CONFIDENTIAL (Unclassified upon removal from the basic letter)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st CAG ltr 6/DFS/ftd over 5700
Ser: 027-69 of 25Dec69

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AGSD)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 November 1969
to 30 November 1969

1. The subject chronology has been reviewed for completeness
and is forwarded herewith.

L.E. PoggeMeyer
BY DIRECTION

Copy to:
CO, 1st CAG
Group Aid Station
1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

From: Senior Medical Department Representative
To: Commanding Officer

Subj: Medical Report for the month of NOV 69; Command Chronology

1. Report on Hospital Corpsmen
   a. Hospital Corpsmen (total) 35
   b. Reported for duty 04
   c. Rotated to CONUS 02
   d. Wounded in Action 01
   e. Killed in Action 01
   f. Recommended for the Purple Heart Medal 01

2. MEDCAPS
   a. Patients Treated 21,339
   b. Adults Evacuated 103
   c. Children Evacuated 14
   d. DENTCAPS 151

3. Personnel Treated at Group Aid Station
   a. Total Visits 101
   b. Hospitalized 13
   c. Illnesses 14
   d. Wounded in Action 30
   e. Killed in Action 03
   f. Med - Non-Hostile (Drowning) 01

4. Summary of Month's Activities
   a. LCM MEDCAPS visited all of the CAPS and CACO's in the 1st CAC area.

W. G. SMITH/USN

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL (Unclassified upon removal from the basic letter)

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st CAG ltr 6/DFS/ftd over 5700
Ser: 027-69 dtd 25Dec69

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code HD)

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 01 November to 30 November 1969

1. The subject chronology has been reviewed for completeness and is forwarded herewith.

R. D. WHITE
By direction

Copy to:
Co, 1st CAG
FIRST ENDORSEMENT on 00, 1st CAG ltr 6/DFS/ftd over 5700
Ser: 027-69 of 25Dec69

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 November 1969
to 30 November 1969

1. The subject chronology has been reviewed for completeness
and is forwarded herewith.

L.E. PoggeMeyer
BY DIRECTION

Copy to:
CO, 1st CAG
SUBJECT: Command Chronology for the period 1 November 1969 to 30 November 1969

Ref: (a) HCO 5750.14
(b) H.PacO 5750.3A

Enc1: (1) Command Chronology, 1st Combined Action Group, III Marine Amphibious Force

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Downgraded at 3-year intervals, declassified after 12 years, DOD Dir 5200.10.

D. F. S. MILLER

Copy 2 of 12 Co.des
HEADQUARTERS
1st Calmed Action Group
IX Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 90002

CHRONOLOGY
1 November 1969 to 30 November 1969

INDEX

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<th>Description</th>
<th>PAGE(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1-1 - 1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part II</td>
<td>NARRATIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>II-1 - II-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part III</td>
<td>SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS</td>
<td>III-1 - III-9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DECORATED
PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. DESIGNATION

1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

COMMANDER

LtCol D. F. SEILER
1Nov69  30Nov69

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Combined Action Company 1-1
Captain P. H. GROSZ
1Nov69  30Nov69

Combined Action Company 1-2
Captain J. E. KNIGHT
1Nov69  30Nov69

Combined Action Company 1-3
Captain J. W. MURPHY
1Nov69  30Nov69

Executive Officer
Combined Action Company 1-3
1stLt J. J. MULHEARN
1Nov69  30Nov69

Company Officer
Combined Action Company 1-3
1stLt B. STEPHEN
22Nov69  30Nov69

Combined Action Company 1-4
Captain P. G. MITCHELL
1Nov69  9Nov69

Captain J. E. TYLER
10Nov69  30Nov69

ATTACHED UNITS

1. None.

2. Locations

Hq 1stCAG
CACO 1-1
CACO 1-2
CACO 1-3
CACO 1-4
Chu Lai, Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, RVN
Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province, RVN
Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, RVN
Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN
Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN
3. **STAFF OFFICERS**

   Executive Officer
   Major W. D. THOMPSON
   1Nov69    30Nov69

   Adjutant/S-1
   Captain J. E. TYLER
   1Nov69    30Nov69

   S-2/S-3/Comm
   Major R. L. PADGETT
   1Nov69    30Nov69

   S-4/Supply
   Captain T. M. GARBOWSKI
   1Nov69    30Nov69

   S-5/Special Services
   Major W. D. THOMPSON
   1Nov69    30Nov69

   Medical
   Hel W. G. SMITH
   1Nov69    30Nov69

4. **AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>ENL</td>
<td>OFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EXHIBIT 1-2
PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. Personnel Administration.

   a. Joined and Transferred. During the month of November 1969, the 1st Combined Action Group joined and transferred the following number of personnel listed in the four categories below:

   (1) Joined
      Officers 2
      Enlisted 51

   (2) Rotated CO/US
      Officers 0
      Enlisted 31

   (3) Transferred Within WestPac Command.
      Officers 0
      Enlisted 2

   (4) Transferred by SR w/sick (out of country hospital)
      Officers 0
      Enlisted 2

   b. Awards.

      (1) There were six Bronze Stars, three Navy Commandations and one Navy Achievement recommendations submitted to FMFPac for approval during the month of November 1969.

