CONFIDENTIAL (Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1))

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st CAG ltr 6/JEH/jlg 5700
of 10May69

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 February 1969 to
28 February 1969

1. The subject chronology has been reviewed for completeness and
is forwarded herewith.

R. D. WHITE
By direction

Copy to:
CO, 1st CAG
CG, III MAF

PERMANENT RETENTION
Report Destruction to HQ Classified Files Sect. (Code ABQ)
CONFIDENTIAL (Unclassified upon removal from the basic letter)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st CAG ltr 6/JEH/jlg 5700 of 10 May 1969

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 February 1969 to 28 February 1969 (U)

1. Forwarded.

Copy to: CO, 1st CAG
HEADQUARTERS
1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 February 1969 to 28 February 1969

Ref: (a) HOO F5750.41A
(b) MII Part 5750.6A

Enccl: 1. 1st Combined Action Group, III Marine Amphibious Force

1. In accordance with provisions of reference (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Downgraded at 3-year intervals, declassified after 12 years, DOD Dir 5200.10.

J. E. Hennegan

Copy 1 of 11 Copies
HEADQUARTERS
1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 February 1969 to 28 February 1969

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<th>Page</th>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. DESIGNATED

1st Combined Action Group
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO, San Francisco, California

Commander
LtCol E. R. HUNTER
1 Feb 69 - 28 Feb 69

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Combined Action Company 1-1
Capt L. H. ROSS
1 Feb 69 - 28 Feb 69

Combined Action Company 1-2
Capt R. R. WELPOTT
1 Feb 69 - 28 Feb 69

Combined Action Company 1-3
Capt P. G. MITCHELL
1 Feb 69 - 28 Feb 69

Combined Action Company 1-4
Capt J. H. CHAMPION
1 Feb 69 - 28 Feb 69

ATTACHED UNITS

None

2. LOCATIONS

Hq, 1st CAG
Chu Lai, Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, RVN

CA CO 1-1
Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province, RVN

CA CO 1-2
Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, RVN

CA CO 1-3
Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN

CA CO 1-4
Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN

MTT-1
Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province, RVN

MTT-2
Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer
Maj T. L. FOLKS
1 Feb 69 - 10 Feb 69

Maj J. H. LAWSON
11 Feb 69 - 28 Feb 69

ENCLOSURE (1)
### Adjutant/S-1

- SSgt J. J. BRADLEY
  - 1 Feb 69 - 8 Feb 69
- 2nd Lt B. W. SMITH
  - 9 Feb 69 - 28 Feb 69
- Maj R. F. ENDERTS
  - 1 Feb 69 - 28 Feb 69
- Capt W. H. JAROSZ
  - 1 Feb 69 - 28 Feb 69
- Maj R. F. ENDERTS
  - 1 Feb 69 - 28 Feb 69
- Maj T. L. FOLKS
  - 1 Feb 69 - 10 Feb 69
- Maj J. H. LAIBSON
  - 11 Feb 69 - 28 Feb 69
- HM2 T. H. TAYLOR
  - 1 Feb 69 - 6 Feb 69
- HMCS R. W. ELLERS
  - 7 Feb 69 - 28 Feb 69

### S-2/S-3

### S-4

### Communications Officer

### S-5/Special Services

### Medical Section

### Average Monthly Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Off</td>
<td>Enl</td>
<td>Off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(ARVN)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENCLOSURE (1)
PART II
NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. Personnel Administration:

   a. Joined and transferred. During the month of February, the
      1st Combined Action Group joined and transferred the following
      number personnel listed in the four categories below:

       (1) Joined.
           Officers      Enlisted
           3            57

       (2) Rotated CONUS.
           Officers      Enlisted
           2            19

       (3) Transferred within WestPac Command.
           Officers      Enlisted
           1            8

       (4) Transferred by SRB w/sick (out of country hospital).
           Officers      Enlisted
           0            15

   b. Awards.

       (1) There was one Bronze Star for heroism and one end
           of tour award submitted to WestPac for approval during the month
           of February 1969.

           SHI   BSH   HGI   NAI
           0     1     0     1

       (2) Awards returned approved from WestPac included the following:

           SHI   HGI   NAI
           2     2     1

       (3) Personnel of the 1st Combined Action Group also
           received the following awards as a result of combat wounds,
           heroic/meritorious service in the Republic of Vietnam.

           PSHI  WGI  Commendation From WestPac
           13    2

ENCLOSURE (1)
c. Casualties during the month of February 1969 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>DU</th>
<th>DOC</th>
<th>KOF</th>
<th>NIA</th>
<th>UTI</th>
<th>REC</th>
<th>VIA/LBO</th>
<th>KET TO DU</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. CONGRESSIONAL/SPLINTS/SHRAPNEL. There were no Congressional
Interest Correspondence and seven Welfare Reports during the month of February 1969.

c. Administrative Assistance.

(1) Two Group directives were promulgated during the reporting
month. Copies of these orders are located in the documents section
(section IV) of this chronology.

(a) Group Order 23021 Radio Set AN/PRC-25 Operational
Checklist.

(b) Group Order 10120 Organizational and Individual
Clothing Maintenance of.

f. Legal. A break down of legal activities for February is
shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Art 32 Investigations</th>
<th>Informal Investigations</th>
<th>HJP SPCM SG1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two article 32 Investigations were pending at the end of the reporting
period.

g. Morale and Welfare. The morale of the unit continues to be
high and special services equipment available to all hands. Quotes
for both out of country and incountry Rest and Recuperation (R&R)
are effectively being utilized. The following is a break down:

(1) Out of country R&R - Quotes Utilized

|     | 36 | 36 |

(2) In country R&R -

|     | 4  | 4  |

(2) A party is held at a different CAP each week consisting
of a cook out, beer and soda. Each CAP sends a man in to the rear
on a staggered schedule to allow him to relax and enjoy the club
facilities.

h. Career Planning.

(1) Career planning is continued at an increased pace in 1st CAP with efforts made to pursue all possible avenues available
to retain potential career Marines.
(2) The career planning program was frequently augmented by the visits of the III Marine Amphibious Force Career Planner who holds interviews at the Group and G3/01's Headquarters.

(3) Reasons for failure to take advantage of reenlistment incentives are not many, nor are they varied. Continuance of education and return to interrupted civilian employment are frequent reasons. The small number of promotion quotes to Lance Corporal is a significant factor in career motivation within 1st GM, where large numbers of Private First Class have more than ten months in grade, and those quotes for promotion average fewer than twelve per month.

(4) A significant number of potential reenlistees have not completed a high school education, a fact which prejudices their choices of reenlistment option where formal schooling is concerned. A concerted effort is currently being made within the Group to administer the GM's test to all eligible Marines.

1. Mail. Daily average bags of mail were processed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letters</th>
<th>Incouraged</th>
<th>Outgoing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>½ bag</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Packages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incouraged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>½ bag</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** One bag of letters represents approximately 2,000 letters.

2. Promotions. Twenty enlisted promotions were affected during the month of February as follows:

SSgt - 1  Sgt - 1  Cpl - 1  LCpl - 16  PFC - 1

(1) Any eligible Marines with time in grade of six months or more continue to be passed over due to the lack of promotion quotes to Cpl and LCpl having a deleterious effect on both the morale and on our Career Planning Program.
k. Hospital Visit. Hospital visits are made daily by the Hospital coroner representative, the Casualty NCO and the Mail Orderly along with frequent visits by the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Adjutant and First Sergeant. Casualties are visited as soon as they are evacuated from the field. Normally, the Commanding Officer or his representative, having been notified by DUSTOFF Control Chu Lai, of the destination of the individual are waiting at the hospital when the casualty arrives. The dead are identified within hours of arrival at Chu Lai.
2. Intelligenceme

a. General,

(1) The month began with the high level of activity on the part of NVA/VC units within the 1st CAG areas in both Provinces. As indicated by intelligence, there were continued small scale ground attacks and attacks by small arms and mortar fire conducted to keep up pressure on targeted pacification areas. As further indicated by intelligence, VC tax collectors and proselytizing cadre were at work collecting back and current taxes in order to sustain the month’s fighting, and propagandizing ARVN servicemen and GVN cadre with Anti-GVN themes. Some CAPs found opportunities to answer VC psyops loudspeaker taunts with artillery fire during the period. The tax collecting, food-gathering and proselytizing traffic is credited with the increase of activity and kills in the Ly Tin TACO of CACO 1-2. At the same time, the VC conducted meetings to explain the upcoming “Winter-Spring” offensive to their own forces.

