted with (14) classes.

7. Lessons Learned: No new or significant lessons learned during the period.

8. Logistics

a. Significant Events

(1) Combat losses for the month were one (1) Rifle, .56mm, M16A1 and one (1) Binoculars, 7 x 50.

(2) The ammunition bunker construction was started and was 90% completed during the month.

(3) PARIPE report has been submitted on all required items.

b. Supply

(1) The Group is short some T/E items but they do not affect the Unit Readiness. As a result of the reduction in the number of GAP's authorized within the Group, there are some T/E items which must be declared excess. The allowance list is being revised accordingly and necessary adjustments will be made.

c. Maintenance

(1) Repairs required to deadlined communications and ordnance items are completed within reasonable time frames. Motor Transport equipment is the only problem area. Evacuating equipment to Okinawa has caused an excessive deadlined period for some items.

d. Motor Transport

(1) During the month of May 3,310 miles were logged by this Group.

(2) Currently there is no significant shortage of motor Transport Equipment.

e. Miscellaneous

N/A

III-3
9. Civic Action

a. Civic Action projects during the month of May 1970 proceeded at a normal pace. The following commodities were distributed throughout the I St Combined Action Group's Area of Operation during May 1970:

(1) Foodstuffs - 331 pounds
(2) Meals - 297
(3) Clothing - 12 pounds
(4) Soap - 88 pounds

b. Educational Assistance: Thirty-eight (38) English classes were taught by Q.P personnel for three hundred and sixty-two (362) Vietnamese students.

c. Financial Aid: A total of $80,000 was voluntarily contributed during the month of May 1970.

d. Other Projects: None

10. Personnel and Administration

a. Personnel Transactions. During the month of May 1970 the following personnel transactions were completed:

(1) Joined USMC
   Off 0     Enl 47

(2) Rotated CONUS
    Off 0     Enl 39

(3) Reassignment Within WestPac
    Off 0     Enl 8
(4) Transferred by Service Records While Sick (Out of Country Hospital)

USMC

Off 0  Enl 0

(5) Extension of WestPac Tour Affected

USMC

Off 0  Enl 0

b. Promotions: During the month of May 1970 the following promotions were affected:

To PFC 1
To LGpl 50
To Cpl 78

c. Legal Matters

(1) Courts Hold: GCM 0
SpCM 0
SCH 0

(2) Article 32 Investigations: 0

(3) NJP 3

(4) JAG-type Investigations Completed: 5

d. Award Recommendations

ICH 1
SSN 1
BSN 9
NCO 14
PMH 18

e. CONGRATULATIONS/SPLINTS/VELREPS

The command has responded to:

(0) CONGRATULATIONS

III-5

UNCLASSIFIED
ENCLOSURE (1)
f. 

(1) **R&R**. The command has utilized the following number of quotas to the R&R areas listed:

(a) Hong Kong (2)  
    Taipei (4)  
    Hawaii (9)  
    Okinawa (3)  
    Japan (3)  
    Bangkok (8)  
    Sydney (9)  
    Manila (1)

(b) **In-Country** - None

(2) **Mail**. Daily average bags of mail processed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incoming</th>
<th>Outgoing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) **Hospital Visitation**. Hospital visits are made daily by the Hospital Corpsman Representative, the Casualty NCO and the Mail Orderly, who also delivers mail to the patients located in hospitals at Chu Lai. Frequent visits are made by the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Adjutant and First Sergeant.

g. **Career Planning**

Re-enlistments: None

Extensions: None
11. Intelligence

a. The comparative lack of contact experienced in the Tam Ky area during the month is believed to be due in part to the large VC/NVA attack that took place in Hiep Duc. The area around Tam Ky and the CAP units, was believed to have been used by the enemy for supply and logistics during this period. Tam Ky was the target of a number of rocket attacks during this period, as well as terrorist's activity, but no large scale ground attacks followed. The Front Four element of the 409th Sappers and the 1st Inf. Bn. (NVA) elements of which were reported in lst Company’s area, are still present, but failed to put up any organized resistance against the CAP teams. Of note during the month was the capture of two NVA POW’s, one of which was later identified as belonging to the 72nd LF Bn.

b. The situation remained quiet in the second company, as light contact was experienced in the Ly Tin area. The lack of contact but increase in sightings gives rise to speculation that the Ly Tin area was also being used to resupply and support the sojor of Hiep Duc. A sighting of 15 to 20 NVA, possibly from the 78th LF Rocket Bn, resulted in one NVA KIA. There were no other important changes in the OB during this period.