      (2) Awards returned approved from FMFPac included the following:

      | SSM | BSN | NCM | NAM |
      |-----|-----|-----|-----|
      | 1   | 0   | 0   | 0   |
(3) Personnel of the 1st Combined Action Group also received the following awards as a result of combat wounds, heroic/meritorious service in the Republic of Vietnam:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHM</th>
<th>VCG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


c. Casualties. Casualties during the month of November 1969 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>DOD</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>WIA/NC</th>
<th>WIA/NC R&amp;D</th>
<th>INJ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


d. CONFRONT-SPLINT-HELPS. There were two pieces of Congressional Interest/ Special Interest Correspondence and seven Welfare Reports processed by this organization during the month of November 1969.

e. Administrative Assistance. There was one Group Directive promulgated during the month.

f. Legal. A breakdown of legal activities for November is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Art 32 Investigations</th>
<th>Informal JAG Investigations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

General Court Martial: 0
Special Court Martial: 1
Summary Court Martial: 1
Non Judicial Punishment: 6

g. Morale and Welfare. The morale of the unit continues to be high and special services equipment is available to all hands. Quotas for both out of country and in country Rest and Recuperation (R&R) are effectively being utilized. The following is a breakdown of the R&R within this command:

(1) Out of Country R&R - Quotas 15 Utilized 15

(2) In Country R&R 1

(3) Five parties are held at a different CAP each week consisting of a cook out, beer and soda. Each CAP sends a man into the rear on a staggered schedule to allow him to relax and enjoy the club, beach and USO facilities.
h. Career Planning. The career planning program continues to be stressed at all levels of command. USAF/GE testing is continually offered to all personnel who have not completed high school. During this reporting month, one SMCO was sent to the Career Planners School on Okinawa.

i. Mail. Daily average bags of mail were processed as follows:

Letters

**Incoming**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P2 Bags</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Bag</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Outgoing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P2 Bag</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Bag</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Packages

**Incoming**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5% Bag</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Bag</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** One bag of letters represent approximately 2,000 letters.

j. Promotions: One officer and twenty-seven enlisted promotions were affected during the month of November 1969. The following is a breakdown of these promotions:

- Captain ....................... 1
- Sergeant ........................ 2
- Corporal ........................ 17
- Lance Corporal ................... 6
- Private First Class ............... 2

k. Hospital Visits. Hospital visits are made daily by the Hospital Corpsman Representative, the Casualty NCO and the Mail Orderly who also delivers mail to the patients located in hospitals at Chu Lai. Frequent visits are made by the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Adjutant, and the First Sergeant. Normally, the Commanding Officer or his representative, having been notified by Dustoff Control Chu Lai of the destination of the individual medevaced from the field, is waiting at the hospital when the casualty arrives. The remains of persons killed in action are identified within hours of arrival at Chu Lai.

II-3
1. Civic action. The Group continued to place emphasis on the Civic Action aspect of its mission and although the CAP's were somewhat restricted by the frequent rains, the following projects were accomplished by the Group and individual CAP's:

(1) Medical
   (a) 21,339 medical treatments
   (b) 151 dental treatments
   (c) 103 adults evacuated
   (d) 44 children evacuated

(2) Commodities
   (a) 1310 pounds of food
   (b) 306 meals
   (c) 55 pounds of clothing
   (d) 263 pounds of soap
   (e) 1 midwife kit
   (f) 516 school kits
   (g) 136 sewing kits

(3) Health and Sanitation
   (a) 49 immunizations
   (b) 36 medical aides trained
   (c) 1 lecture on sanitation

(4) Education. 107 English classes - 1908 students.

(5) Contributions
   (a) $10.00 to orphanages
   (b) $90.00 schools
   (c) $30.00 individuals

(6) Miscellaneous. CAP 1-2-7 helped construct a volleyball court at Ly Pho (2). (BT 474050).

II-4

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED
b. Activities

(1) The 1st Company continued to be hampered by mines and booby traps in their TACO. Although the 1st Company received several harassing attacks, they received only one large contact that occurred at CAP 1-1-2 toward the end of the month on the 22nd. In this contact, an enemy unit of 30 NVA attacked a CAP patrol. Although face to face contact with the enemy in the early part of the month was confined to one successful ambush, which supports the school of thought of a lack of aggressiveness on the part of the local VC, this ambush was premeditated and planned. Although, the CAP killed 6 enemy, they suffered 2 Marines, 2 PFC's, and 1 corporal KIA. On the 5th, CAP 1-1-1 received 2 KIA Chams from the 21st Regiment. This should prove to be informative, as elements of the 21st Regiment were the ones who attacked CAP 1-3-9 and sustained 116 losses last September. Another point of interest was the release of 3 American Army personnel by the VC/NVA in the 1st Company area. The three Americans were released in the Pineapple Forest area (vic. BT 2522), and walked into CAP 1-1-4. Except for the contacts mentioned, all 1st Company received was small harassing attacks and one light rocket on the Tam Ly Airport that caused little damage.

(2) The 2nd Company continued in its role of securing the Ly Tin area. 2nd Company completed the month with only two significant reports. On the 12th, a CAP 1-2-2 patrol was contact and lost two PFC's KIA. On the 18th, a CAP 1-2-2 patrol found 2 NVA/VC bodies that had been buried for about two weeks. These kills were the only ones that the CACO received for the month.

