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(Unclassified upon removal from the basic correspondence)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st CAG ltr 6/JEH/irs 5700 Ser: 018-69 of 12 Jul 1969

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 June 1969 to 30 June 1969 (U)

1. Forwarded.

R. H. BARROW
By direction

Copy to:
CO, 1st CAG

DECLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
(Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1))

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 June 1969 to 30 June 1969

Ref: (a) MCO 55750.11A
(b) HiFiPacO 5750.8A

Encl: (1) 1st Combined Action Group, III Marine Amphibious Force
Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b),
   enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Downgraded at 3-year intervals, declassified after 12 years.
   DOD Dir 5200.10.

J. E. HENNEGAN

Copy 1 of 10 Copies
### COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

**1 June 1969 to 30 June 1969**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART I</th>
<th>ORGANIZATIONAL DATA</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PART II</td>
<td>NARRATIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>II-1 - II-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART III</td>
<td>SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS</td>
<td>III-1 - III-19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**UNCLASSIFIED**

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12-YEARS

ENCLOSURE (1)
PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. DESIGNATED

1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO, San Francisco, California

Commander
LtCol J. W. HENNEGAN
1Jun69 - 30Jun69

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Combined Action Company 1-1
Captain L. H. ROSS
1Jun69 - 30Jun69

Combined Action Company 1-2
Captain R. B. WEBBOTT
1Jun69 - 30Jun69

Combined Action Company 1-3
Captain P. G. MITCHELL
1Jun69 - 30Jun69

Combined Action Company 1-4
Captain K. M. SEARS
1Jun69 - 30Jun69

ATTACHED UNITS

1. None.

2. LOCATIONS

HQ, 1st CAG
Chu Lai, Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, RVN

CACO 1-1
Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province, RVN

CACO 1-2
Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, RVN

CACO 1-3
Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN

CACO 1-4
Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN

MTT-1
Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province, RVN

MTT-2
Bin Son District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer
Major J. L. McKINNON
1Jun69 - 30Jun69

Adjutant/S-1
2ndLt B. W. SHYH
1Jun69 - 30Jun69

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ENCLOSURE
S-2/S-3

Major R. F. ENDERT
1Jun69 - 30Jun69

S-4/Supply

Captain T. M. GARBO
1Jun69

Communications Officer

Major R. F. ENDERT
1Jun69 - 30Jun69

S-5/Special Services

Major J. H. LAWSON
1Jun69 - 30Jun69

Medical Section

HML T. A. ROBINSON
1Jun69 - 30Jun69

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Off</td>
<td>Enl</td>
<td>Off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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PART II
NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. Personnel; Administration.
   a. Joined and transferred. During the month of June, the 1st Combined Action Group joined and transferred the following number personnel listed in the four categories below:

   (1) Officers \( \frac{0}{57} \)

   (2) Rotated CONUS
       Officers \( \frac{0}{40} \)

   (3) Transferred within WestPac Command.
       Officers \( \frac{0}{4} \)

   (4) Transferred by SR w/sick (out of country hospitals).
       Officers \( \frac{0}{19} \)

   b. Awards.

   (1) There was one Silver Star, one Legion of Merit, two Navy Commendation and one Navy Achievement and six end of tour awards submitted to FMFPac for approval during the month of June 1969.

       SSM \( \frac{1}{5} \)
       LCM \( \frac{1}{4} \)
       BSM \( \frac{3}{4} \)
       NCM \( \frac{4}{5} \)
       NAM \( \frac{5}{5} \)

   (2) Awards returned approved from FMFPac included the following:

       BSM \( \frac{1}{1} \)
       NCM \( \frac{4}{4} \)
       NAM \( \frac{1}{1} \)

   (3) Personnel of the 1st Combined Action Group also received the following awards as a result of combat wounds, heroic/meritorious service in the Republic of Vietnam.

       PHM \( \frac{9}{9} \)
       VCO \( \frac{1}{1} \)
       Commendation from RVN Government \( \frac{1}{1} \)

II-1

ENCLOSURE (1)
c. Casualties. Casualties during the month of June 1969 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>DAI</th>
<th>DOW</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>WIA/N</th>
<th>NBC</th>
<th>WIA/NBC RET TO I/H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. CONGRINTS/SPLINTS/WELREP. There were one Congressional interest correspondence and no Welfare Reports during the month of June 1969.

e. Administrative Assistance.

There were no Group directives promulgated during the reporting month.

f. Legal. A breakdown of legal activities for June is shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Art 32 Investigations</th>
<th>Informal Investigations</th>
<th>NJP</th>
<th>SPFOM</th>
<th>SCN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. Morale and Welfare. The morale of the unit continues to be high and special services equipment available to all hands. Quotas for both out of country and in country Rest and Recuperation (R&R) are effectively being utilized. The following is a breakdown.

(1) Out of country R&R - Quotas Utilized
   49 49

(2) In Country R&R - 4 3

(3) Five parties are held at a different CAP each week consisting of a cookout, beer and soda. Each CAP sends a man in to the rear or staggered schedule to allow him to relax and enjoy the club and beach facilities.

h. Career Planning. The career planning program continues to be stressed at all levels of command. A continuing effort is being made to increase the civilian education level of Marines within the command through USAFI GED testing. One Marine applied for the fiscal year 70 Warrent Officer Program.
i. Mail. Daily average bags of mail were processed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letters</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incoming</td>
<td>Outgoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2 bag</td>
<td>1/2 bag</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Packages</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incoming</td>
<td>4 bags</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: One bag of letters represents approximately 2,000 letters.

j. Promotions. 128 enlisted promotions were effected during the month of June 1969 as follows:

Staff Sergeant  1
Sergeant        6
Corporal        63
Lance Corporal  56
PFC             3

k. Hospital Visits. Hospital visits are made daily by the Hospital Corpsman representative, the Casualty NCO, and the Mail Orderly along with frequent visits by the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, the Adjutant and First Sergeant. Casualties are visited as soon as they are evacuated from the field. Normally, the Commanding Officer or his representative, having been notified by Dustoff Control Chu Lai, of the destination of the individual are waiting at the hospital when the casualty arrives. The dead are identified within hours of arrival at Chu Lai.
2. Intelligence

a. General

(1) The month began with a low level of activity lasting up until the night of 7-8 June when a wave of enemy attacks in both provinces signalled the June phase of the enemy offensive plan was underway. After the 8th of June, contacts fell off throughout the 1st Combined Action Group Tactical Areas of Coordination (TACOs) with the exception of those in Binh Son District, where the NVA/VC kept up a fluctuating pressure till the end of the month.

(2) Although the 1st Combined Action Company carried the second place for all contact and again produced the majority of the kills for 1st TACO during the month, activities (compared with the Quang Ngai TACOs) fell off considerably in Quang Tin Province. The enemy chose to repair to the hinterlands to refit and train, probably in line with his overall offensive plan and to the casualties taken in the fighting 7-8-9 June in the Tam Ky area.

(3) Following the 7-8 June attacks, the enemy maintained a steady pressure on the hamlets of Binh Son District with small arms and sapper attacks. There were some acts of terrorism including kidnapping and the destruction of hamlet civic buildings. A part of the pressure was placed to a possible diversionary attack designed to relieve pressure on the base area of the 21st NVA Regiment which was under attack later in the month by combined 6th ARVN Regiment and 198th Light Infantry Brigade units operating to the southwest of CAP 1-3-9. Units attacking CAP Company 956 and CAP 1-3-2 along the Tra Bong River, west of Binh Son District headquarters, were identified as the 4th and 5th battalions of the 21st Regiment supported by a weapons company organic to that Regiment. There is a conflict of opinion on whether this was a diversionary measure or, when taken in conjunction with sapper attacks against hamlets in eastern Binh Son, it may have been a coordinated attack plan conducted despite the friendly attacks on the 21st NVA Regiment. In all, there were two significant attacks along the Tra Bong River west of Binh Son District Headquarters and three attacks on villages in eastern Binh Son. The overall nature of the attacks indicates an enemy attempt to harass CAP mobility, as the homes of persons housing the CAPs were most often the targets of sapper raids, and in two attacks the sappers assaulted hamlets yelling for CAP Marines by name. The effect of this could be to make the populace reluctant to house Marines, a factor upon which CAP mobility depends.