c. The early portion of the month saw the beginning of a small offensive which sent the majority of 263 rockets into Chu Lai combat base. During this time, two CAP’s in third company came under heavy contact. A combined operation with CAP’s 1-3-2 and 1-3-9 was attacked by a combined force of VC and NVA on the 5th, believed to be elements of the 95th B sappers. Four days later, CAP 1-3-2 came under heavy attack from a combined force of approximately 100 VC and NVA. This was the largest contact of the month and the CAP killed 16 NVA and 12 VC. Later, the people reported that the enemy carried away approximately 60 more killed and wounded. The enemy killed were positively identified as the 95th B sappers.

d. The Marines of the 4th company in Son Tin experienced sporadic contact during the month, with the most contact coming from the elements of the 408th LF Bn, which inhabit the area around Ly Tin. In two contacts during the month, the 4th company Marines killed 19 VC from the 48th LF Bn.

e. In retrospect, except for the small scale offensive at the beginning of the month, which coincided with Ho Chi Minh’s birthday, contact was not unlike the previous months. For the majority of the month, contact was limited to harassing attacks and attacks by fire as well as terrorist activity. There were two noticeable changes in the OB during this period. The 95th B sappers moved into the third company’s TAOR in the beginning of the month, and were subsequently driven back into the mountains in the area west of the company’s TAOR. The fact that the kills contained VC as well as NVA confirmed earlier reports that there was going to be extensive reorganization of the NVA into VC units throughout I Corps. In the Ly Tin area, the 78th LF Rocket Bn, came out of
hiding and launched a rocket attack on Chu Lai that sent 263 rockets into the combat base. During the attack, no rocket fell closer than 300 meters to the Group HQ's.

1. Enemy units in the 1st CAG TAOR remain vulnerable to interdiction by artillery and aerial bombardment directed by the CAP's. Enemy morale remains vulnerable to psychological exploitation by propaganda concentrating on VC/NVA defeats in combat, fear of death, battle hardships and GVN ability to support the needs and aspirations of the people.

12. Communications

a. Because of the effort of MAG-13 and LSU-4 in providing maintenance support, no significant problems occurred in communications.

13. Fire Support

a. Fire support during the period was provided by Division Artillery, Americal Division (1/14th and 1/82nd BN's) and ARVN artillery, on occasions in the Tam Ky area. The artillery support has been quite timely and effective, with very few exceptions.

14. Air Support

a. Tactical air support was used frequently during the month; this included fixed wing strikes, helicopter gunship strikes and visual reconnaissance missions. No major problems were encountered with close air support and the CAP's continue to utilize the Air Force FAC's to support their daylight operations. The FAC's not only observe for the CAP's but also call artillery missions and control air strikes.

b. Air support is not limited to tactical requests, as logistical resupply of outlying CAP's requires daily attention. The time for these missions is allotted by the proximate battalion on a daily basis. These missions are neither requested nor controlled by the CAG. At times the availability of aircraft was reduced by the requirement for helicopters to support Combat Assaults (CA's) in the Americal Division.

15. Activations, Deactivations, Redesignations, Relocations of CAP's

a. Four CAP's were deactivated during the period; CAP's 1-1-2, 1-1-4, 1-1-5 and 1-2-7.

16. Combined Action Force School

a. Graduated: 31
b. Attending: 16

17. Combined Action Force Vietnamese Language School

a. Graduated: 7
b. Attending: 7
18. Other Schools
   a. Infantry Weapons Repair Course: 2
   b. 1st Marine Division NCO School: 8
   c. American Division Artillery School: 12

19. Psychological Operations
   a. Friendly operations

   (1) The Group distributed 5,665,000 leaflets by aircraft and
       31,000 by hand for a total of 5,696,000.

   (2) Aerial broadcasts were used for a total of 5 hours and
       30 minutes. The "Early Word" aerial broadcast was utilized several times
       during the month.

   (3) The movie team showed movies at the Binh Son Orphanage
       for the benefit of the children, by request of the priest at the orphanage.

20. Volunteer Informant Program

   a. During the month of May the Group paid 40,600$VN to Vietnamese
      nationals for ordnance under the VFP. CACO 1-1 in Tan Ky continues to
      field the Group in the number of pieces of ordnance received under the
      program.