CONFIDENTIAL (Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1))

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st CAG ltr 6/JEH/rdc 5700
Ser: 09-69 of 20May69

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 March 1969 to 31 March 1969

1. The subject chronology has been reviewed for completeness and is forwarded herewith.

R. D. WHITE
By direction

Copy to:
CO, 1st CAG
CG, III MAF
CONFIDENTIAL (Unclassified upon removal from the basic letter)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st CAG ltr 6/JEH/rdc 5700 Ser: 09-69 of 20 May 1969

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 March 1969 to 31 March 1969 (U)

1. Forwarded.

R. H. BARROW
By direction

Copy to:
CO, 1st CAG
From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)  
Via: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 March 1969 to 31 March 1969  

Ref: (a) MCO P5750.11A  
(b) NATPacO 5750.8A  

Encl: (1) 1st Combined Action Group, III Marine Amphibious Force Command  
Chronology  

1. In accordance with provisions of reference (a) and (b), enclosure (1)  
is submitted.  

2. Downgraded at 3-year intervals, declassified after 12 years, DOD Dir  
5200.10  

J. E. HENNEGAN

Copy 1 of 12 Copies
# Command Chronology

1 March 1969 to 31 March 1969

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<td>21</td>
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<td>35</td>
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</tbody>
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Downgraded at 3-year intervals
Declassified after 12-years
PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

Commander

1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO, San Francisco, California

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Combined Action Company 1-1
Captain L. H. ROSS
1 Mar 69 - 31 Mar 69

Combined Action Company 1-2
Captain R. R. KELPOTT
1 Mar 69 - 31 Mar 69

Combined Action Company 1-3
Captain F. G. MITCHELL
1 Mar 69 - 31 Mar 69

Combined Action Company 1-4
Captain J. K. CHAMPION
1 Mar 69 - 31 Mar 69

ATTACHED UNITS

None

LOCATIONS

HQ, 1st CAG Chu Lai, Ky Tin District, Quang Tin Province, RVN
CAGO 1-1 Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province, RVN
CAGO 1-2 Ky Tin District, Quang Tin Province, RVN
CAGO 1-3 Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN
CAGO 1-4 Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN
MCT-1 Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province, RVN
MCT-2 Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN

STAFF OF OFFICERS

Executive Officer
Major J. H. LAWSON
1 Mar 69 - 31 Mar 69

Adjutant/S-1
2nd Lt B. W. SMITH
1 Mar 69 - 31 Mar 69
UNCLASSIFIED

S-4/Supply

Communications Officer

S-5/Special Services

Medical Section

1. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USNI</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Off</td>
<td>In</td>
<td>Off</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Off</th>
<th>In</th>
<th>Off</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4(AVN)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maj. R. F. ENDERT
1 Mar 69 - 31 Mar 69

Capt. W. H. JAROSZ
1 Mar 69 - 31 Mar 69

Maj. R. F. ENDERT
1 Mar 69 - 31 Mar 69

Maj. J. H. LAWSON
1 Mar 69 - 31 Mar 69

Maj. R. W. ZILLIS
1 Mar 69 - 31 Mar 69
PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

Personnel Administration

a. Joined and transferred. During the month of March, the 1st Combined Action Group joined and transferred the following number personnel listed in the four categories below:

1. Joined.
   - Officers 0
   - Enlisted 57

2. Rotated CONUS.
   - Officers 0
   - Enlisted 25

3. Transferred within WestPac Command.
   - Officers 0
   - Enlisted 4

4. Transferred by SR w/sick (out of country hospitals).
   - Officers 0
   - Enlisted 17

b. Awards.

1. There was nine Bronze Star for heroism and six end of tour awards submitted to FMFPac for approval during the month of March 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCM</th>
<th>FM</th>
<th>NM</th>
<th>NM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Awards returned approved from FMFPac included the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FM</th>
<th>NM</th>
<th>NM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Personnel of the 1st Combined Action Group also received the following awards as a result of combat wounds, heroic/meritorious service in the Republic of Vietnam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FM</th>
<th>VCG</th>
<th>Commendation from RVN Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
c. Casualties. Casualties during the month of March 1969 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>MiA</th>
<th>KIA+MiA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>PP</th>
<th>WIA/HOC RTO/DU</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


d. CONGRTNS/COMMENTS/THKRRP. There were one Congressional Interest Correspondence and four Welfare Reports during the month of March 1969.


e. Administrative Assistance.

(1) One Group directive was promulgated during the reporting month. A copy of this order is located in the documents section (section IV) of this chronology.

(a) Group Bulletin 3/30: Enemy Body-trapped Flags

f. Legal. A breakdown of legal activities for March is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Art 32 Investigations</th>
<th>Informal Investigations</th>
<th>NJP</th>
<th>SPEI</th>
<th>SCI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two Article 32 Investigations were pending at the end of the reporting period.

g. Morale and Welfare. The morale of the unit continues to be high and special services equipment available to all hands. Quotes for both our of country and in country Rest and Recuperation (R&R) are effectively being utilized. The following is a break down.

(1) Out of country R&R - Quotes Utilized

37 37

(2) In country R&R - 4

(3) A party is held at a different CAF each week consisting of a cook out, beer and soda. Each CAF sends a man in to the rear on a staggered schedule to allow him to relax and enjoy the club facilities.

h. Career Planning. There were no significant changes in the Career Planning Program in the 1st Combined Action Group during the reporting period. Our Career Planner conducts his interviews at the CAGQ’s and was frequently augmented by the III MAF Career Planner. A concerted effort is still being made within the group to administer the CED test to all eligible Marines especially stressing high school level testing. The major factor for failure of personnel taking advantage of reenlistment incentives continues to be in the cases of Private First Class where many have more than ten months in grade, and where quotas for promotion are few.
Hal's daily average bags of mail were processed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letters</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ingoing 1/4 bag</td>
<td>Outgoing 1/4 bag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingoing 1/4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: One bag of letters represents approximately 2,000 letters.

j. Promotions. Fifty-nine enlisted promotions were affected during the month of March 1969 as follows:

- Sergeant - 13
- Corporal - 6
- Lance Corporal - 40

k. Hospital Visits. Hospital visits are made daily by the Hospital corpsman representative, the Casualty NCO and the Mail Orderly along with frequent visits by the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Adjutant and First Sergeant. Casualties are visited as soon as they are evacuated from the field. Normally, the Commanding Officer or his representative, having been notified by Dustoff Control Chi Lei, of the destination of the individual are waiting at the hospital when the casualty arrives. The dead are identified within hours of arrival at Chi Lei.
1) One of the advantages of the CAP Program is the familiarity which develops between the CAP Marine and the civilian living in the hamlet of his TAOC. This familiarity from daily contact evolves into the main link of the Combined Action Program intelligence chain. Because the Vietnamese is much more familiar with his hamlet/village area and its inhabitants, than the CAP Marine can ever become, he is more aware of the presence of strangers in the area and underlying political signs which may come from enemy presence or imminent enemy movement. The information which is received from the villagers is of primary importance, then, because this is intelligence which pertains to the proximate area of the CAP, as opposed to the intelligence from higher units, the bulk of which applies to a larger area and has less immediate pertinence to the CAP and the Combined Action Program. During this reporting period there were 23 occasions on which Vietnamese provided information on enemy location, movement, or suspected moves and impending attacks. Of these, 13 occasions had known results of 1 Chieu Hoi, 6 VC POWs, 3 VC KIA, 21 weapons, 7 VCS, 2 enemy contacts with small arms fire. The incidents reported also retain their pertinence, even if they do not have results, because they show the willingness of the people to volunteer information, and establish a context for possible future use.

2) Further intelligence is gained through the units of the Americal Division. While this information is not normally of the same proximate value to the CAPs, or requiring immediate reaction, it shows enemy movement toward or away from CAP areas and possible future enemy goals. The main source of this intelligence to 1st CAG were the Intums of the Americal Division and the 198th Light Infantry Brigade.