(4) As mentioned above, contact was heavy during the 7-8 June attacks dwindled (with the exception of CAP 1-3 CAPs) during the rest of the month in the other three company areas. In terms of contact for June, CAP 1-3 had the greatest number, with CAPs 1-1, 1-4, and 1-2 following in that order. Of note in the CAP 1-4 area was the proof of reports that the VC were schooling children to observe Popular and Regional Forces movements and report their patterns as well as lane areas of frequent use when patterns were set. At CAP 1-4-2, a Ho Chi Minh provided information leading to the capture of 14 children who had this type of mission.

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II-4

ENCLOSURE (1)
b. Intelligence Chain. There was no change in the Intelligence Chain during the month. First CAG-America Division G-2 relationship continues to be very good, with every assistance given the CAG in Intelligence matters. Contact between the Assistant G-2 and S-3 of the CAG was frequent as the Division provided document readouts on captured PsyOps leaflets and identification of other combat paraphernalia turned in by CAGs.

(1) There was a drop off in the volume of verified intelligence reports by the populace although this source remains the CAP's best for intelligence of immediate tactical import. The ratio of reports to verified activities fell to about twenty-five percent. In May, the ratio was about fifty percent.

c. ARVN Liaison Officer/Interpreters. The Group continues to enjoy the services of a dynamic young liaison officer who has greatly assisted the coordination of this Headquarters with counterpart leadership. This is the result mainly of personalities, as the Liaison Officer and the Commanding Officer of the CAG are of similar bent with regard to positive relations with foreigners, and this has led to a positive response from Vietnamese leaders at both province headquarters and all four districts in which the 1st CAG operates. The present situation reflects one of the truths of any advisory-oriented program: Where the American is interested and generates and impression of willingness to trust his counterparts and to learn and understand their problems, there will be a positive and fruitful relationship. Where the American is reticent, distrustful, and overbearing the relationship will vary from neutral to negative in terms of results.

(1) Three interpreters remain assigned this group with a fourth interpreter still in an unauthorized absence status. A case of personalities caused some difficulty encountered with one interpreter during June. A conference with both the NCOIC of MTT 1-2 and the Interpreter served to reduce friction. The ARVN Liaison Officer provided invaluable assistance in this instance also.
3. Operation
   a. General

   (1) The 1st Combined Action Group continued to conduct operations in accordance with its mission of village level security in the two southernmost provinces of the I Corps Tactical Zone. When compared with the previous months of 1969, June proved to be least productive in terms of kills, as the enemy generally avoided contact after the wave of attacks 7-8 June in all TACOs of the 1st Combined Action Group excepting that of the 3d Company, where he kept up pressure throughout the month.

   (2) On 30 June 1969, 1st CAG completed the turnover of all River Patrol craft equipment to 2nd SAT Battalion in accordance with verbal arrangements made with the Americal Division G-3 and G-4 and S-4 19th LIB. This action was prompted by the loss of necessary maintenance support resulting from reorganization of Americal Division logistical and maintenance support systems. This reorganization of Americal support eliminated the Division’s boat repair capability. With the relocation of two CAPs from the northern Patrol area in March and April, the benefit from 1st CAG conducting the patrol mission was considerably reduced. The opportunity for use of the Southern Patrol Area to assist CACO 1-3 operations along the Tuy Hoa River was consistently hampered by equipment breakdown after February so that this resource could not be counted upon when planning operations. In all, the lack of maintenance, the relocation of CAPs, and the need to put headquarters personnel into the field from time to time thus reducing the number of personnel available to man the patrols, all served to erode the effectiveness of the patrol mission from the 1st CAG point of view. This headquarters requested relief from the mission when it was apparent no support was to be available. After the reorganization.

   b. Activities. During the period there were a total of three joint-CAP operations and two multi-CAP operations conducted which resulted mostly in excuse as the number of kills was limited to 16.

   (1) CACO 1-1 as usual, accounted for the greatest results from operations in June. The operation involved CAPs 1-1-1 and 1-1-4, accompanied by two platoons of Tu Do District Popular Forces in a coordinated sweep of both CAP TACOs. Control was exercised by the District Chief personally, with the CO, CACO 1-1 accompanying. The operation resulted in 6 NVA KIA, 4 VC KIA, 1 VC POW, and 3 AK-47s, 1 M-79 grenade launcher and 7 chicom grenades captured.

   (2) CACO 1-2 conducted three operations, two of which were joint CAP-US Army RAPCordon and Search operations. These operations resulted in 10 VCS, most of whom were later released as Innocent Civilians. The important result was experience, which by then director exercised increasing coordination and control. These Cordon and Search operations approached the ideal in effecting Combined Action Program goals involving training of Popular Forces and PF leadership in the coordination of joint VII/US operations and in the conduct of a bilingual multi-force Cordon and Search involving not only US Forces, but Vietnamese agencies such as Revolutionary Development Teams and District Census Grievance Committees. This Company, due to its proximity to Chu Lai Base and to Americal Division line unit.
enjoy a "buffered" situation which allows stronger emphasis on the training aspect of Combined Action Program. No other company in the 1st CAG finds itself in this position.

(3) CACO 1-3 conducted a single operation this month involving CAP 1-3-2 1-3-9 and RF Company 956. The operation resulted in 4 VC KIA, and another experience in CAP/RF coordination under the control of CO, CACO 1-3. The operation also kept the VC aware that he does not have a free run of the contested area between CAP 1-3-9 and RF Company 956.

(4) The following statistics derive of 1st CAG operations and activities

(a) Night Patrols 42 Multi-CAP operations 5
Ambushes 1710 Dry Patrols 824
IPs 712

(b) Enemy Casualties

KIA FM DETAINERS IDI CHANCE
64 13 53 3

(c) Weapons and Ordnance Captured.

8 AK-47s 1 M-16 rifle
1 M-1 carbine 1 .45 caliber pistol
1 M-79 grenade launcher 2 SKS rifles
2 M-1 rifles 1 B-40 rocket launcher

(d) Friendly Casualties Sustained.

          KIA       WIA       MIA       POW
UHIC 1 15 0 ( ) 0
USF 0 1 0 0
FF 11 35 0 0

o. Training

(1) General. Formal training conducted during this period included the daily training schedule for the CAPs and three Training Inspectors traveling from CAP to CAP conducting formal training on certain subjects. Two schools and one indoctrination class were attended by 1st CAG Marines.

(2) CAP Training. On the CAP level, 962 hours of formal training was conducted. At each CAP location 37 hours of formal training was conducted. This is in addition to the informal training conducted during visits by headquarters personnel. Also, Training Inspectors conducted training at 16 CAP positions.
Type of Training       Location  Hours
----------------------  ------  -----
General Military Subjects   CAP    546
Vietnamese Language        CAP    312
Personal Response          CAP    52  
Leadership/Tactics         CAP    52

(3) MTT Training. MTT training included 98 hours of formal training for Vietnamese Forces. Included in MTT training were many hours of On the Job Training when the daily instruction was completed.

(a) MTT 1-1 trained 31 Popular Self Defense Force personnel from Tam Ky District.