(3) The 3rd Company experienced a large number of attacks by fire, with no sustained ground assaults. This type of activity seemed to predominate the 3rd Company, as they not more than one kill in any contact. Although the Company had eight (8) KIA Chams, they were mostly heavy guerrillas and local VC and proved to be of limited value. Conjecture is that the enemy in the 3rd Company's TACO is conserving manpower as well as building morale for a concerted offensive in the next months. Intelligence fails to single out any month as this time, except for the coming TET holiday.

(4) The 4th Company experienced moderate contact this month, resulting in 15 kills. The largest total of kills on the 14th,
when the VC of the 49th En. attempted an assault on CAP 1-4-5. The CAP sustained only 2 KIA, while they totaled 6 VC KIA. The CAP received 2 Ho Chi Minh from the 49th En. Other than the hills and the Ho Chi Minh, there was found the same general lack of activity as in the other CAP's. The rest of the month was predominately filled with a number of harassing attacks of little consequence.

(5) In retrospect, the month proved less active than the previous month. Four hills, or the enemy in all four companies seemed to deploy evasive tactics and avoid contact. Troop movements in general showed no definite pattern although intelligence reports show that enemy units that once threatened the northernmost CAP's in the 1st Company have moved inland towards the mountains. The enemy units in the 3rd Company continue to remain in their AO's and in the 4th Company, the 49th En. still poses the primary threat to the CAP's in that area. The enemy situation around the 1st CAP THAC is not different than that of the rest of I Corps. Recent intelligence points to a tactic being deployed that will breakdown the NVA units and incorporates them into the I and II units to strengthen the guerrilla units as well as bring unity to enemy forces in the area.
3. Operations

a. General

(1) During the reporting period the 1st Combined Action Group continued to conduct operations that facilitated accomplishment of its assigned mission of village/hamlet security and the goals of the Accelerated Pacification Program (ACP). In conjunction with the ACP, request for relocation of certain Combined Action Patrols was submitted to CG I MAF during the month.

(2) Enemy activity declined somewhat from the previous month. The decline in activity can probably be attributed to the heavy rain, making movement more difficult and some areas inaccessible except by boat. Whether or not the decline in enemy-initiated contacts is a developing trend of just a temporary situation will come to light in the next few weeks.

(3) The Americal Division, USA also experienced a month of light and infrequent contacts throughout the AO. The Division continued Operation Geneva Park and Frederick Hill with minimal contact. The Division now has two companies engaged in the Infantry Company Intensive Pacification Program; one adjacent to CAP 1-1-1 and one adjacent to CAP 1-1-6; both appear to be working satisfactorily. The 196th and 198th Infantry Brigades continued to provide logistical and troop reaction support.

b. Activities

(1) The CAPs continued to participate in combined operations with U.S. Army, Regional Forces and Popular Forces throughout the month. The most significant one lasted the entire month and is continuing in the village of Muong Tho (DS52075) with Popular Forces, U.S. Army and CAP 1-1-4. The Americal Division maintained the bulk of its forces west of National Highway 1 while conducting several operations of company and platoon size in the coastal lowlands east of the highway.

(2) CAOC 1-1-1 experienced less contacts during the month and consequently finished the month with fewer kills. The contacts the CAOCs did experience indicated the presence of NVA forces due to the mortar and rocket (R-0) support and also the aggressiveness and effectiveness of the enemy's tactics. CAP 1-1-3 was relocated into a new CAOC in the Long village. CAP 1-1-1 assumed a modified TACO that included a portion of CAP 1-1-4's old TACO. CAP 1-1-4 was moved into the company headquarters pending the establishment of a new TACO. On 5 Nov CAP 1-1-4 received three (3) U.S. Army personnel that had been released by the enemy west of Tam Ky.
(3) CAGO 1-2 continues to have the least number of contacts which are at a minimum and results being obtained by the PF's and CA's in Ly Tin District. The Company had six (6) contacts during the period, resulting in two (2) VC KIA. The District was required to send sixty (60) PF's to become National Soldiers; this caused some shifting of PF's within the District but this did not affect the CAP PF's to any appreciable degree. Intelligence reports indicate the presence of the 100th Seppeh BN in Ly Tin District with the aim of collecting taxes and conducting attacks on U. S. installation and bridges along National Highways.

(4) CAGO 1-3 finished the month with considerably less contacts than the preceding month and ended the period with fewer kills than October but the number of KQ's increased from one (1) for October to eight (8) and the number of POW's from three (3) to thirteen (13). During the month, CAP's 1-3-1, 1-3-2, 1-3-4, 1-3-5, and 1-3-6 went completely mobile and the problems initially encountered were quickly overcome. A few CAP's experienced a shortage in the number of PF's reporting for duty but the District Chief of Binh Son took steps to rectify this situation.

(5) CAGO 1-4 had an active month although the number of contacts was less than October the number of enemy killed was greater. Elements of the 14th BN continued to operate near the IGO's of CAP's 1-4-1, 1-4-6, and sightseeing and contact, both day and night, are frequent. The 14th BN continues to use artillery and air to clear areas since the IGO's of part of the CAP's are heavily populated and close hits to fire are rapidly achieved. The Company Commander, Capt. H. G. Rudder, was wounded by fragments during the contact CAP 1-4-8 had on the night of 10 November and was replaced the following morning. First Lieutenant Tyler assumed command of the company until a replacement became available. The Company is studying the area northwest of CAP 1-4-1's present IGO as a possible area for a new or relocated CAP.

