UNCLASSIFIED

L (Unclassified upon removal from the basic letter)

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st CAG ltr 6/DFS/glc over 5700 Ser: 026-69 of 26Nov69

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code HD)

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 October 1969 to 31 October 1969

1. The subject chronology has been reviewed for completeness and is forwarded herewith.

R. D. WHITE
By direction

Copy to:
CO, 1st CAG
PART 1

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

DESIGNATED

1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96502

COMMANDER

LtCol J. E. HENNEGAN
10ct69  23oct69
LtCol D. F. SEILER
21oct69  31oct69

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Combined Action Company 1-1

Captain N. H. GIOSZ
10ct69  31oct69

Combined Action Company 1-2

Captain J. E. KNIGHT
10ct69  31oct69

Combined Action Company 1-3

1stLt. J. J. MULHEARN Jr
10ct69  22oct69

Combined Action Company 1-4

Captain J. W. MURPHY
23oct69  31oct69

Captain K. M. SEARS
10ct69  6oct69

Captain P. G. MITCHELL
7oct69  31oct69

ATTACHED UNITS

1. None

2. Locations

Hq 1st CAG Chu Lai, Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, RVN
CAGO 1-1 Tan Ky District, Quang Tin Province, RVN
CAGO 1-2 Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, RVN
CAGO 1-3 Phuoc Son District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN
CAGO 1-4 Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN

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ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED
3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer

Adjutant/s-1

S-2S-3

S-4Supply

S-5Special Service

Medical Section

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>439</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Major W. D. THOMPSON
10ct69    31Oct69

1stLt J. E. TYLER
10ct69    31Oct69

Major R. L. PADGETT
10ct69    31Oct69

Captain P. M. GARROWSKI
10ct69    31Oct69

Major W. D. THOMPSON
10ct69    31Oct69

Maj. T. A. ROBINSON
10ct69    31Oct69

ENCLOSURE (L)
PART II
NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. Personnel Administration.

   a. Joined and transferred. During the month of October, the 1st Combined Action Group joined and transferred the following number of personnel listed in the four categories below:

      (1) Joined
          Officers 2
          Enlisted 91

      (2) Rotated CONUS
          Officers 2
          Enlisted

      (3) Transferred within WestPac Command
          Officers 0
          Enlisted

      (4) Transferred by SR w/sick (out of country hospital)
          Officers 0
          Enlisted 4

   b. Awards.

      (1) There were Four Silver Stars, Five Bronze Stars, and Six Navy Commendation recommendations submitted to FMFPac for approval during the month of October 1969.

      (2) Awards returned approved from FMFPac included the following:

          SSM 4
          BSM 5
          NMN 6

II-1

ENCLOSURE (1)
(3) Personnel of the 1st Combined Action Group also received the following awards as a result of combat wounds, heroic/meritorious service in the Republic of Vietnam:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PH</th>
<th>VCG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Casualties. Casualties during the month of October 1969 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>DAT</th>
<th>DOW</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>WIA/NBC</th>
<th>NEC</th>
<th>WIA/NBC</th>
<th>RET TO DU</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. CONGRATULATIONS WELFR. There were no pieces of congressional Interest Correspondence and 10 Welfare Reports handled by this Command during the month of October 1969.

e. Administrative Assistance. There was one group directive promulgated during the reporting month.

f. Legal. A breakdown of legal activities for October is shown below:

- Article 32 Investigations: 0
- Informal Investigations: 0
- General Courts-Martial: 0
- Special Courts-Martial: 0
- Summary Courts-Martial: 2

- Morale and Welfare. The morale of the unit continues to be high and special services equipment available to all hands. Quotes for both out of country and in country Rest and Recuperation (R&R) are effectively being utilized. The following is a breakdown of the R&R within this command:

  1. Out of Country R&R - Quotas Used
     - 38

  2. In Country R&R
     - 2

  3. Five parties are held at a different CAP each week consisting of a cookout, beer and soda. Each CAP sends a man into the rear on a staggered schedule to allow him to relax and enjoy club, beach and USO facilities.

ENCLOSURE (1)
h. Career Planning. The career planning program continues to be stressed at all levels of command. USAF GBM testing is constantly being stressed at all personnel who have not completed high school. During December 1969 this command will send one staff NGO to the Career Planners School in Okinawa.

1. Mail. Daily average bags of mail were processed as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letters</th>
<th>Outgoing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 bag</td>
<td>9 bag</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Packages</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 bags</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: One bag of letters represents approximately 2,000 letters.

j. Promotions. 110 enlisted promotions were affected during the month of October 1969 as follows:

- Sergeant ................. 0
- Corporal ................... 2
- Lance Corporal ............ 108
- Private First Class ........ 0

k. Hospital Visits. Hospital visits are made daily by the Hospital Corpsman representative, the Casualty NGO and the Mail Orderly, who also delivers mail to the patients located in hospitals at Chu Lai. Frequent visits are made by the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, the Adjutant, and the First Sergeant. Normally, the Commanding Officer or his representative, having been notified by Dustoff Control Chu Lai of the destination of the individual medevaced from the field, are waiting at the hospital when the casualty arrives. The dead are identified within hours of arrival at Chu Lai.
2. Intelligence
   a. General