(b) MTT 1-2 trained no Vietnamese Forces due to the lack of platoon available for training in Binh Son District.

(4) Other Training

(a) Five 1st CAC Marines attended the month-long Vietnamese language course at 2nd CAC headquarters. One failed to complete the course because of illness, and will attend the July course.

(b) Four Marines from 1st CAC completed a three-day Artillery school conducted by the American Division Artillery headquarters.

(c) All newly-joined Marines received a one day indoctrination course prior to attending CAP school, and a four-hour familiarization firing exercise with the M-16 rifle. This course involves training to show the effectiveness of semi-automatic fire over automatic fire and teaches correct night-firing techniques.

(d) One Marine attended the Kit Carson school orientation conducted in Da Nung area by 1st Marine Division.

d. Inspections. Each CAC headquarters and most CAPs were inspected by a number of the 1st CAC headquarters during the period. Company Commanders and/or Gunnery Sergeants inspected their CAPs, remaining overnight in many instances. General DOHERTY and the CAP Director, Colonel HUNTOON, were accompanied on a site visit to a number of CAPs in all four districts by CO, 1st CAC 1st in the north. The CAP Director remained overnight at CAC headquarters, going on to inspect more CAPs the following day.

(1) I&I Section Inspector strength was increased by one Sergeant in June. He is presently being oriented by the Training Inspector FCO by means of an inspection of the 1st Company CAPs. When a third Inspector Training FCO is allotted the section, it will be possible to inspect each CAP in the Group at least once per month and with a greater degree of thoroughness than is presently allowable. This part of the I&I Section has not functioned with any real stability until recently when a Staff FCO and one Sergeant both of whom had a reasonable time remaining on tour were assigned. At present, Sergeants and Corporals in a transient status are still utilized to accomplish a part of the CAP inspections.

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II-8

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This lends no close experience to the individual inspections, as the transient NGO inspector has a varying degree of interest and experience, and no more can be expected than the completion of the Inspector Questionnaire plus the conduct of one or more CMS classes. Continuity and stability are sought for this section, but are difficult to obtain. Once there are sufficient sergeants commanding CAPs, there is the possibility that a third sergeant can be drawn into the I&I Section as a Training Inspector.

(a) In the case of transient NGOs awaiting orders to CAP School, there is a certain benefit drawn from their employment as Training Inspectors. On the one hand, they receive an introduction to the program not available at CAP School which, it is hoped, motivates their learning. On the other hand, their reports and comments upon being debriefed after inspecting allow a closer look at their capabilities and attitudes than the Service Record Book and pre-assignment interview afforded. With this additional background to work with and knowledge of the specific leadership needs of each company gained from conferences with the company commanders, the chances of fitting the NGO to the job are greatly increased.

e. Air Support. Fixed Wing and CAS continued best in the Tan Ky area, with CACO 1-1 utilized it on all operations and during enemy patrols. All Companies have utilized Air Support of some description during the month, and both Third and Fourth Companies took advantage of helicopter gunships and Spooky during the night actions.

f. Fire Support. The fire support situation fluctuated slightly, with the addition of a battery of 8" Howitzers at NPT 1-1 during the high threat period and wave of attacks early in the month. This battery was pulled out late in the month when activity was reduced. The platoon of 105mm Howitzers added to the 4-2" mortar battery position on Hill 26 in CAP 1-4-1's TAOC was scheduled to move to LZ MINUTE MAN along with the 4-2" mortar battery in order to better support 198th LIE screening operations west of the Datangan Peninsula. Engineer units prepared positions late in the month but the projected movement of the artillery was postponed due to more immediate operations which removed the screening units from the Datangan Peninsula area for a period of time. Artillery Fire Support remains otherwise stable, with this Army being most often called upon by CAPs in need of support.

g. Scout Dog Teams. There were seven Scout Dog Teams operating in support of IAT CAS operated at varying times throughout the month. Four teams remained at the end of the month, with one scheduled to leave because the dog - a Sentry Dog - was too friendly and a burker, which diminished his suitability for the job.

h. Other Support. Due to a rise in sniper attacks of CAPs in the Eastern Dien Bien Phu area, a company-size operation was conducted by 198th LIE in the area due south of CAP 1-3-3's TAOC in an effort to engage the 95th VC Sniper Company. It happened purely by coincidence that the Combat Assault of the 198th LIE unit followed the termination of a sniper attack on CAP 1-3-3's hamlet of Phuoc Noi. In effect, it appeared that a reaction force had been put in, while this was not a response to that single action itself, but to two previous such actions during the month. The 1st CAS-198th LIE relationship and that with the Americal Division CP continues to go along quite well, with those headquarters doing every thing within reason to provide adequate support to this command.
1. Psychological Operations. In June, 1st CAG, in coordination with the Americal Division dropped over 9 million leaflets and conducted over 25 hours of taped aerial and ground broadcasts. The primary themes were: Chieu Hoi, Pro-GVN, and Anti-NVA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEAFLETS</th>
<th>VOLUME</th>
<th>AERIAL BROADCAST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chieu Hoi</td>
<td>6,060,000</td>
<td>13:35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-GVN</td>
<td>2,075,000</td>
<td>8:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-VC</td>
<td>127,000</td>
<td>1:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-NVA</td>
<td>3,445,000</td>
<td>2:55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rovers</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>1:10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

j. Kit Carson Scouts. The KCS continue to contribute to the effectiveness of CAP operations. One Kit Carson Scout was recently transferred to CACO 1-2 from CACO 1-1 due to a problem indicating a lack of motivation. He is serving a probation period now wherein he is to be supervised and closely evaluated by CO, CACO 1-2 to determine his retention with 1st CAG.

k. Volunteer Informant Program. A total of 23,900 SVN was spent during June under the VIP program. All expenditures were for weapons or ordnance turned in or pointed out in place to the CAP. As is usually the case, CACO 1-3 accounted for the greatest amount of ordnance turned in, with CACO 1-4, CACO 1-1 and CACO 1-2 following in that order.

   (1) The following statistics recap VIP expenditures for June:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type Ordnance</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type Ordnance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>105mm rds</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>82mm rds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>60mm rds</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60 World rds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>57mm rds</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>39mm rds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>M-16 mines</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>M-26 rds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>chincan grenades</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>AK-47 rds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

l. Communication Improvement

(1) Radio Set AN/PRC-47. During the reporting period the 1st CAG Communications Chief received from 5th Communication Battalion on a temporary loan but

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EQUIPMENT</th>
<th>CTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio Set AN/PRC-47</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery ED-451/U</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote AN/GRA-6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery Recharger</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) In addition to the above equipment, a Sergeant 2533 was given TAD orders to assist the Communications Chief in the installation of the equipment at outlying Companies of the 1st CAG. For a period of 10 days the PRC-47 Radio Sets were installed and tested with various antennas using various frequencies with no success in obtaining reliable communications between Company and Group headquarters. After this period of time, additional technical assistance was deemed necessary. Accordingly, the Radio Platoon Commander and Platoon Sergeant of Communication Company, 5th Communication Battalion were made available for this purpose. After
a period of trials installations, at all companies, employing various antenna configurations and utilizing various frequencies, it was determined the Radio Set AN/PRC-47 would not perform adequately to achieve the standards of reliability required at the 1st CAG. In view of this, the Radio Mateon Sergeant returned to his parent organization to submit appropriate reports on the performance of the Radio Set AN/PRC-47. Further, to recommend the 1st CAG be given on a temporary loan basis; Radio Set AN/GRC-125 and antenna Log-Periodic AS-2236. This communications system has a profile of medium power output with high directivity of signal and simplified operating characteristics.

