FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st CAG ltr 6/JEH/djm over 5750 Ser: 020-69 dtd 14 August 1969

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 July – 30 July 1969

1. The subject chronology has been reviewed for completeness and is forwarded herewith.

R.D. WHITE
By direction

Copy to:
CO, 1st CAG
AL (Unclassified upon removal from the basic letter)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st CAG ltr 6/JEH/SS over 5700 Ser: 020-69
of 14 Aug 1969

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 July 1969 to 31 July 1969 (U)

1. Forwarded.

R. L. REED
R. L. REED
BY DIRECTION

Copy to:
CO, 1st CAG
HEADQUARTERS
1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602
6/JEH/djm
5700
Ser: 020-69
14 Aug 1969

(Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1))

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AC3D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 July 1969 to 31 July 1969

Ref: (a) MCO P5750.11A
(b) PNPacO 5750.8A

Enccl: (1) 1st Combined Action Group, III Marine Amphibious Force
Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Downgraded at 3-year intervals, declassified after 12 years,
DOD Dir 5200.10.

J. E. HENNEGAN

J. E. HENNEGAN

UNCLASSIFIED

Copy 1 of 12 Copies
HEADQUARTERS  
1st Combined Action Group  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602  

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
1 July 1969 to 31 July 1969  

<table>
<thead>
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<th>PART</th>
<th>CONTENT</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
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<td>PART II</td>
<td>NARRATIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>II-1 - II-18</td>
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<td>SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS</td>
<td>III-1 - III-17</td>
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<td>SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12-YEARS  

ENCLOSURE (1)
PART 7

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. DESIGNATED

1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO, San Francisco, California

Commander
LtCol J. E. HENNEGAN
1Jul69 - 31Jul69

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Combined Action Company 1-1

Captain L. H. ROSS
1Jul69 - 21Jul69

Captain N. H. GROSZ
25Jul69 - 31Jul69

Combined Action Company 1-2

Captain R. R. WEAVER
1Jul69 - 31Jul69

Combined Action Company 1-3

Captain P. G. MITCHELL
1Jul69 - 31Jul69

Executive Officer
Combined Action Company 1-3

1stLt J. J. MULHERN JR.
26Jul69 - 31Jul69

Combined Action Company 1-4

Captain K. M. SEARS
1Jul69 - 31Jul69

ATTACHED UNITS

1. None.

2. LOCATIONS

Hq, 1stCAG
Chu Lai, Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, RVN

CACO 1-1
Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province, RVN

CACO 1-2
Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, RVN

CACO 1-3
Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN

CACO 1-4
Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN

MTT - 1
Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province, RVN

MTT - 2
Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN
3. **STAFF OFFICERS**

- **Executive Officer**
  - Major J. H. Lawson
  - 1 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69

- **Adjutant/S-1**
  - 2nd Lt B. W. Smith
  - 1 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69

- **S-2/S-3**
  - Major R. F. Endert
  - 1 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69

- **S-4/Supply**
  - Captain T. N. GarbowskI
  - 1 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69

- **Communications Officer**
  - Major R. F. Endert
  - 1 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69

- **S-5/Special Services**
  - Major J. H. Lawson
  - 1 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69

- **Medical Section**
  - HNLT T. A. Robinson
  - 1 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69

4. **AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>ENL</td>
<td>OFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*UNCLASSIFIED*
PART II
NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. Personnel Administration.

a. Joined and transferred. During the month of June, the 1st Combined Action Group joined and transferred the following number of personnel listed in the four categories below:

(1) **Joined**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) **Rotated CONUS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) **Transferred within WestPac Command.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(i) **Transferred by SR w/sick (out of country hospitals)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. **Awards.**

(1) There were two Bronze Stars, nine Navy Commendation, and six Navy Achievement awards submitted to FMFPac for approval during the month of July 1969.

(2) Awards returned approved from FMFPac included the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BSM</th>
<th>NCM</th>
<th>NAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Personnel of the 1st Combined Action Group also received the following awards as a result of combat wounds, heroic/meritorious service in the Republic of Vietnam:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHM</th>
<th>VCG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. **Casualties.** Casualties during the month of July 1969 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>DAI</th>
<th>DOJ</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>WLAME</th>
<th>NBC</th>
<th>WIA/NBC RET TO DU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
d. **CONRINTS/SPLINTS/MELREP.** There were three pieces of Congressional Interest Correspondence and one Melrep Report handled by this command during the month of July 1969.

e. **Administrative Assistance.** There were three group directives promulgated during the reporting month.

f. **Legal.** A breakdown of legal activities for July is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Art 32 Investigations</th>
<th>Informal Investigations</th>
<th>MJP</th>
<th>SPCM</th>
<th>SCM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. **Morale and Welfare.** The morale of the unit continues to be high and special services equipment available to all hands. Quotas for both out of country and in country Rest and Recuperation (R&R) are effectively being utilized. The following is a breakdown of the R&R within this command:

1. Out of country R&R - Quotas
   - Utilized
   - 2

2. In Country R&R
   - 4

3. Five parties are held at a different CAF each week consisting of a cook-out, beer and soda. Each CAF sends a man into the rear on a staggered schedule to allow him to relax and enjoy club and beach facilities, and the USO facilities.

h. **Career Planning.** The career planning program continues to be stressed at all levels of command. A continuing effort is being made to increase the civilian education level of Marines within the command through USMTC GED testing. During the month of July 1969 one Marine applied for a commission in the Marine Corps Reserve under the enlisted commissioning program. There was one career reenlistment, one career extension of enlistment and five first term extensions of enlistment effected.

i. **Mail.** Daily average bags of mail were processed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incoming</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outgoing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Packages</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incoming</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outgoing</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** One bag of letters represents approximately 2,000 letters.
j. Promotions. 66 enlisted promotions were affected during the month of July 1969 as follows:

Sergeant 2
Corporal 1
Lance Corporal 63

k. Hospital Visits. Hospital visits are made daily by the Hospital Corpsman representing the Casualty NCO and the Mail Orderly who delivers mail to the patients located in hospitals at Chu Lai. Frequent visits are also made by the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, the Adjutant, and the First Sergeant. Normally, the Commanding Officer or his representative, having been notified by Casualty Control Center of the destination of the individual medevaced from the field, are waiting in the hospital when the casualty arrives. The dead are identified within hours of arrival at Chu Lai.
2. Intelligence

a. General. The month began and ended with the same general lack of activity experienced during the last week of June, with the majority of contact continuing in Minh Son District (CCO 1-3). No wave of attacks initiated the Second Phase of the Summer Campaign occurred, although this was warned of on two occasions by higher headquarters and led to alerts for them. The relative quiet in CCO 1-1 and the non-silence in the CCO's of CCO's 1-2 and 1-4 was consistent with the lull experienced generally throughout the IOCC. Only CCO 1-3 broke the mold with significant contacts reported almost daily.

(1) Enemy propaganda efforts increased, with the leaflets collected carrying VC victory and US retreat out of the WVM as themes.

(2) More than 20 of the enemy rallied to the WVM at DMZ locations mostly in the vicinity of CCO's 1-4 and 1-3. Again, Operation Kentucke Beach appears responsible for this increase in Chieu Hoi. All units reported their knowledge of the program coming from both leaflets and aerial broadcasts, with at least part of their motivation provided by the fact their families were under WVM control (mostly in refugee center).

(3) CCO 1-1 again this month was second in the number of contacts, while again producing the greatest number of kills. But enemy activity against the 1st Cavalry GEs was low, with no significant contact at all for the San Bi District GEs during either the first or last week of the month.

(a) The strongest contact occurred two kilometers northwest of Minh Son District Headquarters on July 16th, when a reported 20 VC ambushed CCO 1-3 while it was on the move after dark to a night defensive position. In effective nine ambush, it accounted for a dozen friendly casualties with only one VC killed.

(4) CCO 1-2 experienced only four significant contacts all month, and these were off in part because of a 2400 boundary shift in line with needs of pacification. This shift of boundaries caught the enemy with all hands being notified and four VC died as a result.

(5) CCO 1-3 had significant contact 21 days of the month, most of it occurring in eastern Minh Son, and the majority of contacts during the 2nd and 3rd weeks of the month.

(a) Toward the end of the month, the enemy was faced with Operation Kentucke Beach in Minh Son and Son Tinh Districts east of National Route 1, and this caused a reduction in his activities. This was unfortunate for CDO 2-2, which entered the combat CCO 1-3 22 COs on 24 July (Operation Gold One). To find the enemy prepared to lie low. At month's end, there had been a few kills for the CCO, and the most significant accomplishments lay in discovery and destruction of a number of tunnels and capturing of some small caches of weapons/food caches. The operation kept the enemy action against GEs 1-2, 1-3, 1-3-4 and 1-3-5 at a near standstill, with only three contacts reported during the last week of July. The operation was scheduled to go into the first week of August.

(6) CCO 1-4 had only four significant contacts for the entire period.
b. Intelligence Chain. There was no change in the Intelligence Chain during the month. 1st CAG/Berkeley Division C-2/198th LNC C-2 relationships remained the same, and the 1st CAG C-2 briefed incoming relieving Intelligence Section NCOs for the above units during the month.

(1) Approximately 60% of village intelligence void off during the month—though the volume of reports to the C-2s fell off some. This intelligence was responsible for 3 VC IEDs, the destruction of four bunkers and the destruction in place of four pressure-detonation type mines in CAP 1-3-2's 7406, where an SVN battalion was conducting an operation along the road to PHU BONG.

c. NVN Division Officer/Intelligence. There was little change in this area. The NVN Intelligence officer to CWO 1-3 had been employed primarily with 189th C-2 was scheduled at month's end to move into the CWO headquarters because of the cessation of NVN training activities.
a. General.

(1) 1st Combined Action Group operations in support of village security and pacification was affected markedly by RFNAP support of the Accelerated Pacification Program for 1969 during the month of July. In further support of the same program, several TACG modifications were accomplished or planned, and training at both 1st CAG ATs ceased when the training mission was turned back to the MACV Mobile Training Teams, and the teams went into normal CAP operations without a change of TACG, though changes were projected.

(2) Up until this month, 198th Light Infantry Brigade had concentrated their efforts on the west side of National Route #1 with the exception of periodic forays into the Batangan area to screen the friendly refugee hamlets there to keep the 16th VC Local Batt all on off balance. Increased enemy attacks against CAPs and other Binh Son District-controlled hamlets to the east of National Route #1 called attention to the need for larger unit operations in the area, and brought about Operation Nantucket Beach conducted by the 5th Battalion, 149th Infantry, 198th LIB. The overall operation would include the 2d Battalion, 26 Marines (SLF-B) and the 6th Regiment of the ARVN 2d Division, and particularly affect the CAPs of CACO 1-3 along the eastern Binh Son coast. The operation was planned in support of the Accelerated Pacification Program and would have the side effect of working over an area in Son Tinh District where two new CAPs projected for 4th Company were planned for insertion in August.

b. Activities.

(1) During the period there were six joint CAP-District RF/PF operations, two of which involved more than one CAP as a part of the joint friendly forces. These operations produced only 10 NVA KIA, but the weapons ration was high: 5 individual and 1 crew served weapons captured. Also 10 VCS, 11 VCI, and 12 draft dodgers were apprehended. CACO 1-4 claimed the greatest number of kills as usual, with CACO 1-2 obtaining the remaining kills, probably due to the change in TACG bound-aries as much as the tactic of stay-behind ambushes following cordon and search operations which caught the enemy coming out of his holes early in the evening.

(a) CACO 1-3 was limited in operations to some extent by the presence of the SLF in its eastern CAP TACG's. During the period, Operation Bold Arrow was conducted as a complement to Operation Nantucket Beach (198th LIB) which continued after the SLF left the area. 1st CAC/198th LIB/SLF 2-26 coordination was outstanding, and 1st CAC had the opportunity to contribute in some measure to the success and smoothness of the operation by providing close liaison and local information regarding minefields, enemy habits, the friendly civilian situation and the like. Prior to the operation, the SLF coordinated with USA and 1st CAC at a meeting at Americal Division headquarters held at the end of June. At a subsequent meeting at the headquarters of the 198th LIB, 1st CAC provided a liaison team consisting of the Company Commander, CACO 1-3 and two radiomen from CAP 1-3-3 Marines to serve as radio liaison teams with the BFT. The radiomen were highly experienced in the projected area of operations and it was felt they could provide additional assistance to the battalion by their knowledge. The Company Commander of CACO 1-3 and the liaison team radiomen went...
The following statistics derive of 1st CAG operations and activities during July:

(a) Night Patrols 83  Multi-CAP Operations 36  
Ambushes 1056  Day Patrols 854

(b) Enemy Casualties
KIA 76  WIA 2  DETAINERS 20  HOI CHI MINH 22

(c) Weapons and Ordnance Captured
LWC 214  GSW 1

(d) Friendly Casualties Sustained
USMC 6  WIA 13  WIA 0  KIA 0  PRV 0
USN 0  0  0  PRV 0  0
PF 4  26  0  0  0

(b) The most significant aspects of CAOC 1-4 operations were the coordination with USA and ARVN units pursuing Operation Nantucket Beach to the west of CAPs 1-4-1, 1-4-2, and 1-4-4 and the increase in VIP ordnance turn-in especially in the Batangan area, where VIP revenue contributed to an easing of the people's difficulties to some extent. During the period, an 81mm mortar section moved into CAP 1-4-2's position to provide assistance to the 5th Battalion, 16th Infantry forces conducting screening operations to the west of Batangan, and from time to time these forces based at the CAP locations and conducted joint patrols and ambushes in the CAP TACO. In July, CAOC 1-4 received the greatest number of Chua Hoi's, as the local guerrilla forces began to come in to the GVN side due mostly to their families being housed in the refugee centers on the Batangan.