3) All companies work closely with District and Province Headquarters S-2 offices and District/Province Advisors. From these channels, they receive information of possible intelligence value from the ARVN, RF, and FV units in the areas surrounding the CAP TAOC's. The information gathered from each company in this manner is then forwarded to the 1st CAG S-2 for possible use by the other companies within 1st CAG.

4) The CAP Marines receive intelligence from their field contacts with the enemy. While enemy activity was generally at a low level in the early part of the month, the increased activity in the CACO 1-1 area and the numerous sniping incidents and probes in the CACO 1-3 area showed an enemy intention towards Tan Ky District headquarters and Quang Tin Province headquarters in Tan Ky, and Binh Son District headquarters. The intentions of the enemy materialized on 19 March when the enemy over-ran, and attempted to hold in daylight a PF outpost on hill 25, 6 kilometers south west of Tan Ky. This showed the enemy's desire to attempt to hold ground, at any price, for political advantage. The enemy was removed from the hill by 0900H the next morning. The enemy threat in the Binh Son area never materialized. These contacts, the prisoners that were taken, and the swoop of battle litter in contact areas produced documents and personal effects of the enemy, which aided in the desig-
5) All information which is received from the CAPs is passed up the chain to both Vietnamese and American 6-3/8-2 section by the last CAP 8-3/8-2.

b. Interpreters

1) During the reporting period, 1st CAP had four ARVN Staff Sergeant interpreters, and a 1st Lt. ARVN Liaison Officer. Before the end of the reporting period, the ARVN Liaison Officer was transferred, and one of the Staff Sergeant interpreters was brought in from the field to fill the billet of Headquarters Interpreter. A second Staff Sergeant interpreter entered U/A status toward the end of the month.

2) Due to expansion of the CAP into less accessible areas, the one interpreter is not always able to fulfill the requirements of the CAP's. There are at times also apparent difficulties for the city-born ARVN Interpreter to identify fully with the country people. Direct differences serve to widen the identity gap for the Saigon-born interpreter. While the ARVN Interpreter works best in the Group or Company headquarters environment, what is needed is English-speaking Popular Force soldiers in the villages. Where it is true that the CAP conduct English classes, process is slow, replete with all the difficulties, mis-information and mis-understanding available in a situation in which the layman tries to teach.

3) The present input of CAP Marines into the III MAF Vietnamese Language School is insufficient to cover the needs of the CAP - especially with the majority of CAP personnel joining the program with little over six months remaining on their Vietnam tours. Vietnamese speakers are also part of the casualty list from time to time, which further lessens chances of providing one CAP Marine with Vietnamese language proficiency for every CAP. The answers may lie in providing the PF an opportunity for English language school, in enlarged language school quotas for the III MAF school, or in increased CAP Program input of Defense Language Institute - trained personnel direct from COMUS.
b. General.

(1). CAP operations continued in March in accordance with the CAP mission of village security and Popular Force training. In the March phase of the "Winter-Spring" offensive, the enemy showed himself often enough for 1st CAG to produce its highest record of kills to date. Assisting the increased kill count was the change to mobile status and relocation of six CAPs into new TAOCs and the change to Mobile status of four others which remain in their present TAOCs. The VC began to feel the impact of Fourth Company activities as the three-CAP company finished its first full month of operation in the Son Tinh TAOCs, adding a fourth CAP late in the period.

(2). The patrol of inland waterways requires a minimum of two boats for any patrol. In March, patrol operations were reduced by about twenty-five percent due to problems with support of engine maintenance. The remaining seventy-five percent of operational time was spent during the hours of darkness in patrols and ambushes. During daylight hours the boats provided numerous troop lifts, primarily to CAPs 1-2-1 and 1-3-4. In support of Chu Lai defense, the patrols were often called out or diverted in response to reports of suspicious craft or persons sighted along the waterway within view of the base perimeter.

b. Activities.

(1). Eleven multi-CAP operations, and one joint operation were conducted in March. Of these, seven were Reaction Force operations. The joint operation was a CAP-U. S. Army Armor sweep. The majority of these operations were conducted in the Tam Ky area where CAGO 1-1 was in contact almost daily, with CAPs 1-1-4, 1-1-6, and 1-1-7 most often committed. The availability and effective use of supporting air and artillery by First Company CAPs was responsible for many of the 34 kills and 12 weapons captured during those operations in the Tam Ky area.

(2). CAGO 1-1 produced the majority of significant operations and results during March, with the following being most noteworthy:

(a). On 19 March CAGO 1-1 and Tam Ky district headquarters provided a joint reaction force under the control of the Tam Ky District Chief
and 1st Company CO, then a Regional Forces compound was overpowered and occupied by an estimated NVA platoon. In the course of this day-long action, the estimated size of the enemy force rose to one NVA company. Artillery and Fixed Wing CAS were employed to eliminate the force in the compound and later, sweep action against two platoons of NVA was highlighted by a spirited skirmishline assault which drove the NVA from treeline positions forcing them to leave the area under fire from supporting arms. This jointly controlled reaction operation resulted in 17 NVA killed, the capture of five weapons and an amount of ammunition.

(b). On 26 Mar, CAP 1-1-7 on a sweep operation encountered an estimated VC platoon near what was apparently a base camp area and drove them off. Subsequent sweeping of the area produced 26 VC killed and the capture of seven weapons, including two rocket launchers and a mortar.

(3). CAGO 1-3 had two contacts of significance in March. In both contacts, the CAPs utilized supporting arms including mortar fire support from the Swiftboat patrols of Coastal Division 12.

(c). On 24 March, CAP 1-3-5 engaged 10 NVA with small arms fire and requested artillery from L/C BATOR. During the sweep of the battle area, 81mm mortar support was provided by Swiftboats. Results were seven NVA killed and one weapon captured along with the destruction of two boobytraps.

(b). On 27 March a CAP 1-3-1 patrol came under heavy fire in which they received incoming satchel charges, machinegun and mortar fire. The CAP responded with artillery and small arms fire and swept the area, finding one NVA KIA, and a weapon. Contact was regained, and the CAP utilized Swiftboat mortars and helicopter gunships in support, while a reaction force from CAP 1-3-5 arrived to assist. In the morning, the battle area provided an additional four NVA bodies, three weapons, including one rocket launcher, and 32 grenades.

(4). The following statistics derive from 1st CAG operations and activities:

(a). Night Patrols 987 IFS 725
Day Patrols 912 Multi-CAP 11 Operations
Ambushes 1743

(b). Enemy Casualties:
KIA (C) FO DETAINERS KIA CHAIN
209 27 195 7

ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED
b. Weapons and Ordinance Captured:

1 MAT 39
23 AK-47
2 HMG 36
7 AK-44
3 M-16
3 AK-50
9 M-2 Carbines
1 PPSH SMG
2 BAR
2 Thompson SMG

(d). Friendly Casualties Sustained:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>HIA</th>
<th>POW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Training:

a. General. Training conducted by the 1st CAG includes General Military subjects for both the USMC and Vietnamese Personnel. Vietnamese Language and Personal Response instructions were conducted for the USMC personnel.

(1). CAP Training. During the period, 1070 hours of instruction was conducted on the CAP level; 32 hours of formal training was conducted at each CAP’s position. This was in addition to informal instruction conducted by CAG headquarters and CAG headquarters personnel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Training</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>#Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Military</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese Language</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Response</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership/Tactics</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2). Mobile Training Teams. This Group has two Mobile Training Teams: MTT 1-1, located in Ton Ky District, and MTT 1-2, located at Binh Son District, conduct training for Vietnamese forces of their respective districts.

(a). MTT 1-1 trained 110 Cadre of Revolutionary Development and 83 National Police Men.
Due to the combat operations conducted by the Vietnamese in the Bình Sơn District during this period, HAT 1-2 trained no Vietnamese forces. The platoon lost graduated remained on position and normal CAP activities were conducted.