(1) The month was characterized by increased enemy activity throughout the CAP area. There seemed to be some type of local organized offensive in the Binh Son District, as CAPs 1-3-5 and 1-3-6 were both the target of well-coordinated ground attacks during the month. Although these attacks did not coincide by date or method of engagement, they were both aimed at CAPs in the 3rd Company, with the objective of destroying the CAPs and demonstrating to the people that the GW and MAIF are unable to protect them. Evidence indicates that these attacks were not made by the same unit. In the attack at CAP 1-3-6 the enemy employed suppr tactics, while the tactics employed at CAP 1-3-5 were conventional in nature. The 4th Company continued its efforts to reduce the population of the 46th LF VC Bn, and was rewarded for their efforts with 17 enemy kills and one Hoi Chanh from the 46th Bn who may prove very helpful to the southernmost CAPs in their assigned task. The 1st Company was moderately successful in attaining Hoi Chanh, as a total of 11 rallied to the GV during the month. This should help to strengthen the 1st Company's influence in their TAOC. The 1st Company also received moderate contact resulting in 11 VC kills. The three northern-most CAPs in the company continued to take casualties from an abundance of mines and booby traps in their TAOC's. Conjecture is that the enemy units in this area are attempting to use the mines and booby traps as a deterrent to the CAP, rather than meet the CAP in an open fight.

b. Activities

(1) CAGO 1-1, experienced an increase in contacts over the previous month but was still well below its usual average. Intelligence construes this to be a period of withdrawal on the part of the enemy to retrain and resupply its personnel to build up for a renewed offensive effort, probably beginning in the next two months. The CAGO received 11 Hoi Chanhs for the month which is relatively high, further attesting to the theory of low morale and insufficient logistics on the part of the VC/GW. Five of the Hoi Chanh rallied on the 16th to CAP 1-1-7. They were reportedly bandit guerrillas who worked for an INVA unit in their area. Of the five, one was a doctor, one worked in propaganda and the other three were ammunition carriers. Here evidence supporting the theory that the enemy units around the 1st Company's TAOC are attempting to avoid contact, lies in the number of kills compared to the number of contacts. During the month, the CAGO tallied eleven (11) kills in eight (8) significant contacts. There were no ground assaults directed toward any CAP, and a minimum of harassing attacks during this reporting period. Close attention will be paid to any intelligence concerning troop movements or build-up in this area.

(2) CAGO 1-2 received little enemy contact during the month, but managed to come up with 2 enemy kills. One kill was produced the first day of the month by a successful ambush at CAP 1-2-4, which was a joint effort
by the C.I.P. and number of revolution by Development Cadre personnel. The second kill was produced in the 25th when a C.I.P. patrol came upon two VC soldiers and then killed one. The lack of contact in the 2nd Company's mission enabled them to concentrate on psychological operations and their civic action program.

(3) C.I.P. 1-3 received most of the increase in enemy-initiated activity during the month, as at least one C.I.P. was in contact on 20 of the 31 days. The two largest actions involved C.I.P. 1-3-5 and 1-3-6, and prompted a conjecture that this was part of an organized effort by VC/NVA to eliminate the C.I.P. in Binh Son District. On the 12th, C.I.P. 1-3-5 received a heavy volume of 62mm mortar rounds and small arms fire from an estimated company of VC. The VC attempted to infiltrate the C.I.P., but were unsuccessful. A reaction force was called from C.I.P. 1-3-1 and the enemy was driven off. Besides the friendly casualties, the C.I.P. lost one PaC-65 radio destroyed and one 460 machinegun captured. Seven days later, on the 19th, C.I.P. 1-3-6 was attacked by an unknown size enemy force. The attack on 1-3-6 was different than the attack on 1-3-5 in that superior tactics were employed. The enemy initiated contact with RPG fire, and followed up with anti-tank charges and demolition grenades. The amount of small arms fire directed on the C.I.P. during the entire action was small. Other developments during the month included capturing three (3) VC NCO and two (2) NVA, whom at C.I.P. 1-3-5, assigned only one Hei-Chinh during the month, but he proved invaluable when it was maintained that he was previously a member of the 95th Special Bat., which is a constant problem to the C.I.P.'s in the 3rd Company area. The majority of contact for the rest of the month was limited to harassing attacks and attacks by fire with no significant results. The C.I.P. completed the month with twenty-seven (27) confirmed kills.

(4) C.I.P. 1-4 was the second highest C.I.P. in the number of kills for the month, with 17. There was drop in enemy-initiated contact, as the C.I.P. got 11 of its kills in one action involving C.I.P. 1-4-5 on the 9th. The action began when a neighboring Regional Force unit began taking small arms fire. The C.I.P. then received a large volume of 62mm mortar rounds and heavy small arms and automatic weapon fire. The C.I.P. called artillery, snipers, and -picky. This was the largest C.I.P. conducted engagement in Quang Ngai Province during the month. Also of great importance was a Hei-Chinh from the 10th VC LC. The fact that he rallied from the 10th LC is promising in that they are the dominate enemy unit in the area, and any news of low morale or logistics problems with them is good news.

/DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED
a. General

(1) During the reporting period, the 1st Combined Action Group (2.4) continued to conduct operations in accordance with its assigned mission of villa/hamlet security and in support of the Accelerated Pacification Program (A.P.). In conjunction with the ACA and mobilization of the Combination Action Teams (CAT's), new areas were studied for possible relocation of certain EU's. The ACA continued to progress with studies, subject to increased enemy activity in both Quynh Thanh and Quynh My provinces. It appears that within a lesser area, the area is becoming more aggressive and willing to initiate contact.