(6) The following statistics are the results of the 1st CAG's operations and activities for the month of November:

(a) Friendly Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Night Patrols</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day Patrols</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambushes</td>
<td>1593</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Enemy Casualties/Losses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>DETAIL 25</th>
<th>IGI CLAIMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c. Training

(1) General. Final training covered the subjects of General Military Subjects, Leadership, Small Unit Tactics, Infantry Weapons and Supporting Arms. The individual GAPs averaged thirty-seven (37) hours of instruction for the month. The problem of having enough FPIs remain with the G. during the day to receive instruction still prevails as most of the FPIs leave during the day to work or sleep.

(2) GAP Training. The GAPs are managing to accomplish an acceptable amount of training, but not full in the weekly training schedule.

(3) Other Training

(a) Eight (8) barracks attended the Vietnamese Language Course in Da Nang during the month.

(b) Eight (8) barracks attended the FO Course conducted by Division Artillery, Americal Division, USA. This is a substantial increase in the number trained in preceding month and reflects the efforts of the Group to obtain a larger quota.

(c) All new personnel received a one day indoctrination course prior to their assignment to the field.

(d) Classes were also conducted covering the Stenlight Scope and the Patrol Saddle Instruction Device.

d. Inspection. The S-3 Section visited the GAP's and GAO's, checking supplies and status. The radio blanket continues to be the most frequent piece of combat equipment to malfunction in the field.

e. Fire Support. Artillery support was used daily during the month either in the form of H-1 fires or contact fire missions. Several missions were fired on intelligence targets based on information received from Hill Christmas, 307th and in some cases the local populace. The responsiveness of the supporting artillery units is commendable. Due to the isolated locations of many of the GAP's the importance of rapid illumination and H-2 missions is greatly neglected and often the deciding factor in the contact and the artillery unit, especially the 2nd of the 16th, have exerted maximum efforts to ensure timely, accurate fire support.

f. Air Support

(1) Tactical air support was utilized twelve (12) times during...

(2) The information and figure does not include the missions flown for logistical support as the CH-47s at this time is allotted by the principle battalions on a daily basis and these missions are not requested nor controlled by the CH-47.

4. Scout Dog Teams. During the month scout dog teams were available to all but CH-47s. The maximum number attached to the group at any given time was 3rd Battalion plans to gradually increase the number as funds become available.

V. Periodical Operations

(1) Periodical Operations. The Group continued to take one of the aspects of the essential Division to support the Pyropo program. A total of 74,000 lenticles were distributed (71,000 by air; 3,000 by hand). A total of 400 were used for a total of three (3) hour and deviations were flown for a total of three (3) hour. A low altitude was designed by the 243rd and Pyropo 100 propelling the three VD with rewards for buddy troops (GI's). It was submitted to 1st Marine Division for printing and should be available within the next few weeks. The Group received fifteen (15) K9 Cane dogs during the month, a slight decrease from last month but still a substantial number. In the near future a COMIN box filled with pyropo material will be delivered to the 3rd Company as a pilot study for utilization of the material at the CACO level.

(2) Buddy Program. Many lenticles were found in the 1st Company's area west of Task Force. The primary threat was corruption in the Saigon government and the inability of SVN forces to continue the war once the U.S. troops leave.

1. Hit Carvan Scout. During the month the RCS's accounted for two (2) VC MIA, three (3) VC's killed, and one (1) individual weapon captured and discovered two (2) buddy troops. Initial coordination has been accomplished between III AAF and the 1st Marine Division concerning the possibility of receiving RCS support from the American as well as the 1st Marine Division.

2. Volunteer Enlistment Program. 23,700$ 85 were paid to Vietnamese nationals under this V. This amount was more than double the amount last month and probably resulted from the increased emphasis on the program by the CACO. The program appears to be on an upswing and it is anticipated that even more ordnance will be turned in for rewards in the future.

V. Considerations

(1) General. Due to the transfer of the former Communications Chief, Gunner Sergeant FREDERICK, Sergeant CORBETT assumed the position.
2. Situation. During the reporting period communications between Group Headquarters and 0400 Headquarters were generally satisfactory, between 0400 and their respective CAP's communications problems exist due to interference at the assigned frequency. It is hoped that this problem will be resolved by a change in the assigned frequency. Also, problems in communications are arising from the fact that almost all of the CAP's have now one mobile and can no longer use the Ground Plane Antennas RC-222. This problem is being alleviated by the 0400's installing stations. Air placed relay points that will be under the Ground Plane Antennas RC-222.

3. Radio Technician Contact Team. As per agreement with the General Air Unit, United States Marine Air Group-12, on 17 November a Radio Technician Contact Team was provided for our use at 0400 level. The mission of this contact team was to perform maintenance and provide instruction in care and cleaning of Marine communications equipment. This team was successful in their mission, and it has been recommended that this Radio Technician Contact Team be provided on a routine basis to undertake the same mission at the field unit level, covering each of the CAP's in the Group.


   a. Due to the excellent second echelon support given this unit by Marine Air Group-12, the turn-around time for equipment remains at a minimum. This usually never more then 3 to 4 days between turn-in time to time of completion.

   b. During the latter part of the month, HMG B started a direct exchange program to replace their third echelon repair support of 1st CG. This will eventually prove a beneficial program to use, but for the present it will be inadequate due to the fact there is no equipment in stock to replace items turned in. This means that equipment turned in will be on a demand basis for an unspecified length of time until HMG B acquires these items.
(1). Receipts of T/2 deficiencies, in the case of, M-60 machine guns, M-79 grenade launchers and 60mm mortars were realized during the month. Although, M-79 launchers and 60mm mortars are not 100% on hand deficiencies have been reduced considerably.