(3) Radio Repair

(a) 1st FSR. During the reporting period a relatively significant improvement in "turn-around" time was evident. Although the 1st CAG is doing the majority of repair work on the RF-505/PRC-25; Maintenance Battalion 1st FSR/PIC is still receiving AN/PRC-25 accessory items such as headsets, microphones, loudspeakers, etc. The turn-around time on these items during the reporting period has averaged about 14 days. This is a significant improvement over past performance, but it still not considered to be satisfactory. Satisfactory turn-around time is considered to be one day in-shop time.

REPAIR WORK SUMMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION</th>
<th>TO REPAIR</th>
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4. S-4/Supply
   
a. Significant Events.
   
   (1) Second echelon maintenance support of the equipment in this group is now being provided by the FLC activity at Chu Lai. Results to date indicate that the readiness of tactical equipment will improve significantly by virtue of the current support program.
   
   (2) One AN/PRC-25 radio was reported as a combat loss during the month.
   
   (3) A reinspection of the Motor Transport function of this command was conducted and an overall rating of "Good with discrepancies" resulted. Command attention is being focused on Motor Transport and significant improvement has been realized.
   
b. Supply.
   
   (1) At present the supply situation within the command is satisfactory. Certain T/E deficiencies as reported in the monthly LOGSUM effect the material readiness of the Group and are of primary concern. Addressing the monsoon season, certain items, particularly rain suits, ponchos, and poncho liners will be required to outfit troops in the field. This material is on order and receipts should be realized in sufficient time to preclude a critical status on these items. Continual emphasis is being placed on the informal account and timely requisitioning to preclude a stock out position pending material availability at the CCP.
   
c. Maintenance.
   
   (1) The maintenance of material and equipment has generally improved during the month of June. A problem with handset 189-GR continues, however, the FLC support unit has turned around repaired items in a rapid manner. Ordnance items currently in repair are not significantly impairing the unit's combat posture and downtime is also minimal. Of great importance is the fact that at the end of the month only two vehicles remain deadline which depicts the benefits derived from the establishment of a support program by the cognizant FLC unit.
   
d. Motor Transport.
   
   (1) During the month of June the Motor Transport capability and vehicle utilization has improved continuously. Vehicle maintenance remains paramount, and through constant "Troubleshooting", the aim is to spot necessary repairs and minimize deadlining of equipment. Administrative records, i.e., trip tickets, record jackets, and PM Sheets are being carefully scrutinized for accuracy adding to the overall improvements in this area.
   
e. Miscellaneous.
   
   (1) Troop facilities, EM and NCO quarters, have been renovated and various improvements made to include air conditioning of recreation rooms. In addition, the relocation of the Group mail room and special
services has been effected. Work continues on the readying of 3 quanset huts to be utilized as the Group Headquarters.

(2) Two Marines of Group Supply completed the Basic Organic Accounting School conducted at PLC during June.

f. Medical. The following information was received during the Senior Corpsman's Meeting in Quang Tri during the month of June.

(1) In the event it becomes necessary to inoculate a village for a specific disease obtain prior permission from the District Headquarters and the Medical Chief of the CAG unit.

(2) All F.U.O. cases should be checked for possible malaria; quite frequently "low grade" malaria is not demonstrated by the organism on a blood smear.

(3) Corpsmen should be on the alert for possible Neuropsychiatric cases. Emotional stress, passive aggressive reaction are two examples of what institutes a potential N.P. patient.

(4) Techniques

(a) Field inspections of all CAPs and the CAG Headquarters continue to be conducted weekly. Improvements in field sanitation are steadily being made.

(b) Medcaps conducted  
Patients treated 17,121  
Adults evacuated 25  
Children evacuated 07  
Dentcaps 37

(c) U. S. Personnel treated at CAG  
Sick Call 240

(d) Hospitalized  
WIA 09  
Illness 46
5. Civic Action

a. Food, Clothing and soap was distributed by the CAPs along with 300 school kits. These school kits went to the Hamlet in An Hoi on the Batangan Peninsula since Binh Duc resettled, their village is the only one with schools operating at this time. Two wood-working kits were also given out in this hamlet since there is much building going on for the additional refugees being resettled in An Hoi.

b. The following projects were completed during June:

(1) CAP 1-1-1 Constructed a volley ball court at grid BT 292187

(2) CAP 1-1-3 installed a pump in an existing well in the resettlement village of Bich Ngo (2) vicinity of grid BT 3h916:

(3) CAP 1-2-2 Built a crude chicken cage at grid BT 393164.

(4) CAP 1-3-3 Completed repairing a roof of a school house in Phouc Hoa in the vicinity of grid 655975.

(5) CAP 1-3-6 Completed repair of dispensary at ES 67h937. This dispensary was built by the Vietnamese last February and blown up by the Viet Cong one week after completion. This time we only provided tin for the roof and the villagers purchased or acquired the cement through their own sources. All work was done by the Vietnamese.

(6) The S-5 NCO sprayed the hamlets at An Ky and An Hoi in 1-4-3 and 1-4-4's AO with fly spray. He also gave out 5000 rolls of fly paper which the people greatly appreciated. They went out of their way to thank him for this generosity.
PAX III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS

1 June
CAP 1-3-9. Spotted 8 -10 VC crossing a river at BS 503634. The VC were moving S and appeared to be carrying supplies. The CAP called artillery mission on the enemy force and swept the area with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

2 June
CAP 1-1-4. Element received SAF from an estimated enemy squad at BT 260260. The CAP returned fire and the enemy broke contact heading W. The CAP swept the area finding 2 VC KIA and 1 M-1 carbine. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 1 WIA.

CAP 1-3-3. A patrol received heavy SAF at BS 664969. An artillery mission was adjusted on the enemy position and the remainder of the CAP linked up with the patrol to sweep the area. 15 - 20 VC were observed withdrawing NW. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-1-2. One dul 105mm round was turned in to CAP at BS 578905 by a local civilian. RESULTS: 1 105mm round destroyed.

CAP 1-3-3. Received approximately 20 round of incoming 82mm and a heavy volume of SAF from an unknown number of enemy at BS 69697. The CAP returned fire and requested an artillery mission. A sweep found indications that the enemy had withdrawn to the S. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-4-2. Received approximately 20 round of sniper fire at BS 775855. The CAP returned fire and adjusted artillery on the suspected enemy position. A sweep was conducted with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

3 June
CAP 1-3-2. A VN male delivered one 60mm round to CAP at BS 576905. The round destroyed and a VIP payday made. RESULTS: 1 60mm round destroyed.
3 June

MOT 1-1. Received word from villagers that 5 VC were in the vicinity of MT 303188. An MOT patrol sent to the area was unable to make contact with the reported VC but approached 1 female VC. RESULTS: 1 VC.

CAP 1-3-7. Ambush spotted lights and movement at BS 629942. The CAP called in an artillery mission on the area and swept with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

MOT 1-2. Received 1 incoming satchel charge at BS 599919. The satchel landed short of the MT's position and fell into a civilian home, killing 1 VN child and wounding 2 VN adults. The MT swept the area with negative results. RESULTS: 1 civilian KIA, 2 civilians WIA.

CAP 1-4-1. Elements checking in cards detained 1 female without a card at BS 610815. RESULTS: 1 VC.

CAP 1-4-3. A VN female tripped a booby trapped M-26 grenade at BS 769838. CAP moved the woman and checked the area with negative results. RESULTS: 1 civilian WIA.