(2) The 1st Division experienced a month of relatively light contact throughout the AO. The Division continued Operation Geneva for the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th battalions. Operation Frederick Hill also continued in the 1st Company's area with no major or significant contacts. The company that initiated the Infantry Company Intensive Pacification Program continued to operate with success and plans are being formulated to have the company to a new area to continue the OP. The brigade of the Division continued to provide logistical and reaction assets as required, with the 155th Infantry Brigade providing seventy-five percent of the 1st Division's logistical support in an outstanding manner.

b. Activities

(1) During the period there were nineteen (19) combined operations with the HMM's, MI-1, and 5.5 inch units. Several of these operations involved more than one OP. The concept of combined operations is working well in the Vietnam area, with the enemy more aggressive and more effective than previously. The 1st Division continued to devote some of its efforts west of National Highway 1 while conducting small-scale operations and company-size operations. The 3rd and 4th Battalions were sent to the north of Highway 1.

(2) 1-1-1 had an active month and experienced an increase in contact with the NVA. This was in keeping with the increased upsurge in enemy activity throughout the 1st Division area of operations. The company had contact with the enemy (18) at night and (4) at daybreak, which resulted in eleven (11) enemy killed, one (1) WIA, one (1) NV, and eleven (11) RVN Casualties. The 1-1-1 had eleven (11) new TF positions taken over, which in the future will provide an improvement of PFF for all units in the Trucyı District. The Group Operations Office reported the 1st Platoon, CPL 1-1-4, on 11 October, and the CP experienced its first contact in over six months in the form of an attack by fire, including 81mm rockets, 81MM rounds, and automatic weapons fire. On 23 October, Major General GC visited CP 1-1-4.
(3) CICO 1-2 experienced another month of very light contact although the number of enemy sightings increased and the company accounted for two (2) kills and two (2) captured weapons. Indications are that the enemy is attempting to infiltrate into the heart of the 5th District and procure foodstuffs and collect taxes. The latter appears to be the primary area of VC activity and plans are underway to conduct intensive operations in this particular sector.

(4) CICO 1-3 led the Group in contacts, sightings and kills. The presence of the 10th Local Force En. and the 95th Seaport En. continues to provide a threat to the CICO's in the Binh Son District, especially those along the coast. The company experienced forty-three (43) contacts, twenty-six (26) sightings and accounted for twenty-seven (27) KIA's and thirty (30) WIA's killed. The most notable change in the 3rd CICO's area is the increase in activity close to the city of Binh Son itself. Several daytime contacts in the District indicate a willingness on the part of the enemy to engage FMLF and Vietnamese forces without the cover of darkness. The frequency and size of contacts continue to increase in the 3rd Company's area. The well-organized and well-executed attacks against CICO's 1-3-5 and 1-3-8 indicate more sophisticated training and probably a larger percentage of NVA personnel in the local units.

(5) CICO 1-4 ranked second in number of contacts and sightings but third in kills. Enemy activity continued high in CICO's 1-4-1, 1-4-5, and 1-4-6's ITC's. The enemy seems particularly concerned about the presence of CICO 1-4-6 and the contacts and sightings are frequent in that area. Due to the lack of populated areas the 3rd Company CICO's continue to utilize artillery and airstrikes to great extent during their contacts and sightings. Plans are underway to relocate CICO's 1-4-6 and 1-4-5 to provide them with more populated ITC's in which to operate.

(6) The following statistics are the results of the 1st CICO's operations and activities for the month of October:

(a) **Friendly Activities**

- Night Patrols 56
- Day Patrols 940
- Ambushes 1610

(b) **Enemy Casualties/Losses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>DELENES</th>
<th>WIA CHIJNS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) **Weapons and Ordnance Captured**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IWC</th>
<th>CSSC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c. Training

(1) General. Formal training for the period covered the subjects of General Military Subjects, Leadership, Small Unit Tactics, Infantry Weapons and Supporting Arms. 1st Bn., 16th Artillery, USMC sent an FO Team to the CP's in the 3rd and 4th G.O.O.'s to refresh the CP Marine's knowledge of artillery call for fire techniques and procedures. This instruction was most beneficial since it was provided by the unit that actually fires the CP's fire missions and it will be repeated in the future.

(2) CP Training. The individual CP's conducted daily classes as prescribed by the Group training schedule.

(3) Other Training

(c) Twelve (12) Marines attended the Vietnamese Language Course at Da Nang.

(b) Three (3) Marines attended the FO School conducted by Division Artillery, Marine Division, USMC. An increase in the quotas to this school has been requested and approved and the Group anticipates an input of ten (10) to twelve (12) a month in the future.

(c) All new personnel reporting to the command received a one

(d) Instruction on the new F-SID and the Starlight Scope was given to selected personnel from all G.O.O.'s.

d. Inspections. The S-3 Section continued to visit the individual CP's to inspect personnel and equipment with the emphasis on weapons and radios.

e. Fire Support. The USMC artillery units continued to provide excellent fire support throughout the month. ARVN artillery fired a few missions in support of G.O.O. 1-1 in the Tan Ky area. The 1st Bn., 16th Artillery continued to provide timely and accurate fire support in an outstanding manner. Through intensified coordination between the S-3 and the 1/14, the time per fire mission has been reduced to a minimum.

f. Air Support

(1) Tactical air support was utilized fifteen times during the month, this included fixed wing strikes, helicopter gunship strikes, Spooky, Shadow, flankships and visual reconnaissance missions.

(2) The aforementioned figure does not include the missions flown for logistical resupply of the CP's as this time is allotted by the proximate battalion on a daily basis and these missions are not requested or controlled by the G.O.
g. Scout Dog Teams. During the month Scout Dog Teams were available to the 3rd and 4th Companies and a request was submitted to the CGP Directorate for an increase in the number of teams allotted.

h. Psychological Operations

(1) Friendly Operations. During the month the 1st C.G. continued to make maximum utilization of the support provided by the Psychological Division and this resulted in the distribution of 974,000 leaflets exploiting the Chinese Hoa Program and anti-V.C. and pro-SWN themes. The number of Hoa Chahh’s increased again for the month to seventeen (17).