(2). There were no combat losses during the month of November.

(3). One M151A1 half ton truck was "Code H" creating a deficiency in available motor transport equipment.

B. SUPPLY

(1). Supply support was adequate during the month, however, certain items are now deficient and affect material resupply capabilities. Organizational clothing (trousers, utility covers, underclothing, poncho liners, pneumatic mattresses and equipment) are deficient. In addition, stocks of certain batteries, AN/PRC-25 antennas and sandbags are deficient.

(2). As stated in October's chronology delay in shipment processing could affect the supply posture, and such is the case, as non-receipt of items in paragraph (1) above and other replenishment requisitions has indicated.

(3). The problem of shortages in Class III materials was discussed in a conference held at the CAP DIRECTOR at the end of the month. Results of the conference included recommendations to the expenditure rates and a fuller realization of C&S operations by Force Ordnance and PLC representatives.

C. MAINTENANCE

(1). Excessive turn-around time of the M-189 handset continues to be a problem in communications maintenance. The significant factor being insufficient assets in the DX Program.

(2). H-Q-13 transport failures increased during the month and has reduced the organic motor transport capability. Although deadline rates increased C/O's were still affording a vehicle and unit resupply was not affected.
D. WORK TRAVEL:

(1). During the month the Group logged 19,820 miles.

(2). Through discussions with the CAP S-4 it was ascertained that certain water transport equipment would be available in December through T/E 1960.

E. MISCELLANEOUS:

(1). The mid-year budget review will be accomplished during December.

(2). Requests for assistance in ensuring transshipment of material to the Group have been solicited from the CA. S-4.
INITIAL LISTING OF CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS

1 November 1969

CAP 1-1-3. Spotted approximately 10 VC 1500 meters N of the CAP's position at BS 752831. The CAP engaged the enemy force with a 107mm mortar mission and helicopter gunships. The VC force fled NW. The A-1 accompanying the gunships reported seeing two VC KIA. The CAP was unable to sweep the target area due to an intervening river. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA.

3 November 1969

CAP 1-1-4. A day howitzer site received 3 324 mortar rounds from an USMIF in the vicinity of BT 258200. The CAP called an artillery mission on the suspected enemy location after which no further enemy activity was encountered. A sweep of the impact area was nonproductive. 2 USMC were WIA(n). RESULTS: 2 USMC WIA(n).

CAP 1-3-3. While patrolling a trench line near the CAP's day howitzer site, a CAP PF detonated a mine (TNT) wounding his left hand and another PF at BS 670791. RESULTS: 1 PF WIA(3), 1 PF WIA(n).

CAP 1-3-2. Patrol detained 6 VN without ID cards at BS 578934. The detainees were turned over to District Headquarters for interrogation. RESULTS: 6 VCS.

CAP 1-3-6. A Hoi Chanh turned himself in to CAP at BS 574937. The caller reportedly a member of the Binh Thanh village guerrilla force, was turned over to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh.

4 November 1969

CAP 1-3-3. In a huddle at BS 667977, a patrol detained a VN male who had been wounded in the foot by CAS. Evasive to questioning by CAP PFs, the wounded VN was turned over to District Headquarters for interrogation. RESULTS: 1 VCS.

5 November 1969

CAP 1-1-1. 3 USA who reportedly had been held by the VC as prisoners in the mountains west of Chu Lai walked in to CAP's position at BT 260190. The former prisoners did not know why the VC released them. The CAP turned the men over to 3-2, Amphibious Division. RESULTS: 3 USA POW's released by VC.

CAP 1-3-5. A patrol spotted 3 armed VC at BS 719932. The CAP initiated organic weapons fire on the enemy who fled S. A sweep of the area revealed 1 VC KIA who was recognized by CAP PFs as a member of the Binh Thanh village guerrilla force. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.
CAP 1-1-2. A patrol base initiated organic weapons fire on and killed 1 VC attempting to infiltrate the position. Under illumination, 3 other VC were observed fleeing south and were engaged with SAF. At this point an USF located to the south of the patrol base initiated SAF. The CAP returned organic weapons fire causing the enemy to withdraw to the S. The CAP then used 107mm mortar fire and helicopter gunships to strike at possible enemy assembly areas and avenues of escape. One PF was KIA and 1 PF was wounded in the contact. A sweep of the area disclosed 1 VC KIA, 1 AK-47, and 2 chicom grenades. RESULTS: 1 PF KIA, 1 PF WIA(B), 1 VC KIA, 1 TWC, 2 chicom grenades destroyed.

6 November 1969

CAP 1-3-0. Ambush received grenades, sethual charges, and SAF from an USF at BS 575922, 2 km W of Binh Son. The CAP returned organic weapons fire as was reinforced by a CAP 1-3-6 reaction force. The enemy then broke contact and withdrew to the SW. One USGK was WIA(B) in the contact. A daylight sweep of the area was nonproductive. RESULTS: 1 USGK WIA(B).

7 November 1969

CAP 1-4-6. Patrol called a medevac helicopter for a W who had been wounded in the shoulder by SAF. CAP PFs were unable to find out how the W received the wounds. The W was medevaced to the 27th Surgical Hospital and will be interrogated after treatment. RESULTS: 1 WGS.