(2) The following statistics derive of 1st CAG operations and activities during July:

(a) Night Patrols 83  Multi-CAP Operations 36
Ambushes 1056  Day Patrols 854

(b) Enemy Casualties
KIA 76  WIA 2  DETAINERS 20  HOI CHI MINH 22

(c) Weapons and Ordnance Captured
LWC 214  GSW 1

(d) Friendly Casualties Sustained
USMC 6  WIA 13  WIA 0  KIA 0  PRV 0
USN 0  0  0  PRV 0  0
PF 4  26  0  0  0
(1) General. Formal training during the period included General Military Subjects and Leadership and Tactics training for USMC and Popular Force personnel, and Vietnamese Language and Personal Response training for USMC personnel only. This is in addition to the proponderance of time spent in On the Job Training while carrying out the normal CAP mission.

(2) CAP Training. On the CAP level, 33 hours of formal training were completed at each CAP position, meeting the requirements of the Group training Schedule which is promulgated weekly. Each CAP has been provided with the bilingual training manual: Handbook of Basic Military Principles published by FMFPAC, and weekly with lesson plans covering each subject required by the training schedule. Essentially, all CAP leaders need to do is review the lesson plans and utilize experience and the FMFPAC handbooks for background in the conduct of his formal training. A page of Vietnamese language is also published weekly and coincides to some degree with the lesson plans subject.

(3) MTT Training. MTT 1-1 (Tam Ky) conducted 77 hours of formal instruction while training Vietnamese forces. This, in addition to On the Job Training in normal CAP Operations. MTT 1-2 (Binh Son) conducted no training due to lack of PF availability, and continued normal CAP operations with Quang Ngai platoon #189, the last platoon trained there, which had remained.

(a) MTT 1-1 trained 73 Popular Self Defense Force personnel and conducted classes on the M-16 rifle for another eight platoons of these Popular Self Defense Forces. It is noted that in the pidgin translation these forces are referred to as: "Popular Self Defense Force."

(b) On the 26th of July MTT training ceased and the MTT's conducted normal CAP operations in assigned TAOC's while awaiting further orders. Plans called for MTT 1-1 to be re-designated as CAP 1-1-5 and go into a projected TAOC at such time as new PF platoons become available. MTT 1-2 was scheduled for deactivation, with the personnel being used to provide the nucleus for two new CAPs to be activated and installed in Son Tinh District in support of the Accelerated Pacification Program. The last-trained PF platoons remained at both locations providing the PF element for CAP operations.

(4) Other Training

(a) Four 1st CAG Marines completed the month-long Vietnamese language course conducted by III MAF at the old 2d CAG headquarters, vicinity of Camp Horn, Danang.

(b) Eight 1st CAG Marines completed the three-day artillery course conducted by the American Division Artillery at Chu Lai, Binh. This course is designed to provide personnel with the capability of calling and adjusting support artillery. Response to the course has been quite good from all Marines attending.

(c) All newly-joined Marines received a one day indoctrination course prior to entering CAP School. This included the firing of the M-16 in both day and night familiarization courses. The firing is conducted at a small range.
d. Inspections. A member of the 1st CAG headquarters inspected each CACO headquarters during the period. Company Commanders and/or their Gunnery Sergeants inspected their CAP's, remaining overnight in many instances.

(1) I&I Section Inspector strength remained constant during July. Training inspections were conducted at all CAPs by I&I Inspector personnel. The practice of orienting replacement CAP leaders by having them accompany an I&I Section Inspector on his rounds of the CAPs continues and is felt to be an effective tool for focusing the replacement's thinking and providing motivation for learning at the CAP School which he attends prior to a permanent assignment. On one occasion the 1st CAG assistant training 300 and a replacement he was orienting distinguished themselves along with a CAP Leader by extracting two downed and injured helicopter pilots from a friendly minefield into which the pilots had wandered. Three Navy Commendation Medals were awarded.

e. Fire Support. The Fire Support situation changed to some degree with the commencement of Operation Nhatucket Beach, when the platoon of 105's at Hill 26, vicinity of CAP 1-4-4, was moved out in support of 5th Battalion, 16th Infantry operations further north of the Betaget, and the 1-2" mortar battery was shifted from the same position to LZ Namdeung on the Betagnet Peninsula as planned but not executed the previous month. In addition, a squad of 60mm mortars was moved in at CAP 1-1-2's position on the northern Betagnet to provide additional support to 5th/16th recon elements screening the area while the battalions companies were occupied further north. During the conduct of Operation Bold Arrow, artillery support of the eastern Binh Son CAPs is being provided by Marine 105's and 1-2's. Coordination has proved good due to the presence of CACO 1-3 liaison NCOs with HLT 2-26, and that battalion's efforts in coordinating every aspect of the operation tightly.

f. Air Support

(1) Tactical air support included the employment of helicopter gunships and Fixed Wing on a total of nine occasions. This support again proved most responsive in the 1st Company's TAOC's, as the Quang Tin Province MAC's continue their fine cooperation with the CAP's.

(2) Administratively, helicopter support of 1st CAG improved with the allotting of an American helicopter for Group use on an all-day basis when called for. This increased opportunities for Visual Reconnaissance and inspections and facilitated call-in for the CACO 1-3 and CACO 1-4 CAP's, which often wait a few days before receiving their pay because of difficulties obtaining transportation. Some missions were turned down from time to time however, and the request system becomes more cumbersome with the need for submission of a form which involves increased time for completion and limits flexibility to some degree as it requires a specific flight plan from which some pilots will not deviate. For the entire month there was a total of 35 hours flown by American helicopters in support of 1st CAG, this figure excludes the time flown in logistical support of the Companies, as that support is provided out of Reseotime allotted the battalions which support the CACO's.

II-9
(a) The 1st L13 continued to provide LCH support when available and requested. This fine Army unit has been a consistent friend to the Group and generous with its assets when available.

b. Scout Dog Teams. This month, all companies had a Scout Dog Team working almost the entire period. Teams were available and there were no unduly long periods a company was left uncovered by the rotation of teams. In an incident July 16th the Dog Team supporting CAP 1-2-6 was at the point when the enemy initiated a mine ambush against the CAP while it was on patrol to its night position. Both dog and handler were killed by command detonated mines.

h. Modification of CAP TACO's

(1) During the month, increased emphasis on the Accelerated Pacification Program brought about TACO changes for CAP 1-1-7 (Tan Ky District) and CAP 1-2-2 (Ly Tin District). The TACO's were modified in order to provide optimum employment of existing forces in the upgrading and further development of certain hamlets within the above districts of Quang Tin Province.

(2) In Quang Ngai Province, plans were made for the modification of CAP 1-4-1's TACO, but this planning did not go beyond the local GVN chain and there was no change in the Son Tinh District CAP TACO's.

(3) In Binh Son District, the Accelerated Pacification Program and the landing of AATF 2-26 in Operation Bold Armada provided the basis for plans to relocate the eastern Binh Son CAP's into areas targeted in the Pacification Plan. The relocations however, did not come about by the end of the month, as the plans await the approval of higher headquarters in both the GVN and American chains of command.

(4) Planning for the activation of two new CAP's in eastern Son Tinh District to secure the line of communication to the coast and the Batangan refugee centers have been firmly considered and are awaiting approval at higher headquarters. These CAP's should be inserted during the month of August.

i. Psychological Operations. In July, 1st EAO in cooperation with the American Division, dropped over five million propaganda leaflets and conducted approximately fourteen hours of broadcasts by air. Additionally, another five million leaflets were distributed by hand throughout CAP TACO's and there were twelve hours of propaganda films shown by Army HE teams at the CAP locations. The breakdown is as follows:

(1) Aerial Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEAFLETS</th>
<th>VOLUME</th>
<th>BROADCASTS (HRS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R. words</td>
<td>456,000</td>
<td>11:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chieu Hai</td>
<td>4,118,000</td>
<td>11:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-VC</td>
<td>204,000</td>
<td>00:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-GVN</td>
<td>382,000</td>
<td>01:10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IL-10 ENCLOSURE (1)
In addition to the above, liaison was made with Quang Ngai Sector PsyOps Advisors and a quantity of Huong Quoc and The Giao Tu Do magazines were obtained and distributed to GVN administrative cadre in the interior CAs of CACO 1-3 and CACO 1-4. In the case of the above magazines, copies were also provided to the Popular Forces battalion leaders of the CAs in order not to slight their importance and to keep relations good all around. The distribution of the magazines will, it is hoped, provide another reason for CAP-Revolutionary Development Team contact and increase cooperation between the two to include improved intelligence information flow. Several thousand copies of the May issue of Sen Tin newspaper were received and distributed during July.

In July, a number of propaganda leaflets were employed by the enemy in Ca Tien CAs. The most frequent theme concerned the withdrawal of American troops and the increasing "Vietnamization" of the war. In these times, the enemy pointed to the reduction of US forces as a victory for the Communist side and proclaimed they had driven the US out and that the day of victory was not far off; that communist forces should not then, lose courage.

Another leaflet claimed that the friendly Vietnamese forces were being deserted by the Americans who had previously denigrated their capabilities as soldiers, but were now proclaiming those same capabilities and leaving, causing an increase in front line employment of Vietnamese forces and an accompanying increase in Vietnamese casualties. Another leaflet quoted Dr. Benjamin Black's views with regard to the US involvement in the war. Still another leaflet--one which has been seen quite often on both this area and the Da Nang area--provided statements against US involvement in the war, purported to have come from a list of American prisoners whose names were listed. Most of these leaflets were well organized and translated and had been printed on a press. Some examples of these leaflets appear in rough translation under supporting documents section of this report.

The KCS continued to contribute to the effectiveness of CA operations. In CAP 1-1-7, the KCS assigned there got a kill this month and a weapon by leaping into a trail and shooting down a lone VC.

A total of 16,500 VN were spent during July under the VIP program. With few exceptions, those expenditures were for ordinance, as the Katang CAs received aggregate volume of ordinance than in previous months. CACO 1-3, 1-1, and 1-2 followed in volume of expenditures in that order.

Two unusual things turned up this month to attack the VIP with regard to the ordinance turn-in program.
DECLASSIFIED

(a) An additional 82mm mortar round purchased from a boy on National Route #1. It was discovered that this round was equipped with an eight hour chemical delay fuse which had been initiated prior to the round having been turned in. As soon as the incident was learned of, all CACOs were informed and warned to be on the lookout for rounds so fused, and to avoid collections ofVIP ordnance at any locations by ensuring such ordnance was blown in place ASAP. Americal C-2 put out information on this fuse within a few days.

(b) It became apparent that the VIP program has spawned an entrepreneur in the Ly Tin District, as Army personnel in that area were being offered dummy chicom grenades for VIP. CACO 1-2 obtained one of these at no cost and turned it over to the S-2/S-3 of the CAG. The item consists of a small C-ration size can fitted with a wooden plug, the end of which is carved into a deceptively authentic handle. The can and handle are sealed together with road tar. In the production of this item, a short length of bamboo was used to simulate a spoon and was tied down to the grenade body with straw. The fact that the "grenade" is quite light in weight and that the handle does not consist of a hollow wooden tube with a cap and pull string make it easily identified as a dummy.

(2) The following statistics recap VIP expenditures for July:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2     42mm rds</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36    105mm rds</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4     82mm rds</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13    81mm rds</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23    60mm rds</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8     57mm rds</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1     81mm rds</td>
<td>9</td>
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**Miscellaneous Items**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 AK-47 charged</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 60mm bomb fuse</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 lb stick TNT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600 lb bomb fuse</td>
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</table>

1. **Communications**

(1) **Operations.** During the reporting period, 1st CAG received, on a temporary loan basis from 5/7 Communication Battalion, one radio set AN/GRC-125 and five log-periodic antennas, AN/SCR-22. A sergeant 25th Licentian TAD from 5/7 Communication Battalion to assist in the installation of the antennas. The performance of these antennas along with the AN/GRC-125 and other radio equipment of the 1st CAG is satisfactory. The communication system of the 1st CAG now meets the reliability criteria set forth by the Commanding Officer.

(2) **Communication Chief's Conference.** On the 10th of July a Combined Action Program Communication Conference was convened. The Communication Chiefs from all Combined Action Groups, representatives from G-6 III MAF, CAP Director, CAP S-3, and CAP S-4 were in attendance. The agenda items discussed by the 1st CAG Communication Chief are:

II-12

Confidential

ENCLOSED (1)

UNCLASSIFIED
(a) Radio communication personnel authorized by present O/0.

(b) Direct Exchange Program.