(2) By mid-month, larger NVA/VC forces began to move, and contacts increased. In two CAP TACOs, government buildings were damaged by sapper terrorist attacks, and the rumored “Winter-Spring” offensive began to take shape as intelligence reports showed the appearance of a new NVA rocket artillery unit in the mountains west of Chu Lai Base. The Tet holiday passed without noticeable contact. 1st CAG precautions included reinforcing some CAPs with headquarters personnel during the high threat period. On the 23d of February, CAP 1-1-4, while on a joint operation with forces of the 5th ARVN Regiment contributed to the growing body of intelligence targeting Van Ky for ground attack by capturing the commander of the 72 PF Battalion. This officer provided as critical information which affected the outcome of the coming attacks in favor of MACV forces.

(3) On 25 February, the “Winter-Spring” offensive became reality with coordinated rocket artillery and ground attacks throughout Quang Ngai and Quang Tin TACOs of the 1st Combined Action Group. Of the 27 units in the Group, 12 CAPs and both DNTs were in contact during the period 222400Z-230115Z Feb 59, the first day of attacks. CACO 1-1 was the most heavily engaged, and accounts for 22 enemy killed during the above period. In all, three of the four CAG headquarters received attacks by fire of light to moderate strength. The 1st CAG headquarters received two attacks of incoming 122mm rockets, there were no casualties to CAG headquarters personnel from this incoming which fell at 0230 and 0705 the morning of the 25th. An adjacent support unit suffered three killed in the 0705 attack.

b. Intelligence Chain

(1) The most timely and valuable intelligence of immediate tactical value comes from the populace. Of twenty-two reports drawn from local Vietnamese villagers, sixteen was picked off in some kind of action. One report resulted in six VC KIA, in Van Ky area, another resulted in the capture of four local forces VC cadre holding a meeting in CACO 1-2 TACO, while still another resulted in a large pickup of ordnance under the VIP program.
(2) Information received by the CSN this to 1st CAG is passed to the
American Division and local interested commands as applicable. Feedback from
Viet Cong suspects captured and sent to the various districts by CAFs remains
slow in most cases... This problem receives continuing attention from 1st CAG
headquarters and subordinate companies.

9. ARVN Liaison Officers/Interpreters. The Group continued to employ
one Liaison Officer and four interpreters through the end of the period, all
of whom contributed as usual to the success of coordination among Group units.
3. **Grain**

   a. **General**

   (1) The 1st Combined Action Group continued to conduct operations in accordance with its mission of village level security in the two southernmost provinces of the I Corps Tactical Zone. Early in the month, the Fourth Combined Action Company was activated to operate in Son Tinh District of Quang Ngai Province.

   (2) On 1 February, 1st Combined Action Group relieved the 198th Light Infantry Brigade of the River Patrol North and South mission, the patrolling of two inland waterways. The advantages of assuming this mission included the small ability of the shallow draft Boston Whalers with their M50 machineguns and M79 grenade launchers for use in operations along the waterways by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Combined Action Companies. In addition to flank security and blocking force missions, it is envisioned these boats will also be used for the conduct of raids, night ambushes, and for limited transport of personnel of the CAPs located near the water.

   (a) Eight "Boston Whalers" and 40hp outboard engines were provided for the mission by the Americal Division as well as communications equipment for the bases.

   (b) The Northern Patrol is based on the western side of the Ky Ha peninsula at the south of the bay, while the Southern Patrol is located on the south bank of the Tam Bong River near its mouth.

   (c) Personnel to conduct the patrols are provided from the 1st CAP headquarters, supplemented by CAP Marines and Popular Forces Soldiers from those CAPs located near the water.

   (3) Despite the accumulation of reports of an imminent "Winter-Spring" offensive, the RVN holiday passed with relative quiet, and 1st CAP activity had produced less than forty confirmed enemy kills. The initiation of the offensive on 23 February changed this, however, and as a result of "Winter-Spring," 1st CAP units confirmed 48 NVA/VC kills during the last six days of the month, this was more than one half the total for the entire month.

   b. **Activities**

   (1) There were a total of six multi-CAP or joint CAP-FA/ARVN operations during the month. While these activities did not pay highly in terms of kills, one did pay off in the capture of a VC Battalion Commander in the Tam Ky area, providing important intelligence regarding an impending attack there. The operations required from half a day to a day, and in some cases took one or more CAPs out of their RACs for a short while. The fires of all supporting arms including 105mm mortar fire from Swiftboats, were utilized in these operations. Swiftboats from Coastal Division 12 have continued to prove themselves to be of valuable assistance in the Tam Ky and Binh Son coastal areas. Most recently they have supported the newly activated Company CAPs with both Elca
mortar fire and transportation between Chu Lai and the Béténun Peninsula.

(a) On 9 February, CACO L-4 conducted one three-CAP operation, a joint CAP-ARVN swoop, and a CAP-US Army Armor operation.

(b) On 12 February, CACO L-4 activities produced a significant result when CAP 1-2-4 ambush one VC under fire from all directions by an estimated reinforced VC platoon. This action began 123150H Feb 1969. When a reinforcing FF platoon from Ly Tin District Headquarters was pinned down and the 1-2-4 element ran low on ammunition, 101st CAG reacted with an emergency resupply of ammunition and a reinforcing element flown from the CAG headquarters by a medevac helicopter. The medevac helicopter took fire, slightly wounding one pilot while evading enemy fire. The insertion of the reaction force and the ammunition resupply was achieved with the help of a tracker dog team from the 193d Infantry was inserted, and following blood trails and clothing scent, the dog located two VC suspects in their homes near the area of the contact. The action was completed 131200H Feb 1969.

(c) Three of the multi-CAP operations were conducted by CACO L-4 and included in one also the use of a unit of twenty-five Regional Development Team coders, and in another a coordinated sweep with a Regional Forces Company. During the sweep of 22 February, 1st CAG Boston Uhlanos provided flank security and small arms fire support on the Tien Chau River for a multi-CAP operation conducted in the eastern part of CACO L-3 TAOC. This operation gave the CAP Marines and Popular Force soldiers opportunities to train, as it involved water-crossing and landing from Vietnamese fishing craft.

(d) CACO L-4 conducted no operations of note, as the period was spent becoming familiar with new VC units, and developing working relationships with their respective Popular Forces platoons. At month's end, however, this company had accounted for more than ten of the 1st CAG's confirmed kills and a number of VC suspects captured.

(2) The following statistics derive of 1st CAG operations and activities:

(c) Night Patrols 850  Light-CAP Operations  6
    Ambushes  1107  Day Patrols  656
    KIA  75

(b) Enemy Casualties

    KIA  61 也比较  50  KIA  7

(c) Weapons and Ordnance Captured:

    3 Carbines M-1  1 SES
    12 AK-47s  1 M-16
    3 .45 Cal. Pistols  1 B-40 RL
    4 AK-44s  5 M-16 mines
2. 50mm rounds
3. M-25 grenades
4. Chindon grenades
5. 2.3-40 RL rounds

(d) Casualties Sustained:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>POW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>FF</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Training

(1) General. Training conducted by the 1st CAG includes General military subjects training at both CAG and CAP levels, and the training of the Vietnamese forces of the Districts.