(2) Enemy Psyops. The 1st C.G. experienced no VC/NVA attempts at psyops as it had the previous month in the form of VC loudspeaker teams and enemy leaflets.

i. AirCorps Scouts. The ACS continues to be extremely beneficial to the C.P. if they have knowledge of the enemy and his tactics is invaluable. The 1st C.G. has requested additional ACS’s and the possibility exists of receiving additional support from the Psychological Division. The scouts accounted for nine (9) enemy KIA’s, captured nine (9) weapons, discovered two S.F.D.’s and conducted three (3) psyops broadcasts.

j. Volunteer Infringement Program. 11,100 NVA were spent during the month under the VIP Program. This was much less than in previous months but it seems the C.P.’s are finding and tripping fewer S.F.D.’s than in the past; consequently the people are finding less to turn in also. As part of the C.G.’s psyops program a leaflet promoting the reward for turning in S.F.D’s was printed; this may lead to an increase in the amount of VIP payments.

k. Communications

(1) Operations. During the reporting period, communications between Group Headquarters and C.G. Headquarters were generally satisfactory. Due to the use of Ground Plane Antenna RC-292, communications problems between each C.G. and their C.P.’s were minimal.

(2) Maintenance Support

(a) LC-12. Due to the continuing support of the radio repair facilities of LC-12, the time between dead-line and return to the field for use has steadily decreased. In the near future it will become possible to see that the C.G.’s radios are not on dead-line for more than three to five days at a time.

(b) MG-14. The turn-around time for equipment dead-lined to MG-14 is still excessive in many cases. The main problem is the time necessary for completion of repair on E-389/DX handsets. Periods in excess of thirty days are not unusual and put a strain on the existing usable stock. Some of the trouble of excessive turn-around time is due to wet and weather conditions between Chu Lai and Da Nang.
(3) Administrative Communications Net. The administrative communications net between O.F. Director and Combined Action Groups is operating successfully, however, the hours of operation for the afternoon (1500 until 1700) are at times extremely inconvenient. This comes at a time when 1st US radio operators are in the process of taking daily activities from the 0200s. It would be easier and more efficient if this time could be changed to a less active part of the afternoon.

a. Significant Events.

(1). Combat losses during the month were one AN/PRC-25 radio, one 60mm mortar and three machine guns, M60.

(2). An LTI of weapons was conducted at CACO's 1-1 and 1-2. Results were satisfactory.

(3). The move of the administrative office spaces, i.e., CO, XO, lstSgt and S-1 was completed during the month.

b. Supply.

(1). T/E deficiencies continue to affect overall unit readiness, however, the combat mission has not been impaired. The receipt of 6 AN/PRC-25 radios during the month has reduced T/E deficiencies. Expected receipt of 13 machine guns during November will add to the readiness posture.

(2). Stocks of organizational clothing and equipment has become critical in some areas, as reported, by the monthly LOGSUN. A lack order status from the supply source contributes to the problem.

(3). The rains have periodically closed vehicular traffic to Benang during the month and material has to be transshipped by PLC, any delay in shipment processing may hamper the supply posture.

(4). Short supply of Class V illumination at the LSP's became critical during October. Effort was generated by the CAP S-4 to ship assets which solved the immediate problem. Shortages of various illumination type Class V exists and will continue to be a problem until adequate assets are held at LSP's.

c. Maintenance.

(1). Excessive turn-around time of communications equipment, particularly DX items, continues to be a problem. Lack of assets within the DX program is the significant factor in deadline time frames. Motor transport and ordnance maintenance support is satisfactory.

d. Motor Transport.

(1). During the month motor transport logged 20,853 miles.

(2). Deadline equipment did not hamper the operations.

e. Miscellaneous.

(1). LTI's of C400 1-3 and 1-4 weapons are scheduled for November.
1 October 1969

CAP 1-2-4. An RD ambush, working in conjunction with a CAP ambush, initiated SAF on 5 VC at BT 457071. The enemy returned fire on the RD's and fled SW. An RD sweep of the area disclosed 1 VC KIA, 1 M-1 carbine, 1 .357 caliber pistol, 1 M-26 grenade, 2 chicom grenades and various documents. One RD was WIA(E) in the contest. RESULTS: 1 RD WIA(E), 1 VC KIA, 2 M1s, 1 M-26 and 2 chicom grenades destroyed, various documents captured. (All items not CAP).

2 October 1969

CAP 1-1-7. Acting on information from a villager, a patrol located 3 VC at BT 313263. The CAP and VC exchanged SAF before the VC fled SE. A sweep of the area disclosed 1 VC KIA and 1 M-1 carbine. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 M1.

CAP 1-3-2. Acting on information from villagers, a patrol located a home-made box-type mine at BS 563898. The mine was destroyed. RESULTS: 1 home-made mine destroyed.

3 October 1969

CAP 1-3-4. The UH-1 portion has been relocated to operate in the vicinity of BT 647006. 1F platoon 38 will comprise the Vietnamese portion of the CAP.

CAP 1-3-8. While an element of the CAP and local villagers were repairing a fence, 1 VC was WIA(E) by an 81mm round fired by a VC in the vicinity of BS 572922. The CAP returned SAF and searched the area with negative results. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA(E).