8 November 1969

CAP 1-4-6. Patrol base received 1 grenade from an USF in the vicinity of BS 715779, 7.5 km NE of Quang Ngai. The CAP returned SAF after which no further enemy activity was encountered. One USGK was WIA(B). A daylight sweep of the area was nonproductive. RESULT: 1 USGK WIA(B).

9 November 1969

CAP 1-1-4 at BT 285200, 2.5 km SW of Tan Ky. Reported from the 31st NVA Regiment, the raiders were delivered to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 2 Red Chambs.

CAP 1-3-5 was participating in a harvest security operation, a PF detonated a mine (NTI) at BS 733952, 13.5 km NE of Binh Son. the PF was KIA. RESULT: 1 PF KIA.

CAP 1-3-8 Patrol alerted the CAP to enemy presence. A point element was sent to investigate and received SAF from an estimated 20 VC at BS 576920, 2 km E of Binh Son. The main body of the CAP patrol maneuvered to the enemy's flank and initiated organic weapons fire causing the enemy to break contact and flee W. The CAP then directed artillery and helicopter gunships on the fleeing enemy.
A search of the area under illumination revealed numerous blood trails. One USMC was WIA(E) in the attack. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA(E).

CAP 1-A-5. Ambush initiated organic weapons fire in the direction of several lights 200m to the S of its position at BS 739792, 10.5 km NE of Quang Ngai. The CAP then received K-79 fire, SA, and 10 60mm mortar rounds from US Marines at BS 739792 and BS 739795. Claymore illumination and a spook were deployed and resulted in the enemy fleeing W and S. One USMC was WIA(E) and 1 RF with the CAP ambush was also WIA(E). A daylight sweep of the area was nonproductive. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA(E), 1 RF WIA(E).

10 November 1969

CAP 1-A-6. Patrol base located in a refugee resettlement head-er at BS 734777, 9 km NE of Quang Ngai, received 5-8 grenades from an USMC resulting in 1 WIA KIA, 3 USMC WIA(E), and 1 WIA KIA. The CAP returned organic weapons fire causing the enemy to flee W. A daylight sweep of the area disclosed 1 B-40 rocket launcher, 3 B-40 rounds, 7 ChiCom grenades, and bloodstained vats of clothing. RESULTS: 1 WIA KIA, 3 USMC WIA(E), 1 WIA KIA, 1 RF, 3 B-40 rounds, and 7 ChiCom grenades destroyed.

CAP 1-A-10. Patrol located and initiated SIF on 7 VC at BS 620004, 5 km SE of Binh Son. The enemy returned fire and fled in an unknown direction. A sweep of the area disclosed 1 dual K-15 rifle and several blood trails. RESULTS: 1 VC.

13 November 1969

CAP 1-A-5. Patrol, c. PF spotted a 12 Mi fighter-bomber at BS 702955, 10.5 km NE of Binh Son, killing Pf. Lt. and WIA, 1 KIA and 1 RF. RESULTS: 2 PF KIA, 1 USMC WIA(E), 1 RF WIA(E).

CAP 1-A-5. Ambush initiated SIF on 2 VC at BS 700955, 11 km NE of Binh Son. The enemy fled SW. A sweep of the area disclosed 1 VC KIA, 1 KIA and a heavy blood trail leading SW. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 KIA.

CAP 1-A-10. Was informed by a Headet Chieu that several armed VC were in his hamlet attempting to collect rice from the villagers at BS 605074, 5 km S of Binh Son. A patrol sent to investigate heard a shot as it approached the area. The patrol continued and found 1 VC KIA. Villagers told the CAP that the VC shot the VN for unknown reasons and fled as the CAP patrol arrived. The CAP then swept the area with negative findings. No rice was stolen. Paysas was contested. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 KIA.

CAP 1-A-2. Sweep received K-79, and SA fire from an USMC at BS 512872, 19 km NW of Quang Ngai. The RPs and CAP returned organic weapons fire and received support from helicopter gunship. An 10 then came on station and directed airstrikes on the enemy who fled in unknown direction.
A sweep of the area was nonproductive. RESULTS: 1 RF KIA.

CAP 1-3-3. Patrol located 100 lbs of rice in a tunnel and detained 5 VN without proper identification at BS 673934, 8.5 km NE of Binh Son. As the patrol proceeded back to its patrol base, an U.S. initiated SAF on the patrol which returned organic weapons fire and called in air strikes. The enemy filed in an unknown direction and a sweep of the area was nonproductive. RESULTS: 5 WOS, 100 lbs of rice.

14 November 1969

CAP 1-4-6. Patrol base received grenades, RPGs, satchel charges, and SAF from an U.S. at BS 714776, 3.5 km NE of Quang Ngai. The CAP returned organic weapons fire causing the enemy force to withdraw and flee SW. The CAP then called in helicopter gunships which fired on suspected enemy routes of escape. Two PAVN were WIA in the contact. A sweep of the area disclosed 12 VC KIA, 1 AK-47, 4 B-40 rounds, and 9 ChiCom grenades. RESULTS: 2 PAVN WIA, 12 VC KIA, 1 EWC, 4 B-40 rounds and 9 ChiCom grenades destroyed.

CAP 1-3-3. Patrol initiated organic weapons fire on VC at BS 662992, 9 km NE of Binh Son. The enemy returned SAF and broke contact withdrawing to the SW. A sweep of the area revealed 1 VC KIA and a blood trail leading SW. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

15 November 1969

CAP 1-2-5. Has abandoned its compound and is now mobile. No change of personnel or TAC was involved.