(a) CAP Training. During the period, 950 hours of instruction including Vietnamese Language and Personal Response classes were conducted at CAP positions; 12 hours of leadership subjects were taught at the CAG Headquarters to the Squad Leaders and their assistants. The subjects instructed at CAG Headquarters were highlighted by a presentation on.foo procedures by local Armyavad helmets pilots. In addition to the above mentioned training, informal training was conducted weekly by CAG Commanders during CAP Squad Leader’s meetings.

Type of Training | # Hours
--- | ---
General Military Subjects | 16
Vietnamese Language | 0
Personal Response | 2
Leadership/Tactics | 4

(b) Mobile Training Teams. This Group has two Mobile Training Teams conducting training of Popular Forces platoons. The following training was completed by these teams during the period:

1. MTT 1-1 - Trained 1 Revolutionary Development Team
2. MTT 1-2 - Trained 2 Popular Forces platoons

(c) Other Training. Three 1st CAG Marines attended the III MAF Vietnamese Language School at NQ 2nd CAG, Yen

d. Relocation of CAG Headquarters. During the period, the headquarters of CAG 1-1, CAG 1-2 and CAG 1-3 were relocated at Tam Ky, By Tin and Binh Son District headquarters respectively. The moves were made to facilitate coordination with district chiefs, fire support clearance agencies, and intelligence resources.
(c) Activity of CAGs.

(1) On 1 February, CAG 1-1 was activated at Son Tinh District headquarters, Qui Nhon Province, approximately four kilometers north of Qui Nhon City.

(a) This company was established to control CAGs projected to assist the pacification of the Binh Tan Peninsula and eastern Son Tinh District in the wake of OPERATION KUHETTE/BEDTIME/ROAD HEART. The CAGs to be activated for this company were previously planned as a part of CAG 1-3. Experience proved, however, that ten CAGs and one MTT were the manageable limit for CAG 1-3, given the problems of administrative and operational supervision, logistical support capabilities of the supporting battalion, and the distance to be covered by organic communications assets.

(b) This company is presently co-located with the Son Tinh District headquarters, and is accessible by vehicle via National Route #1, or by helicopter. With the highway pavement ending within a kilometer of Binh Son District headquarters, vehicles require approximately one hour to cover the distance between Son Tinh headquarters and 1st CAG headquarters at Chu Lai Base.

(c) Logistical support is provided by 5th Battalion, 16th Infantry, a unit of the 198th Light Infantry Brigade. One hot meal per day, ammunition resupply, some transportation and administrative traffic is provided via helicopter from assets allocated the battalion by 198th Brigade.

(d) This company faces certain coordination problems resulting from two of the three CAGs being located on the Binh Tan Peninsula, which is a political entity of Binh Son District.

(1) The geographical location dictates those CAGs be controlled from a headquarters closer than Binh Son primarily because of effective communicating range of the FRC-25 radio.

(2) When the remaining CAGs projected for Son Tinh District are established, the bulk of CAG 1-3 will lie in Son Tinh District and the need of coordination will originate and need to be resolved in the Son Tinh District. This situation increases the coordination load upon the company commander. It is expected that the requirement for logistical support of CAG 1-3 will be shifted to another, closer battalion of the 198th Brigade than the tactical situation in the American Division. FRC allows the battalion to return to OPCU of the 198th.
(a) Shortly after the installation of the CAP, PF security opened fire on a small group of VC, initiating the CAPs first day in being with no reports to respond. The action lasted approximately one hour, and 23 February. Binh Due Village was released from the operation of the Binh Son District Chief and Commanding Officer, lieu CAP observed. Results were not apparent.

(2) CAP 1-4-2 was installed after an appropriate ceremony in Chua Ma hamlet, Binh Due Village, Binh Son District on 23 February. Binh Due Village was released from the operation of the Binh Son District Chief and Commanding Officer, lieu CAP observed. Results were not apparent.

(3) On 23 February, CAP 1-4-3 was installed after an appropriate ceremony in an E5 (2) hamlet, Binh Due Village, Binh Son District. CAP 1-4-3 is a mobile CAP responsible for the protection of approximately 900 civilian refugees living in a resettlement hamlet. This CAP is accessible by either sea or helicopter, overland routes not being secure at this time.

(a) Both the above CAP 1-4-2 and 1-4-3 are mobile within an assigned AOCC. Fire support is provided by heavy artillery located 13 kilometers northwest of LZ DUKE, and closer in, by a section of 4.2 mortars located in the middle of the Binh Son Peninsula with a US Army rifle company from the 5/46 Infantry, 199th Brigade. Both CAPs are accessible only by sea or helicopter, the overland routes not presently being presently secure for vehicular travel.

(g) Inspections. Each CAP and CIAO headquarters was inspected by a number of the 1st CIAO headquarters during the period. The Commanding Officer spent a number of nights in the field with various CAPs, observing them as he had been his habit.

(h) Fire Support. Artillery support changed this month in two respects:

(1) The 4.2 mortar battery which had been located in the vicinity of CAP 1-3-3 was replaced by the 7th Battalion, 46th Infantry to the battalion CP, and with the inception of CIAO 1-4, the artillery based at LZ DUKE BS65757 became more closely identified with the CAP program, as it would be called upon to provide heavy artillery support to the newly installed Binh Son CATS. 100,000 meters to southeast as well as CAP 1-4-1 located to the southwest. Coordination was achieved without problem and support of the Binh Son CATs has been arranged. INF support remains unchanged for the period.

(I) Air Support. Helicopter transportation is at a premium, with the supporting US Army battalions hard-pressed, but consistently cooperative in lifting CAP personnel to the interior and coastal CATs on supply runs, as well as complying with occasional requests for visual reconnaissance and CAP visit flights for the Commanding Officer of the 1st CIAO. The addition of CIAO 1-4 is expected to either strain helicopter assets or the distance.

14
to be covered when their resupply grows and thereby the time.

1. Psychological Operations. Through coordination with the American Division Pullout Section, Asia Command, affected psychological operations to exploit the rallying of seven Boi Canton, the VC wounding of civilians; to prepare the 5,000 of the new and relocated GPs; to provide mini-bombing to an estimated 3,000 Vietnamese watching seventeen films in GAP Thoong; and to provide the following aerial broadcasts and propaganda leaflets for dissemination as indicated:

(1) Aerial Dissemination

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leaflet Theme</th>
<th>Number Dropped</th>
<th>Broadcasts</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Rewards</td>
<td>429,000</td>
<td>Rewards</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chieu Ho</td>
<td>2,470,000</td>
<td>Chieu Ho</td>
<td>7:20 hrs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti VC</td>
<td>248,000</td>
<td>Anti VC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pro GVN</td>
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<td>Pro GVN</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Anti NVA</td>
<td>0:10 hrs</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(2) Hand Dissemination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leaflet Theme</th>
<th>Number Disseminated</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bro GVN</td>
<td>56,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rewards</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti VC</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

K. Volunteer Informant Program. A total of $47,000 was spent during the month under the VIP program. All expenditures were for ordnance turned in or pointed out to the GPs in place. Seventy-four items which had become mines or may have been otherwise used against PNWF forces were purchased from local civilians. Of all items seven of these items were body-trapped.

(1) A statistical recap of ordnance purchased is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type Ordinance</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type Ordinance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>155mm rd's</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>M-16 mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>105mm BR rd.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>01-yarnes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>105mm rd's</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Economic mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.2mm rd.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>M-14 mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>81mm mortor rd's</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>LAA M-72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>81mm mortor rd's</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>M26 frag grn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3-40 rocket rd.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chieu green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>60mm mortor rd.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>M-79 round</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Communications.

1. Communication Improvement. During the reporting period several passive measures were taken to improve communications in the 1st QAG.
(a) 1st CAG: The section concerning communications was completely revised, amplified, and rewritten.