(c) Radio equipment 9T/90 G-125, 9T/221-12, and antenna F-21 Periodic AS-2236.

(d) O/0 recommended changes to include the 9T/V22-12 and/or 9T/C22-12.

(e) Present antenna 9C-292 be replaced with the antenna AS-2236.

(3) Repair Report Summary

(a) During the reporting period, Sub Unit 91, Maintenance Battalion, 1st Div/BFC was transferred to FG 21 and became Maintenance, NCU-7, FGCA (NCU-3A). At present NCU-3A has not been in existence long enough to show any appreciable return on Repair Orders submitted to them.
DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

3101

FROM: IRWIN P. XOXER

TO: COMD 5200.10

SUBJECT: U.S. VICTORIES IN VIETNAM

U.S. servicemen, we represent officers and men of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Marine Divisions, who have been captured in various battles by the people's Liberation Armed Forces. Among us are whites, Negros, and Americans.

We are very hopeful of the war ending soon, so that we may return to our families and loved ones. But due to the stubbornness of the present U.S. administration and their Hanoi puppet, the war is needlessly suffering and slaughter of the Vietnamese people continues to drag on.

Their attitude of will has been clearly shown time and again by their refusal to stop the bombing of North Vietnam! And now by the Saigon Governments obduracy in continuation of the U.S. aggressive war in the South. And continuing violation of North Vietnam air space, their warlike aggressive nature is clearly laid bare.

On the other hand, the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, the genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people, is an organization full of good will and striving for peace. Their policy toward captured U.S.'s is lenient and humane. All during the war our needs on regarding food, clothing, shelter, and medical attention are well met.

They have clearly demonstrated their peaceful aspirations, and their wishes to end war and Vietnamese suffering. They want only peace and the right to settle their own affairs. To prove this they have sent without delay a delegation to Paris, offered a three day suspension of military attacks at the Christmas and New Year holidays, and recently announced the release of three former GI's, which is living proof of their good intentions and lenient and humanitarian policy.

Like the Front and the Vietnamese people, we are completely opposed and desirous of a speedy peace. You can help bring this about. Bring an end to the useless killing. It is the job of freedom loving, humane everywhere.

American servicemen, we American GI's appeal to you to demand:

1. That the U.S. government stop its aggression in Vietnam so that we all may return to our families and loved ones.
2. Do not interfere in the People's affairs while they overthrow U.S. puppet government.
3. Inform all former GI's to avoid a useless death by all means. Refuse to take part in murderous operations and support the Vietnamese people's struggle for peace.

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Only doctor Benjamin Spock has talked about the US government's Vietnam policy in his book in Vietnam. Our government has been in Vietnam for more than 15 years now. We gave France 2.5 billion dollars to put down the Vietnamese struggle for independence. We replaced the French puppet dictatorship of our own choosing. We refused to allow free elections in 1966. We armed a Saigon military force so that our puppets could control the Vietnamese people. When all this failed and the people of South Vietnam rebelled, we sent 500,000 Americans to keep our dictatorship in power. We have destroyed homes and cities, poisoned crops, burned homes, opened the refugee camps to overflowing and killed men, women, and children by the hundreds of thousands with shells, bombs, and napalm.

Can we just pull out? Many Americans, congressmen, foreign ambassadors, clergyman, veterans of the Vietnam war itself have expressed their outrage against the war. They feel that we were wrong to get involved at all, that it is immoral for us to be killing civilians, that the war cannot be won.

Yet, no established politician in the US, even those opposed the war, has said in public that we can end the war without an honorable settlement. Withdrawal is strong medicine. Most politicians would rather tell us that they think we want to have our justice in on our side, that victory is just around the corner, that the enemy is responsible for the continuation of the war. None of them are brave or bold enough to tell us that we are still far from victory. The US can admit its mistakes and bring its wounded home and alive.

UNCLASSIFIED
4. S-1/Supply

a. Significant Events.

(1) Conference held at 2nd CAG by CAP S-1 for Group S-1's. A discussion of T/E changes and final recommendations resulted.

(2) Combat losses for the month were 3 M-16 rifles, 1 M-79 grenade launcher, 2 AN-PRC/25 radios.

(3) The Supply Chief and Logistic Chief both rotated during the month.

b. Supply.

(1) The supply posture within the group during July was satisfactory. Certain T/E deficiencies still affect overall readiness as the unit is in a C-2 condition for supplies and equipment. In addition certain shortages in Class II, organizational clothing and equipment continue to be a problem. Tracer action on outstanding documents reveal a backorder status. Continual emphasis has been placed on sending unit representatives to Danang on a weekly basis, to receive material on the RUC line, thereby reducing valuable lead time.

c. Motor Transport.

(1) The motor transport section logged 23,318 miles for the month. The Group still has a T/E deficiency for 1 M374L Truck 3 1/4 Ton.

(2) During the month M35A2C 2 1/2 Ton vehicles were deadlined periodically, however, repair was accomplished by SUB-1 Maintenance quite rapidly. Lack of spare parts is a problem with the M374L and contributes to long downtimes.

d. Maintenance.

(1) The maintenance support provided by the FLSD-A support unit at Chu Lai has directly contributed to keeping downtime at a minimum on all communications, motor transport, and ordnance equipment. 1st echelon maintenance is being stressed to maintain equipment operationally ready.

e. Miscellaneous.

(1) The Garrison Property Account was reconciled during the month with the Garrison Property Office at FLC.

(2) The IX program for body armor was effectively utilized at FLC allowing for the exchange of 60 sets of body armor.

(3) All unchromed chambered rifles were turned in to FLC and chromed chambered rifles received.
f. Medical. The following was received during the Senior Corpsman's meeting in Chu Lai during the month of July 1969.

(1) Clean-up and general sanitation efforts in the villages and hamlets of all the CAPs was discussed. A continuing effort will be made in this direction through classes and demonstrations of sanitation methods for the villagers.

(2) A continuing effort will be made by all CAP corpsmen in teaching care and cleaning of teeth to the villagers.

(3) A visual audit of all health records will be conducted to ensure that "shots" are up to date.

(4) Techniques

(a) Field inspections of all CAPs and the CAG Headquarters continue to be conducted weekly. Improvements in field sanitation are steadily being made. Field inspections of the villages and hamlets in the villages and hamlets are also being conducted. All CAP corpsmen are stressing the importance of sanitation to the villagers.

(b) Medcaps conducted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>Patients treated</td>
<td>23,275</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adults evacuated</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children evacuated</td>
<td>54</td>
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<td>Denticaps</td>
<td>117</td>
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(c) U. S. Personnel treated at CAG Sick Call

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>219</td>
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(d) Hospitalized

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<td>65</td>
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(e) WIA

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<td>20</td>
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(f) Illness

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<td>34</td>
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(g) KIA (DCW 1)

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5. Civic Action

a. Some 11,500 pounds of food and 300 pounds of clothing were distributed during the past month. The bulk of the food was captured rice that was redistributed to the hamlet, Ky Xuyen and An Ky in CAP 1-4-H's AO. The clothing was distributed to the hamlet of An Hai in CAP 1-4-3's AO. 600 pounds of sugar was also distributed through all the CAP's AO's through the MLDC PS.

b. There were three children fitted for wooden legs from CAP 1-3-7's area. This was done through the Canker's Hospital in Quang Ngai City.

c. MT-1-1 started an English class three weeks ago which initially had on 10 children. To date it has grown to 40. Corporal VECH, teaches the class and with his excellent knowledge of the Vietnamese language has excellent results.

d. The following civic action projects were completed during June.

   (1) CAP 1-1-1 cleaned one well. Also policed up one road at BT186273. The village that these two projects were done in is Nui Can located in Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province.

   (2) CAP 1-1-7 helped the people put a fence around Tam Ky BT 291303. Located in Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province.

   (3) CAP 1-1-2 installed one water pump at the village of Thach Kieu BT 192332. This project is located in Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province.

   (4) CAP 1-1-6 put in one culvert. Also the road into Thon Sau was graded BT251242. These two projects are located in Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province.

   (5) CAP 1-2-5 installed one hand water pump in the village of Dien Pho (LII) BT127403. Located in Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province.

   (6) CAP 1-3-4 helped the people put in three sanitation ditches. This was done so as to cut down on mosquitoes and flies ES831772. Located in Minh Son District, Quang Ngai Province.
1 July

CAP 1-3-2. CP element heard an explosion and several rounds of SDF in the village 700 meters to their west at BS 577905. A CAP element investigated and found that the village chief's office had been destroyed and approx 10–15 meters of the village bamboo fence had been burned. A sweep of the area found VC Chieu Noi leaflets in both English and VN. Some leaflets were typewritten, others were mimeographed. VN civilians reported that approx 50–60 IVA had been in the area and had departed in a SW direction. Americal Division and the 198th LIE have been informed of the incident. RESULTS: 1 village chief's office destroyed, 1 section of village fence burned, and several leaflets retrieved and delivered to District Headquarters.

CAP 1-3-2. A VIH male turned in 1 105mm dud round and 1 60mm dud round to CAP at BS 575897. A VIP payment was made and the ordinance destroyed. RESULTS: 1 105mm and 1 60mm round destroyed.

2 July

CAP 1-3-8. A patrol apprehended 1 VIH female and 2 VIH children carrying food at BS 575915. The detainees were delivered to the District Headquarters for interrogation. RESULTS: 3 detainees.

3 Jul

CAP 1-3-2. CP at BS 570904 received about 5 satchel charges, 4 B-40 rockets, 10 82mm mortar rounds, and estimated 2,000 SA rounds, and numerous grenades, followed by a ground attack by an estimated 35 VC. The CAP returned fire with organic weapons and requested artillery support. The enemy broke up into small bands and withdrew to the N and NW. Artillery was employed on possible escape routes and a sweep was begun. While sweeping, the CAP received 1 82mm mortar round and approx 200 SA rounds believed to have been delivered by a BAR. The CAP returned fire, requested artillery on the suspected mortar site, and continued the
sweep finding 1 AK-47, parts of another that had been destroyed during the flight; and numerous blood trails and drag marks. During the contact, 1 USMC received minor fragment wounds not requiring evacuation; 1 PF and 1 FSDF received minor fragment wounds requiring evacuation. RESULTS: 2 IV, 1 USMC WIA, 1 PF WIA, and 1 FSDF WIA.

CAP 1-3-2. A liaison party at the RF compound at BS 556892 reported that the RF compound received 3 82mm mortar rounds and light SAF from an USMC. The RFs returned fire and the CAP liaison team called artillery on the suspected enemy position. Incoming 82mm was also received at 0230H, 0300H, and 0400H with counter battery delivered in each instance. 1 secondary explosion was observed as a result of the counter battery delivered following the 0400H ART. A first light sweep was conducted by the RFs with negative results. At 1030H 4 armed VC were spotted by the RF company with weapons at BS 551891. At the same time VN civilians were observed vacating the area. A joint CAP/RF activity consisting 1 CAP squad (3 Marines and 10 PFs) and a RF platoon, was ambushed by an estimated enemy platoon while sweeping toward the suspected enemy location. 1 Marine was wounded in the initial volley; 2 other Marines were wounded as they rushed to his aid. RFs and PFs returned organic weapons fire, called artillery on AV positions, and requested emergency evacuations for the wounded Marines. The enemy, tentatively identified as elements of the 21st NVA Regiment, broke contact and withdrew NV. As a result of this and the previously reported CAP contact, 1st CAG has directed that the Marine element of CAPs in the area be strengthened, and has requested a comparable increase in PF strength. The 2nd ARVN Division was requested, and has agreed to conduct an operation in the area. The 195th and the 5th of the 46th are monitoring operations in the area. RESULTS: 3 USMC WIA.
HEADQUARTERS
1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

GruBul 1650
1/BWS/djm
15 July 1969

GROUP BULLETIN 1650

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Meritorious Mast; case of Sergeant Thomas S. DALE, 207 81 44, USMC

Ref: (a) MCO P5000.3, par 8052

1. Purpose. To award a Meritorious Mast to the subject man.

2. General. Under the provisions of reference (a), you are awarded a Meritorious Mast for your outstanding performance of duty on 13 July 1969. Your performance of duty in arranging and setting up dinner demonstrated a high degree of professional knowledge and skill in your MOS. Your enthusiasm, initiative, and hard work were exemplary and materially aided in improving the relationship between the United States and the Vietnamese people. The dinner prepared and served by you was an outstanding selection of food with combined taste desires of both countries. Your devotion to duty, aggressiveness, and leadership has been an inspiration to all and truly reflects the high standards of performance for a Marine Noncommissioned Officer.

3. Action. By copy hereof the Adjutant is directed to ensure that appropriate service record book entries are made in accordance with reference (a), and that a copy of this Mast is attached to your next fitness report.


J. E. HENNEGAN

DISTRIBUTION: "A" & "B" plus
LSU-3 (10)

IV-1
4 July

CAGO 1-2. VN teenagers brought 1 M-26 grenade, 1 105mm round and 1 60mm round to CAGO Headquarters at BR 483072. The CAGO destroyed the ordnance and made a VIP payment. RESULTS: 1 M-26 grenade, 1 105mm round and 1 60mm destroyed.