4 October 1969

CAP 1-1-5. 2 Hoi Chanhs turned themselves in to CAP at BT 245255. The Hoi Chanhs, ages 16 and 17, were reportedly members of a squad sized unit which operated in the Ky An village area at BS 223236. 5 chicom grenades were surrendered by the callers. The Hoi Chanhs were delivered to District Headquarters for interrogation. RESULTS: 2 Hoi Chanhs, 5 chicom grenades destroyed.

5 October 1969

CAP 1-4-5. Acting on information from the 78th RP Company, CAP called a fire mission on an estimated company of VC spotted by the RP's in the vicinity of BS 741777. The enemy fired in an unknown direction. Most of the impact area was not swept due to numerous mines. The area that was swept revealed 2 bunkers destroyed. RESULTS: 2 bunkers destroyed.
6 October 1969

CAP 1-1-4. CAP assisted by a National Policeman, detained a VN male carrying a large amount of foodstuffs under his shirt at BT 265200. The VN was evasive during preliminary interrogation by the policeman. It was learned however, that the VN had rallied to the GVN two months ago. The CAP turned the detainee over to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

CAP 1-4-3. A 16 year old Hoi Chanh turned himself in to CAP at BS 767875. The Hoi Chanh was reportedly a member of a unit from the 68th VC BN which operates periodically in the Chu My village area. The retailer was delivered to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh.

CAP 1-3-7. An ambush initiated organic weapon fire on 4 VC at BS 617977. The enemy fled in an unknown direction. A sweep under artillery illumination disclosed 1 VC KIA and 1 VC WIA who died of his wounds shortly after being discovered. 2 AK-47's and 2 chicom grenades were also found. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 2 WIA, 2 chicom grenades destroyed.

7 October 1969

CAP 1-1-6. A VN male attempting to enter a hamlet at BT 239274, was recognized as a VC boy by the CAP 1P's. The VC was shot and killed when he attempted to escape capture. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

9 October 1969

CAP 1-4-4. CAP and the surrounding hamlet received approximately 35 82mm mortar rounds and SAP from an estimated 2 platoons of VC in the vicinity of BS 765824. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called a mortar mission on the enemy causing them to break contact and flee NW. A sweep of the area under illumination revealed several drag marks and blood trails. Villagers reported 1 VC child was killed and several dwellings were damaged by the enemy mortars. 1 VN child was kidnapped by the fleeing VC. PayOps was contacted. RESULTS: 1 VC child KIA, 1 VN child kidnapped, several dwellings damaged.

CAP 1-4-5. CAP and the surrounding hamlet received 25 70 82mm mortar rounds and SAP from an VCBN in the vicinity of BS 757795. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and was supported by artillery and helicopter gunships. The enemy broke contact and fled in an unknown direction. A sweep of the area revealed 11 VC KIA, 5 AK-47's, 2 RPG launchers, 2 RPG rounds, 7 bengalite torpedoes and 20 chicom grenades. Villagers reported several dwellings were damaged by the enemy mortar attack. PayOps was contacted. RESULTS: 11 VC KIA, 5 VC, 2 CS:Q, 2 RPG rounds, 7 bengalite torpedoes and 20 chicom grenades captured.

CAP 1-1-4. A patrol received SAP from 5 VC spotted at BT 262196. The CAP called an artillery mission causing the enemy to flee in an unknown direction. As the CAP neared the impact area 1 VC was seen fleeing NW. The CAP initiated SAP with negative results. A sweep of the area revealed 1
VC KIA by artillery and a small quantity of rice and canned goods captured.

10 October 1969

CAP 1-3-3. A Hoi Chanh turned himself in to CAP at BS 774829. The Hoi Chanh was reportedly a squad leader of an unamed VC unit which operates in the vicinity of BS 779835. 1 AK-1 rifle, 1 K26 grenade, 1 82-33 grenade, 1 chicom grenade and 1 document were surrendered by the railler. The Hoi Chanh was turned over to the 158th Brigade USA for further interrogation. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh, 1 AK-1, 1 K26 grenade, 1 82-33 grenade and 1 chicom grenade destroyed, 1 document captured.

CAP 1-3-5. During a patrol, PF's recognized 3 unamed VC in a treeline at BS 710946. As the patrol approached, the VC raised their hands and surrendered Initial interrogation by the CAP "A" failed to yield the PF's unit identification. RESULTS: 3 VC PF's.

11 October 1969

CAP 1-3-3. A Hoi Chanh turned himself in to CAP at BS 650980. The railler was reportedly from the 95th VC sapper unit. 3 chicom grenades were surrendered by the Hoi Chanh. He was delivered to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh, 6 chicom grenades destroyed.

CAP 1-3-7. A patrol received SAP from an USARV at DT 276283. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called an artillery mission causing the enemy to flee in an unknown direction. A sweep of the area disclosed 2 VC KIA and 1 AK-47. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 1 I/C.

CAP 1-3-4. PF received SAP and 20-25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from an USARV in the vicinity of DT 624017. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called an artillery mission on the enemy causing them to flee NE. One PF at the CAP's OA was KIA(1). A daylight sweep of the area was nonproductive. RESULTS: 1 KIA(1).

CAP 1-3-3. A Hoi Chanh turned himself in to CAP at BS 650980. The railler was reportedly from the 95th Sapper unit. 6 chicom grenades were surrendered by the Hoi Chanh. He was delivered to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh, 6 chicom grenades destroyed.