3. Vietnamese Language Training.

(a). Four Marines from 1st CAG attended the month-long III IAF Language course conducted at 2nd CAG Headquarters near Pleiku. All personal selected for the language school are recommended by the company commander, and the SRAEs are screened to determine potential. Length of tour remaining, GCT, Verbal expression, and Pattern analysis scores are considered as well as an Army Language aptitude test score if available, level of schooling, class standing in military courses, military correspondence courses completed, and Conduct and Proficiency marks.

(b). Training files are utilized to determine the language scores obtained in the two week CAP school attended by every CAP Marine, and which covers approximately 17.5 hours of language instruction.

(c). Background is sought to attitudes toward the Vietnamese, toward learning a language, toward school generally, toward the CAP program. Additionally, the high school background is explored to determine if there has been a language course or an interest in language-related courses, the depth of social science interests, speech courses, leadership or participation in clubs, plays, orchestras, debating teams, the like.

(d). The problem is, very few Marines are available, that will be able to provide a lengthy return to the CAP after school. After a Marine has been selected for the CAP Program, the Administrative processing, CAP School completed, and goes to Language School, he will normally have only about three and a half months of the Vietnam tour remaining.

(e). The entire aim is to select the best qualified Marine with the greatest time remaining in the CAP Program and thus school a man who will provide the greatest success for the CAP on return from this thirty-day school.

4. Inspections.

(a). Each CAP and CAGC headquarters was inspected by a member of the 1st CAG Headquarters during the period. The Commanding Officer spent a number of nights in the field with various CAPs and the MTs conducting his personal inspections.

(b). The commanders of Third and Fourth Combined Action Companies continue to experience difficulty in adequately supervising their CAPs. In CAGC 1-3, seven of ten CAPs are accessible by foot or helicopter only, due to road mining by local Force VC. In the CAGC 1-4 area, three of the four CAPs are accessible by helicopter, or via the sea by Swiftboats, due to mining and the presence of large Main Force NVA/VC units between Son Tinh District head-
quarters and the east coast G4 locations. These company commanders are faced with enough administrative work and coordination work that the taking forty-eight to seventy-two hours to make an inspection visit of twelve to eighteen hours becomes prohibitive. At the same time, it is preferable to have either the Company Commander or his Company Gunnery Sergeant at the CP at all times. This further complicates the inspection problem. T/O changes have been suggested to alleviate this problem to some degree by adding a company executive officer. Such an addition should free the Company Commander and Gunnery Sergeant so that one or, in some circumstances, both could be conducting inspections at the same time.

c. Air Support.

(1) Fixed Wing CAS was available throughout the 1st G4 LOC, with most of it employed in the Tan Ky area. Forward Air Controllers of the USAF operating in the Tan Ky area have developed a fine working relationship with G4O 1-1 G4Ps, from whom they can normally obtain lucrative targets and good surveillance. These F4Os are often monitored on the Company frequency asking for a situation report and targets when they are not specifically supporting a G4P in contact.

(2) Helicopter assets of the Americal Division have been reduced due to heavy commitment in the "Winter-Spring" offensive, but there has been adequate helicopter support for the 1st G4O G4Ps in contact. Mostly this support is in conjunction with helicopter medevacs. The reduced availability of helicopters has been felt mainly in the area of logistical support of the G4Ps. Due to the increase in 19th LTB operations, helicopters Combat Assault Operations (CAOs) took the supporting helicopters from all logistical missions and the G4O support was accordingly reduced. Although this resulted in the loss of the daily hot mail and mail delivery, no G4P went without food, weapons, ammunition, or personnel at any time. The 19th LTB continues to make every effort to support 1st G4O despite hardpressed helicopter assets.

d. Fire Support. There was one change in fire support picture during March, when ARVN artillery co-located with U.S. Army artillery on LZ DOTTE, north of Son Tinh District. This has not affected 1st G4O units, as the calling of fires continues under US control.

e. Scout Dog Team. During the north of March, 1st G4O continued to employ Scout Dogs teams made available from 5d MP Battalion, Danang, for periods of 15 days. The teams then further assigned to the companies best able to employ them. In March the teams were responsible for pointing out a number of mines in the G4O 1-1 area and were employed on most operations. While serving with the companies, these teams spend the majority of their time in the field with the G4Ps thus increasing the number of hours of effective use.

(a) Beginning with one team on the first of the month, another four teams were assigned for duty during the period. At the end of the month, two teams remained with the G4Ps.
1. Payops coordination with the Americal Division Payops and 198th LIB Payops sections continues to be good, and has resulted in quick response to immediately exploitable situations, as well as the normal leaflet/soundtrack support. In all, seven rallies were exploited. Additionally, eight different films were shown to the local populace.

2. With the present offensive continuing, emphasis was placed on Chieu Hoi themes. More than three-quarters of a million leaflets were disseminated by air in addition to six and one half hours of tapes broadcast. There were 56,000 Chieu Hoi leaflets, 35,000 rewards, and 20,000 Pro-GVN leaflets distributed by hand.

3. The following statistics show the 1st CAG program for March:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>LEAFLETS</th>
<th>BROADCASTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rewards</td>
<td>134,000</td>
<td>2:45 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chieu Hoi</td>
<td>3,078,000</td>
<td>10:05 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-VC</td>
<td>964,000</td>
<td>6:35 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-GVN</td>
<td>405,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-JWL</td>
<td>249,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1. 1st CAG continues to employ clever Kit Carson Scouts, most of whom are assigned to the First and Third companies due to knowledge of these areas, one of these Kit Carson Scouts was wounded in action and evacuated during the action of 22 March. On 14 March, two of eight KCSs graduated from an English language course conducted at Chu Loi Base, at the MAC 17 Industrial Relations Apprentice School. Six of the group were released from the course on their own request due to low achievement. The two graduating placed first and third in a class of 26 Vietnamese. It is felt that a part of the problem was a general lack of education, and concomitant dislike for school. The Kit Carson Scouts consistently contribute to the overall success of the CAF mission.

j. Volunteer Informant Program. A total of $29,600 was spent during the month under the VIP program. All expenditures were for weapons or ordnance turn in or pointed out in place to the GFs. Of all items, two were bootstrapped.

1. A statistical recap of weapons and ordnance purchased is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>TYPE ORDNANCE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>TYPE ORDNANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>AK-44</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60mm Mortar Rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>M-1 Carbine</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.5 Rocket Rounds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
k. Communications.

(1). Communication Improvement.

(a). During the reporting period the 1st Combined Action Group Communications Chief attended a Combined Action Program Communication Chief Conference hosted by 2nd CAG. During this conference several conclusions were reached concerning improvement of the Combined Action Group communication system. These conclusions were forwarded as recommended T/O and T/E modifications to the Combined Action Program Directors Office. A summary of these is outlined below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Order</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6mm Mortar Rounds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangalore Torpedo</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-79 Rounds</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle Grenades</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-26 Grenades</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicom Grenades</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms Rounds</td>
<td>190J</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. T/O Additions.

   a. One MSgt Communications Chief 2591 - CAG Communication Chief

   b. Three Cpl/LCpl Voice Operators 2531 - Each CAG Headquarters

   c. One Sgt Radio Repairman 2541 - Each CAG Headquarters

   d. One GySgt Radio Chief 2539 - Each CAG Headquarters

   Replaces the present GySgt Communication Chief 2591.

2. T/O Deletions.

   a. Sgt Radio Chief 2533.

   b. Sgt Wire Chief 2511.

   c. GySgt Communications Chief 2591. Replaced Radio Chief 2539.

3. T/E Additions.

   a. One RT-524 Radio at each CAG and CACO Headquarters.

   b. One AN/MRC-109 Vehicular Mounted Radio for each CACO Commander.

   c. Second echelon test equipment and repair parts for 2nd echelon maintenance of all communication equipment organic to the CAG.