(b) Operators' Procedure Booklet. A booklet prescribing and explaining correct voice radio procedures, transmission security measures, and preventive maintenance procedures was written for future distribution to the CAP and CAG radio operators. The booklet will be used in conjunction with procedure classes to be conducted by the Group Communications Chief at a future date. Further, these booklets may be employed as a reference source by all operators to resolve communication problems which may arise.

(c) Inspections. During the reporting period the Communication Chief conducted intensive inspection tours of CAG and CAP communication facilities. During these tours classes were held to correct discrepancies noted. The largest number of discrepancies were noted in Antenna RC-292 siting and adj st, and Radio Set AN/FRC-25 preventive maintenance.

(d) T/O, T/E Modifications. With communication improvement and reliability in mind, recommended modifications to the T/O are being considered and written to include trained Voice Radio Operators at all CAG Headquarters and Group Headquarters; and T/E modifications to include Radio Set RT-52h/VRC at each CAG and Group Headquarters.

2. RADIO REPAIR.

(a) 1st SSI. The support afforded by 1st SSI Maintenance Battalion to this command through the Direct Exchange (DX) Program has continued to be a problem. Radio Set AN/FRC-25 DX "turn around" time is in excess of 60 days on the average which is wholly unsatisfactory to provide this command the support required to maintain operations at the optimum level.

(b) LSU-3. To overcome this difficulty, the LSU-3 Communication Maintenance Section has been utilized for large amounts of this Command's communication repair work. In spite of their own heavy workload, "turn around" time, as compared to 1st SSI Maintenance Battalion, has been significantly reduced. However, because there exists in LSU-3 a lack of adequate quantities of repair parts, test equipment, and technicians, their support has proved helpful, but not adequate to meet the needs of this command.

(c) T/O, T/E Modifications. To solve the problems inherent to the 1st CAG, a modification to the T/O and T/E has been considered and is in the preparation stage. This modification will include recommendations to:

1. Upgrade the scholm of maintenance from 1st scholm to 2nd scholm.
2. Authorize a Sergeant 2nd Grade (Radio Repairman, Ground) be added to the T/O.
3. Authorize all necessary repair parts and test equipment to maintain all communication equipment operating to the 1st CAG at the 2nd scholm level of maintenance.
DECLASSIFIED

3. EQUIPMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radio Set AN/ARC-25</th>
<th>TO 1st ISR</th>
<th>TO LSU-3</th>
<th>FROM 1st ISR</th>
<th>FROM LSU-3</th>
<th>TO Tot</th>
<th>TO Tot</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F/R REPAIR</td>
<td>F/R REPAIR</td>
<td>F/R REPAIR</td>
<td>F/R REPAIR</td>
<td>F/R REPAIR</td>
<td>D/L EST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Set AN/ARC-25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handset H-109/BR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) The major cause of deadlined radios is defective modules due to normal electronics failure. The major cause of deadlined headsets is defective transmitter and/or receiver elements.

4. RADIO SET AN/ARC-74. During the reporting period, four (4) AN/ARC-74 radios were received through G-6, 315 AAF on a temporary loan. Through testing, it was determined that three of the radios were defective. These were returned to 1st ISR Maintenance Battalion for repair. At this time no definitive decision has been reached concerning the adequacy of this radio communication capability within the 1st CAS. However, when possible in the future, testing of the radio will be made under all conditions and conclusions concerning its applicability to the communication system of this command will be developed.

5. ACQUISITION OF SUPPLIES. At this time it is not possible to determine accurately the "fill" time on requisitions. However, in a few instances, requisitions of priority 02 and 05 are taking in excess of 6 months to be filled.
c. Significant Events:

(1) During the month of February Combined Action Company 1-4 was activated and initial outfitting and supply support was satisfactorily accomplished.


(3) The Field Supply Analysis Office (SAO-3) conducted a supply inspection of this unit. All discrepancies were discussed with responsible personnel and necessary corrective actions recommended. Actions were initiated to enhance the supply effectiveness of the unit.

b. Supply:

(1) The overall supply situation during the month was adequate to support the mission.

(2) Problem areas encountered:

(a) Organizational Clothing - The increase of personnel due to newly activated CAPs and the lack of clothing held by personnel being transferred to the program has resulted in a poor asset posture.

(b) With the activation of Combined Action Company 1-4, the need for the T/3 deficiency of one (1) truck, 3/4 ton, M37BL became critical.

(c) With the T/0 increase pistol, caliber .45 assets were insufficient.

c. Maintenance:

(1) The maintenance posture within 1st CAP is inadequate. The direct exchange and maintenance fleet programs affecting motor transport and communications equipment has not provided satisfactory turn around times.

(2) Problem areas encountered:

(a) Lack of Shop Stores capability at Chu Lai.

(b) Excessive deadline time on AN/PRC-25 radios during February.

d. Motor Transport:

(1) Generally, the motor transport situation is satisfactory. The majority of problems encountered are with the truck, 3/4 ton, M37BL as parts for this equipment are in critical supply.
(1) Support by U.S. Battalions continue to provide adequate support to the CAP's in the areas of class I, III and IV supplies.

(2) FMFPAC Bulletin 4600 of 31 Jan 1968 provides for Development of the Mechanized Embarkation Data System (MEDS) in Vietnam. In February 1stCAG completed the data base for the Billet Description Card.

2. Medical

(1) General. Besides the capabilities of assigned Hospital Corpsman, the 1st CAG is serviced medically by the medical battalions and evacuation hospitals of the Americal Division. At CAG Headquarters, medical administration is carried on normally by one Chief Hospital Corpsman and an assistant. In addition to administration, the Headquarters element conducts Sick Call, and provides a corpsman for the reaction force, or to cover any CAP which loses a Corpsman for any reason.

(2) Evacuation. CAGC 1-1 casualties are normally evacuated to Denaré, via evacuation hospitals north of Tam Ky, while casualties from CAGC's 1-2, 1-3 and 1-4 are evacuated via Chu Lai, to hospital ships or hospitals out of country.

(a) Americal medevac helicopter support has been quite satisfactory during the period, with emergency medevacs averaging approximately fifteen minutes.

(3) Additional Information. The following areas are reported for the month of February.

(a) Personnel Hospital Corpsman.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reported for duty</td>
<td>09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotated to CONUS</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medevaced out of country</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awarded the Purple Heart Medal</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommended for Navy Command-</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tion Medal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommended for waiver of Advanced Examination</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Techniques.

(a) Medcaps conducted        | Totals |
| Patients treated            | 31,911 |

19
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Adults evacuated: 437
Children evacuated: 237
Dentosaps conducted: 61

(d) U. S. Personnel treated at Sick Call by CAG: 215
(e) Hospitalized WIA: 19 USMC, 2 USN

Illness: 61

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ENCLOSURE (1)
5. Civic Action.

a. The Combined Action Platoons of this Group were responsible for treating over 30,000 patients during their MEDCAPS. During February 2000 pounds of food was given out along with 10 boxes of clothing and a 1000 pounds of soap. CAF and kits were also given to selected families based on recommendation of the CAP Leader. Among these were 2 Midwife kits, 1098 school kits and school refill kits, 2 Masonry kits and 1 barber kit. These items were obtained primarily from Amerial Division G-5.

b. The following civic action projects were completed during February:

(1) CAP 1-1-2 Built 2 culverts vicinity BT 342184.

(2) CAP 1-1-3 Obtained fill to repair road at BT 335175.

(3) CAP 1-1-4 Assisted villagers in constructing a protective fence vicinity BT 204277.

(4) CAP 1-2-5 Obtained two loads of fill for road at vicinity BT 416123.

(5) CAP 1-2-6 Built and set up playground equipment for school at vicinity BT 438056.

(6) CAP 1-3-6 Provided materials for a 3 room Dispensary at vicinity BS 255973. Villagers did work and completed project.