12 October 1969

CAP 1-3-3. CAP in NWP at BS 722956 received heavy SAP, 50-70 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, and a ground assault from an estimated VC company. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and was supported by artillery and machine guns. The CAP was reinforced by reaction forces from CAP 1-3-1 and 5/46 Inf. The enemy force fled SW. 17 PF's and 2 USARV were KIA, 16 PF's and 2 USARV were WIA in the contact. 1 USARV machinegun was captured by the enemy and 1 SRC-25 radio was destroyed by enemy fire. A sweep of the area revealed 6 VC KIA, 2 AK-47's, 4 82-40 rounds, 20 chicom grenades, and 11 AK-47 machineguns. A letter found on one of the VC KIA indicated he was possibly a member of the
95th WU sniper unit. RESULTS: 2 USSM KIA, 7 PFC KIA, 3 USMC WIA(2), 16 PFC WIA(2), 1 B-50 machinegun lost, 1 PRC-25 radio destroyed; 6 VC KIA, 2 VC, 4 B-40 rounds, 20 silicon grenades and 11 AK-47 magazines captured.

CAP 1-4-6. While in an MTZ, CAP initiated organic weapons fire on an estimated platoon of VC at BT 716774. The enemy returned grenades, SAP, satchel charges, and 20 82mm mortar rounds. The enemy then broke contact and fled S. The CAP called on artillery mission on suspected routes of escape. 3 USG and 2 PFCs were wounded in the contact. A sweep of the area was nonproductive. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA, 2 PFC WIA, 2 USMC WIA(M).

13 October 1969

CAP 1-2-1. A patrol detained 1 Viet male without an ID card at BT 470079. The detainee was delivered to District Headquarters for interrogation. RESULTS: 1 VC.

CAP 1-1-7. A Hoi Chanh turned himself in to CAP at BT 293209. Preliminary interrogation indicated the raider was a member of a local village guerrilla force in ly Qua village. The Hoi Chanh was taken to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh.

14 October 1969

CAP 1-1-6. A CAP patrol was moving across a rice paddy at BT 236256, a PFC tripped an R-164 mine killing himself and wounding 1 PFC. A Viet male in the immediate vicinity was detained for not possessing an ID card and for questioning concerning the mine incident. RESULTS: 1 PFC KIA, 1 PFC WIA(M), 1 VCS.

CAP 1-1-4. A patrol spotted a Viet male carrying a large quantity of rice at BT 282190. CAP PFCs told the Viet to halt but the Viet began to run. The CAP pursued and caught up with the man who then stopped, pulled out a .45 caliber pistol, and shot himself. CAP PFCs and villagers recognized the Viet to be a Viet from the local village guerrilla force. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 VC, and 50 lbs of rice captured.

CAP 1-1-5. Having been informed that 3 Viet were WIA(2) by a mine explosion a patrol was dispatched to the area to affect a medevac. As members of the patrol were carrying the Viet WIA(2) to the medevac helicopter, 1 USMC stepped on an R-164 mine at BT 723797. 2 USMC and 2 of the Viet victims were KIA. 1 USMC and 1 USN corpsman were WIA. RESULTS: 2 USMC KIA, 2 Viet KIA, 1 USMC WIA(B), 1 USN WIA(2), 1 Viet WIA(2).

15 October, 1969

CAP 1-1-4. A CAP NDF received RFQ, K-79, and SAF from an NSEF at BT 236201. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called for artillery illumination causing the enemy to break contact. 2 USMC and 4 PFCs were wounded in the contact. 1 PFC was at the CAP NDF was also wounded. A sweep
of the area disclosed 1 H-72 and 2 chicon grenades. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA(E), 2 FF WIA(B), 1 USMC WIA(N), 2 FF WIA(N), 1 IEDF WIA(H), 1 TC, and 2 chicon grenades destroyed.

16 October 1969

CAP 1-1-1. A patrol received SAF from 3-5 VC at BT 273178. The CAP returned SAF cruising the enemy to flee in an unknown direction. A sweep of the area disclosed 1 VC KIA, 2 M-26 grenades and 1 pack containing assorted documents. The documents were forwarded to District Headquarters. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 2 M-26 grenades destroyed, assorted documents captured.

CAP 1-1-7. 5 Hoi Chanhns turned themselves into CAP at BT 297287. Reportedly leaders of a local village guerrilla force at Ky Anh, the Hoi Chanhns were delivered to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 5 Hoi Chanhns.

CAP 1-1-8. A patrol received SAF from an USSF at BS 583927. The CAP returned organic weapons fire. The enemy filed N. 2 USMC were WIA in the contact. RESULTS: 2 USMC WIA(B).

17 October 1969

CAP 1-3-5. A patrol initiated organic weapons fire and called 81mm mortar and artillery missions on 6 NVA at BS 704949. The enemy returned SAF and filed in an unknown direction. During a sweep of the area the CAP detained 2 VN women who admitted being VC. The 2 FUs were delivered to District Headquarters where they were confirmed to be VC. No additional information has been learned. Interrogation is continuing at District Headquarters. RESULTS: 2 VC POW.

18 October 1969

CAP 1-1-1. During a patrol, a TF tripped an M-26 grenade booby trap wounding himself and 1 USMC at BT 265176. A search of the area for additional booby traps was nonproductive. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA(E), 1 FF WIA(N).

CAP 1-1-7. A Hoi Chanh turned herself in to CAP at BT 300280. Reportedly a VC nurse in Binh Tam village, the Hoi Chanh was delivered to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh.

CAP 1-3-5. A patrol called an artillery mission on 8 VC spotted at BS 702957. The enemy filed in an unknown direction. A sweep of the area disclosed 1 VC KIA, and 1 chicon grenade. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, and 1 chicon grenade destroyed.