4. Remarks. It is felt the above T/O and T/E modifications are essential to enhance communications reliability and maintenance support to the level required to support each Combined Action Group in its present tactical mission. Each Combined Action Group has far outgrown the communication needs first envisioned for the original program, which are still in effect in the pro-
a. 1st FSR. The support afforded by 1st FSR Maintenance Battalion to this command through the Direct Exchange (DX) Program has continued to be a problem. Radio Set AN/PRC-25 IX "turn around" time is in excess of 60 days on the average and is thoroughly unsatisfactory to provide this command the support required to maintain operations at the optimum level.

b. ISU-3. To overcome this difficulty, the ISU-3 Communications Maintenance Section has been utilized for a great deal of "the Command" communication repair work. In spite of their own heavy workload, "turn around" time, as compared to 1st FSR Maintenance Battalion, has been significantly reduced. However, because there exists in ISU-3 a lack of adequate quantities of repair parts, test equipment, and technicians, their support has proved to be helpful, but not adequate to meet the needs of this Command.

c. MAG-12, MASS-3. Because of the heavy workload of repair work sent to ISU-5, it has been necessary at times to depend on MAG-12 and MASS-3 Communication Repair Sections for priority work. During the reporting period several radios have been repaired by these sections on a priority basis. However, in the future these sections cannot be depended on to support 1st CAG on a permanent basis because of their own workloads and lack of adequate repair parts to repair the AN/PRC-25.

d. Repair Work Summary. During the reporting period the following quantities of communication equipment were requisitioned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EQUIPMENT</th>
<th>To 1st FSR</th>
<th>To LSU-3</th>
<th>From 1st FSR</th>
<th>From LSU-3</th>
<th>Tot</th>
<th>Tot</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio Set AN/PRC-25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Handset H-199/GR</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>Telephone TA-312/PT</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loudspeaker LS-454/U</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All Code II (Un economical to repair; 7 requisitioned)*
   a. Significant Events.
      (1). The Phase II, FY-1969/70/71 budget estimates were submitted during the month of March.
      (2). There were no combat losses during the month.
   b. Supply.
      (1). In general the supply posture of this unit improved slightly from the previous month.
      (2). Table of equipment deficiencies for communications, motor transport, and ordnance equipment continues to be a significant problem.
      (3). With significant receipts of organizational clothing (utils) the problems previously encountered in this area have been alleviated to an extent.
      (4). Battery BA-386 is a critical item, and other than walk-thru documents, receipts have not been realized.
   c. Maintenance.
      (1). The maintenance posture is relatively unchanged from last month. The AV/PRO-25 radio continues to be a problem and the number of radios deadlined in March are 14 as compared to 11 last month.
      (2). The M37B1 truck, 3/4 ton continues to be a problem hampering normal operations in that two vehicles have been deadlined for 52 and 27 days respectively.
   d. Motor Transport.
      (1). The motor transport assets in this unit are adequate, however excessive downtime on any vehicle affects unit operations. The problem of M37B1's became more apparent this month, at one point all authorized 3/4 ton vehicles were deadlined simultaneously. Also one M35A2C has been deadlined throughout the month.
   e. Miscellaneous.
      (1). During March CAG's were furnished 5,261 meals, combat, individual and 6,408 LRPR's by Group Supply.
      (2). This month 1st CAG completed the MECS data base for the vehicle summary card.
f. Medical.

(1) General. Besides the capabilities of assigned Hospital Corpsman, the 1st CAG is serviced medically by the medical battalions and evacuation hospitals of the Americal Division. At CAG Headquarters, medical administration is carried on normally by one Chief Hospital Corpsman and assistant. In addition to administration, the headquarters element conducts Sick Call, and provides a corpsman for the reaction force, or to cover any CAG which loses a Corpsman for any reason.

(2) Evacuation. First CAG 1-1 casualties are normally evacuated to Danang, via evacuation hospitals north of Tam Ky, while casualties from CAG's 1-2, 1-3, and 1-4 are evacuated via Chu Lai, to hospital ships or hospitals out of country.

(a) Medical evacuation helicopter support has been quite satisfactory during this period, with emergency medevacs averaging approximately fifteen minutes.

(3) Additional Information. The following areas are reported for the month of March.

(a) Personnel Hospital Corpsman.

- Reported for duty: 02
- Rotated to CONUS: 00
- Medevaced out of country: 02
- Awarded the Purple Heart Medal: 00
- Recommended for Navy Commendation Medal: 01
- Recommended for waiver of Advancement Examination: 00

(4) Techniques.

(a) A field inspection was held of all CAGs by HM2 TALLOR, USN. Areas of improvement were pointed out in field sanitation and Med CAP techniques.

(b) Medics conducted

- Patients treated: 30,270
- Adults evacuated: 114
- Children evacuated: 75
- Dentists: 18

Enclosure (1)
(d) U.S. Personnel treated at Sick Call in CAG 304

(e) Hospitalized

WII

ILLNESS

26 USMC

65
5. Civic Action

a. The Combined Action Sections of this Group distributed over 4,413 pounds of food. This food is obtained from excess items from marshalls and the MACV Mos at Tan Ky. 85 pounds of clothing and 540 pounds of soap was obtained from America Division 6-5 and distributed to the people through the MEDCAPs.

b. CARE kits were also distributed. A total of 3 Midnight kits, 1 physical education kit, 2 woodworking kits, 102 sewing kits, 36 school kits and 205 school refill kits were distributed.

c. In the area of health and sanitation advancement were made by the Medical section to inoculate against a plague outbreak in 1-3-84 AD. A total of 600 shots were given. There were three classes given by 1-3-84かなり to the villages.

d. The following civic action projects were completed:

(1) CAP 1-1-3 assisted a family repair roof of house vicinity M2 348161.

(2) CAP 1-1-6 and 1-2-4 built showers for village at vicinities M2 345296 and M2 455075 respectively. Showers used by children mainly.

(3) CAP 1-2-5 built a culvert at vicinity M2 41717.

(4) CAP 1-2-7 assisted in whitewashing village dispensary vicinity M2 454055.

(5) CAP 1-3-4 repaired shutters of school building at vicinity M2 62101.

(6) CAP 1-3-6 assisted in repairing roof at school located within their compound at vicinity ES 515937.

(7) CAP 1-3-7 put up protective fence near entrance to village vicinity ES 614936.

(8) MTT 1-1 cleared and repaired well at vicinity M2 323190.
1 Mar

CAP 1-2-1. Discovered 6 VC bunkers. RESULTS: 1 AK-50, 1 French Carbine, quantity of documents, 1 bunker destroyed.

CAP 1-1-7. Reported that 2 VC had come into the hamlet and killed the hamlet chief and brother and his son. The CAP swept the area with negative results. RESULTS: 2 VN civilians KIA, 1 VN civilian WIA.

CAP 1-3-7. Villagers reported that the VC were trying to steal cows. Sent element to investigate. Observed suspect and told him to stop. He ran and hid in a dodgerrow. Element opened fire. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

CAP 1-3-8. 1 VN boy informed CAP of a dud 105mm round. The round was blown in place, VIP payment made. RESULTS: 1 105mm round blown in place.

2 Mar

CAP 1-3-5. Received 30-50 rounds of sniper fire. At the same time, Le Thuy (2) receive an unknown number of 60mm mortar rounds and 1 B-40 rocket. A reaction force was sent and an 81mm mortar mission was requested from Swift Boats. A sweep of the area revealed nothing. RESULTS: 5 houses destroyed and 3 civilians and 1 PF WIA.

CAP 1-2-1. Conducted a sweep, the CAP checked ID cards and found a number of tunnels. RESULTS: 5 VCS, 2 AK-50's, 5 chlocon grenades, 7 tunnels destroyed.

CAP 1-4-3. While on patrol, 3 Marines stopped on a boobytrap. RESULTS: 3 WIA WIA.

CAP 1-1-7. 2 VC surrendered as Chieu Hoi's, they were sent to Tam Ky District Hq. RESULTS: 2 Ho Chi Chunks.

MTF 1-1. Sighted 2 VN males about 60 years old. The men tried to avoid the patrol, were pursued and apprehended. 1 was detain when interrogation revealed that his son is a confirmed VC. RESULTS: 1 VCS.
2 Mar

CAP 1-3-3. 2 civilians turned in ordnance to CAP 1-3-6. RESULTS: 1 3.5 rocket round, 1 105mm dud round destroyed; VIP paid.