CAP 1-3-5. Patrol received SAF from VC at BS 704936, 10 km W of Binh Son. The CAP returned organic weapons fire causing the enemy to flee SW. A sweep of the area disclosed 1 VC KIA. Another VC was found hiding in some bushes and was captured. Reportedly a member of the Binh Thien Village guerrilla force, the POW was turned over to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 VC POW.

CAP 1-3-10. Patrol was sent to investigate SAF heard coming from the vicinity of BS 610875, 5 km S of Binh Son. While enroute, the patrol received AMP and SAF from an estimated 30 VC. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and used artillery support causing the enemy to break contact and flee NW. The CAP swept the area and found numerous blood trails. Villagers informed the CAP that 30-40 VC entered the hamlet and killed the Hoalet Chief. PFC was contacted. RESULTS: Hoalet Chief assassinated.

CAP 1-1-5. Has been relocated to operate in the vicinity of DT 241/3, 5.5 km SW of Yen Ia. Patrol /Platoon will comprise the Vietnamese portion of the CAP.
CAP 1-1-1. Activity observed approximately 20 VC entering a refugee Hau Lot at BT 04173, 5 km SW of Tam Ky. The ambush Personnel reinforced with a reaction force from the CAP's patrol base then maneuvered toward the enemy and engaged them with SAF. The enemy returned fire and in the ensuing fire fight a VN was KIA by the enemy fire. The VC then broke contact and fled SW. A sweep of the area was nonproductive. **RESULT: 1 VMware.**

CAP 1-1-2. At BS 74837, 17 km SE of Binh Son. Reportedly members of the Binh Doc Village guerilla force, the raiders were delivered to District Headquarters for further interrogation. **RESULT: 2 Hoi Chanhs.**

CAP 1-1-3. Spotted an unnamed VI approaching its ambush site at BS 61036, 1.5 km NE of Binh Son, and detained the VN for violating curfew restrictions. The detainee was turned over to District Headquarters for interrogation. **RESULT: 1 VC.**

16 November 1969

CAP 1-2-4. Patrol found 2 Chicom grenades near a trail and detained 5 VN in the area who were evasive to questioning by CAP PFs. The detainees were delivered to District Headquarters for interrogation. **RESULT: 5 VC; 2 Chicom grenades destroyed.**

CAP 1-3-3. Patrol received SAF from 3 VC at BS 64296, 0.5 km NE of Binh Son. The CAP returned fire causing the enemy to flee NE. A sweep of the area revealed 1 VC KIA. **RESULT: 1 VMware.**

CAP 1-3-10, which operates in the vicinity of BS 62872, 5.5 km SW of Binh Son, has been redesignated as CAP 1-3-12. No change of personnel or TASC was involved.

17 November 1969

CAP 1-1-1. Patrol, 1 UH1C tripped a booby trap consisting of a tin can filled with explosive and rigged with a trip wire firing device at BT 05179, 5.5 km SW of Tam Ky. Two UH1C were WIA(E). A search for more booby traps was nonproductive. **RESULT: 2 UH1C WIA(E).**

CAP 1-3-2. Patrol detained 1 VN with improper identification at BS 58091, 1 km SW of Binh Son. The VN was turned over to District Headquarters for interrogation. **RESULT: 1 VC.**

CAP 1-3-4. Three Hoi Chanhs turned themselves to a CAP patrol at BT 05016, 10 km NE of Binh Son. During the same patrol, 1 VN was detained without an ID card. The VGS and 3 Hoi Chanhs, the latter reported to be VC tax collectors, were turned over to District Headquarters for interrogation. **RESULT: 3 Hoi Chanhs, 1 VC.**

III-5

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18 November 1969

Capt 1-2-4 A patrol found the bodies of 2 VC buried in shallow graves at BT 417675, 7-5 km SE of Bien Han. The VC appeared to have died of starvation and were possibly implicated during a CAP 1-2-4 contact on 25 October. RESULTS: 2 WIA VIETOM.

Capt 1-4-3 Capt. ... Cui, reportedly from the 105th RVN Battalion turned himself in to the CAP 1-4-3 at BS 707632, 15.5 km NE of Phu Yen. Fifteen minutes later, another VC turned himself in to the CAP. Initial interrogation by the CAP revealed that the second caller was the VC Village Chief of Mek Hon. Both VC suspects were delivered to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 2 VC Chicks.

19 November 1969

CAP 1-1-4 ALVU7 initiated CAP on 27C at BT 258560, 5.5 km SW of Tranyakilling both of the enemy. One ALVU7 was found during an after action sweep of the area. RESULTS: 27C VIA, 1 WIA.

CAP 1-2-3 ALVU7 initiated organic weapon fire on 4 VC moving E at BT 475017, 15 km W of Bien Han. E a day earlier. A survey of the area was unproductive. About 10 minutes after the contact, an explosion was heard at a distance of about 500 meters SW of the ambush site. An investigation revealed that a schoolhouse had been damaged by an unknown type of explosive charge. No charge was possibly dropped by the 4 VC contacted earlier. Pyro was contacted. RESULTS: 1 WIA schoolhouse damaged.

20 November 1969

CAP 1-3-4 Cao Hoi Chicks turned themselves in to CAP 1-3-4 at BT 659411, 10 km S of Minh Sen. Reportedly members of the Minh Sing Village military force, the VC were turned over to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 3 Hoi Chicks.