CAP 1-4-1. 3 Hoi Chanhns turned themselves in to CAP at BS 754617. The ralliers who were reportedly from the 187th NVA En, were delivered to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 3 Hoi Chanhns.
19 October 1969

CAP 1-3-8. CAP in an NDP at BS 575923 received a surprise sapper attack from the E by an USEF using bulldozers, satchel charges, RPGs, and grenades. 1 CAP patrol had just returned to the NDP and a second patrol was just about to depart when the attack was launched. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and engaged the enemy in close combat as the NDP was penetrated. At 0225H the enemy began to break contact and withdraw to the E. A CAP 1-3-6 reaction force led by the CO of CASO 1-3 arrived on foot at the site at 0315H. Co A 5/16 USA was called in on the site and received moderate SAF from a USEF which filed W when the USA troops returned organic weapons fire. RESULTS: 5 USEF and 8 PF KIA in the principal contact, and four USSOC, 1 USN and 4 PF WIA(E). There were 5 VC/NVA KIA found in the area of contact.

CAP 1-5-1. A CAP ambush initiated organic weapons fire on 3 VC at BT 401121. The enemy returned SAF and filed W. A sweep of the area was nonproductive. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA(E).

CAP 1-1-6. During a patrol a USMC was WIA(E) when he tripped a 7.62mm cartridge booby trap at BS 717777. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA(E).

21 October 1969

CAP 1-1-2. CAP heard SAF within the village at BT 577287. A patrol was dispatched to the area and spotted 4 VC firing SAF at the Village Chief's office. The CAP initiated SAF on the VC who then directed their fire at the CAP patrol, killing 1 TF and wounding 1 WN. 2 VC were killed by the CAP. The CAP captured 1 H-16, 1 H-11, and a letter found on 1 of the VC KIA which indicated that he had been the leader of the VC. The document was turned over to District Headquarters. RESULTS: 1 PF KIA, 1 WN WIA(E), 2 VC KIA, 2 WN, 1 document captured.

22 October 1969

CAP 1-3-3. In a combined operation with a USA unit received SAF from an USEF at BS 630959. 1 USMC was wounded by the enemy fire. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called in helicopter gunships on the enemy to break contact and fire SW. Secondary explosions occurred as the gunships expanded their ordnance on the enemy position. The CAP then swept the area and found bunkers and tunnel complex. Destroyed bunkers produced 1 chicom grenade, 10 lbs of gunpowder, and AK-47 parts. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA(E), bunkers, tunnel complex, 10 lbs gunpowder, 1 chicom grenade and AK-47 parts destroyed.

CAP 1-4-6. A CAP NDP initiated organic weapons fire on an USEF at BS 717776. The enemy returned SAF and filed WN. The CAP then called in an artillery mission on possible escape routes. A sweep of the area disclosed 1 VC KIA, and 1 chicom grenade. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 chicom grenade destroyed.
23 October 1969

CAP 1-1-7. During a patrol, 2 PFTs were WIA(3) when an M-26 grenade booby trap was tripped at BT 283285. A search for additional booby traps was nonproductive. RESULTS: 2 PFTs WIA(3).

CAP 1-1-7. A I.DP at BT 272285 shot and killed a VC infiltrator, the CAP received SAF from a second VC in a nearby treeline. When the fire was returned the VC fled in an unknown direction. One PT was wounded in the contact. A sweep of the treeline area was nonproductive. RESULTS: 1 PT, WIA(3), 1 VC KIA.

24 October 1969

CAP 1-3-3. As CAP was proceeding across an open field to its ambush site, a scout dog alerted the patrol to enemy presence and a CAP PT initiated SAF at the suspected enemy location at BS 563928. A scream was heard and the CAP investigated finding two VI, one slightly wounded by the CAP. The VI were evasive to questioning by CAP PFTs and were detained. The CAP corporal treated the wounded VI and the two VI were turned over to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 2 VCS.

25 October 1969

CAP 1-1-5. One Ho Chi Minh turned himself in to CAP at BT 249255. The raider, reportedly a member of the local village guerrilla force of Iy Iy, was delivered to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 1 Ho Chi Minh.

CAP 1-1-6. A CAP ambush initiated organic weapons fire on 5 VC moving W at BS 704774. The CAP then called an artillery mission as the enemy fled S. A daylight sweep of the area disclosed 4 VC KIA, 3 chicom grenades and 2 AK-47 magazines. RESULTS: 4 VC KIA, 3 chicom grenades destroyed, 2 AK-47 magazines captured.

CAP 1-3-5. A CAP ambush initiated organic weapons fire on an estimated platoon of VC on a ridgeline at BS 709773. The enemy returned grenades and SAF wounding 2 USNCO and 2 PFTs. The CAP then used artillery and snappy support causing the enemy to break contact and flee in an unknown direction. A daylight sweep of the area was nonproductive. RESULTS: 1 PF WIA(3), 2 USNCO WIA(1), 1 PT WIA(1).

26 October 1969

CAP 1-3-2. A VI received a VIP payment for delivering 2 1-166A mines and 1 105mm round to CAP at BS 571903. The ordnance was destroyed. RESULTS: 2 1-166A mines and 1 105mm round destroyed.

CAP 1-1-6. In a day combined operation with REPs, CAP discovered 1 1-166A mine and 3 bunkers in the vicinity of BS 696775. After searching the bunkers with negative results, the bunkers and mine were destroyed. RESULTS: 3 bunkers and 1 1-166A mine were destroyed.
CAP 1-3-1. Acting on information from villagers, a patrol located 1 VC KIA in a field at BS 585974. The VC had been killed by SAF approximately 4-5 days ago, possibly during a contact on 21 October. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

CAP 1-3-2. Acting on information from PPs, a patrol located 8 VC buried in shallow graves at BS 586977. It was estimated the 8 VC had been killed by artillery about 2 days ago. RESULTS: 8 VC KIA.