5 July

CAGO 1-2. On three separate occasions on 5 July VN civilians delivered dual ordnance to CAGO at BR 482075. In each case the ordnance was destroyed and a VIP payment made. RESULTS: 5 M-79 rounds, 2 M-26 grenades, and 1 107mm mortar round destroyed.

6 July

CAP 1-3-3. A CAP OP at BS 664935 received sniper fire from an unseen enemy. The OP returned fire and called an artillery mission on the suspected enemy position. A sweep of the area had negative findings. RESULTS: Negative.

7 July

CAP 1-3-7. The CP element spotted 3 VC starting fires on the hamlet fence line at BS 619935. Illumination was requested and the enemy was taken under fire with an M-60 MG, causing the enemy to flee S/W. A sweep of the area found one wounded VN who was dusted off as a WIA. Approx 100 meters of fence had been burned. RESULTS: 1 WIA.

CAP 1-1-4. Patrol received SAP from an estimated 5 VC at BR 259201. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called a fire mission, causing the VC to withdraw N/E. The CAP swept the area finding 3 VC KIA, 1 I/D, 3 chien grenades, 1 booby trapped 81mm round. The booby trap was set in the middle of a trail and had a pressure type detonator. The CAP blew the booby trap in place. RESULTS: 3 VC KIA, 1 I/D, 3 chien grenades, 1 booby trapped 81mm round destroyed.

CAP 1-1-2. A patrol heard SAP at the vicinity of BR 33283 and moved into the area to investigate. Civilians directed the CAP patrol to a seriously wounded VC who was dusted off as an emergency evacuation. The patrol then heard more firing in the

III-3

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
7 July

New Life Hamlet and moved to that area where civilians and ARVN soldiers stated 4 VC, dressed in ARVN uniforms and wearing 2d ARVN Division patches, had entered the hamlet and opened fire on the RDs. The RDs returned fire and the 4 VC broke contact and withdrew SW. RESULTS: 1 RD KIA.

CAP 1-3-2. A VII civilian brought a 105mm round and a bengalore torpedo to CAP at BS 577905. The CAP destroyed the ordnance and made a VIP payment. RESULTS: 1 105mm round and 1 bengalore torpedo destroyed.

CAP 1-3-2. 2 105mm rounds were delivered to CAP at BS 577805 by a VII male civilian. The rounds were destroyed and a VIP payment made. RESULTS: 2 105mm rounds destroyed.

CAP 1-4-3. 1 female and 3 male Hoi Chanhs turned themselves in to CAP at BS 768827. The Hoi Chanhs reported they had been operating in the vicinity of BS 595866 but had been driven off by airstrikes. The Hoi Chanhs also reported to the CAP that VC live in large tunnels at BS 777835. Further interrogation is being conducted by VII officials. CAP swept the area of the reported tunnels on 3 July 1969 with negative findings. RESULTS: 4 Hoi Chanhs.

3 July

CAP 1-1-4. CAP received SAP and 1 60mm mortar round from approx 6 VC in a tree line at DT 262205. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called an artillery mission, causing the VC to flee SW. A sweep of the area found 4 VC KIA. RESULTS: 4 VC KIA.

CAP 1-3-9. A Chieu Ho came to CAP's position at BS 473866 for the reported reason that he had heard there was going to be a USA operation in the area. The Ho Chanh carried an AK-47 and had 2 M-26 grenades, 2 AK-47 magazines with rounds and 1 cartridge belt. RESULTS: 1 Ho Chanh, 1 WIA.

CAP 1-3-5. CP in the hamlet at BS 712973 received approx 400 rounds of SAP from an USN vehicle at grid BS 708966. The CAP element returned fire with organic weapons, illum...
8 July

CAP 1-3-1. The CP received sniper fire from an unseen enemy at BS 634977. The CP unit returned fire on suspected enemy locations and swept the area with negative results. 1 VN female received a minor wound from the enemy fire. RESULTS: 1 VN civilian WIA.

2 July

CAP 1-3-6. A patrol sent to investigate an explosion heard at BS 574977, found 1 cow KIA by a booby trapped hand grenade. The patrol approached the surrounding area and found one other booby trapped M-26 which was blown in place. RESULTS: 1 friendly cow KIA, 1 booby trapped M-26 grenade destroyed.

CAP 1-3-4. CAP triggered a squad sized ambush on 6-7 VC at DT 624005. The VC returned fire and withdrew SE. Illumination was requested, mortars fired on possible escape routes, and the area was swept finding 2 VC KIA, 1 100g grenade, and 15 L-1 grenade clips of ammunition. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA.

CAP 1-3-2. Element at BS 556992 received 20-30 rounds of SAP from an estimated 8-10 enemy at grid BS 556994. The CAP unit returned fire, requested illumination, and swept the area finding footprints leading N. RESULTS: Negative.

11 July

CAP 1-3-6. Received 12 incoming mortar rounds, the closest landing 30 meters from the CAP's position at DT 245255. The CAP called artillery on the mortar position at DT 235247, silencing the mortars. A first light sweep had negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-2. At BS 566992, CAP received 1 incoming 60mm round from an unknown source. The CAP requested illumination but was unable to determine the enemy.
11 July

LOCATION. At 1100 H the CAP received an additional 4 incoming 60mm rounds. Artillery was fired on logical enemy positions and DHA fires were requested on those sites for the remainder of the night. A first light sweep was unable to locate the enemy firing position. RESULTS: Negative.

CAP 1-3-10. A village chief came to the CP at 1840 H and informed the CAP of 11 VC setting in an embush at 8K 624380. Artillery was called on the reported position and 1 secondary explosion resulted. A first light sweep had negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

CAGO 1-3. The CAGO and Binh Son District Headquarters at 8K 602922 received 3 incoming 60mm mortar rounds from an unknown location. The rounds caused negative casualties or damage. RESULTS: Negative.

12 July

CAP 1-1-6. A patrol initiated organic weapons fire on an estimated NVA squad at 8K 236248. The enemy returned SAP and fled SW after an artillery mission called by the CAP caused a secondary explosion. The CAP swept the area and found 5 NVA KIA and 4 chicom grenades. RESULTS: 5 NVA KIA, and 4 chicom grenades captured.

CAP 1-2-3. An embush initiated organic weapons fire on 5 VC spotted moving E at 8K 436100. 3 VC fled E and 1 fled W. The CAP swept the area under illumination finding 1 VC KIA, 1 AK-47 with full mag, and documents. The CAP swept the area again at first light with negative further results. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 KIA.

13 July

CAP 1-1-6. A patrol approaching a hedgerow at 8K 244229 received fire from an estimated VC squad. The CAP returned fire, killing 3 VC and causing the enemy to withdraw.
13 July

The CAP pursued the enemy and made contact again at 0723, killing 2 more VC and capturing 1 wounded VC and 1 AK-47.

After airstrikes were directed on the VC by an AO, the CAP swept the area with negative further results. RESULTS: 5 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA, 1 INJ.

CAP 1-3-3. Element called a fire mission on 10-15 VC spotted at BS 666992. The VC fled W. The CAP was unable to sweep the area due to mines in the vicinity. RESULTS: Unknown.

14 July

CAP 1-4-4. Following a presentation by an Army PayOps team, the element turned in 3 M-1 carbines with ammunition, 1 cartridge belt, and 3 chico grenades to CAP at BS 754816. The element chief reported that the cache had been found at 1100H but not turned in to him until after the speech concerning VIP payments. A VIP payment was made. RESULTS: 3 M-1 recover 3 chico grenades destroyed.

CAP 1-1-7. 2 elements were sweeping vicinity grids BT 313316 and 307324, when the element at the first grid received SAF from an estimated VC platoon causing wounds to 6 PPs. The CAP unit returned fire with small arms and 60mm mortars and adjusted an HMM on the enemy. At this time the second element at BT 307324 received incoming mortar rounds and called artillery on the mortar position. An AO conducted airstrikes on the enemy positions and a sweep by the CAP elements found 7 VC KIA, 1 AK-47, 1 M-1 carbine, and 1 840 rocket launcher. RESULTS: 6 PP WIA, 2 PPs WIA, 7 VC KIA, 2 INJ, and 1 CIV.

CAP 1-4-3. A 17 year old Noi Chanh arrived with 2 chico grenades surrendered to CAP and reported that 17 VC were at grids BS 778832, and 779833. Artillery was called on the suspect grids by the CAP and fires were requested by USA personnel. CAP conducted a sweep of the area and found 2 destroyed huts, 1 HMM pack, 3 porches, 10 remains of 1 body, 500 lbs of rice and foodstuffs, and 1 bloody medium battle dress.
ing. The Ho Chi Minh was delivered to Binh Son District Headquarters for further interrogation. **RESULTS:** 1 Ho Chi Minh, 1 NVA/VC KIA, 500 lbs of rice and foodstuffs, 2 chican grenades, 1 NVA pack, and 3 ponchos.

**CAP 1-3-9.** A patrol approached 2 VN foothold at grid BS 513969, after it was determined they had information concerning VC activity in the area. The suspects were turned over to the DIOCC for interrogation. **RESULTS:** 2 VCS.

**CAP 1-4-2.** 1 VC Ho Chi Minh, age 44, and 2 boys ages 10 and 7, surrendered to CAP at BS 777958. They informed the CAP of an unknown number of enemy at grids BS 732989, 695989, and 7285 and reported tunnels and bunkers in grid BS 7299. The enemy was alleged to be from the 48th Regiment commanded by NG-278. Weapons were reported to consist of 2 81mm mortars, 2 60mm mortars, 8 M-79s, 3 50mm (NFT), 15 M-16s, a number of AK-47s, 8 D-40 rocket launchers (NFT), a quantity of AP mines, and one 90mm NR. The Ho Chi Minh stated the enemy had been in those locations for about one week and that they were to stay there for another week. The TAOR commander was notified. **RESULTS:** 1 Ho Chi Minh and 2 boys.

**CAGO 1-3.** Reported that Binh Son District Headquarters at BS 602922 received 5 incoming 82mm mortar rounds from grid BS 628936 causing negative casualties or damage. Artillery was called on the enemy gun position and a first light sweep of the area was conducted by CAP 1-3-7. **RESULTS:** Negative.

**CAP 1-3-3.** An element was moving into a position vicinity BS 664960 to act as a blocking force for an RG sweep when it received 82mm mortar, 24 rounds from BS 628356 estimated 50 enemy located in fortified positions, 1 PF was KIA in the initial contact. The CAP element returned fire, requested artillery and gunship support, and called the remainder of the CAP as reinforcements. CAP 1-3-3 moved to BS 664976.

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**UNCLASSIFIED**
and provided covering fire while the element evacuated the PT KIA and withdrew to a better position. P/F air strikes were run at 1600H against small arms fire. The enemy withdrew to the SB following the air strikes. Artillery was employed on the enemy withdrawal routes. A sweep could not be conducted due to mines in the area. The TF sweep had negative contact. RESULTS: 1 PT KIA.

CAP 1-3-3. An ambush employed organic weapon fire and grenades on 2 VC spotted at BS 664980. The VC fled SE and the CAP swept the area under illumination with negative results. A re-sweep of the area at first light discovered propaganda leaflets. RESULTS: Propaganda leaflets collected.

MRT 1-2. A VN role turned in 1 60mm round and 1 chicom grenade to MRT at BS 599919. A reward was paid and the ordnance destroyed. RESULTS: 1 60mm round and 1 chicom grenade destroyed.

16 July

CAP 1-3-10. An estimated platoon of VC employed approx 7 satchel charges, 20 M-79 rounds, and SFG on CP at BS 611879. The CAP returned organic weapon fire and called artillery and illumination, causing the VC to flee SW. 1 USMC was KIA in the attack and 3 USMC and 1 PT received minor wounds. On a sweep of the area at first light, VN civilians informed the CAP that 5 VC KIA had been carried off, and the civilians pointed out the location of the wounded VC. The CAP captured the wounded VC and under interrogation by 5th/46th USA personnel, the POWN revealed he was from the 5-31 company. RESULTS: 1 USMC KIA, 3 USMC WIA(2), 1 PT WIA(1), 1 VC POW.

CAP 1-3-8. The CP group on route to a new night position, was ambushed by approx 20 VC using command detonated mines and SFG at BS 582925. 3 USMC, 3 PPs, and 1 scout dog were KIA in the initial contact. The CAP returned fire, requested illumination and a reaction force from CAP 1-3-6. The enemy broke contact and withdrew W. Emergency evacuation was completed for 2 USMC.
2 PF, and 4 RD wounded in the contest. A sweep under illumination found one AK-47 magazine, 2 M-16 magazines, 1 hull box and two wires. Civilians in the area denied any knowledge of VC presence. A first light sweep found 1 VC KIA, 1 AK-47; and 2 chinc grenades. 2 K-16s, 1 M-79, and 1 M-12 were lost in the contest.

RESULTS: 3 USMC KIA, 3 PF KIA, 1 scout dog KIA, 2 USMC WIA, 2 PF WIA, 4 RD WIA, 1 VC KIA and 1 T.C., 2 K-16s, 1 M-79 and 1 AK/FRG-25 lost. (Lost equipment assumed to have been heavily damaged by the mines.)