CAP 1-3-9. An unknown size VC force initiated a helicopter approaching LZ at BS 478267. The helicopter vacated the area and the CAP returned SA and AIF. An artillery mission was called on the enemy position and blood trails leading W were found on a sweep of the area. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-1-7. Requested by FF units to act as a blocking force for possible VC movement in the vicinity of MT 305293. The CAP made contact and exchanged fire with an estimate of two squads of VC. The enemy withdrew to the NE and the CAP requested gunships for the area. After the gunships departed the CAP swept the area finding 12 VC KIA, 3 AK-47's, 21 shrapnel grenades and assorted SA rounds and 782 gear. RESULTS: 12 VC KIA, 3 I/C.

5 June

UNCLASSIFIED

III-2

DECLASSIFIED
5 June

CAP 1-3-2. A VN male brought two 60mm mortar rounds to CAP at BS 576904. The CAP destroyed the rounds and made a VIP payment. RESULTS: Two 60mm rounds destroyed.

CAP 1-3-8. The CAP group received fire from approximately 4 VC at BS 586924. The CAP element returned fire and called an artillery mission on the enemy position causing the enemy to flee in an unknown direction. A sweep produced negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

6 June

CAP 1-3-3. Outpost observed people carrying bundles and baskets in a restricted area at BS 664985. SAF was received from the area of the movement and an artillery mission was fired in return. The area could not be swept due to the presence of numerous enemy mines in the area. RESULTS: Unknown.

7 June

CAP 1-3-2. Received 1 incoming grenade in its wire at BS 570904. The grenade wounded civilian VN drum beater, part of the local early warning network. The area was swept with negative results. RESULTS: 1 VC WIA.

CAP 1-3-3. Received approximately 100 rounds of SAF from an unknown number of enemy at BS 664985. The CAP returned fire with organic weapons and artillery and swept the area with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-4-4. Personnel observed one VC mortar round at BS 744918. Artillery was adjusted on the area and 1 VC was seen to fall and flee NE. The fallen VC was observed for 1 hour during which time he did not move. The area could not be swept due to a water barrier. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

CAP 1-3-9. A patrol observed and approached an unarmed VC carrying supplies at BS 48380. RESULTS: 1 VC POW.

8 June

CAP 1-1-7. Patrol approaching the Biet Loi CP received enemy mortar fire at BS 298295, wounding 2 FF's and 1 USN requiring evasive action. A spotter plane was requested and artillery and air strikes were employed against the enemy. A sweep found 3 VC KIA, 3 civilians

III-3

ENCLOSURE (1)
grrenades, 2 AK-47 magazines, 2 82mm mortar rounds, 3 cartridge belts and 2 NVA entrenching tools. RESULTS: 1 USN WIA, 2 PF WIA, 3 VC KIA, 3 chicom grenades, and miscellaneous energy 782 gear captured.

CAP 1-1-6. Patrol received SAF and AMF from an estimated 15 VC at BS 229250. The patrol returned fire and called artillery forcing the enemy to break contact to the SW. 1 Marine was wounded and evacuated in the contact. A search of the area found 3 roccon rifles, 1 radio rounds (NFE) and 200 pounds of rice. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA, 3 RN rounds and 200 pounds of rice captured.

CAP 1-3-7. Reported that approximately 20 to 25 VC had attacked the hamlet at BS 613: with approximately 5 WP grenades, 15 rifle grenades, 20 smoke charges, 400 rounds SAF and many chicom grenades, wounding 1 Marine and 2 RN's minor and 1 civilian requiring evacuation. The CAP returned fire on the enemy, requested illumination, and adjusted artillery on possible withdrawal route to the SE and N. A search of the hamlet found 8 chicom grenades, and 1 Bangalore torpedo. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA, 1 civilian WIA, 8 chicom grenades and 1 Bangalore torpedo captured.

CASCO 1-4. Received 10 incoming 82mm mortar rounds at BS 643755, causing 1 PF from the District Headquarters KIA. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy positions with unknown results. RESULTS: 1 PF (Not CAP) KIA.

CAP 1-3-3. PF patrol leader reported that a armed VC had kidnapped 1 VN male at BS 661928. A patrol was dispatched to the area with negative results. RESULTS: Nega

CAP 1-3-2. 2 M-16 mines were brought to CAP by a Vietnamese boy. A VIP payment was made and the mines were destroyed. RESULTS: Two M-16 mines destroyed.

CAP 1-4-1. A patrol made contact with an estimated company of VC at BS 867681. The CAP maneuvered and engaged the enemy with...
organic weapons fire, causing the enemy to break contact. The CAP pursued and reestablished contact at 080345H. Artillery and organic weapons were employed by the CAP in an unsuccessful attempt to fix the enemy. Gunships arrived and were employed in the area. A daylight sweep netted 1 VC KIA, 2 B-40 rockets, 2 chicom grenades, numerous AK-47 rounds and several M-1 carbine magazines. 1 PT was KIA in the contact. RESULTS: 1 PT KIA, 1 VC KIA, 2 B-40 rockets, 2 chicom grenades, several M-1 carbine magazines and numerous AK-47 rounds.

CAP 1-3-8. A patrol checked the area of the old CP at BS 575724, finding 1 bounding trip mine estimated to have been emplaced for approximately 3 hours. The mine appeared to be marked with 3 "C" Ration cans placed in a triangular formation to the right of the mine. RESULTS: 1 enemy mine destroyed.

CAP 1-3-9. A VN male brought 1 105mm HE round to CAP at BS 576904. The CAP destroyed the round and made a VIP payment. RESULTS: 1 105mm HE round destroyed.

CAP 1-4-2. Received SAF from an unknown number of VC at BS 776857, inflicting minor wounds on 1 Marine. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and swept the area with negative result. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA(H).

CAP 1-4-3. VN villagers notified CAP that VC had fired 5A rounds to warn civilians to warn civilians to leave the area at BS 767827. The CAP called artillery mission on the enemy grid and swept the area. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-10. The CP group received SA and N-fire at BS 620679. The CAP returned fire and swept the area under illumination finding 1 VC KIA, 1 SBS, and 1 M-1 carbine. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 1 WIA.

CAP 1-1-7. Heard an explosion in the wire of Biot Lòp compound they were utilizing for the night. A search discovered 2 naked VC KIA, who had apparently detonated a Biot Lòp booby trap. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA.

9 June
CAP 1-3-7. Received two incoming rocket charges at BS 614935. The CAP returned fire in the direction of the US MACV and swept the area with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-6. Received a report from local civilians that an unknown number of VC, 12 to 15 years old, kidnapped five people from a hamlet at BS 574937. 1 of the kidnapped civilians was the wife of a KSK working with the CAP. The CAP investigated and found that the following individuals had been kidnapped: VC DOI, male, age 45, the hamlet chief; PHAM HOAN, male, age 55; NGO TAU, male, age 57; BUI THI, female, age 23; and DUA THI, female, age 23, the wife of the CAP. RESULTS: 1 M-16 mine destroyed.

CAP 1-3-3. The PL platoon leader reported the location of an M-16 mine to the Marines at the CAP. An activity was dispatched and the mine was destroyed in place. RESULTS: 1 M-16 mine destroyed.

CAP 1-3-2. 1 M-16 mine was delivered to CAP at BS 576904 by a local civilian. A VC payment was made and the mine destroyed. RESULTS: 1 M-16 mine destroyed.

CAP 1-3-4. Received approximately 15 rounds of SAP from an US MACV at BS 621017, causing 1 to one nearby VC female. The CAP returned organic weapons fire on the US MACV and conducted a sweep with negative results. RESULTS: 1 civilian KIA.