(7) CAP 1-3-7 Constructed a small dam for rice paddies near BS 613935, along with a protective fence. One well was cleaned out and sides repaired by the CAP at vicinity BS 613935.

(8) CAP 1-3-8 Constructed a fence near vicinity BS 484824.
1 Feb
CAP 1-3-2. Patrol picked up 4 VCS in connection with information given by VCS captured the previous day. VCS taken to Binh Son.

2 Feb
CAP 1-3-5. Received call that chopper was shot down near 1-3-5 location. Reaction Force arrived in area of chopper and set up a 360° perimeter. Received sniper fire, returned fire and swept area finding 5 homemade mines. Chopper was lifted out and patrol was lifted to home base. RESULTS: 5 mines CIA.

3 Feb
CAP 1-2-4. RD who lives in Khuong Dai area informed Marines of some kind of VC activity going on. Patrol checked area and captured two female and two male VC. They will be taken to Ly Tin District. RESULTS: 4 VC POW.

4 Feb
CAP 1-5-9. Sighted two VC, pursued them. Found and destroyed VC living/supply houses. People stated 50 VC moved from house to tree line to ambush 1-3-9 element. Called artillery and started to sweep area. Received heavy automatic weapons fire. Returned fire and swept area finding 5 VC KIA, 6 bunkers destroyed and blood trails. RESULTS: 500 lbs. of m16, two cartridge belts, 3 M-26 grenades, 2 helmets, 5 VC KIA.

CAP 1-2-4. Information from four VC captured led to round-up of eight additional VC intelligence/supply cadre. The four VC captured were VC infrastructure in Khuong Dia. RESULTS: 4 VC turned over to Ly Tin.

7 Feb
CAP 1-4-1. Patrol saw ten VC in open and two VCS by themselves. Patrol told them to stop. Patrol pursued and apprehended them. RESULTS: 2 VCS sent to Son Tinh Headquarters.

CAP 1-3-8. While on patrol moving down trail spotted 3 VC. Opened fire and pursued them. Called artillery. RESULTS: 3 VC KIA, 1 homemade mine destroyed.
CAP 1-3-4. Patrol returning from sweep came upon a group of people working; people scattered and VC opened fire wounding 1 PF, patrol returned fire and called artillery. VC broke contact and fled leaving two VC KIA behind. Swept area. 1 VC turned himself in because he was wounded and wanted to be medevaced. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 1 PF WIA, 1 POW.

CAP 1-4-1. Ambush set up for night, two VC females walked into site, ambush captured them and turned them over CACO 1-4 for further transportation. RESULTS: 2 VCS.

MITT 1-1. Patrol set in ambush site and observed 4 VC on trail. Marine made movement in brush and enemy opened fire with automatic weapons, chicom grenades and 1 B-40 rocket. Patrol returned fire with claymores and small arms fire, enemy broke contact, patrol called artillery and illumination. RESULTS: 1 USMC KIA and 1 USMC WIA.

CAP 1-3-2. Received incoming small arms fire and grenades. Returned fire and received 3 60mm rounds, called illumination and checked area. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA and 2 grenades CFA.

9 Feb

MITT 1-2. Checked out intelligence received previous night. RESULTS: 3 81mm rounds, 1 105 HE round, 1 155 round HE, 3 60mm rounds, and 2 grenades. All ordnance destroyed and VIP will be neds.

10 Feb

CAP 1-2-4. Patrol initiated ambush. Enemy broke contact. Reaction Force of PP's from Ky Khong conducted a house to house search of the area. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 1 USMC & 1 WNA. 3 AK-47's CFA.

11 Feb

CAP 1-4-1. Patrol swept through area finding 2000 lbs of rice, 75 lbs of salt, 4 tunnels and 9 bunkers, also found 4 VCS who will be interrogated.

CAP 1-3-2Z. Received intelligence of possible position of VC platoon. Artillery was called on area. Checked area at night. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA, 17 IEDs, 17 IEDs, 17 IEDs, 17 IEDs.
CAP 1-1-6. Patrol made contact, VC returned fire and broke contact. Area was swept.
RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 2 VC POW, 1 M-2 Carbine and 4 AK-47 GIA.

CAP 1-3-6. Element was checking personnel for ID cards. When 1 VC female started running from area, counterparts told her to halt but she kept on running, resulting in gun shot wound in leg inflicted by PF. RESULTS: 1 GCS WIA.


CAP 1-3-1. Activity on way to site reported fire from one platoon VC. VC fired 15 rounds 60mm mortar and numerous small arms. Activity started back to compound. VC opened fire from flank and fired was returned, VC broke contact. Compound fired 60mm mortars and machine gun fire at VC. Element re-supplied with ammo and swept area. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA.

CAP 1-2-4Z. Following an intelligence report 42B was dispatched as a third ambush from Ky Khomg compound. Contact was made by 42B resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 PP WIA. Sweep was conducted attempting to flush enemy into other 42 ambush site with negative results. RESULTS: 2 PP's WIA, 1 VC KIA, 1 AK-47 and 3 chicom grenades CIA.

CAP 1-3-6. Patrol spotted a VC who exited into a house. Element caught him going out the back window. He had no ID card. Another VC came up with his ID card. The ID card showed no history of military service. RESULTS: 2 VC POW.

CAP 1-3-3. PF's opened fire on 2 squads of NVA moving west toward 1-3-3's compound. Called illumination and received good cover-age. PF's swept area finding four NVA KIA.
16 Feb

17 Feb

18 Feb

19 Feb

21 Feb

and a M-16 carbine. Night area again at 618 lights and PT's found 1 VC KIA and 2 night carbines. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 2 night carbines ROE.

CAP 1-3-1. 1 VN came to compound with 1 live M-79 round. Round was blown in place VIP held.

CAP 1-3-3. Spotted 1 NVA flag, element pulled back and linked up with PT's from 1-1-1 and 1-1-2, called spotter plane and swept area finding one NVA flag and propaganda telling Marines and PT's to Chieu Hoi. Booby trap was attached to flag pole. RESULTS: 1 USC WIA.

CAP 1-3-8. 1 FF came to compound with 1 VC who was previously an RD. FF's found propaganda leaflets on him, VC was interrogated and taken to Binh Son.

CAP 1-3-5. Patrol spotted movement in village and called for Reaction Force. Returns one hooch which had five VC in it. Could not fire because civilians were mixed with them, VC ran and element opened fire. Swept area and found 40 loose AK-47 rounds, cleaning gear and 1 blood trail. Turned over nine VCS who were in the hooch to Binh Son. RESULTS: 9 VCS.

CAP 1-4-1. Patrol received small arms fire approximately 5 VC, returned fire and swept area finding 1 VC KIA. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

CAP 1-4-1. Patrol sweeping artillery impact received small arms fire. 3 USMC WIA, and one PT KIA in initial contact. Conducted activity in same area at first light. RESULTS: 1 PT KIA, 1 USMC WIA, 1 USMC WIAEB, 2 VC KIA.

CAP 1-5-22. HF observed approximately 5 VC who opened fire with small arms. HF's returned fire and VC fled. Area was swept and found articles of clothing and 2 grenades.

CAP 1-3-5. Marine stepped on M-14 mine with checking village defensive wire. RESULTS: 1 USC WIA.
CAP 1-3-2. VN civilian reported a mine at BS 57507. Element found 1 M-16 mine. RESULTS: 1 M-16 mine destroyed, VFP paid.

CAP 1-3-5. Patrol of Biet Lops from northern compound made contact with 5 VC. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

CAP 1-3-8. Element spotted 6 VC moving down trail. Element opened fire. Element called artillery. Checked area and found intestines and blood trails. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 M-26 grenade CIA.

CAP 1-1-4. Ambush opened fire on 3 VC. VC returned fire and fled. Called illuminating and swept area finding 1 body and 1 AK-47. Village policeman identified the body as a 1st Lt. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 1 AK-47 CIA.