CAP 1-2-5. Heard movement to the west. Patrol moved to that location and initiated contact with approximately 8 VC. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

3 Mar

CAP 1-4-1. Received a report of VC activity in Dong Than. The VC burned 5 houses including the house of the hamlet chief. 1 woman was stabbed and beaten and 1 child was beaten. 2 VC were reported killed by Spooky but they were not confirmed. Cattie was also reported taken by the VC in fire. 1 friendly artillery round hit the school without causing casualties. RESULTS: 2 VN civilians WIA.

CAP 1-3-4. A patrol set up security for VN civilians building a fence. They received sniper fire from unknown number of enemy. The patrol returned fire, called artillery, they received more sniper fire while attempting to sweep the area. An AO was called to direct artillery. RESULTS: 2 VN civilians WIA.

CAP 1-3-5. Swept Dong Lo (1) hamlet. RESULTS: 1 VC POW, 1 VC KIA.

4 Mar

CAP 1-4-5. Making a reconnaissance by fire with a M-79 when they triggered a secondary explosion. 1 Marine received shrapnel wound and was medevaced. The patrol found 23 bunkers, 1 B-40 rocket round, 12 chicom grenades and 3 tunnels. All were destroyed.

CAP 1-3-6. Made contact with approximately one squad of VC. 2 VC KIA, and 1 M-2 carbine were found in the sweep of the area. One Marine was wounded. CAP 1-1-7 sent a reaction force which killed an additional 2 VC. RESULTS: 4 VC KIA, 1 USMC WIA, 1 M-2 Carbine recovered.

CAP 1-3-4. Acted as a blocking force for a 1/1 Cav USA sweep. The CAP received fire
from an unknown number of VC and returned M-79 and SAF, then swept area. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 1 UNSK WIA, 1 M-2 Carbine KIA.

5 Mar
CAP 1-2-5. Detained 2 VC. RESULTS: 2 VC.

6 Mar
CAP 1-1-7. A patrol attacked 3 VC sitting beside a bunker. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 2 VC POW.

7 Mar
CAP 1-1-8. Patrol conducted a sweep. The patrol received SAF from an unknown number of VC. Returned fire. RESULTS: 3 VC KIA, 3 AK-47's, 3 chicom and 1 Hcn Chmn.

CAP 1-4-2. A patrol detonating a bounding type mine. Emergency medevac called. RESULTS: 1 UNSK KIA, 1 PF KIA, 3 UNSK WIA, 1 RD WIA.

CAP 1-5-2. Civilians brought 2 dud M-79 rounds and 1 chicom grenade. RESULTS: 2 M-79 rounds and 1 chicom grenade destroyed, VIF padd.

8 Mar
CAP 1-1-7. Encountered 3 VC. The VC ran into a bunker and refused to come out. A grenade was thrown into the bunker. RESULTS: 3 VC KIA, 1 AK-51, 1 AK-44, 1 Hcn-36, 1 BAR.


CAP 1-3-6. Received SAF from an estimated squad of VC. The CAP returned fire and swept area. RESULTS: 6 VC KIA, 1 Hcn Chmn; 2 AK-47's, 1 French Carbine, 1 .30 Cal MG.

CAP 1-3-7. Received incoming M-79 and SAF while in ambush. Returned fire and swept area. RESULTS: 1 PF KIA, 1 PF WIA (M), 1 UNSK WIA (M), 2 VC, 1 claymore mine.

9 Mar
CAP 1-4-3. Patrol hit a command detonated mine. The mine consisted of 6 106mm HR rounds. RESULTS: 2 UNSK WIA.
10 Mar

CAP 1-3-6. Informed that Hamlet Chief had been ambushed by 2 VC's. Reaction force called in - 1 VN village official KIA.

CAP 1-1-7. Spotted 1 VC with a weapon. The patrol opened fire and swept area. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 2 M-1 rifles with ammunition, 1 canteen and cartridge belt.

CAP 1-1-6. VN male with shrapnel wounds came to position. The VN had no ID card and claimed he had stepped on a mine. He was medevaced. RESULTS: 1 VCS.

CAP 1-2-4. Made contact with an estimated 200 VC. CAP initiated fire, the enemy broke contact and the area was swept. RESULTS: 3 VC KIA, 1 AK-47, 5 chien grenades.

11 Mar

CAP 1-3-6. Detained 3 VN males listening to a VC radio broadcast. RESULTS: 3 VCS.

CAP 1-1-7. The point element of patrol tripped a boobytrapped 105mm round. RESULTS: 1 PF KIA, 3 PF WIA's.

13 Mar

CAP 1-5-3. Received approximately 40 rounds of sporadic rifle fire. CAP returned 14 rounds of artillery, swept area. RESULTS: 3 VCS, 250 lbs of rice, 1 cartridge belt, 1 canteen and various articles of clothing.

CAP 1-4-3. Patrol made contact with enemy force of unknown force. 1 USMC KIA, 2 USMC WIA's, 2 PF's WIA's.

14 Mar

CAP 1-1-7. Patrol killed 1 VC in open. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

CAP 1-1-2. A patrol went to the assistance of a Hamlet. When it was reported that 10 VC had entered the hamlet and threw a grenade into the home of the hamlet chief killing 1 PF and wounding 3 civilians. The patrol made immediate contact with the VC force and a firefight ensued. RESULTS: 4 VC KIA, 1 AK-47, 4 chien grenades, 1 M-16 recovered.
CAP 1-3-8. Patrol was ambushed resulting in 1 USMC KIA, 1 civilian KIA, 1 AH/HR lost. Reaction from CAP 1-3-2, MRT 1-2 and CAHO 1-3 mod. contact, swop; apprehended 20 VC. 2 USMC from CAHO 1-3 were killed when a boobytrap was detonated during the sweep. RESULTS: 2 USMC KIA, 1 FF KIA, 2 USMC WIA, 1 VN civilian KIA, 26 VC apprehended.

CAP 1-4-2. 2 Koi Chahs turned in to CAP; the Koi Chahs indicated there were others in their squad who might turn in. PsyOp was employed. RESULTS: 2 Koi Chahs.

CAP 1-3-7. Wounded VC was brought to CAP. RESULTS: 1 VC WIA.

14 Mar

LTC 1-2. Received 1 M-16 mine from a Tet boy. RESULTS: 1 mine destroyed, VBIED pain.

CAP 1-4-1. Patrol received CAP. RESULTS: 1 USMC KIA.

CAP 1-4-1. Patrol received sniper fire. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA.

CAP 1-3-5. Modn contact with 4-5 VC, CAP called artillery and swept area. RESULTS: 1 AK-47.

CAP 1-1-6. Patrol engaged an estimated VC squad. VC returned fire and fled. The area was swept. RESULTS: 1 FF KIA, 1 VC KIA.

16 Mar

CAP 1-3-2. 2 VN civilians were injured and 1 was killed by a M-16 mine. CAP called medevac. RESULTS: 1 VN KIA; 3 VN civilian WIA.

CAP 1-4-2. A VN boy brought in 1 AK-44 to CAP. RESULTS: 1 AK-44; VBIED pain.

CAP 1-3-2, MRT 1-2, and CAHO 1-3. Swept area in which a patrol from CAP 1-3-8 was ambushed on 15 Mar. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA.
CAP 1-3-9. Detonated a mine. RESULTS: 1 PT WIA.

CAP 1-4-2. A VH female detonated a mine. Called medevac. RESULTS: 1 civilian WIA.

CAP 1-4-3. Found a large bunker. RESULTS: 1000 lbs of corn, 600 lbs of rice and 20 AK-47 rounds.

CAP 1-3-4. Opened fire on 1 VC. VC returns fire and fled. RESULTS: 1 PT WIA.

CAP 1-3-4. Received SAF from an unknown large enemy force. CAP returned fire and swept area. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA.