CAP 1-3-5. Received approximately 250 rounds of SAP from an US MACV at BS 712973. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and employed gunships causing the enemy to withdraw in an unknown direction. The area was swept finding 1 VC civilian KIA from the VC fire. RESULTS: 1 civilian KIA.
CAP 1-3-5. A patrol observed and engaged with organic weapons, 7 VC at BS 69996. The enemy returned fire, broke contact and fled. The CAP swept the area with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-1-7. Shortly after a helicopter left position at DT 279287, the I2 received five incoming mortar rounds. The CAP called an artillery mission on the suspected enemy positions and searched the area with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-6. A patrol initiated organic weapons fire on a group of VC spotted moving W at BS 574933. The VC returned fire and fled. The CAP called an artillery mission on the fleeing enemy and swept the area, finding eight VC KIA, 1 M-26 grenade, and 1 140mm howitzer. A Vietnamese civilian informed the CAP that he could lead them to the spot where the VC were obtaining their rice in the area. A CAP patrol accompanied the civilian during the morning of 11 June and located three more VC in the vicinity of BS 573934. The three VC were believed to be supplying the VC with rice. A VIP payment was made to the civilian informant. RESULTS: 11 VC, 100 lbs of rice and 1 M-26 grenade.

CAP 1-1-6. CAP initiated organic weapons fire on an estimated squad of VC. The VC returned fire and broke contact, fleeing W. The CAP swept the area finding 2 VC KIA, 1 M-16 and documents. The documents were sent to District Headquarters. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 1 TC, documents.

CAP 1-3-3. The Pk leader reported that 10 VC were located at BS 640974. The CAP called an artillery mission on the VC position and swept the area finding blood trails and drag marks leading NNW and NW. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-10. A patrol observed 10 VC at BS 624876. The CAP called an artillery mission on the VC causing them to flee NE. A sweep of the area found blood trails. RESULTS: Negative.
12 June

CAP 1-3-5. A patrol received SAF from an estimated 6 VC at BS 700960. The CAP returned fire causing the VC to flee S. A sweep of the area had negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-2. Initiated SAF on 4 VC moving across a road at BS 554893. The VC returned fire and fled. A CAP sweep of the area and illumination, had negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-4-3. 5 - 10 VC initiated SAF on CAP at BS 767827. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and swept the area with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

13 June

CAP 1-2-7. An element engaged an estimated 2 VC with SAF in the vicinity of BS 455033. The VC returned fire and fled SW. The CAP had negative results on a sweep of the area. RESULTS: Negative.

MTT 1-1.Received 22 rounds of 60mm mortar fire at BS 303188. Friendly artillery was not fired due to the proximity of civilians. A sweep of the area at first light had negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-4. A patrol initiated organic weapons fire on 5-10 VC moving W at BS 620006. The enemy returned fire and broke contact fleeing E. A sweep of the area had negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

14 June

CAP 1-1-6. Night patrol base at BS 245255 received approximately 5 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called artillery. A sweep of the area produced negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-7-2. While on a sweep with an RF Coy, CAP made contact with an estimated VC platoon in the vicinity of BS 540860. The CAP utilized organic weapons fire and called artillery, causing the enemy to break contact and flee S. The CAP swept the area finding 4 VC KIA. RESULTS: 4 VC KIA.

CAP 1-4-4. CAP apprehended 1 VC in vicinity of BS 756535. The VC had a small quantity of NVA money, and was sent to Quang Ngai.

III-8 ENCLOSED (1)
14 June

for further questioning. RESULTS: 1 VCS.

CAP 1-2-7. A FF platoon, 2 USA platoons, and the District Central Census Grievance Committee ran a cordon and search mission in the vicinity of grid HT 4504. 6 VCS were detained in the operation but later released as innocent civilians. 2 draft dodgers were apprehended during the operation and volunteered to join the ARVN. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-1-6. A patrol exchanged fire with a VC squad at HT 245255. After returning S/E, the VC fled N. A sweep of the area found blood trails and drag marks. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-1-3. An ambush exchanged fire with an estimated VC squad at HT 346187. The C called in an artillery mission and swept the area with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-2. A VN male brought 3 M-16 mines to CAP at RS 570905. The CAP destroyed the mines and made a VIP payment. RESULTS: 3 M-16 mines destroyed.

15 June

CAP 1-1-6. A patrol exchanged fire with a VC squad at HT 237245. The enemy broke contact and fled SW leaving behind 2 VC KIA and 10 chicoon grenades found by the CAP on a sweep of the area. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 10 chicoon grenades.

CAP 1-3-8. While returning home without a weapon a FF was KIA at RS 564922. Local villagers reported 2 VC armed with M-16's killed the FF and fled N. RESULTS: 1 FF killed.

CAP 1-3-3. A patrol received information from villagers that a mine was located at RS 671971. The patrol checked the area an received S/E from an UH-20. After the enemy fled, the CAP found and destroyed the mine. RESULTS: 1 mine destroyed.

CAP 1-3-8. While on a patrol an RD called in on a US ammo can at RS 563927. The ammo can contained assorted SA ordnance and spare parts for AK-47's. RESULTS: Assorted SA ordnance captured.

16 June

III-9

ENCLOSURE (1)
16 June

CAP 1-4-1. A patrol received word from civilians of two buried VC bodies. The patrol went to the reported location and dug up 2 VC bodies believed to have been KIA in aCAP contact approximately a week ago. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA.

CAP 1-3-2. A VN male brought a 105mm dud to CAP at BS 578905. The CAP destroyed the round and made a VIP payment. RESULTS: 1 105mm round destroyed.

CAP 1-1-7. A patrol received fire from approximately 6 VC in a trench line at BS 302293. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and assaulted the VC position causing the enemy to flee W. The CAP swept the area finding 1 VC KIA, and 2 chicon grenades. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 2 chicon grenades.

CAP 1-1-5. A patrol exchanged S/L/F with 5 VC at BS 237249. After the enemy broke contact and fled W, the CAP swept the area finding 2 VC KIA, and 1 AK-47. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 1 AK.

CAP 1-3-3. VN civilians informed that a VC desiring to Chieu Hoa was at BS 664980. The CAP went to the reported location and found the Hoa Chinh, VC BA, from the village of Dong Le (4). The Hoa Chinh was sent to District Headquarters for questioning. RESULTS: 1 Hoa Chinh.

17 June

CAP 1-2-5. At BS 416123 received approx 80 81mm mortars and organic weapons fire from an estimated VC platoon. A heavy volume of fire was sustained on the CAP’s position until 0200H. 4 IFI’s received minor wounds in the contact. The CAP returned organic weapons fire until the VC broke contact and fled W. While sweeping the area, the CAP heard noises in a bush and found 1 wounded VC. The POW was taken to District Headquarters for questioning. RESULTS: 1 VC POW, 4 IF WIA.

CAP 1-4-3. A patrol received sniper fire at BS 773934. 1 IEMC received minor wounds when a round hit a magazine on his hip. The patrol called artillery on the suspected positions and swept the area finding blood trails. RESULTS: 1 IEMC WIA(M).

III-10

ENCLOSURE (1)
17 June

CAP 1-3-6. A patrol found 4 satchel charges in open holes near a gate at BS 574937. The charges were rigged with electrical blasting caps and time fuses. Footprints were found indicating that 8 people had fled SW, leading the CAP to assume they were surprised in the act of setting the charges. RESULT: 4 satchel charges destroyed.

CAP 1-3-1. An ambush observed movement in the area of BS 694777, and received 1 incoming round believed to have been 60mm. The CAP ambush element returned organic weapons fire, called an artillery mission and swept the area, finding footprints. RESULT: Negative.