CAP 1-3-3. An ambush initiated SAF on 2 VC at BS 586922. The VC fired N. A sweep of the area disclosed 1 VC KIA and 1 chicom grenade. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 chicom grenade destroyed.

20 October 1969

CAP 1-3-4. During a combined USA and CAP patrol at BT 665005, an M-26 grenade booby trap was tripped wounding 1 USIC and 1 USA. A search for additional booby traps was nonproductive. RESULTS: 1 USIC WIA(H), 1 USA WIA(I).

CAP 1-3-5. A patrol called a fire mission on 6 VC spotted at BS 553903. The enemy fired 107's. A sweep of the area disclosed a camp fire and various cooking utensils. As the patrol was returning to its CP, CAP's recognized 2 local VC reconnoitering the CAP's CP. The patrol surrounded the VC who surrendered upon being discovered. The POW's members of a village force in Binh Thang, were delivered to District Headquarters for interrogation. RESULTS: 2 VC POW's.

CAP 1-3-6. A patrol detained 4 VC who ran from the patrol as it was approaching them on a trail at BS 685967. The 4 VC refused to answer questions and were turned over to District Headquarters for interrogation. RESULTS: 4 VC.

29 October 1969

CAP 1-3-7. A CP received 3 grenades and 1 satchel charge from an USEF in the vicinity of BT 660001. The CP returned organic weapons fire after which no further enemy activity was encountered. One USIC was WIA(E), in the content. A daylight sweep of the area was nonproductive. RESULTS: 1 USIC WIA(E).

30 October 1969

CAP 1-1-1. During a patrol a USIC detonated a mine (NHG) wounding himself and 2 other USIC at BT 260170. RESULTS: 2 USIC WIA(E), 1 USIC WIA(I).

CAP 1-1-2. An ambush received grenades and SAF from an estimated platoon of VC at BS 575928. The CP returned organic weapons fire and used artillery support. The enemy broke contact and withdrew to the SE. A sweep of the area was nonproductive. One USIC was KIA and 1 PF was WIA(H). Two NPs who had participated in the ambush were also wounded in the contact. RESULTS: 1 USIC KIA, 1 PF WIA(H), 2 RD WIA(I).
CAP 1-3-4. A combined USA and CAP patrol detained 3 VN who had no ID cards and were in a restricted area. As the patrol was heading back to its CP, one of the VN tripped a 15K4 round booby trap at BT 575005, killing himself. The other 2 VN and 1 USA. Two USA were WIA(B). RESULTS: 1 USA KIA, 2 USA WIA(B), 3 VN KIA.

CAP 1-3-4. A combined CAP and CP 1-3-4 NDP received 2 B-40 rounds, 3 rounds of 80mm mortar fire, and 2/F from a USAF in the vicinity of BT 257157. The CAP returned fire and used artillery and helicopter gunship support. The enemy broke contact and withdrew to the S. A sweep of the area disclosed 1 VC KIA and 4 chico grenades. 2 KPs were KIA, 1 USA and 1 VN were wounded in the contact. RESULTS: 2 KPs KIA, 1 USA WIA(B), 1 CP WIA, 4 chico grenades destroyed.

CAP 1-3-3. A CAP CP spotted 3 VN observing the CP and apparently drawing a diagram on the ground at BT 575924. A CAP patrol was dispatched to the area and detained the 3 VN who refused to answer questions by 3 CP KPs. The detainees were taken to District Headquarters for interrogation. RESULTS: 3 VCS.

DECLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS
1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

GROUP ORDER 1301.3

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Assumption of Command

Ref: (a) Art. 0503 NavyRegs

1. Purpose. To publish an assumption of command as required by reference (a).

2. Cancellation. Group Order 1301.2

3. Directive. I have this date assumed command of 1st Combined Action Group, III Marine Amphibious Force. All orders issued by my predecessor remain in effect until cancelled or superseded by my order.

D F Seiler
D. F. SEILER

DISTRIBUTION: "A" & "B" plus
CG, IIIIMAF, CG, FLC,
CG, AmalDiv, CO,
9thEngRbn, CO, MAG-12,
CO, MAG-13, OIC, Sub-
Unit #1, FLSG-Alpha
GROUP BULLETIN 1650

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Meritorious Mast

1. Purpose. To promulgate a Meritorious Mast for HM 2 Jerry W. BOYCE, B3O 27 83, USN.

2. On 22 October 1969 a Meritorious Mast was awarded to HM 2 BOYCE by the Commanding Officer. The following information is quoted from that Mast:

"During your tour of duty with this organization, your performance of duty has been exemplified by sacrifice, diligence, industry and genuine professionalism. You are meticulously accurate in your work and have a high sense of personal responsibility. You are an imaginative thinker, with a retentive memory. In addition you have the exceptional ability to examine and analyze methods and procedures and to devise ways and means of increasing their effectiveness and efficiency.

These exceptional efforts on your part have helped raise and maintain the morale of this organization at a high level and has resulted in an increase in the combat effectiveness of the organization."

3. Action. By copy hereof the Adjutant is directed to ensure that appropriate service-record book entries are made in accordance with current regulations, and that a copy of this Mast is attached to your next fitness report.


J. E. KENNEDAN

DISTRIBUTION: "A" & "D"

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