CAP 1-3-5. Civilian brought 1 M-26 grenade. RESULTS: 1 M-26 grenade destroyed, VIP paid.

CAP 1-3-9. Patrol observed 3 VC on the opposite side of the river. The patrol initiated SAF, wounding and later capturing 1 VC. VC died before medevac arrived. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

CAP 1-1-6. Approximately 8 VC entered a village and set fire to two hovens. RESULTS: 5 VC KIA, 1 AK-47, 1 AK-44, 8 claymore grenades.

CAGO 1-1. CAGO 1-1 was informed by Quang Tin Province Chief that the HV compound had been overrun and was in enemy hands. Reaction Force consisting of CAP's 1-1-2, 1-1-5 and PF's from Tam Ky District HQ received SAF from compound, called artillery on the site. A spotter controlled air-strike on the objective. Reaction force swept, contacting estimated two Platoons of NVA. Reaction force attacked and secured an intermediate objective, where it received M-16 rounds SAF from an estimated platoon of NVA on a nearby hill. Reaction force gathered fire superiority and assaulted the hill, killing 8 NVA and capturing a number of weapons. The enemy fled and reaction force searched the compound, finding partial remains of 12 persons, 3 of whom were identified as friendlyVN's who had been killed who...
20 Mar

CAP 1-3-2. Approached 1 VCS. RESULTS: 1 VCS.

CAP 1-1-7. Received 4 incoming RPG rounds. CAP returned fire with mortar and 81mm F based on suspected enemy positions. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA, 1 FF WIA.

21 Mar

CAP 1-3-3. Received mortar and satchel charge preparation followed by an estimated VC company in ground attack. VC swept through village throwing grenades. CAP 1-3-3 elander in village exchanged fire with VC. 1 M-16, 1 M-60, 1 60mm mortar were captured by the R. RESULTS: 2 USMC WIA, 1 USMC WIA (M), 1 RP, 2 Combat Youth KIA, 1 AK-47 CTA.
21 Mar

CAP 1-3-5. Observed enemy flag and possible enemy movement. Called 81mm fire swept area. RESULTS: 1 VC flag, quantity of propaganda documents.

CAP 1-1-3. A sweep of NACC when they received fire from enemy squad. Airstrike and artillery were employed on enemy position and area was swept by CAG 1-1/Tan Ky District Chief reconn force. RESULTS: 6 VC KIA, 2 damaged Thompson SMGs, 25 chicom grenades, length of doot cord, 12 expended IED's CIV.

CAP 1-3-4. Element received 5 M-79 rounds and 50 sporadic sniper rounds. Element returned fire, swept area. RESULTS: 36 M-79 rounds.

CAP 1-4-1. Received SAH from unknown size enemy force. CAP returned fire, called artillery and airstrike. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 3 VCS.

CAP 1-3-4. Spotted movement and opened fire, called illumination, swept area. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 1 UNK MIA(M), 2 chicom grenades, various 762 gear, quantity documents.

CAP 1-4-2. Spotted VC wearing packs. Called 81mm mortar fire, swept area receiving SAH during which 1 civilian was MIA. RESULTS: 9 VC KIA, 7 VCS MIA, 1 civilian MIA.

CAP 1-1-4. Patrol received fire from estimated squad of VC, CAP assaulted, killing several VC and capturing weapons. 1 PF KIA and 2 PF's were MIA. 1 KCS and Scout Dog were MIA in this action. Proceeded to CP, patrol again received SAH, patrol returned fire with MG, killing 2 VC. Continuing to CP patrol apprehended 2 VCS, who had given then false information earlier in the day. RESULTS: 1 PF KIA, 2 PF MIA, 1 KCS MIA, 1 Scout Dog WIA(M), 6 VC KIA, 2 VCS, 2 AK-47's.

22 Mar

CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (1)
22 Mar

CAP 1-1-3. CAP reacted to VC attack on Hamlet of Bich Ngo. 2 PF's attached to the Hamlet Chief's force were KIA. CAP swept toward scene of incident, spotted 1 VC fleeing. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 chicom grenade.

23 Mar

CAP 1-4-1. Patrol received fire from an estimated 30-40 VC. Enemy utilized HE's, RPG's, 3.5 rockets, and SAF. Returned fire and swept area finding numerous blood trails. RESULTS: 2 Wounded KIA, 5 VC KIA, 1 PF Wounded, 1 USM(S), 1 N-16 lost.

CAP 1-3-2. Element detained 1 VC. RESULTS: 1 VC.

CAP 1-1-7. Received intelligence from PF's that 1 platoon of VC was located north of Tam Ky. CAP called artillery on suspected position, swept area. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 4 chicos.

24 Mar

CAP 1-3-5. Patrol observed 10 NVA in khaki uniforms. Patrol opened fire, called artillery, swept area finding 3 NVA KIA, 1 N-1 carbine. Continuing sweep, patrol received SAF, requested 8mm mission from Swift Boat; found 4 NVA KIA, equipment and 6 blood trails. While returning to compound, CAP found and destroyed in place 2 N-26 grenade boobytraps. RESULTS: 7 NVA KIA, 1 N-1 carbine, 2 I-26 boobytraps, 2 chicom grenades, 4 AK-47 magazines, 6 blood trails.

CAP 1-4-1. CAP detained 1 VC with a faulty ID card. VC turned over to VN Rangers, taken to Quang Ngai. RESULTS: 1 VC.

25 Mar

CAP 1-4-3. Patrol exchanged fire with VC unit until VC fled area. While sweeping the area, patrol spotted 3 VC running across a rice paddy, opened fire. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

26 Mar

CAP 1-1-7. Patrol made contact with an estimated platoon of VC. SAF was exchanged and enemy broke contact. Patrol swept area, finding 7 VC KIA, several bunkers which produced a number of weapons, 732 gear and documents. Patrol continued for another four
26 Mar

hours, finding numerous tunnels and caves which were blown with explosives. Many of the caves were occupied by VC, and several VC weapons were destroyed when the element of VC that the area was an enemy base camp. RESULTS: 2 USMC WIA, 26 VC KIA, 4 AK-47s, 1 60mm mortar and sight, 1 B-40 rocket launcher, 1 B-41 rocket launcher, 1 NVA claymore 1 Bangalore torpedo, and several items of 792 gear and documents captured. Captured materials were turned over to Tan Ky Prov Hq. 1 PRG-25 radio was damaged by SAF.

CAP 1-1-6. Received SAF, GAP opened fire and requested artillery on movement heard about 75 meters from their position. Swept area. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

27 Mar

CAP 1-3-10. Received approximately 50 SA rounds. Illumination was called, area swept with negative results. Area swept again by first light. RESULTS: 1 LNAV.

CAP 1-5-7. Airstrip received approximately 25 rounds of AWG, element returned fire and swept area. RESULTS: 1 claymore, 1 blastir GAP, 1 hell box.

CAP 1-4-3. Patrol found small VC mine; at same time, unknown size force fired on patrol. Patrol returned fire and swept area. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 USMC WIA, 1 FF WIA.

MET 1-2. 1 Maroon WIA by incoming grenade. Element returned fire, swept area with negative results. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA.

CAP 1-1-5. Patrol found six destroyed bunkers. Fifteen minutes later the patrol made contact with and killed 3 VC. Continuing, the patrol found more bunkers and tunnels containing 1 SMin cleaning rod. Continuing, they spotted and killed 2 VC crossing rice paddy. Patrol received 81mm mortar fire and a spotter plane directed an airstrike on enemy positions resulting in several secondary explosions. A reaction force of CAO 1-1 Hq Personnel and MET 1-1 swept area of airstrike, finding 2 VC KIA (KIA). Further search recovered 500 pounds of rice.
and a small cache of mortars and small arms ammunition that was destroyed. The search also resulted in 6 additional VC KIA (KIA). bunkers and tunnels were destroyed. 1 VC KIA was discovered as the patrol returned from the sweep. RESULTS: 14 VC KIA, 1 WIA, 34 ANV, 2 LI-1 carbines recovered, 500 lbs of rice, 10 60mm mortar rounds, 500 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 12 spigot grenades destroyed and 2 AK-44's captured.