18 June

CAP 1-3-1, 1-3-3. Received a total of 8 incoming mortar rounds from an enemy tube located at BS 693971. 60mm counter mortar was fired by CAP 1-3-1 and an artillery mission was requested. At 0230, CAP 1-3-1 was in the process of sweeping the area when CAP 1-3-3 received RPG's, satchel charges, Bangalore torpedoes, NAP, and an unspecified number of 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds, followed immediately by an assault by approximately 50 VC/NVA. The assault was launched from the N, S, and W. CAP 1-3-3 returned organic weapons fire, requested illuminating shells and gunships. CAP 1-3-1 escorted by gunships moved as a reaction force and linked up with 1-3-3. The enemy withdrew NW and SW and the combined CAPs swept the area finding 2 VC KIA, and 1 5.56 machine gun. RESULTS: 1 LT KIA, 3 USMC WIA, 3 PF WIA, 2 VC KIA, and 1 I/C.

CAP 1-4-2. XD and National Police delivered 14 VC children and 1 Chieu Hoi to CAP at BS 782600. The children ages 10 - 17 years of age had been apprehended while passing out VC leaflets to villagers. Interrogation revealed that the children were to meet the VC in a few days and pick up demolitions to be used to blow USA bunkers in the area. The children and the Chieu Hoi were sent to Binh Son District Headquarters. Samples of the leaflets the children were alleged to have been handing out were not provided. RESULTS: 1 Med Churh, 14 VCS.
18 June

CAP 1-2-4. CAP found and destroyed 2 bunkers at HT 452075. RESULTS: 2 bunkers destroyed.

CAP 1-1-4. A patrol initiated SAF on 1 VC going into a bunker at HT 269180. The VC was killed and 2 nearby female VCs were apprehended and sent to district headquarters for interrogation. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 2 VCs captured.

CAP 1-3-6. A patrol spotted and engaged 3 VC armed with carbines at BS 574937 killing 1 VC. Continuing along the patrol route, 4 more VC were spotted and engaged, killing 2. 1 M-16 was captured in the exchange. RESULTS: 3 VC KIA, 1 VC captured.

CAP 1-3-9. CAP participating in a sweep operation, killed 1 VC running across an open rice paddy at BS 514686. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

CAP 1-3-3. VN civilians informed CAP of a wounded VC in the vicinity of BS 664980. A patrol dispatched to the area found blood trails leading to the home of LE-QUAN-TOAN, 75 years of age, and THAN-HUY-VAN, age 51. Both were apprehended as VCs after the denied knowledge of wounded persons. RESULTS: 2 VCs.

CAP 1-3-2. A VN male brought a 105mm dummy to CAP at BS 579906. The CAP made a VIP payment and destroyed the round. RESULTS: 1 105mm dummy destroyed.

CAP 1-3-7. While checking light in the vicinity of BS 613945, CAP spotted and initiated SAF on 1 VC. The CAP received 1 M-79 round in return and swept the area finding 1 VC KIA and 1 VC WIA. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA.

19 June

CAP 1-3-2. A Hoi Chanh led elements to 8 VCs in the vicinity of BS 577904. The VCs were sent to district headquarters for interrogation. RESULTS: 8 VCs.

CAP 1-4-1. A patrol, checking ID cards, at BS 625626 detained 3 VCs without ID cards. The VCs were sent to district headquarters.
19 June

for interrogation. RESULTS: 3 VCS.

CAP 1-1-6. A patrol spotted an UHIB at BT 245255. An AO was called to recon the area and spotted approximately 30 VC. The AO called air strikes on the VC and the CAP patrol swept the area finding 10 VC KIA, 2 bunkers, and six 60mm rounds. The CAP destroyed the bunkers. RESULTS: 10 VC KIA, 2 bunkers destroyed.

CAP 1-2-3. CAP spotted 3 VC at BT 423103. The CAP initiated organic weapon fire and the VC fled S without returning fire. A sweep of the area had negative results. The CAP reswept the area at first light, finding 2 chicon grenades and a bag of rice and fish. RESULTS: 2 chicon grenades and 1 bag of rice and fish.

CAP 1-3-6. A patrol found 1 VC BT-10 directional mine at BS 574937. The mine was hanging in a tree and facing down a trail. There was an electrical blasting cap in the mine but the CAP was unable to find a firing device. RESULTS: 1 BT-10 mine destroyed.

20 June

CAP 1-3-3. A patrol was informed by a VH male of a mine at BS 672973. The CAP located the mine, an M-16 mine, and blew it in place. A VIP payment was made. RESULTS: 1 M-16 mine destroyed.

CAP 1-3-10. An element received SAP and 3 M-79 rounds at BS 623862. The CAP unit returned fire and approximately 10 enemy were seen moving N. The area was swept following the engagement and again at first light with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

21 June

CAP 1-2-3 and 1-2-4, along with a USA Company from the 1st of the 6th and RD team #16, conducted a cordon and search operation in Khung-Nhon hamlet at BT 439093. A psyop program and MEDCAP were conducted in addition to the search. 6 women and 4 men were detained for questioning. RESULTS: 10 VC
CAP 1-3-7. While setting in an ambush site on elements observed 4 grenades explode in the CAP's CP of the previous night at BS 593961. An artillery mission was fired on the area, illumination was requested, and the CAP consolidated to sweep the area. 8-10 VC were seen moving SE. The area was swept again at first light, also with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-4. An element spotted and engaged 2 VC at BT 621011. The VC returned SAF and broke contact heading S. The area was swept following the contact and again at first light. RESULTS: Negative.

22 June

The RF Company 936 compound at BS 556992, was attacked by an USSF using mortars, RPGs, and SAF. A CAP 1-3-2 liaison located at the compound called supporting artillery and gunships. The attack was repulsed at 0500H and sporadic fire commenced again at 0500H continuing until approximately 0600H. The compound came under heavy attack again at approximately 0630H. The enemy was repulsed and withdrew at or about 0730H. A sweep of the area found 4 VC KIA, 1 NVA POW, (wrote 3 AK-47s, 1 M-1 rifle, 1 B-40 rocket launcher, 2 B-40 rockets, 100 cal. .50 rounds, 2 banana shaped torpedoes, 20 chicom grenades, 1 cal. .50 feed plate, and parts of a Chinese MG tripod (NFI). Initial interrogation of the wounded prisoner determined the attacking force to have been the 4th Battalion of the 21st NVA Regiment supported by the 16th Direct Support Company. The 16th DS Company was reported to have been armed with 82mm mortars and recoilless rifles (NFI). According to the prisoner, the battalion's mission was to conduct harassing attacks against friendly units along the Tra Bong road and to interdict that road. RESULTS: (Credited to 936th RF Co.) 4 VC/NVA KIA, 1 NVA POW, 4 DNG, 1 CSOC, 3 Youth Group members WIAE, 4 VN civilians WIAE, and 2 RF WIAE.

CAP 1-3-2. The hamlet at BS 570905, was attacked by an USSF using mortars, automatic weapons, and small arms. The CAP returned fire with organic weapons and artillery.
22 June

The District Chief moved with a reaction force from his headquarters and ordered CAPs 1-3-6, 1-3-8, and NLT 1-2 to the scene. At that time the NLT compound came under RPG fire from an UXO. The NLT returned fire, called artillery, silenced the enemy weapons, and linked up with the District reaction group enroute to CAP 1-3-2. Prior to the arrival of the District reaction force, the enemy broke contact withdrawing to the S and E. CAPs 1-3-6, and 1-3-8 occupied blocking positions N of the river and CAP 1-3-2 began sweeping E to juncture with the District reaction force and NLT. CAP 1-3-2 made contact with 8-10 enemy at BS 575905. The enemy returned fire with small arms, automatic weapons, and RPGs before breaking contact and withdrawing S. 2 VC KIA, (one in black pajamas and the other in green utilities), 1 AK-47 magazine and 1 BMR magazine were found in the contact area. Continuing the sweep the CAP observed and fired upon 4 VC fleing SE. At this point CAP 1-3-2 junted with the District reaction force and NLT 1-2 and the sweep was continued to vicinity BS 563905 without further incident. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 1 hamlet youth group member KIA, 1 hamlet BN WIA.