17 July

CAP 1-1-1. A Marine on a patrol tripped a booby trapped M-26 grenade at BT 278187, wounding himself and 1 PF. The M-26 was hidden in the brush at the side of the trail and had been rigged with a trip wire. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA, 1 PF WIA.

CAP 1-1-7. The point element of a patrol received SAP from an estimated 2 squads of VC at BT 320304. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and the VC filed HJ. The CAP swept the area finding 3 VC KIA and 1 AK-47, and pursued the fleeing enemy. Artillery was called on the VC and the CAP found an additional 10 VC KIA, 3 AK-47s, 1 K-1 carbine and 8 chinc grenades. 2 Diet Lops accompanying the CAP were KIA. RESULTS: 2 Diet Lop KIA, 13 VC KIA, 5 T.C., 8 chinc grenades captured.

CAP 1-1-2. Patrol initiated organic weapon fire on 3 VC crossing a river at BT 320176. 2 VC were KIA, but the CAP could not locate their weapons on the river bottom. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA.

CAP 1-4-3. A VIP female received a VIP payment for leading the CAP to an M-16 mine placed at BS 767632. The CAP blew the mine in place. RESULTS: 1 M-16 mine destroyed.

CAP 1-3-3. A PF was wounded by a sniper round at BS 664980. The CAP returned M-60 fire on suspected enemy locations and requested an emergency evacuation for the
17 July

18 July

19 July
quarter\(^2\) (NFI) at BS 775637. The CAP called an artillery mission on the reported VC position and airstrikes were run on the area. The CAP swept the area finding blood trails. PsyOps have been initiated to exploit the Hoi Chanh. RESULTS: 1 Hoi Chanh.

CAP 1-3-8. CAP reported the recovery of the M-16 rifles reported missing after the CAP's contact of 162130H at BS 582925. The rifle had belonged to a VC NVN in the contact and had been in the possession of a PF in the CAP. RESULTS: 1 M-16 recovered.

20 July

CAP 1-1-7. While searching a tunnel and bunker complex at BT 318308, CAP found 20 82mm rounds still in cases, 20 B-40 rockets in wrappers and 4 cases of AK-47 ammunition. The CAP destroyed the ordnance. RESULTS: 20 82mm rounds, 20 B-40 rockets and 4 cases of AK-47 ammunition.

CAP 1-4-3. 2 Hoi Chanhns came to the village at BS 769828, and told the people they wanted to Chieu Ho. Villagers reported the incident to CAP and a patrol was sent to pick up the VC. 1 of the males had his wife and 9 year old son with him at the time of surrender. The Hoi Chanhns were delivered to the MOCC for interrogation. PsyOps exploitation is planned. RESULTS: 2 VC Hoi Chahnhs and 1 woman and 1 child detained.

21 July

CAP 1-3-4. 3 VC Hoi Chanhns surrendered to the village Chief at BT 621099, claiming to be members of the 95th Sapper Unit at BS 701957. Sapper weapons were reported to include 1 M-79, 1 60mm mortar, 1 M-60 MG, several AK-47s, some RPGs, 1 N-2, some M-16s, and 2 RPG launchers. The 3 Hoi Chanhns were taken to Binh Son District by CAP personnel. RESULTS: 3 VC Hoi Chanhns.

CAP 1-4-4. A VN boy led CAP to 2 VC mines of an unknown typeemplaced at BS 754816. The CAP destroyed the mines and made a VIP payment. RESULTS: 2 mines destroyed.

III-12

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21 July

CAP 1-4-3. A CAP ambush initiated SAF on 5 VC spotted moving E across a bridge at BS 765835. The VC fled E without returning fire. The CAP swept the area finding 1 VC KIA and 3 chicom grenades. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 3 chicom grenades captured.

22 July

CAP 1-1-7. A patrol initiated organic weapons fire on 1 NVA carrying a B-40 rocket at BS 302292. RESULTS: 1 NVA KIA, 1 B-40 rocket destroyed.

23 July

CAP 1-3-2. A VN male found 1 AK-47 at BS 579904, and brought it to CAP in exchange for a VIP payment. RESULTS: 1 IV turned in.

CAPs 1-2-4, 1-2-7, participated with a PF platoon from Ly Tin District Headquarters on a sweep of the area in the vicinity of BT 44072. After the conclusion of the sweep, 2 ambushes from CAP 1-2-7 and 2 ambushes from the PF platoon remained in the objective area. 1 of the PF platoons initiated organic weapons fire on 3 VC spotted from a bunker in front of the PF's position. The CAP elements joined in a sweep of the area finding 3 VC KIA, 2 AK-47s, and 1 cal .45 pistol. RESULTS: (not CAP) 3 VC KIA, 3 VC.

24 July

CAP 1-4-1. During the morning of 23 July, CAP participated in a combined sweep with RPs and PFs in the vicinity of grids BS 6077, and BS 6076. 4 draft dodgers and 3 VCIS were detained on the sweep and taken to District Headquarters. RESULTS: 3 VC.

CAP 1-1-6. A joint patrol by an IF platoon and CAP received SAF from an estimated 80 m of enemy (NVA) at BM 235244. 1 IF received minor wounds in the contact. The patrol returned organic weapons fire, causing the enemy to withdraw to the W. A sweep of the area found 2 VC KIA. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 1 IF WIA(M).

CAP 1-1-6. CAP elements on route to the CAP CP received SAF from an estimated 2 squads of VC at BM 235247, causing 2 WIA VC. The CAP returned organic weapons fire.

UNCLASSIFIED
24 July

fire; gunships and airstrikes were employed in the area. While sweeping the area, 1 USMC from the CAP stepped on a mine causing 5 USMC WIA, 1 later D, 1 USMC KIA(M). RESULTS: 1 USMC KIA, 6 USMC WIA, 1 USMC WIA(M).

CAP 1-1-7. A patrol initiated organic weapons fire on 2 NVA spotted running across a rice paddy at DT 314313. A sweep of the area found 2 NVA KIA, 1 SHW, 1 M-1 carbine, 6 chicom grenades and 2 M-16 grenades. RESULTS: 2 NVA KIA, 2 SHW.

CAP 1-1-7. CP received 6A, M-79 and 1 round of 60mm mortar fire from an USARV at DT 305293. The CAP returned organic weapons fire and called in artillery mission. A sweep of the area found 4 VC KIA. RESULTS: 4 VC KIA.

CAP 1-3-3. A 14 year old VN boy, Thanh Vd, came to the home of a CAP PF to Chieh Thi at BS 665997. The Hoa Chanh stated he had been kidnapped from his home and forced to work for the B-95 unit (NVN) as a food carrier. The Hoa Chanh stated there were 3 platoons in his company, with each platoon containing 30 VC. The Hoa Chanh was taken to District Headquarters for further questioning. RESULTS: 1 Hoa Chanh.

25 July

CAP 1-4-3. Received a report from a village chief of an estimated VC company at BS 778331. The CAP called artillery and mortar fire on the reported location and swept the area. Two M-16 mines were found emplaced on a path and were blown in place. One of the mines had been marked by having a square drawn around it in the dirt. Continuing the sweep, the CAP discovered a house, showing signs of recent occupation, and 4 bunkers destroyed by the artillery fire. One VC was spotted by the CAP and fled after the CAP initiated fire. RESULTS: 2 M-16 mines, 1 house and 4 bunkers destroyed.

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25 July

CAP 1-3-4. A VN man led CAP personnel to a booby trapped chicom grenade rigged with a trip wire across a trail at DT 621017. The CAP blew the booby trap in place and made a VIP payment. RESULTS: 1 booby trapped chicom grenade destroyed.

26 July

CAP 1-2-5. Ambush spotted 1 VC traveling from S to N in the vicinity of grid 400123. Engaged enemy with small arms fire. Swept area finding 1 VC KIA, 1 cartridge belt, 1 bottle dressing, 1 chicom grenade. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 chicom grenade and 1 cartridge belt captured.

27 July

CAP 1-2-2. Ambush spotted and engaged 5-10 VC at DT 399125. Approx 5 minutes later the ambush was surrounded by an estimated 20 VC. The remainder of the CAP moved as a reaction force, but the enemy had withdrawn and the reaction force was unable to regain contact. Artillery was employed on possible escape routes and a sweep of the area at first light had negative results. RESULTS: 1 WIA, 1 KIA, and 1 KIA.

CAP 1-4-4. CAP called artillery on 15 VC observed at BS 752616. An AO was requested and employed gunships, artillery, and fixed wing air strikes on an estimated VC platoon. RESULTS: 7 VC KIA.

20 July

A SF compound at DT 315307, received incoming 82mm and 50mm mortar rounds, and D-40 rocket rounds. In response to a SF request, CAP 1-1-7 called an artillery mission on the suspected enemy position at DT 312318, silencing the incoming. A SF sweep of the area found 3 VC KIA, 1 AK-47 and 1 M-1 carbine. RESULTS: 3 VC KIA, 2 WIA (1 SF CAP).

25 July

CAP 1-3-3. Received 1 incoming mortar round at NX 664980. The CAP checked the suspect on my location with negative results. RESULTS: Negative.

29 July

CAP 1-4-4. Elements exchanged fire with an NLF withdrawing from a village at BS 7526016. The CAP called an artillery mission on the enemy and swept the area with negative results. The CAP was informed by
29 July

a FF that the VC had beaten a hamlet chief
with a bamboo stick. The FF and other VC had
been killed or captured by the VC. The FF
reported that the VC had been killed by the
VC. They had been engaged in an ambush
against the VC. The VC had been engaged in a
battle with the VC. They had been engaged in a
battle with the VC. They had been engaged in a
battle with the VC. They had been engaged in a
battle with the VC.

CAP 1-3-4. 1 male and 2 female civilians
with fragmentation wounds were brought in
by VC. The FF and other VC had
been killed or captured by the VC. The FF
reported that the VC had been killed by the
VC. They had been engaged in an ambush
against the VC. The VC had been engaged in a
battle with the VC. They had been engaged in a
battle with the VC. They had been engaged in a
battle with the VC.

CAP 1-4-2. Spotted 6 sampans operating in
the vicinity of BS 777857 to BS 777877.
Artillery, 4.2 mortars, and swift boats
were employed to locate the sampans. The
CAPs swept the shore line and located the
sampans. They were located in the water. The
CAPs were turned over to District Headquarters
for interrogation. RESULT: 1 VC MV, 3 VCS.

30 July

CAP 1-1-4. CAP called an artillery mission
on approx 30 VC at BT 285200. Shortly
after the completion of the fire mission,
2 Vietnameses approached the CAP with
fragmentation wounds. The village chief
identified the 2 as VCS. After medical treat-
ment the VCS will be turned over to District
Headquarters for interrogation. RESULT: 2 VCS.

CAP 1-4-2. Spotted 6 sampans operating in
the vicinity of BS 777857 to BS 777877.
Artillery, 4.2 mortars, and swift boats
were requested to check out the area. Swift boats found 1 VC MV, 2
VC MVs, and 3 VCS. The VC MVs were
engaged and the VCS were turned over to
District Headquarters for interrogation. RESULT: 1 VC MV, 2 VC MVs, and 7 VCS.

31 July

CAP 1-1-4. While on patrol a FF tripped a
booby trapped 1-26 grenade at BT 265279.
Causing 1 FF to be and 1 FF to be treated. RESULT: 1 FF TSB, 1 FF TSB.

CAP 1-1-4. Received intelligence from
that VC were located at BT 256201. Art-
illery was fired on the suspected target.
Sweep found 3 VC MVs with 5 chicom

III-16
RESULTS: 3 VC KIA

CAP 1-1-7. A patrol was engaged by an estimated squad of VC at grid 305360. The CAP patrol returned fire and the enemy withdrew by a sweep of the contact area found 4 VC KIA, and 2 AK-47s. XFRMARK: 4 VC KIA, and 2 AK-47s.

CAP 1-4-2. RDs delivered 2 Hoi Chans to CAP for evacuation to the DEVC. The Hoi Chans claimed to be farmers for the VC at grid 33 714805. XFRMARK: 2 Hoi Chanh (KIA Cop).

1st CRO reported minor WOC boundary adjustments for CAP 1-1-7, and CAPs 1-2-9, and 1-2-5. The adjustments were made in order to more effectively support the Phase II, 1969 Pacification Plan in Quang Tin Province. Support capabilities and requirements were not changed as a result of the adjustments.
GROUP ORDER 2000.1

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Standing Operating Procedure, 1st CAG Combat Operations Center (COC)

1. General. The COC shall operate within the cognizance of the 1st CAG Operations Officer and under the direct supervision of the Communication Chief.

2. Spot Reports.

a. All Spot Reports will be PRINTED neatly and legibly EXACTLY as received.

b. Each Spot Report will be logged in the Spot Report Log and assigned a number. Numbers will run consecutively for a period of one month and will be prefixed with the month number. EXAMPLE: 07/234 - This number indicates the 234th Spot Report received in July.

c. An original and one carbon copy will be made on all Spot Reports. The carbon copy will be filed in the radio station file and retained for one month, after which they will be destroyed.

d. If it should become necessary to repeat a Spot Report which has been called in previously, the repeat shall not be called in using the carbon copy. The original will be provided by the S-3/S-2 clerk when requested for this purpose. Clearance for the repeat will be obtained according to paragraph 2.e below.

e. Effect delivery of the original copy as outlined below:

(1) Deliver immediately to one of the following officers in the order indicated:

(a) Operations Officer (S-3)
(b) Executive Officer
(c) Commanding Officer

(2) The cognizant officer will direct the radio operator as appropriate in each case.