CAP 1-1-4. Patrol received M-79 and SAF from an unknown size enemy force. The CAP returned fire swept with negative results. At 1215 the CAP came under M-79 and M-79 fire. A spotter employed artillery and gunships on the enemy positions. CAP swept area finding 2 VC KIA dressed as females, at 1415 gunships were again employed by the spotter. 3 VC KIA were found by the CAP. Returning from patrol CAP observed 5 VC dress as females. The 7 attempted to flee from the patrol, and were killed. RESULTS: 13 VC KIA.

CAP 1-1-7. Patrol encountered heavy enemy fire, CAP returned fire, swept area. RESULTS 0 VC KIA, 2 AK-47's, 1 LI-2 carbine.

CAP 1-1-8. Received incoming satchel charge mortars and M-60 fire. CAP returned fire called artillery, swept area finding 1 WIA KIA. The CAP called gunships and swift boats for supporting areas, and CAP 1-3-5 sent a reaction force. In the ensuing change of fire 5 PF's were WIA. At first light sweep of the area was conducted. RESULTS: 4 ANV KIA, 2 PF's WIA, 1 PF WIA (M), 2 AK-47's, 32 grenades, 1 84 rocket launcher, assorted SA rounds. CAP 1-3-2. 1 VN female brought 3 weapons to CAP. RESULTS: 1 M-1, 1 LI-60, 1 R-56 VIP ruck.

CAP 1-4-2. FF detonated a bounding-type mine. RESULTS: 1 USMC KIA, 1 FF KIA, 3 USMC WIA, 2 PF WIA.

CAP 1-4-3. Received approximately 110 60mm rounds, 3 40 rockets, 3 satchel charges and
20 Mar

Granados and SADF. CAP returned fire, called mortars and swept area. RESULTS: 6 VC KIA, 1 PFC KIA, 2 WIA, 43 granados and 11 3.5 rocket.

CAP 1-4-1. CAP found 1 R-1 mine, 2 R-26 granados and a partially burned map. RESULTS: 1 R-1 mine, 2 R-26 granados and map turned over to CAP 1 Eo.

CAP 1-3-0. Element enroute to ambush site received SADF from estimated 10 VC in sugar cane field. CAP returned fire and swept area. RESULTS: 1 WIA/MISS.

CAP 1-3-10. Element observed 5 VC in ambush element received M-79 fire, assaulted enemy position hearing VC cry out, no body found. RESULTS: 1 WIA/MISS.

29 Mar

CAP 1-4-4. 5 VC entered north part of hamlet CAP received word from USA SF advisors in same area. RESULTS: 7 civilians KIA, 5 civilians WIA, 2 RD WIA, 1 PFC WIA, 1 National Policeman kidnapped. USA advisor called a medevac for WIA.

CAP 1-5-2. 1 VC WIA was brought to CAP. CAP medevaced VC. RESULTS: 1 VC WIA.

30 Mar

CAP 1-4-7. CAP detained and medevaced 1 VN with gunshot wounds of unknown origin. RESULTS: 1 VCO WIA.

CAP 1-5-3. CAP was informed of the location of 1 Chin Ho. Patrol picked up the Chin Ho and PF's interrogated him. Chin Ho said that he was a Sergeant with 95th Sapper Co. Further stated the 95th Sapper Co. had taken part in the attack on 1-5-3 location on 21 Mar with 50 NVA in their ranks. Further stated that the 95th Sappers had taken 2 KIA and 3 WIA in the same attack, and that his unit had also attacked CAP 1-3-1 earlier in the month, sustaining 6 KIA's and 4 WIA's. WIA's were taken to hospital at unknown grid. Unit is armed with 9 AK-47's, 6 AK-44's, 3 Sks, 3 BAR's, 2 M-60's, 2 M-40's and 25 granados per man. There are 2 medics in the
30 Mar

unit. The Hoi Chanah was turned over to Binh Son District M&G for exploitation.
Payoff follow-up was conducted by USA Brigade.

RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanah.

CAP 1-1-6. Received sniper fire, CAP called artillery and swept area detaining 100 VCS,
later released who were held for questioning by local officials. Several bunkers
were destroyed and approximately 10 tons of rice captured and distributed to needy villagers.

RESULTS: Approx 10 tons of rice captured/distributed.

CAP 1-3-9. CAP reported outbreak of plague, USA Doctor diagnosed the symptoms and in
conjunction with CAP corporal inoculated 9 VCS.

CAP 1-3-9. Did M-79 round which had been turned in by VN, detonated killing 1 PF
and wounding 5 Marines. RESULTS: 1 PF KIA, 5 WOUNDED.

CAP 1-4-9. Patrol with 1 Hoi Chanah to the
location of his rifle spotted 3 VC running into a streamline. The CAP opened fire, killing
1 VC. Patrol proceeded and recovered Hoi Chanah's weapon. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 Hoi
Chanah, 1 AK-47.

CAP 1-5-9. Received information from villagers that VC were coming into hamlet at
night. Patrol investigated, capturing 5 VC (3 female) with grenades at a house.
RESULTS: 5 VC KIA, 2 M-26 grenades.

CAP 1-5-1. A PF received intelligence that
1 of the NVA who engaged CAP 1-5-1 on 27
Mar at 1915H was a Captain who carried a .45 cal. pistol. CAP swept the area designat-
ed by PF finding parts of a .45 cal. pistol which had been destroyed by some type of
explosion. RESULTS: 1 damaged pistol.

CAP 1-4-3. CAP's ambush observed 3 VC.
Ambush opened fire, swept area. RESULTS:
1 VC KIA.
CAP 1-1-7. CAP found and destroyed a tunnel complex killing and capturing a number of VC and VC and a weapon. RESULTS: 7 VC KIA, 2 VC POW, 1 AK-47, 40 chicom grenades.

CAP 1-1-4. 3 VN males carried 1 wounded female into CAP. The 4 VN were sent to Tam Ky District as VCS. RESULTS: 4 VCS.
1st CAG----Supporting Documents, Mar 1969

a) 1st CAG CRubu 3480, "Enemy Boobytrapped Flags", 20 Mar 1969
b) 1st CAG Ltr 3000, "Relocation of CAP 1-1-4; concurrence in", 15 Feb 1969
c) 1st CAG Ltr 3000, "Relocation and Change in Status of CAP 1-2-3", 25 Mar 1969
d) 1st CAG Ltr 3000, "Relocation and Change in Status of CAP 1-1-1", 22 Mar 1969
e) 1st CAG Ltr, "Relocation and change in status of CAP 1-2-7", 18 Mar 1969
f) 1st CAG Ltr 3000, "Relocation of CAP 1-1-6", 25 Mar 1969
g) 1st CAG Ltr 3000, "Activation of Combined Action Platoon 1-4-4", 31 Mar 1969
h) 1st CAG Ltr, "Changes of CAE Status/TAOC's CAPs 1-3-1, 1-3-3, and 1-3-8", 1 Apr 69
i) 1st CAG Ltr 3000, "Relocation and Change in Status of CAP 1-2-1", 23 Mar 1969
j) 1st CAG Ltr 3000, "Change in TAOC of CAP 1-1-7", 5 Mar 1969
k) 1st CAG Ltr 3000, "Change in Status of CAE 1-3-7", 15 Mar 1969

List added 23 Jul 69/R
HEADQUARTERS
1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

Grubul 3400
3/AFB/rdc
20 March 1969

GROUP BULLETIN 3400

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Enemy Boobytrapped Flags

Ref: (a) FM 5-31
    (b) NAVMC 2614
    (c) MCRUL 3400

1. Purpose. To review a boobytrapping technique currently being employed by the enemy and to promulgate appropriate countermesures.