CAP 1-3-3. Civilians informed CAP that VC were in the vicinity of BS 671971. While checking the area, the CAP observed 5 VC moving S and initiated organic weapons fire. The VC returned AT and fled S, after the CAP called an artillery mission. The CAP swept the area with negative results, 1 civilian was WIA by a stray VC round. RESULTS: 1 VN civilian WIA.

23 June

TAN-HUY hamlet, BT 621017 was attacked from the SE by an estimated 30 to 40 VC. The attack lasted approximately 10 - 12 minutes during which time the hamlet received 25 30 satchel charges and/or B-40 rockets. The PF compound on a hill behind the hamlet at BT 622017 received 15 - 20 rounds of mixed B-40 and 82mm mortar fire. In addition, the CAP 1-3-4 element in the hamlet and the previously mentioned PF compound received CAP. The CAP element and the PFs returne
23 June

fire with organic weapons, .50 cal. MG fir-
and 60mm mortar fire. Approximately 10 -
15 VC entered the hamlet and engaged in w-
appears to have been selective destruction
before withdrawing. Approximately 20 house-
were damaged and 11 civilians were WIAE.
Artillery was called on suspected enemy ro-
of withdrawal and swift boats assisted wit-
6mm mortar fire. At the time of the at-
tack, one CAP squad ambush was located nse-
the hamlet 600 meters N of TAN-HY while an-
other squad size ambush was 400 meters to-
the S of TAN-HY. The closer squad moved to-
a reaction force, however, the enemy had
withdrawn W prior to their arrival. A
first light sweep of the area had negative
results. 198th USA is investigating.
RESULTS: 11 civilians WIAE, 20 houses dam-
aged.

24 June

CAP 1-3-4. Received 20 - 30 rounds of SAH
from an USREP at 111 624007. 1 VN female
was WIAE by the VC fire. The CAP returned
organic weapons fire causing the VC to flee
S. The CAP swept the area with negative
results. RESULTS: 1 VN civilian WIAE.

25 June

CAP's 1-1-1, 1-1-4. Starting at 0600, the
2 CAP's and 2 PF platoons from Tam Ky Dis-
trict Headquarters conducted a joint sweep
operation under the control of the Tam Ky
District Chief and accompanied by the CO
of CA CO 1-1. At 0600, while enroute to its
first objective, CAP 1-1-4 received fire
from approximately 15 VC in a tree line at
111 265205. The CAP returned organic weap-
ons fire and called artillery, causing the en-
to break contact and flee W. A sweep of the
area found 3 VC KIA, 1 N-79, and 4 81mm
grenades. At 1215, CAP 1-1-1 exchanged
SAH with an estimated 5 VC at 111 260161.
The enemy broke contact and fled W and the
CAP swept the area capturing 1 VC POW with
an AK-47 and finding 1 VC KIA, and 3 chie-
grenades. At 1320H CAP 1-1-4 made contact
with an estimated VC/NVA platoon at 111
256200. The CAP employed organic weapons
fire on the enemy and requested airstriker
throughout AO on station. After the enemy
broke contact and fled W, the CAP swept the
area finding 6 NVA KIA, 2 AK-47s, and 500
25 June

CAP 1-3-5. CAP received 70-80 rounds of incoming small arms fire from 3-4 VC at BS 712975. The CAP returned fire with organic weapons and swept the area with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

26 June

CAP 1-3-3. CP in Phuoc-Hoa hamlet received 4 incoming 82mm rounds, 5-10 60mm rounds, and 20 satchel charges at BS 665980. The incoming was followed by a ground attack from 4 directions by approximately 40 enemy who blew their way through the hamlet fence works. The CAP leader called in both CAP ambushees and regrouped to fight from trench within the old compound at BS 665980. Spot gunships, and artillery were employed during the next 30 minutes and CAPs 1-3-1 and 1-3-reacted and linked up with 1-3-3 about the time the enemy was breaking contact at 0500. The combined CAPs swept the hamlet and the surrounding area finding one bangalore torpedo, one chicom grenade, 2 bloody hats, and blood trails leading SE. During the attack 7 youth group members were KIA, 2 USMC, 5 youth group members, and 2 PFs were WIAE. One AN/PRC-25 radio was a combat loss. The withdrawing enemy was observed to be carrying five bodies. RESULTS: 7 youth group members were KIA, 1 USMC WIA, 2 PF WIAE, 5 youth group members WIAE, and 1 USMC WIAE(1).

CAP 1-3-5. Received SF from grid BS 70699. The CAP returned fire with organic weapons and 4-5 VC were seen to flee SW. 2 VN civilians were WIAE by the enemy fire. A search had negative results. RESULTS: Negative.
CAP 1-1-7. Patrol was attacked by approximately 2 squads of VC using small arms at 03 276282. The CAP returned fire and the enemy broke contact in a S/W direction. The initial volley of enemy fire killed one FF and wounded three. Gunships escorting the medevac airplane worked out on the withdrawing enemy and the CAP swept the area finding 3 VC KIA, 5 M-26 grenades, and 2 cartridge belts. RESULTS: 3 VC KIA, 5 M-26 grenades captured, 1 FF KIA, and 3 FF WIA.

CAP 1-3-2. Received incoming grenades at BS 556892. The CAP returned 60mm and SAF and the area was swept under illumination with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-3. Reported approximately 5 VC firing SAF into Phu Long #2 at BS 666982, causing negative casualties or damage. The CAP called an artillery mission on the suspect enemy locations with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-3. A patrol received incoming grenades at BS 664987. The CAP patrol returned fire, called for illumination, and swept the area with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-2-4. A VN girl brought 1 M-26 grenade to CAP at MM 464080. The CAP made a VIP payment and destroyed the ordnance. RESULTS: 1 M-26 grenade destroyed.

CAP 1-3-4. RD éndro opened fire on 10-15 VC at BS 627008. The VC returned fire and M-79 rounds. CAP was nearby and, upon hearing the contact, opened fire on the VC with organic weapons, a cal. .50 machine gun and a 60mm mortar. After the enemy broke contact the CAP swept the area with the RDs, finding drag marks and blood trails leading SE. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-10. Patrol detained 4 female VGS at BS 637904. The women were suspected of carrying food to VC in the area. The VGS were sent to Bình Son District Headquarter for questioning. RESULTS: 4 VCS.
CAP 1-4-2. An ARVN road sweep team was attacked by an US ARVN at BN 777959. CAP provided supporting fire and conducted an attempted sweep in an attempt to regain contact with the withdrawing enemy. RESULTS: 1 ARVN WIA(k).

29 June

CAP 1-3-2. In what later was determined to be a diversionary attack, CAP received 2 incoming 82mm mortar rounds at BN 5756904, followed by SAF delivered by an estimated VC platoon at BN 568908. The CAP returned fire and maneuvered against the enemy force while an element en route to an ambush site was diverted to act as a blocking force. About this time a 10 x 20 building used by the CAP for medicos was destroyed by enemy explosives. Following the destruction of the building, the enemy broke contact and withdrew to the NW and SW. A search determined that the VC had taken the medical supplies before destroying the building. Medicines taken included a quantity of cap and aspirin type drugs, tape, bandages, syrups, tablets, skin ointment, etc., estimated to be sufficient for two sick calls in the hospital. A first light sweep of the contact area was nonproductive. RESULTS: 1 medic building destroyed; miscellaneous medical supplies lost.

CAP 1-3-2, CP received 5 82mm mortar rounds fired from BN 547885. The CAP called illumination and artillery on the enemy position and swept the area at first light with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.