CAP 1-3-4. Received small arms fire from undetermined number of VC. Returned fire with 60mm, 50 caliber and small arms fire. RESULTS: 1 UNSC VIA.

CAP 1-3-8. VC entered village at 0130 and blew up hospital. Ambush went to clear area. People told element that 20 VC had gone to the village. Element swept area with negative results.

CAP 1-3-5. VC got into village throwing 1 grenade and firing 12 small arms rounds, killing the hamlet chief and four members of a youth group, also wounding 2 civilians. RESULTS: 5 civilians KIA and 1 WIA.

MTP 1-2. Compound received 3 mortar rounds. Returned fire with 60mm and M-60. RESULTS: 1 UNSC WMIA.

CAP 1-3-2. Element hit by 40-50 VC with approximately 40 rounds B-40 and 60mm. Enemy also used small arms fire and M-60. Element returned fire and called gunships and artillery. RESULTS: 2 NFP's wounded with shrapnel wounds. Swept area finding blood trails, 1 VC KIA, 3 chickens and 2 M-26 grenades.
23 Feb

CAP 1-3-9. Enemy received small arms fire and 1-25 grenades from approximately 10 VC. Returned fire and called illumination to check area. RESULTS: 1 USMC KIA, 3 ER's WIA and 1 M-26 CIA.

CAP 1-2-4. Ambushed a Prussian team stating they were going to rocket and mortar Ky Khung Headquarters and then by Tin Headquarters. It is believed there were 25 to 30 VC with the team. Called artillery.
RESULTS: Unknown.

CAP 1-3-4. 1 VC brought to position by civilians with gunshot wounds from N-15. People stated that he was a VC informer.
RESULTS: 1 VC captured.

HIT 1-1. Patrol left compound to investigate intelligence from villagers. Observed 30 VC/NVA waiting in ambush. Patrol attacked ambush. Ambush was forced to disperse and return fire. 2 ER's KIA, 3 ER's WIA, 1 USMC WIA. 1 USMC WIA was captured by VC. Patrol returned to compound with KIA and WIA, regrouped. Enemy returned with a bottle rocket enveloped VC/NVA, dispersed with fire and recovered the USMC WIA. Enemy was driven off by fire by regrouped VC/NVA. Reaction (APCs) arrived. Enemy was completed. RESULTS: 2 ER's KIA, 3 ER's WIA, 14 NVA KIA, 1 B-40 rocket launcher 5 grenades, 2 NVA CIA and 1 M-14 lost.

CAP 1-1-4. Marines got into position as blocking force for ARVN sweep and were pinned down by 50-60 VC for about 1 hour. 1-1-4 personnel set in as additional blocking force. ARVN sweep flushed VC gun and Marines opened fire. RESULTS: 5 VC 1 VC CIA, (RN Co Major), 3 AK-47's, 1 SMG, 1 .45 Caliber pistol, 6 cartridge belts and 20 chican grenades CIA.

CAP 1-1-3. When patrol made sweep of vil, VC was hiding behind a bush. He was told to come out but didn't respond and patrol opened fire hitting Muvw time. KIA 1 VC WIA.
CAP 1-3-5. VC came to position to report 1 satchel charge and 2 pounds of C-4 for 1 launcher. Satchel blown in place. RESULTS: 1 Satchel destroyed.

MTT 1-1. Compound received 14 82mm HE rounds, 3 82mm gas rounds, sniper fire and M-79 rounds. Fired 60mm and 81mm at gun positions. Gas shells were of Chinese manufacture.

CAP 1-4-1. While going to Route #1 took area fire from rice paddy. Saw a VN mile in rice paddy and instructed him to come. He did not come and PP's approached him. RESULTS: 1 VGS.

CAP 1-3-5. VC came into village and opened fire on Youth Group wounding 1 in arm. Returned fire and swept area. RESULTS: 1 VC WIA.

CAP 1-3-2. VN came to position with a not from a VC who wanted to Chieu Hoi. RESULTS: 1 VC Chieu Hoi.

MTT 1-1. Received 4 82mm rounds. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA, 1 PP WIA.

MTT 1-1. Received 2 rounds of 82mm. Returned fire with 60 and 81mm and 90mm (tank). RESULTS: 1 PP WIA and 3 USMC WIA.

CAP 1-1-5. Patrol made contact with 5 VC. VC opened contact with 60mm and returned instant, followed with small arms fire. Patrol returned fire and swept area. RESULTS: 2 USMC WIA, 3 VC KIA.

CAP 1-3-9. VN boy found 1 booby-trapped chicom grenade. RESULTS: 1 Grenade destroyed.

CAP 1-5-2. VN civilian reported 1 M-16 mine. RESULTS: 1 M-16 mine destroyed.

CAP 1-4-7. Patrol saw smoke coming from building. Patrol opened fire and swept area. RESULTS: 3 chicom grenades CFA, 4 M-26 grenades CFA, 4 bunkers destroyed and 50 pounds of rice and clothing CFA.
CAP 1-1-2. Received intelligence of 150 VC in area. Element on patrol spotted 2 VC, opened fire, killing 1 and wounding the other. FF's spotted 50-75 VC in treeline, artillery was called and swept area. Found 1 VC KIA, and many blood trails which patrol followed. Patrol received fire from treeline again and assaulted, killing two VC. RESULTS: 3 VC KIA, 5 FF's WIA, 2 VC CIA.

MET 1-1. Force of two Army APC's and 3 Marines as guide left compound in search of mortar position; element received 62mm, APC and small arms fire. APC received minor damage and returned to compound. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA and 2 USMC WIA.

CAP 1-1-3. Personnel were returning to position when LCS stated an NVA soldier was in the area. Personnel checked the area, finding the NVA. Swept area with negative further results. RESULTS: 1 NVA CIA.

CAP 1-3-4. OP spotted VC and opened fire, VC returned fire with M-79 and small arms fire. Patrol swept area. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

CAP 1-3-10. Element received fire fire from estimated 5 VC. Called artillery and swept area. RESULTS: 1 USMC WIA and 1 USMC KIA.

CAP 1-3-2. Element received small arms fire; returned fire. Called illumination and swept area. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

CAP 1-4-2. 3 VC walked up to position, 2 FF's on watch opened fire. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, blasting caps, C-4, fuse and trip wire CIA, ID of one other VC.

CAP 1-3-2. FF's received 60mm, M-79, and small arms fire. Returned fire and called and called artillery. RESULTS: 4 VN civilians WIA, 2 VC KIA.

CAP 1-3-5. Civilians moving from Le Thuy (2) were stopped by VC and asked for rice. Civilians refused then, VC threw 1 grenade at a child resulting in amputation of right foot. RESULTS: 1 VN WIA, 250x50 mm to exploit incident.
CAP 1-3-2. Element fired upon by VC with 60mm and light sniper fire. Returned fire and completely swept area finding blood stained clothing and four M-16 magazines. RESULTS: 4 M-16 magazines.

CAP 1-3-9. Element observed 20-30 VC making numerous crossings of river on raft loaded with supplies; artillery was called. Element moved into area on sweep of impact and found three VC KIA, three cartridge belts and two M-26 grenades. RESULTS: 3 VC KIA, 1 FR KIA, 10 VCS, 3 CARTRIDGE BELTS AND 2 M-26 grenades CIA.

CAP 1-4-3. Room patrol observed two rooms that were occupied by two Vietnamese, FR's and Marines picked up the Vietnamese and took them to their compound. One VC was sent to refugee camp and the other in a commodified VC honcho and is leading element to stored gear. RESULTS: 1 VC POW, and 1 VCS.

CAP 1-4-6. While on patrol received sniper rounds, returned fire with small arms and swept area. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 5 chico grenades CIA.