2. Discussion,

   a. Recently a Marine from this command was wounded when he uprooted a flagpole to which a NVA flag was attached. In this case a CAP element had spotted the flag and proceeded to the location. They approached the area with caution suspecting an ambush. When no action developed, the element proceeded to capture the offending flag and a quantity of propaganda leaflets in the vicinity. The suspected ambush was there in the form of the boobytrapped flagpole; an 81mm mortar round had been connected to the pole.

   b. Similar incidents have been reported by other CAGs, pointing up the need for all CAP Marines to be alerted to this enemy technique.

   c. In boobytrapping flagpoles, the enemy is taking advantage of the Marines desire for souvenirs. Items of personal or issue equipment, or any weapon, equipment, or personal property item which might logically attract the souvenir hunter or the curious may become a profitable boobytrap for the enemy.

   d. Employment Techniques: The boobytrapping technique described in paragraph (a) above was so obvious as to cause surprise that it was not identified. But the obvious makes an excellent mask for boobytraps. The enemy knows we are not always going to fall for this bait, but will investigate it cautiously. To account for this he sets other devices in the area. The most careful observation is required for the detection of these supplementary devices.
3. **Action.** When encountering enemy flags or equipment in situations similar to that described in paragraph (a) above, a line will be used to pull the item clear and cause detonation of any attached boobytraps. If this cannot be done, then the item will be blown in place using explosives or a grenade.

   a. In clearing such suspected boobytraps one member of the discovering unit will accomplish the operation while the remainder provide security from cover a safe distance away.

   b. The clearing party will select a safe position offering adequate protection against expected blast and will check that position for mines or boobytraps prior to occupying it.

   c. Reference (a) through (c) are available through this Headquarters and provide an extensive review of the subject of this bulletin.

E. R. HUNTER

**DISTRIBUTION "A", "B", AND "C"**

Plus one copy to each member of 1st CAG.
From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief, Tan Ky Sub-Sector, Quang Tin Province, Republic of Vietnam

Subj: Relocation of CAP 1-1-4; concurrence in

Ref: (a) Tan Ky Sub-Sector msg KSC.4.052 Ngay II Thang 2 nam 1969 15/3/K

1. This command concurs with the relocation of CAP 1-1-4 from Ky Ly Village Area of Operations to Ky Nghia Area of Operations.

2. CAP 1-1-4 began operations within the boundaries of the Ky Nghia Area of Operations as defined by enclosure (1) to reference (a), on this date.

M. R. HUNTER

Copy to:
USHACV IGA Tan Ky
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: AGofS CAT)

Subj: Relocation and Change in Status of CAP 1-2-3

Ref: (a) Map, Vietnam, Series L7014, Sheet No. 6739 IV
Encl: (1) Overlay of CAP 1-2-3 TAOC

1. On 25 March 1969, CAP 1-2-3 was relocated from its previous position in Ky Xuan Village, Ly Tin District, to Ky Khuong Village, Ly Tin District. The CAP will operate in its new TAOC (enclosure (1) to reference (a) ) as a mobile CAP.

E. R. HUNTER
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: AGofS GAP)

Subj: Relocation and Change in Status of CAP 1-1-1

Ref: (a) Msg, Vietnam, Series L7014, Sheet No. 6640 II

Enccl: (1) Overlay of CAP 1-1-1 TAOC

1. On 22 March 1969, CAP 1-1-1 was relocated from Ky Hung Village, Tan Ky District to Ky Nghia Village, Tan Ky District. The CAP will operate within its new TAOC as a mobile CAP, as indicated in enclosure (1) to reference (a).

E. R. HUMPHREY

DECLASSIFIED
MAP SHEET 6640-II

SCALE 1:50,000

SERIES L7014

ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED
From: Commanding Officer

To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: AGofS CAP)

Subj: Relocation and change in status of CAP 1-2-7

Ref: (a) Map, Vietnam, Series L7014, Sheet 6739 IV

Enclosure: (1) Overlay of CAP 1-2-7

1. On 16 March 1969 CAP 1-2-7 was relocated within Ky Sanh Village. CAP 1-2-7 will operate within their new TAOC, (Enclosure 1) to reference (a), as a Mobile CAP.

E. R. Hunter
MAP SHEET 6739 III
SCALE 1:50,000
SERIES L7014

ENCLOSURE (1)
HEADQUARTERS
1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96502

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: AGofS CAP)

Subj: Relocation of CAP 1-1-6

Ref: (a) Map, Vietnam, Series L7014, Sheet 6640 II

Encl: (1) Overlay of CAP 1-1-6

1. On 24 March 1969, CAP 1-1-6 was relocated in a new TAOC in Ky Ny Village, Tam Ky District. CAP 1-1-6 began operations within the boundaries defined by enclos to (1) to reference (a).

R. F. Enright
By direction
HEADQUARTERS
1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/RFM/rob
3000
31 March 1969

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: AGofS CAP)

Subj: Activation of Combined Action Platoon L-4-4

Ref: (a) Map Vietnam, Series L7014, Sheet No. 6739II, Quang Tin

Encl: (1) Overlay of subject CAP TAOC

1. As of 24 March 1969, CAP L-4-4 was activated at the following coordinates:
   BS7582. See reference (a).

2. Arrangements for logistics and fire support have been made and no serious
   problems are anticipated with the activation.

   E. R. HUNTER

Copy to:
CG, Americal Division (Attn: G-3)
CO, 190th Infantry Bde.
CO, 5/46 Infantry Bn
Senior Advisor, Quang Ngai Province
Senior Advisor, Son Tin District
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: AGofS CAP)

Subj: Changes of CAP Status/TAOs's CAPs L-3-1, L-3-3, and L-3-8

Ref: (a) FORO 3121.4B
(b) Map Vietnam, 1:50,000 Series L7014, Sheet Nos. 6739L, 6739IV

Encl: (1) Overlay of L-3-1/L-3-3 TAOs
(2) Overlay of L-3-8 TAO

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following changes of CAP status/TAO is reported.

   a. On 9 March 1969, CAP L-3-1 (QN #20PF) changed from comfort CAP to Mobile CAP status, moving to a new TAO vicinity BS 5998. (Encl 1).

   b. On 9 March 1969, CAP L-3-3 TAO was modified as a result of relocation of CAP L-3-1. (Encl 1).

   c. On 9 March 1969, CAP L-3-8 (QN #11PF) changed from comfort CAP to Mobile CAP status with TAO vicinity BS 5991. (Encl 2).

E. R. HUNTER
MAP SHEET 6739T

SCALE 1:50,000

SERIES L7014

ENCLOSURE (1)
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: ACofS CAP)

Subj: Relocation and Change in Status of CAP 1-2-1

Ref: (a) Map, Vietnam, Series L7014, Sheets 6740 III, and 6739 IV

Enclosure: (1) Overlay of CAP 1-2-1

1. On 23 March 1969, CAP 1-2-1 was relocated from Ky Hoc village, Iy Tin District, to a new TAOC in Ky Chanh village, Iy Tin District.

2. The CAP will operate in the new TAOC as a MOBILE CAP.

E. R. Hunter
MAP SHEET 6740-III

SCALE 1:50,000

SERIES 47014

ENCLOSURE (1)
From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: ACoS CAP)  
Subj: Change in TaCC of CAP 1-1-7  
Ref: (a) Map, Vietnam, Series L7014, Sheet 6740 III, 6640 II  
Endl: (1) Overlay of CAP 1-1-7 TaCC

1. On 6 March 1969, CAP 1-1-7 will begin operation in a new TaCC in accordance with enclosure (1) to reference (a). The change in TaCC of CAP 1-1-7 will not remove it from the village of its past operation, by Anh Village, Tam Ky District.

E. R. RUMBER
MAP SHEET 6740-III

SCALE 1:50,000

SERIES L7014

ENCLOSURE (1)
From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: CofS CAP)  

Subj: Change in Status of CAP 1-3-7  

1. On 15 March 1969, CAP 1-3-7 changed status from a compound CAP to a mobile CAP. CAP 1-3-7 will continue to operate in its previous TACO.