CAP 1-3-4 AK-47 AK-47 spotted a VC picking up tail charge and redirecting it towards a schoolhouse on the perimeter of the CAP's patrol base at BT 640206, 11 km SE of Minh Sen. A CAP element circled around the VC and captured him by surprise, refusing to divulge any significant information to the VC. In the WIA was turned over to District Headquarters for further interrogation. RESULTS: 1 WIA PAVN.

CAP 1-1-4 Capt. 1-1-4 base received 10 mortar rounds of unknown caliber and several 7.5 rounds from an MLR in the vicinity of BT 262103, 5.5 km NW of Tranyakilling 1 WIA and 2 VC. The CAP returned organic weapon fire and used artillery and artillery support. The enemy fired in an unknown direction. Three VC were WIA in the contact. A daylight sweep of the area was unproductive. RESULTS: 3 WIA WIA VC.
21 November 1969

CAP 1-1-5 A VN villager who had been wounded in the legs by VC was brought to CAP 1-1-5 at MT 241136, 7 km SW of Ta Ky. The VC was in a state of shock and could not respond to questioning by CAP 1-5. The VC was transported to the 91st Evacuation Hospital and will be interrogated later today. 
RESULTS: 1 VC WIA.

CAP 1-3-3 During a patrol, CAP 1-3-3 spotted 2 VC tax agents collecting money from a village at N 59-091E, 10 m NW of A-162. One of the VC was captured and killed by the CAP. The VC was captured and found to be in possession of 10 guns and various tax receipts. A search of the VC house produced nothing. The VC, money and documents were turned over to District Headquarters. 
RESULTS: 1 VC WIA, 1 VC POW, 10 guns and tax documents captured.

CAP 1-3-3 A patrol found 125 lbs of rice in a partially burned bamboo jar at L 55-0949, 7 km SE of Don Son. The rice was turned over to District Headquarters for distribution. 
RESULTS: 125 lbs of rice.

22 November 1969

CAP 1-1-5 Approximately 30 VC initiated guerilla, KMG, 60th Artillery 1-79, and GA fire on a CAP 1-1-5 patrol at PT 251136, 6 km SW of Ta Ky. The CAP returned Guerilla weapons fire causing the enemy to break contact and withdraw to the N. The KMG, 1 GA, and 2 105mm were HHA. The KMG were HHA in the action. The body of the crew discovered 3 VC KIA, 1 GA-47 and 1 105mm fired. 
RESULTS: 2 KMG KIA, 1 105mm KIA, 2 GA-47, 2 KMG WIA, 3 VC KIA, 1 GA, 1 105mm round destroyed.

CAP 1-3-3 Hoa Chinh turned himself in to CAP 1-3-3 at L 55-09X0 2.5 km SE of Don Son. Reportedly a member of the 16th Bieng village guerrilla force, the villager was delivered to District Headquarters for further interrogation. 
RESULTS: 1 Hoa Chinh.
23 November 1969

CAP 1-3-4 patrol received SAP from 6-10 VC at BS 535000, 3.5 km NE of Binh Son. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called in an artillery mission causing the enemy to flee SE. A sweep of the area was nonproductive. One USC and 1 PF were wounded in the contact. RESULTS: 1 USC WIA (1), 1 PF WIA (1).

CAP 1-3-7 patrol detained 14 WI on a trail at BS 544200, 3.5 km NE of Binh Son. A check of identification revealed only 3 of the WI in possession of proper ID cards. The WI were then turned over to District Headquarters for interrogation. RESULTS: 14 VCS.

CAP 1-3-4 patrol initiated SAP on an USEF at BS 535003, 2 km NE of Binh Son. The enemy returned SAP and fled NE. A sweep of the area revealed 1 VC NIA, 1 105mm carbine, and 2 60mm grenades destroyed.

26 November 1969

CAP 1-1-2 Villagers informed CAP 1-1-2 that approximately 20 VC had entered their hamlet the previous night and destroyed several dwellings at BT 339179, 4 km S of Township. A CAP patrol was sent to the area and found 10 WI houses destroyed, 2 of which were booby trapped with Chicoma grenades. The CAP destroyed the booby traps. PayOps was contacted. RESULTS: 10 WI dwellings and 2 Chicoma booby traps destroyed.

CAP 1-4-6 At BS 708705, 7 km NE of Quang Ngai, a CAP 1-4-6 patrol was searching a small natural cave when 1 USC detonated a Chicoma grenade booby trap rigged with a trip wire firing device. The USC sustained only minor injuries and the CAP continued to search the cave with negative results. RESULTS: 1 USC WIA (1).

29 November 1969

CAP 1-3-3 A WI woman and child, both suffering from 2nd and 3rd degree burns, came to the CAP 1-3-3 patrol base for medical attention at BS 533705, 9 km NE of Binh Son. The WI woman said their burns were caused by airstrikes 5 days ago. The PPA interrogated the woman and concluded that she was probably a VC. Mother and child were evacuated to the 91st Evacuation Hospital. After treatment, they will be turned over to District Headquarters for interrogation. RESULTS: 1 VCS.

CAP 1-3-2 Patrol detained 1 WI without proper identification at BS 539009, 3 km SW of Binh Son. The detainee was turned over to District Headquarters for interrogation. RESULTS: 1 VCS.