CAP 1-4-3. While on patrol spotted one VC; opened fire with small arms and swept area. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA, 6 chico grenades, and 1 M-16 mine CIA.

CAP 1-2-1. Patrol on way to ambush site heard noises on side of trail, were checked out area when they received fire. Saw one VC. Male running from hut, opened fire and believed to have hit him. Area was searched. RESULTS: 1 UMG KIA, 2 VCS apprehended, 1 AK-47 CIA.

CAP 1-4-1. Compound spotted approximately 12 VC on rice paddy dike. Marines and FR's opened fire killing 1 VC, area was swept. RESULTS: 1 VC KIA.

CAP 1-2-1. Patrol discovered and searched four bunkers and apprehended two VCS. RESULTS: 2 VCS and 4 bunkers destroyed.

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ENCL (1)
CAP 1-3-6. Civilian found 1 M-26 grenade, with fuse. Grenade blown in place. RESULTS VII rfd.

CAP 1-4-5. While on patrol, encountered two VC, VC ran. FF's and Marines told them to halt. FF's opened fire, the area was swept. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 1 chicom grenade CIA.

CAP 1-4-8. While on patrol, made contact with three VC, opened fire with small arms killing all three VC. One RD stepped on a mine killing him and wounding one USMC. RESULTS: 1 RD KIA, 1 UMC WIA, 3 VC KIA, 13 chicom grenades, 6 M-26 grenades, 55 pounds of rice and 25 pounds of corn.

CAP 1-4-9. While on patrol, Marines and Riot Lops spotted two VC carrying rice and hand grenades; assaulted and killed both VC. RESULTS: 2 VC KIA, 3 M-26 grenades CIA, 1 cartridge belt, 1 canteen and documents CIA.
Supporting Documents-------------1st CAG-----------------------Feb 1969

b. 1st CAG Grp0 10120, "Organizational and Individual Clothing; Maintenance of", 17 Feb 1969
c. 1st CAG Ltr 3000, "Change in Status of CAG 1-2-1", 7 Feb 69
d. 1st CAG Ltr 3000, "Activation of Combined Action Platoons 1-4-2 and 1-4-3", 21 Feb 1969
e. 1st CAG Ltr 3000, "Activation of Combined Action Company 1-4 and Combined Action Platoon 1-4-1", 31 Jan 1969
f. 1st CAG Ltr 3000, "Relocation of CAG 1-1-4; concurrence in", 19 Feb 69
g. 1st CAG Ltr 3000, "Installation of Combined Action Platoons on the Betangan Penninsula", 23 Feb 1969
h. "Tracing" of Vietnam Map Series L 607, Sheet 6640/Sheet 6639, 1/100,000 scale
i. "Tracing" of Vietnam Map Series L 607, Sheet 6739, 1/100,000 scale
j. CG Americal Div, CHL (AUDP-CG 1202), "River Patrol Missions" n/d

List added 24 Jul 69/R
GROUP ORDER 2302.1

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Radio Set AN/PRC-25 Operational Checklist

Encl: (1) Operational Checklist

1. The instructions contained herein are provided for your information and compliance.

2. Purpose. To provide all radio operators with a guide to determine corrective action for a malfunction Radio Set AN/PRC-25.

3. Instructions.

   a. Install a new battery BA-386 in the radio.
   b. Install an antenna (whip or tape) in the connector.
   c. Connect the H-138 or H-189 hand set to the audio connector.
   d. Perform the steps on the enclosed check list in sequence. If other than a normal indication is observed, perform the corrective measure(s) stated.
   e. If higher echelon repair is required:

      (1) Tag the equipment with a description of how the equipment performed
      (2) Turn the equipment in to the 1st CAG Communication Chief with ALL equipment used with the radio when it malfunctioned.

4. Action. Company Commanders will ensure the provisions of the checklist are adhered to.

R. F. ENDERT
By direction

Distribution: A
# RADIO SET AN/PRC-25 OPERATIONAL CHECKLIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Normal Indications</th>
<th>Corrective Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Set VOLUME control at 5.</td>
<td>Channel dial lights</td>
<td>Check to see that the cover for the POWER connector is in place. Replace BA-386/PRC-25.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Set and hold function switch at LITE.</td>
<td>Rushing noise is heard in handset when no signal is received.</td>
<td>Connect handset to other AUDIO connector. Check handset by substitution. Replace BA-386/PRC-25.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Set Function switch at ON.</td>
<td>Rushing noise is not heard in handset.</td>
<td>Higher echelon repair required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Set function switch at SQUELCH</td>
<td>Signals are heard loud and clear</td>
<td>Check antenna.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Adjust the RT-505/PRC-25 to receive test signals from a nearby set operating in the 35-52 MC range.</td>
<td>Signals are heard loud and clear.</td>
<td>Higher echelon repair required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Adjust the RT-505/PRC-25 to receive signals from a nearby set operating in the 53-75 MC range.</td>
<td>Test signals are heard loud and clear at a nearby set.</td>
<td>Connect handset to other AUDIO connector. Check handset by substitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Adjust the RT-505/PRC-25 to a channel in the 50-52 MC range and transmit a test signal.</td>
<td>Test signals are heard loud and clear at a nearby set.</td>
<td>Higher echelon repair required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Adjust RT-505/PRC-25 to a channel in the 53-75 MC range and transmit a test signal.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** ALL TESTING MUST BE DONE WITH A FRESH BATTERY!
GROUP ORDER 10120

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Organizational and Individual Clothing; maintenance of

1. Purpose. To promulgate information and instructions pertaining to the maintenance of organizational and individual clothing by members of this command.

2. Information

   a. Recoverable items of organizational clothing issued to members of this organization are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Qty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trousers, Lightweight, Tropical</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coat, Lightweight, Tropical,</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rain suit, Rain</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. In addition, personnel of this organization are issued the following items of non-recoverable organizational clothing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Qty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boots, Tropical, Pr</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawers, Green, Pr</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undershirts, Green, Ra</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socks, Cushion Sole, Pr</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   c. Personnel of this organization are required to maintain the above items of organizational clothing at all times. When an item becomes unserviceable through normal usage, it must be turned in to Group Supply for exchange for a serviceable like item.

   d. The items listed in sub-paragraph 2a above may not be taken out of the Republic of Vietnam except for temporary duty where the individual will return to the Republic of Vietnam. When an individual rotates to CONUS, all recoverable items of organizational clothing must be turned in to Group Supply. Any missing items will be purchased by cash sale or checkage. Agreement to reimburse the Government for items lost does not relieve the individual of possible disciplinary action for mis-use, destruction, or failure to safeguard Government property.
c. In addition to maintaining organizational clothing, personnel coming to the Republic of Vietnam are required to bring and maintain certain items of individual clothing, including 3 sets of "Stateside" utility uniforms. As those items become unserviceable, they may be turned in to Group Supply for exchange for like items under the in-kind clothing issue system. Any items of "Stateside" type clothing issued to individuals where no unserviceable item is turned in, will be entered in the individual's service record book.

2. Action. Company Commander and Section Leaders will ensure that personnel under their direction maintain the required items of organizational and individual clothing at all times. They will ensure that personnel under their direction have no more than the required 3 sets of lightweight tropical utility uniforms. Company Commanders and Section Leaders will also ensure that when an individual under their direction leaves his position for an extended period of time, he does not leave behind Government property which is on charge to him. An extended period of time includes R & R and Special Leave. These personnel will put their personal effects and Government property in temporary storage at Group Supply. Personnel rotating will bring their Government property to Group Supply for recovery, renovation and re-issue to other personnel.

3. It is emphasized that unauthorized alterations of organizational and individual clothing is strictly prohibited, and any occurrence of this nature will result in disciplinary action being taken. Unauthorized alterations include cutting off sleeves, "pegging" trousers, shortening brims of rainhats, etc.