(3) The radio operator will then deliver, by phone, the Spot Report
2 July 1969

to the addresses indicated, with the exception of III MAF (this is accomplished by the S-3/3-2 clerk at a prescribed time).

(4) After the Spot Report has been completely delivered to all local addresses, it will be given to the S-3/3-2 clerk for further action and file.

1. KIA/WIA Reports. This is a separate form which is prepared in duplicate for delivery to the Adjutant and the Chief Corpsman. The appropriate information for this form will be extracted from any Spot Report which contains information of a 1st CAG Wearing being either KIA or WIA. The delivery of this report will coincide with delivery of the Spot Report.

3. Daily Activities. These are received from each company twice daily and must be plotted on the maps of the respective company area of operations prior to 0600 and 1800. The 2400-0600 watch is responsible for plotting the day activities prior to 0600. The 1600-2400 watch is responsible for plotting night activities prior to 1800. However, the 0600-1600 watch shall plot night activities as they are received from each company up to the time he is relieved, providing the workload permits him to do so.

4. Other Messages.
   a. Incoming.
      (1) Log the message in the Radio Station Log.
      (2) If necessary for delivery, print the message neatly and legibly on a message blank EXACTLY as received.
      (3) Deliver to the appropriate staff section.
   b. Outgoing.
      (1) Write the message on a message blank.
      (2) Log the message in the Radio Station Log.
      (3) Transmit the message, EXACTLY AS WRITTEN, to the appropriate addresses.
      (4) Write a Time of Delivery (TOD) on the message blank and return it to the originating section.

5. Radio Station Logs. These will be used by each operator to record all messages and/or transmissions sent and received over the 1st CAG Command Net. The log will be maintained neatly and legibly by each operator in accordance with separate instructions. The log will be retained in the radio station file for a period of 6 months, after which they will be destroyed by burning.

6. Care of Equipment.
   a. All radios, handsets, loudspeakers, and power supplies located in the CCO will be F.M'd daily by the 2400-0600 watch. F.M. will be accomplished in accordance with Group Order 2302.2. Any equipment which is malfunctioning or defective will be reported to the Communication Chief.
7. **COC Police.** The COC will be maintained in a neat and orderly condition at all times. It is the responsibility and duty of each radio operator to sweep down and swab prior to being relieved. There will be no unofficial reading material allowed during the day watch.

J. E. HENNEGAN

J. E. HENNEGAN
GROUP ORDER 2502.3

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: 1st Combined Action Group Voice Radio Operating Procedures

1. This publication constitutes a directive whereby the 1st Combined Action Group Voice Radio Networks will operate.

2. No deviations from the instructions contained herein are authorized.

3. All personnel shall familiarize themselves with the contents of this publication, particularly those personnel which routinely act as radio operators.

4. Suggested changes or modifications to the instructions contained herein shall be brought to the attention of the 1st Combined Action Group Operations Section (Attn: Communication Chief).

5. WARNING. THIS PUBLICATION IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. ITS CONTENTS SHALL NOT BE DIVULGED TO UNAUTHORISED PERSONS. ALTHOUGH THIS PUBLICATION IS UNCLASSIFIED, IT WILL BE HANDLED AND STORED AS CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL.

J. E. Kemmerman
J. E. Kemmerman

Distribution: A & B
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(1) Preliminary Call. A preliminary call is used by the calling station and all answering stations to initially establish communications. It consists of the call sign(s) of the calling station(s), the word "THIS IS", the call sign of the calling station, and the word "OVER" or "OUT", whichever applies. The word "EXCEPT" may also be used if a station or stations are being exempted from a preliminary call employing a net call sign.

(2) Abbreviated Call. An abbreviated call is used by all stations after initially establishing communications. An abbreviated call consists of the word "THIS IS", and the call sign of the calling station, and the word "OVER" or "OUT", whichever applies.

(3) Single Call. A call in which the calling station calls only one station.

(4) Multiple Call. A call in which the calling station calls two or more stations. Stations called will be in alphabetical-numerical order.

(a) Answering a Multiple Call. Stations called in a multiple call will answer in the order called. If any station fails to answer in turn within 5 seconds, the next station in order will answer followed by all other called stations in order. The station which failed to answer in turn will answer last.

(5) Net Call. A call in which the calling station calls all other stations on the net by using a call sign which means "ALL STATIONS Answer." (a) Answering a Net Call. The stations included in a net call will answer the calling station in alphabetical-numerical order. In any station fails to answer in turn, the same procedure as for multiple Call is followed.

B. C A L L I N G  A N D  A N S W E R I N G  E X A M P L E S

(1) Preliminary Call and Answer

CORAL DRIP-THIS IS-JOEY DRIP-OVER
BIG DRIP-COLS-THIS IS-JOEY DRIP-OVER

(2) Preliminary Multiple Call and Answers

CORAL DRIP-DARY SAND-JOEY DRIP-THIS IS-JOEY DRIP-OVER
BIG DRIP-COLS-THIS IS-CORAL DRIP-OVER
BIG DRIP-THIS IS-DARY SAND-OVER
BIG DRIP-THIS IS-JOEY DARY-OVER

(3) Preliminary Net Call and Answers

AND STATIONS THIS IS-JOEY DRIP-OVER
BIG DRIP-THIS IS-CORAL DRIP-OVER
BIG DRIP-THIS IS-DARY SAND-OVER
BIG DRIP-THIS IS-JOEY DARY-OVER
BIG DRIP-THIS IS-JOEY DRIP-OVER
BIG DRIP-THIS IS-DARY SAND-OVER
BIG DRIP-THIS IS-JOEY DARY-OVER
LINE # REASON FOR DELETION

1 Not used in radio procedure
4 Used only as necessary
6-9 When the call serves as the address
10 Required only when the message text is coded
14 Required only when numbers are in the text
15 Used only as necessary

(5) Determining Lines To Be Used. In the plaindres form, use only those components, lines, and contents which are necessary for the rapid and clear transmission of the message.

C. Abbreviated Plaindres Form.

(1) Purpose. This Form, generally, is used for messages which need not be copied, and are usually exchanges of information between operators.

(2) Use. The Abbreviated Plaindres Form is used for the transmission of messages between operators to exchange communication information, to obtain request, corrections, repetitions, verifications, and other information concerning messages, radio networks, procedures, call signs, frequencies, etc. This Form may be used in place of the Plaindres Form when necessary.

(3) Message Format Lines Used. Generally, the below listed message format lines are used in the abbreviated plaindres form:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINE #</th>
<th>LINE TITLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>Message Call</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Transmission Instructions (only as required)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Final Instructions (only as required)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Ending Sign</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Rules of Exceptions.

1. If a date-time group is used, the separations are necessary.
2. If all stations are not in direct contact with each other, the address must be used.
3. The text will usually consist of prowords, message identification, and correcting and verifying information.
4. Abbreviated Plaindres may be used for other types of messages.

309. CALLING AND ANSWERING.

A. Establishing Communications. When initially establishing communications, all stations involved will use preliminary calls to contact each other.
2. Basic Message Format Components. Each Part of the Basic Message Format is further divided into Components.

(1) Heading. The Heading consists of 5 Components:

(a) Procedure
(b) Preamble
(c) Address
(d) Prefix
(e) Separation

(2) Text. The Text consists of the subject and textual matter.

(3) Ending. The Ending consists of 2 Components:

(a) Separation
(b) Procedure

F. Basic Message Format Lines and Contents. Each Component consists of a certain number of Format Lines and Contents. These are outlined in the Basic Message Format Schematic Diagram, shown in Annex A.

300. FORMS OF MESSAGES.

A. Purpose. Because all messages do not require all components and contents of the Basic Message Format for their transmission, there has been devised three different forms of the Basic Message Format. Each Form is designed to fit a particular need. The three forms of messages are: Plaindress, Abbreviated Plaindress, and Address.

B. Plaindress Form.

(1) Definition. The term "plain dress" is a contraction of the phrase "plain address," which indicates a message is transmitted with the address either in plain language or unencrypted call signs. This form will also contain all Format parts, components, lines, and contents, as required for the transmission of the message.

(2) Purpose. To provide the operator with a format in which all components and lines of the Basic Message Format are used, as necessary for the transmission of the message.

(3) Use. The Plaindress Form will be used whenever any message which must be copied and delivered to the addressees(s).

(4) Format Lines Omitted. The following message format lines may be deleted from the message only for the reason stated below during its transmission:

IV. 22
Z  FLASH  MEANING: The precedence of this message is 'Flash'.
      USE: Same as immediate.

----  FIGURES  MEANING: The numbers (punctuation) following are to be copied as symbols.

----  INITIAL  MEANING: The phonetic equivalent(s) following are to be copied as initial(s).

----  I SPELL  MEANING: To avoid confusion, the following group will be spelled.

----  MESSAGE FOLLOWS  MEANING: The following message is to be copied for record purposes.
      USE: After the preliminary call to indicate to receiving operator he must be prepared to copy.

----  TIME  MEANING: The numbers following will be a time group, or a date-time group; copy as symbols.

----  WILCO  MEANING: I have received, understand and will comply with the content of this message.

307. MESSAGE.

A. Definition. A message is any thought or idea transmitted in plain of secret language by any means of communication.

B. Originator. The originator of a message is the command by whose authority the message is sent. Messages are sent for and in the name of the unit commander. Therefore, the unit commander is the originator of all messages sent from his unit; even though he may not actually write all messages transmitted: the responsibility for their contents rests with him. The unit commander should be aware of the contents of all messages sent from his command.

C. Message Format. All messages to be transmitted by radio are prepared for transmission using a format specifically designed for this purpose. This is known as the Basic Message Format. The Basic Message Format applies to all types of electrical communications. For Voice Radio Procedure, the operator need be concerned only with those contents of the format which pertain to voice operating procedure.

D. Basic Message Format Parts. The Basic Message Format is divided into three parts for identification purposes, which are: The Heading, Text, and Ending.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROSIGN</th>
<th>PROWORD</th>
<th>MEANING/USE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>VERIFY</td>
<td>Verify with the originator of the message and repeat the message, or portions requested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USE: To confirm doubtful or questionable messages or portions of messages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>OVER</td>
<td>This is the end of my transmission, your receipt is invited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USE: In the message Ending.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>NUMBER</td>
<td>The station serial number of this message is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USE: In the message Call.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>PRIORITY</td>
<td>The precedence of this message is Immediate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USE: In the message Preamble, prior to the date-time group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>ROGER</td>
<td>I am receiving your message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>ROUTINE</td>
<td>The precedence of this message is routine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USE: Same as Immediate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>RELAY (TO)</td>
<td>Relay this message to the station whose call sign follows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USE: In the message Transmission Instructions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>TO</td>
<td>All addresses following this provord are action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USE: To indicate a word or group, after which, another word or group was not received.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>WORD AFTER</td>
<td>USE: To indicate a word or group, before which, another word or group was not received.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>WORD BEFORE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>XMT</td>
<td>The station(s) whose call sign(s) following this provord are exempted from the Call (Address).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USE: In the message Call or Address.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROSIGN</td>
<td>PROWORD</td>
<td>MEANING/USE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>THIS</td>
<td>The call sign of the calling station is _______.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In the message Call.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORRECT</td>
<td>CORRECTION</td>
<td>The last word or group sent is in error, the correct version is _______.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Whenever an error occurs which must be corrected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>DISREgard THIS MESSAGE</td>
<td>Disregard this message as if it had never been sent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>To cancel a message being sent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>DO NOT ANSWER</td>
<td>After I have transmitted this message, do not receipt for it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In the message Transmission Instructions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>READ BACK</td>
<td>After I transmit this message, read it back to determine if your copy is correct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In the message Transmission Instructions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>FROM</td>
<td>The originator of this message is _______.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In the Message Address.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>GROUPS</td>
<td>The groups counted in the text of the message are _______.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In the message Prefix.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNGC</td>
<td>GROUPS NO COUNT</td>
<td>The groups in the message text have not been counted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In the message Prefix.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SILENCE</td>
<td>SILENCE SILENCE</td>
<td>Emergency silence is imposed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>To impose emergency silence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I MI</td>
<td>SAY AGAIN; I SAY AGAIN</td>
<td>All words after this proword are repeats (I) you requested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>To indicate an answer to a request, or a request for a repetition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFO</td>
<td>INFORMATION</td>
<td>All addresses following this proword are information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In the Address of the Message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT</td>
<td>INTERROGATIVE</td>
<td>To indicate that a proword is being used as a question rather than a statement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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C. Use. Prowords are used extensively in the Basic Message Format, in procedure message texts, and in establishing communications. Therefore, each radio operator must know these prowords, their meanings, and where they are used. This will provide each operator with the means for more rapid and reliable transmission of messages.