R. R. HUNTER

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" & "B"
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, (Attn: ACofS CAP)

Subj: Change in Status of CAP 1-2-1

Ref: (a) Map, Vietnam, Series 17014, Sheets 6740 III, 6739 IV,
Scale: 1/50,000.

Encl: (1) Overlay of CAP 1-2-1.

1. On 7 Feb 1969, CAP 1-2-1 changed status from a compound CAP to a mobile CAP within the same TAOC.

E. R. HUNTER
ENCLOSURE (1)
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: AGoS CAP)

Subj: Activation of Combined Action Platoons 1-4-2 and 1-4-3

Ref: (a) Map Vietnam, Series 17014, Sheet No. 675911, Quang Tin

Encl: (1) Overlay of subject CAP TAOC's

1. As of 23 February 1969, CAPs 1-4-2 and 1-4-3 were activated at the following coordinates: CAP 1-4-2 BS7866, CAP 1-4-3 BS7883 (see reference (a)).

2. Arrangements for logistical and fire support have been made and no serious problems are anticipated with the activations.

E. R. HUNTER

Copy to:
CG, Americal Division (Attn: G-3)
CO, 198th Infantry Bde
CO, 5/46 Infantry BN
Senior Advisor, Quang Ngai Province
Senior Advisor, Son Tin District

DECLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS  
1st Combined Action Group  
III Marine Amphibious Force  
F.J., San Francisco, California 96602

3/13/69  
3000  
31 January 1969

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: ACoS, CAP)

Subj: Activation of Combined Action Company 1-4 and Combined Action Platoon 1-4-1

Ref: (a) ACoS CAP ltr 14/gxp crx 3120/1 of 24 November 1968  
(b) CAP Frag 422

End: (1) Overlay of CAP 1-4-1

1. Reference (a) authorized the activation of Combined Action Platoon 1-4-1. In accordance with reference (b) notification is given that Combined Action Platoon 1-4-1 will be activated on 1 February 1969 and will be located at BS 614604, Kinh Van (4), Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province.

2. Arrangements have been made for a small ceremony to include the District Chief, Village Chief, Commanding Officer of 1st Combined Action Group, Commanding Officer of Combined Action Company 1-4, and the Combined Action Platoon 1-4-1 Commander. This ceremony along with seven days of PayOps, is designed to enhance the placement of the CAP and display to the villagers that the SVN is interested in and is supporting this program.

3. The Popular Forces platoon is already located in the area and is familiar with the area of operation. The CAP will not be located in a fixed site.

4. Arrangements for logistical and fire support have been made and no serious problems are anticipated with the activation.

5. Combined Action Company is hereby established and is located at Son Tinh District Headquarters, BS643784.

E. H. HUNTER

Copy to:  
CG, Amphibious Division (Attn: G-3)  
CG, 198th Infantry Bde  
Senior Advisor, Quang Ngai Province  
Senior Advisor, Binh Son District
From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief, Tam Ky Sub-Sector, Quang Tin Province, Republic of Vietnam

Subj: Relocation of CAP 1-1-4; concurrence in

Ref: (a) Tam Ky Sub-Sector msg KBC 4.032 Ngay II Thang 2 nam 1969 1/16/3/K

1. This command concurs with the relocation of CAP 1-1-4 from Ky Ly Village Area of Operations to Ky Nghia Area of Operation.

2. CAP 1-1-4 began operations within the boundaries of Ky Nghia Area of Operations as defined by enclosure (1) to reference (a), on this date.

E. R. HUNTER

Copy to:
USMC IV DSA Tam Ky
ENCLOSURE (1)
CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: AGofS CAP)

Subj: Installation of Combined Action Platoons on the Batangan Peninsula

Encl: (1) Province Chief, Quang Ngai Sector ltr of 22 February 1969 (w/ translation)

1. The request of the Province Chief of Quang Ngai regarding the installation of five additional CAPs as shown in enclosure (1) is concurred with providing the following conditions exist and are maintained:

   a. That logistical support is available on a daily basis via helicopter, or, that a daily road sweep of Route 521 is conducted from National Route #1 to CAP locations on the Batangan Peninsula.

   b. That FMAF screen and operate to the West of the Batangan Peninsula.

   c. That adequate artillery support is available.

   d. That FMAF reaction capability is available.

2. It is felt the above conditions must be met and continued in order for this command to operate the proposed CAPs.

   E. R. HUNTER

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
APO, 12 Feb 1969
Col: Tom-Tat- lon
Province Chief and Zone Chief
Quang Ngai Area Zone

CPT DMUH/B/1/43
Republic of Vietnam
Republic of VN Army
I Corps
12 Tactical Zone
Quang Ngai Area Zone
No. 4020/TK/QNG/B5

To:
Lt. General I Corps Commanding Officer
1st Tactical Zone Commanding Officer
(BIT/23)

APO 4.10x

SUBJECT: Would like to ask for 3 CAP Team for control with rebuild and condition Batangan Plan.

REPORT: Report No. 309/TK/QNG/5 9 Nov 1969
Rebuild and Condition Batangan Plan
3 Feb 1969 by Quang Ngai Area Zone HQ

To:
Lt. General

According to lst report of Quang Ngai Province we would like to ask you. Assign to this province five CAPs for "SPECIAL ATTACK CONDITIONS". At the present now we had four CAPs (two had central at Binh Son (D), one CAP at Son Tinh District, and one CAP at Ho Duc (D)).

According to 2nd report Quang Ngai Province, we would like to ask five CAPs for Rebuild and Condition Batangan Plan for (Binh Duc Village, Son Hoi Village, Son My Village) by the planning, five CAPs we had will combine with five PF Platoons and five RD Cadre terms for control with five BT.

1. BT790246
2. BT756825
3. BT766332
4. BT774857
5. BT734794

According to us plan, we would like to move two CAPs at Son Tinh (D) and Ho Duc (D) by lst report we had before, for assign to Batangan Plan. We will need three more CAPs.

General, we would like as soon as will contact with III MAF assign to Quang Ngai Province three more for Rebuild and Condition Plan better.

ENCLOSURE (1)
MAP, VIETNAM
Series L607
Sheet No 6739
Scale: 1/100,000
FROM: CG, AMERICAL DIV, GHL
TO: CO, 199TH INF BDE, LZ BOYOMED
CO, 23D INF Co, GHL (COURIER)
INFO: CO, 1ST CAG, GHL (COURIER)

CONFIDENTIAL AVIF-G 1202

SUBJECT: River Patrol Missions (U)

REF: A. Ltr, Msg 190th Inf Bde, dtd 26 Dec 69, subj, Keystone and
River Patrol Missions After ROAD Reorganization (C)

B. DF, PH, dtd 12 Jan 69, subj same as REF A above (C)

C. Liaison, 1st CAG and 198th Inf Bde

D. Taiseon, Amol Div G3 and S3 1st CAG, 25 Jan 69

1. (C) 198th Inf Bde is relieved of responsibility for the River
Patrol North and South mission effective 010700H Feb 69.

3. (C) 198th Inf Bde will provide combat support and combat service
support of lct CAG CQ teams as required to support 1st CAG in con-
duct of River Patrol North and South mission.

4. (C) 198th Inf Bde will provide the following equipment to 1st CAG
in the manner indicated:

   a. Temporarily hand receipt eight (8) each, boat, Boston Whaler

   b. Lateral transfer the following items using the receipted
lateral transfer document as a turn-in voucher to subtract these
items from property records:

      (1) Eight (8) each, 40 HP outboard engines

      (2) Six (6) each, Radio, AN/PRC-25 complete

      (3) Four (4) each, machine gun, M60

      (4) Sixteen (16) each, life preserver
(5) Three (3) each, fuel pods

c. Transfer on site current stocks of .62mm link and .50mm ball ammunition to 1st CAG. 198th Inf Bde retains resupply responsibility for Class V support of 1st CAG CTR teams for the conduct of River Patrol North and South operations.

CP4