D. Prowords. Contained below is a list of all prowords authorized for use on the 1st Combined Action Group radio networks. All operators shall make maximum use of these prowords at all times when transmitting messages, or other traffic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROSIGN</th>
<th>PROWORD</th>
<th>MEANING/USE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>UNKNOWN STATION</td>
<td>USE: To call an unidentified station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>ALL AFTER</td>
<td>USE: To indicate a word or group, after which, a part of a message was not received.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>ALL BEFORE</td>
<td>USE: To indicate a word or group, before which, a part of a message was not received.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>OUT</td>
<td>MEANING: This is the end of my transmission. No reply is expected. USE: Transmission Ending Sign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>WAIT</td>
<td>MEANING: I will pause for a few seconds, standby. USE: By the sending operator to inform the receiving operator he must leave the net for a few seconds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAR</td>
<td>WAIT OUT</td>
<td>MEANING: I will pause for longer than a few seconds, do not standby. USE: By the sending operator to indicate he must interrupt the transmission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>MORE TO FOLLOW</td>
<td>MEANING: After this message is received for, I have more traffic. USE: In the message Final Instructions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BT</td>
<td>BREAK</td>
<td>USE: To separate the message text from the heading and ending.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>CORRECT</td>
<td>MEANING: That is correct. You are correct USE: To indicate a repeated portion of a message is correct.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| CN      | CONFIRMATION  | MEANING: All text numbers are confirmed as follows. USE: Follows the text of a message after the Break, all numbers are repeated. 

1V-18
A. Transmitting Numbers As Figures. To avoid confusion between the spell version and the figure version of a number, the figure version should be prefixed with the proword "FIGURED" which means: The numbers following this proword are to be copied as symbols. The receiving operator will then copy the number as a figure symbol.

**Example (1):** "FIGURES SEVEN" will be copied by the receiving operator as the figure symbol "7".

**Example (2):** "SEVEN" will be copied by the receiving operator as the spelled version "S-E-V-E-N".

305. Punctuation. The punctuation included below is authorized for transmission by radio and other means of communication.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Punctuation Symbol</th>
<th>Written Abbreviation</th>
<th>Pronunciation</th>
<th>Punctuation Symbol</th>
<th>Written Abbreviation</th>
<th>Pronunciation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/</td>
<td>S-LANT</td>
<td>slant</td>
<td>(</td>
<td>PAREN</td>
<td>pair-on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.</td>
<td>P-D</td>
<td>period</td>
<td>)</td>
<td>UNPAREN</td>
<td>un-pair-on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>,</td>
<td>C-M</td>
<td>comma</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DASH</td>
<td>dash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>;</td>
<td>SEMICOLON</td>
<td>semi-colon</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>DOL</td>
<td>dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>:</td>
<td>C-I-N</td>
<td>colon</td>
<td>!</td>
<td>QUES</td>
<td>question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Q-UOT</td>
<td>quote</td>
<td>&amp;</td>
<td>AND</td>
<td>and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Transmitting Punctuation As Symbols. To avoid confusion between the written abbreviation and the punctuation symbol, the symbol version should be prefixed with the proword "FIGURED". The receiving operator will then copy the punctuation as a symbol.

**Example (1):** "FIGURES DOLLAR" will be copied by the receiving operator as the punctuation symbol "$".

**Example (2):** "DOLLAR" will be copied by the receiving operator as the written abbreviation "DOL."

306. Procedure Words.

A. Definition. Procedure words, or Prowords as they are commonly called, are pronounceable words or short phrases with predetermined meanings which convey orders, requests, and information of a common communication nature. Prowords were designed for use between operators to increase brevity and clarity of transmissions.

B. Prosigs. These are abbreviated forms of prowords which convey the same meaning as the proword, but are designed for use in other means of communications. Prosigs are not to be used on voice networks, however, for ease in copying, the receiving operator may write the prosig in lieu of the proword. Further, this practice is encouraged.
J. Radio Volume. Keep this at a comfortable level for the station you are receiving. It may vary from station to station, depending on many factors such as; distance, antenna site, terrain, weather, etc. The volume being too high will cause noise and voice distortion.

303. PHONETIC ALPHABET. The phonetic equivalents of the alphabet should be used whenever single letters are to be transmitted to avoid misunderstanding or confusion. The phonetic equivalents and their correct pronunciation is included below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LETTER</th>
<th>PHONETIC</th>
<th>EQUIVALENT</th>
<th>PRONOUNCATION</th>
<th>LETTER</th>
<th>PHONETIC</th>
<th>EQUIVALENT</th>
<th>PRONOUNCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>ALFA</td>
<td>al-fah</td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>NOVEMBER</td>
<td>no-vem-ber</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>BRAVO</td>
<td>brah-woh</td>
<td></td>
<td>O</td>
<td>OSCAR</td>
<td>os-car</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>CHARLIE</td>
<td>char-lee</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>PAPA</td>
<td>pa-pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>DELTA</td>
<td>del-tuh</td>
<td></td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>QUEBEC</td>
<td>key-beck</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>ECHI</td>
<td>eck-oh</td>
<td></td>
<td>R</td>
<td>ROMEO</td>
<td>row-mee-oh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>FOXTROT</td>
<td>folk-trot</td>
<td></td>
<td>S</td>
<td>SIERRA</td>
<td>see-er-ah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>GOLF</td>
<td>golf</td>
<td></td>
<td>T</td>
<td>TANGO</td>
<td>tang-oh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>HOTEL</td>
<td>ho-tell</td>
<td></td>
<td>U</td>
<td>UNIFORM</td>
<td>you-ni-form</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>INDIA</td>
<td>in-dee-uh</td>
<td></td>
<td>V</td>
<td>VICTOR</td>
<td>vick-tor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>JULIETT</td>
<td>jow-lee-oh</td>
<td></td>
<td>W</td>
<td>WHISKEY</td>
<td>wis-kee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>KILO</td>
<td>koy-low</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X-RAY</td>
<td>eks-ray</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>LIMA</td>
<td>leo-ma</td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>YANKED</td>
<td>yank-ed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>MIKE</td>
<td>mike</td>
<td></td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>ZULU</td>
<td>zoo-loo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Transmitting Initial Letters. To avoid confusion between the spelled version and the initial version of phonetic letters, the initial version should be prefixed with the word "INITIAL" which means. The phonetic equivalent(a) following are to be copied as initials. The receiving operator will then copy the phonetic letter as an initial.

**EXAMPLE (1):** "INITIAL CHARLIE" will be copied by the receiving operator as the single letter "C".

**EXAMPLE (2):** "CHARLIE" will be copied by the receiving operator as, the spelled out phonetic equivalent "C-H-A-R-L-I-E".

304. NUMBERS. The pronunciation and proper method of writing numbers is included below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>PRONOUNCED</th>
<th>WRITE AS</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>PRONOUNCED</th>
<th>WRITE AS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>won</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Six</td>
<td>six</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>too</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Seven</td>
<td>seven</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>thim-roo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sight</td>
<td>ate</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>fo-wor</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nine</td>
<td>nine</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>fi-yuy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Zero</td>
<td>see-row</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DECLASSIFIED
CHAPTER 3: VOICE RADIO OPERATION PROCEDURES

301. General. The operating procedures explained and illustrated in this chapter shall be followed by all personnel acting as radio operators. All personnel in the 1st Combined Action Group shall familiarize themselves with the procedures contained herein.

A. Training. In order to maintain the highest state of training possible, the Company Communication NGO will conduct a communication school at Company level as required. To ensure all radio operators are familiar with the Voice Radio Procedures contained herein, Company Commanders should ensure maximum participation of personnel when this school is scheduled.

B. Procedure. The 1st Combined Action Group radio networks shall operate in accordance with the procedures contained in the current edition of the ACP-125, and the instructions contained herein. No deviations are authorized. In the event situations occur which are not covered by these instructions, sound judgment and good common sense should be used to resolve the situation.

302. TECHNIQUES OF VOICE OPERATION. Talking over radio is different than talking over a telephone, or person to person. For maximum intelligibility, each operator should practice the following techniques of voice radio operation:

A. Talk Slowly. Remember, the receiving operator may have to copy what is being transmitted.

B. Talk Distinctly. Pronounce each syllable of each word distinctly, but do not exaggerate.

C. Talk In Monotone. Do not raise or lower the pitch of your voice while talking. The frequency response of the radio handset is not as broad as the range of your voice. If you vary the pitch of your voice as you talk some of the words may be partially transmitted or completely lost.

D. Speak Clearly. Do not slur your words, form each word separately.

E. Do Not Hesitate. Know what you have to say BEFORE keying the transmitter. Convey the message to the receiving operator in as few words as possible. REMEMBER: BE BRIEF, CLEAR, AND CONCISE.

F. Procedure Words (Prowords). Make each transmission as short as possible by making maximum use of prowords.

G. Voice Volume. Do not shout or whisper, use a natural voice level.

H. Do Not Become Irritated. Remain calm, cool, and collected. This attitude should be reflected in your voice at all times. When acting as a radio operator you are not a personality, but a part of the radio.

I. Push-To-Talk Lever. Keep this depressed tightly while transmitting, otherwise your voice will be intermittently cutout.
(b) Equipment.

1. Burn. Place a white phosphorous or thermite grenade on the radio or in the battery case.

2. Disintegrate. Place equipment in a hole with a fragmentation grenade. After the explosion inspect to ensure all equipment is completely destroyed.

3. Smash. Use any heavy object to smash the radio so it is not usable by the enemy. Antennas can be bent until broken. Handsets can be taken apart by unscrewing the plastic caps over the transmitter and receiver portions and cutting the power cord. Scatter the different components. Batteries should be torn apart and scattered.

4. During emergency destruction, all documents and equipment must be completely destroyed. It is better to have a few documents and equipment destroyed beyond use than to have many partially destroyed.
PREVENTION OF COMPROMISE

A. Responsibility. The commanding officer of each company within the 1st Combined Action Group is responsible for the accountability, handling, and stowage of all classified material within that company.

B. Safeguarding.

1. Accountability. This is the "key" to security. The commanding officer of each company should account for all classified material under his command at regular intervals. This will ensure all copies are being handled and stowed properly.

2. Storage. Classified material should not be allowed to indiscriminately lie in any place which is convenient. All storage places should be viewed from the standpoint of maximum security and minimum chance of compromise. When the classified material is not in use, it should be stowed in these areas of storage. Further, the commanding officer of each company should assign an NCO in each platoon responsible for the accounting, stowage, and handling of classified material.

3. Security Inspections. The company commander should, from time to time, make security checks to ensure the provisions of this chapter are being complied with.

DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

A. Routine Destruction. A security measure designed to prevent superseded classified material from falling into the hands of unauthorized persons. As soon as classified material is superseded it should be destroyed completely by burning. Superseded classified material has not lost its security, just its usefulness. It is mandatory that it be destroyed completely without delay.

B. Emergency Destruction.

1. Purpose. In the event any position is in danger of being overrun by the enemy, all classified material shall be destroyed to prevent it from falling into the hands of the enemy. This should be accomplished without delay.


(a) Documents.

1. Burn. This is the most effective method of destruction. Place all documents together with a white phosphorous or thermite grenade, or soak the documents with gasoline, kerosene, or other flammable liquid.

2. Shred. If the means to burn is not available, tear the documents into small pieces and scatter them over wide areas.

3. Rely. This is the least desirable method and should be used only as a last resort.
PART 2. PHYSICAL SECURITY

201. PHYSICAL SECURITY. Physical security is that phase of communication security which concerns itself with the physical means by which classified material is safeguarded from loss or compromise.

A. Responsibility. Physical security is the responsibility of everyone that comes into contact with or handles classified material.

B. Methods. The methods by which physical security is enhanced are through:

1. Proper handling.
2. Proper storage.
3. Accountability.
4. Timely destruction.

202. COMPROMISE.

A. Definition. Any classified material which is unaccounted for, falls into the hands of, or viewed by, unauthorized persons is compromised. When classified material is compromised it has lost its security value and must be reported immediately to the next higher headquarters. It must be assumed the enemy has knowledge of it, and its use must be discontinued.

B. Compromise Categories. There are several degrees of compromise which depend on the circumstances of compromise. These categories are:

1. Known compromise.
2. Possible compromise.
3. Unknown compromise.

Of the categories listed above, the Unknown Compromise is by far the most serious. An unknown compromise is a compromise that has occurred, but has remained undiscovered, or has been discovered but not reported to proper authority. Therefore, the material which has been compromised will continue to be used with possible serious consequences.

203. REPORTING OF COMPROMISE CLASSIFIED MATERIAL.

A. When a compromise of classified material is discovered, the report shall be made by the Commanding Officer of the company in which the compromise occurred. This report shall contain the information outlined in Enclosure (1) and shall be forwarded to S-2, 1st Combined Action Group by the next expedients means without undue delay.

B. Upon receipt of the compromise report, the S-2, 1st Combined Action Group shall determine, in so far as possible, if the material is, in fact, compromised.

C. If the S-2 determines the material is compromised, the report of compromise shall be forwarded to the G-2, American Division for action. If the compromised material concerns communication security a copy of the report shall be forwarded to the Signal Officer, American Division for information.
commanding officer to prevent the enemy from prematurely learning of a
unit's presence and breaching plans through traffic analysis. Radio silence
shall be imposed and lifted only by the commanding officer. During radio
silence, no stations under radio silence shall transmit traffic, or key
their transmitters. However, stations under radio silence may monitor
incoming traffic from higher or adjacent commands.

B. Imposing Radio Silence.

1. The operator will transmit the following warning message
with all numbers selected, at the direction of the commanding officer.

RADIO SILENCE WILL BE IMPOSED AT (Date-time group).
SILENCE WILL BE LIFTED AT (Date-time group) BY MY COMMAND.

2. The first receiving operator only will challenge the sending
station to authenticate. All other receiving operators will have monitored
the challenge and reply, thereby knowing the message is authentic. All
other operators will receipt.

3. At the time indicated in the warning message, the station
imposing radio silence will transmit the following order:

ALL STATIONS THIS IS NOT SILENCE SILENCE SILENCE

4. No further authentication is necessary. No station will
receipt and no further transmission will be made until silence is lifted.

C. Imposing Emergency Silence. In the event sufficient time does
not exist to transmit a warning message, and radio silence must be imposed
without delay, the station imposing radio silence will transmit the
following message:

ALL STATIONS THIS IS NOT SILENCE SILENCE SILENCE

1. The first receiving operator will challenge the sending
station to authenticate. All other receiving operators will have monitored
the challenge and reply, thereby knowing the message is authentic. All
other operators will receipt. After the final operator has receipted for
the message, no other transmissions will be made until silence is lifted.

D. Lifting Radio Silence. Only the station which imposed radio
silence, or higher authority may lift it. Lifting radio silence is
accomplished:

1. Upon order from the commanding officer, the radio operator
at the station which imposed radio silence will transmit the following message

ALL STATIONS THIS IS NOT LIFT RADIO SILENCE

2. The first receiving operator will challenge the sending
operator to authenticate. The remaining stations will have monitored the
challenge and reply, thereby knowing the transmission is authentic. After
radio silence is lifted, normal communications will continue.
B. Purpose. The purpose of imitative deception is to cause confusing troop movements, unnecessary radio transmissions, and possible ambush. If operators are not alert to imitative deception attempts, possible adversary messages containing false orders during patrols into enemy ambushes may be the result.

C. Measures to Defeat Imitative Deception.

(1) Operators must be alert for imitative deception attempts.
(2) Operators should become thoroughly familiar with the voice characteristics, and procedural mannerisms of distant friendly operators.
(3) Whenthe operator suspects imitative deception is being attempted, the sending operator should be challenged to authenticate. If the authentication is incorrect, follow the procedure outlined in paragraph 106.
(4) Operators should be suspicious of any sudden changes in radio tone, or voice quality.
(5) In order to defeat attempts at imitative deception, the operator must be thoroughly trained, and alert at all times.

110. JAMMING.

A. Purpose. Jamming is an attempt by the enemy to disrupt communications of friendly radio networks by introducing noise and static on the net. Jamming will either interrupt, or completely obliterate radio signals.

B. Anti-Jamming Procedures. Should jamming occur on the 1st Combined Action Group radio network, the operator should first disconnect the radio antenna to determine if it is jamming, or merely noise caused by an internal malfunction of the radio. When the antenna is disconnected and the noise persists, the radio receiver is defective. If the noise disappears it is jamming, and the operator should take one or more of the following steps:

(1) Notify the commanding officer or squad leader.
(2) Squeeze the antenna. The squeeze should be placed between your antenna and the jamming station. Shift the squeeze around the antenna in several directions until the position is found in which the noise is diminished the most. This will also affect the incoming signal but may enable you to read through the noise.
(3) Shift the radio to another site. If this does not work the first time, try several more, preferably amongst trees, buildings, or other obstructions which may help to screen out the jamming station.
(4) Vary the volume control. The intensity of the incoming signal may be raised above that of the jamming.
(5) If the above procedure do not provide sufficient signal separation, request a change to an alternate frequency and call sign.
(6) IMPORTANT. Do not let the enemy know his jamming is effective. Do not request excessive repetitions.

111. RADIO SILENCE.

A. Purpose. Radio silence is a security measure available to the
B. What To Shackle. The shackleing of the below listed numbers is mandatory:

1. Friendly KIA and/or WIA
2. Coordinates of friendly positions NOT KNOWN to the enemy
3. Quantities of supplies, rations, ammunition and other ordnance
4. Dates and times of planned or pending operations
5. Coordinates of future ambush sites, defensive positions, or patrols
6. Radio frequencies linked with the plain equivalent of the command it represents.

C. What Not To Shackle.

1. Friendly KIA, or POW
2. Enemy KIA, WIA, and/or POW
3. Coordinates of enemy positions
4. Coordinates of friendly positions KNOWN to the enemy
5. Numbers of enemy troops, or quantities of enemy supplies, ammunition, other ordnance, and rations.
6. Generally, any information which is known by the enemy. IF THERE IS DOUBT, DO NOT SHACKLE. Remember, the shackle cipher is relatively insecure, and can be compromised very easily.

D. Shackle Cipher Tables. These are provided by the Group Communication Section at regular intervals. They shall be used in accordance with the instructions contained therein.

108. OPERATIONAL CODE.

A. Purpose. The operational code is a means available to the message originator by which certain commonly used words and phrases may be encoded for radio transmission. Normally, the operational code will be used to encode Confidential information. In an emergency situation the operational code may be used to encode Secret information, if no other means is available, and it is imperative the information be transmitted. This code will not be used to code Top Secret information.

B. Operational Code Tables. These are provided by the Group Communication Section at regular intervals. They shall be used in accordance with the instructions contained therein.

109. IMITATIVE DECEPTION.

A. Definition. Imitative deception is an attempt by the enemy to "dope" an unwary operator into accepting a fraudulent message as one which is authentic, by imitating the procedures and voice characteristics of an operator at another station or the not.
106. AUTHENTICATION.

Authentication is a security measure available to the operator to ensure a received message is from a friendly station, and not an attempt at imitative deception by an enemy station. Authentication, therefore, is a means to detect imitative deception.

B. Types. Generally, there are two types of authentication employed by operators on radio nets:

(1) Challenge and reply authentication
(2) Transmission authentication

C. Challenge And Reply. This is a method by which the receiving operator challenges the sending operator. The challenge consists of characters selected at random. If the correct reply is not received, the sending station is assumed to be an enemy.

D. Transmission. This method of authentication is transmitted in the final instructions of the message, and consists of characters selected from pre-determined positions of the message. This method of authentication will not be used on the 1st Combined Action Group Networks.

E. Receiving Wrong Authentication Reply. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL THE CHALLENGING OPERATOR INDICATE TO THE REPLYING OPERATOR THE AUTHENTICATION REPLY IS INCORRECT. If the challenging operator does not receive a correct authentication reply, the challenging operator will challenge twice more. If a wrong reply is received each time, the operator will discontinue challenging and make the following notation on the message received: "NOT PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED." This will indicate to the addresses that the message is a possible attempt at imitative deception, and may be bogus.

F. When To Authenticate. It is mandatory that authentication be performed when the following situations arise:

(1) When imitative deception is suspected
(2) When challenged
(3) When lifting or imposing radio silence
(4) When a classified message sent in plain language is cancelled
(5) When initially entering a net
(6) When leaving a net
(7) For training purposes, maximum use of authentication procedures shall be made by all operators.

G. Authentication Tables. These are provided by the Group Communication Section at regular intervals. They shall be used in accordance with the instructions contained therein.

107. SKEWLED CIPHER (NUMERICAL CODE)

A. Purpose. The skewled cipher is a means available to the message
CHAPTER 1. TRANSMISSION SECURITY

101. DEFINITION. Transmission security is defined as all those practices and measures which are taken to prevent the enemy from gaining useful intelligence from friendly radio transmissions.

102. PRACTICE. In a combat or tactical situation it must be assumed that the enemy is monitoring all transmissions made by friendly radio stations. Therefore, in view of this, every radio operator shall be aware of, and practice, proper radio procedures, thereby minimizing the possibility of the enemy gaining intelligence from our radio networks.

A. Practices Strictly Forbidden.

1. Linkage of call signs and/or frequencies with their plain language equivalents or meanings.
2. Transmission of any classified information in plain language.
3. Transmission of unauthorized messages.
4. Profane or obscene language.
5. Excessive testing and tuning.
6. Operator chatter.

B. Mandatory Practices.

1. Proper radio procedure at all times.
2. Strict observance of radio silence when imposed.
3. Proper use of authentication, shackles cipher tables, operational codes, and their procedures.
4. Immediate recognition of attempts at imitative deception, and jamming.

103. LINKAGE. No call sign and/or frequency linked with the unit it identifies will be transmitted in plain language over the radio. All frequencies shall be encoded in the Shackles Cipher prior to transmission.

104. TRANSMISSION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. No classified information shall be transmitted in plain language by radio, except as authorized by the commanding officer.

A. In an emergency situation, the commanding officer may authorize confidential information to be transmitted in plain language over the radio. In the event this becomes necessary, the first word of the text will be "CLEAR." The security classification will not be transmitted. The warning "CLEAR" indicates to the addressee(s) that the contents of the message are Confidential which were probably compromised during its transmission, and should be handled accordingly.

B. Under no circumstances shall Secret or above classified information be transmitted in plain language by radio, or any other means of communication.

105. AUTHORIZED MESSAGES. Only those messages which affect the tactical situation, facilitate administration or supply are authorized for transmission.
(4) **Abbreviated Call**

**THIS IS-DIG DROP-OVER**

(5) **Station Frieking to Answer in Turn**

CORAL REEF-DIG SAID-JIM DANKY-SAYS IS-DIG DROP-OVER
DIG DRED-DIGS IS-CORNELL DROP-OVER
(DIG SAID fails to answer within 5 seconds)
DIG DRED-DIGS IS-JIM DANKY-OVER
DIG DRED-DIGS IS-DIG DROP-OVER

DECLASSIFIED
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART</th>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>LINE#</th>
<th>LINE TITLE</th>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>Not used in radio procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Message Call</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>Call sign(s) of called station(s); proword</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EXEMPT; call sign(s) of exempted station(s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>proword THIS IS; call sign of calling station; proword NUMBER and station serial number of calling station.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Transmission Instructions</td>
<td>Prowords READ BACK, or DO NOT ANSWER, or RELAY (TO).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PREAMBLE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Date-time group</td>
<td>Prowords RCUT/E, or PRIORITY, or IMMEDIATE, or FLASH; proword TIME; date-time group; zone suffix; message instructions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Message Originator</td>
<td>Proword FROM; call sign of message originator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Proword TO; call sign(s) of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Addressee(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Addressee(s)</td>
<td>proword ACTION; call sign(s) of information addressee(s).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Proword INFORMATION; call sign(s) of information addressee(s).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>Proword EXEMPT; call sign(s) of exempted addressee(s).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Accounting</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Accounting</td>
<td>Proword GROUPS followed by numerical count of total number groups in text; proword GROUPS NO COUNT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Accounting</td>
<td>Prowords BREAK, separates Text from Heading.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>TEXT</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Text</td>
<td>Message classification or UNCLASSIFIED; passing instructions; drill or exercise identification; subject line, references, textual material.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SEPARATION</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Long Break</td>
<td>Proword BREAK, separates Text from Ending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Confirmation</td>
<td>Proword CONFIRMATION; all numbers and/or odd groups in text repeated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ENDING</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Final Instructions</td>
<td>Prowords MORE TO FOLLOW; CORRECTION; DISREGARD THIS MESSAGE; ALL AFTER; ALL BEFORE; WORD AFTER; WORD BEFORE;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Ending Sign</td>
<td>Prowords OVER or OUT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DECLASSIFIED
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF PLAINDRESS AND ABBREVIATED PLAINDRESS MESSAGE ROUTE

A1. Plaindress Form with All Necessary Format Lines.

**TRANSMISSION CONTENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINE#</th>
<th>TRANSMISSION CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>BIG DRIIP-SMALL ANCHOR-THIS IS DRY SAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>SMALL ANCHOR-CORAL TO CORAL BEACH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ROUTINE TIME 021535H-JAN 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>FROM-DRY SAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>TO-SMALL ANCHOR 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>INFORMATION-CORAL BEACH 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>BIG DRIIP 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>GROUPS 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>BREAK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED WEIO QTR SDP LVN XIC VIEI 123 456 789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>BREAK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>CONFIRMATION 123 456 789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>TIME 1540H-ARRIVE AGAIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>OVER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**TRANSMISSION CONTENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINE#</th>
<th>TRANSMISSION CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>BIG DRIIP-SMALL ANCHOR-THIS IS DRY SAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ROUTINE TIME 021600H-JAN 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>BREAK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED WEIO QTR SDP LVN XIC VIEI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>BREAK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>OVER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B3. Abbreviated Plaindress with Minimum Necessary Format Lines.

**TRANSMISSION CONTENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINE#</th>
<th>TRANSMISSION CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>DRY SAND-SMALL IS BIG DRIIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED WEIO QTR SDP LVN XIC VIEI REQUEST REPEAT ALL AFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>OVER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DECLASSIFIED